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ABSTRACT
This study examines the activities of the Army 
in the South from 1789 to 1835. The United States Army 
began to move into the South in the mid-1790's to occupy 
the posts being abandoned by the Spanish according to the 
provisions of Pinckney's Treaty. From that time until the 
outbreak of the Second Seminole War in December of 1835» 
the members of the Army helped to settle the southern 
frontier. The term "South" as it is used in this study 
refers to the area contained in the present-day states of 
North and South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, 
Mississippi* and Louisiana. Within these seven states 
the Army performed similar functions and encountered the 
same problems.
The officers and men of the Army performed numerous 
important duties as well as countless trivial tasks. Their 
principal duties were to protect America's borders and 
settlers from attacks by foreign invaders and hostile 
Indians. When not actively engaged in these operations, 
the soldiers performed numerous jobs that contributed to 
the settlement of the frontier. The soldiers built roads,
vi
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mapped the country, enforced laws and attempted to bring 
a semblance of order and authority to the frontier.
Special consideration is given to two factors that 
complicated the duties of the Army in the South, the climate 
and the existence of the institution of slavery. The 
soldiers were plagued by health problems that were directly 
attributable to the South's weather. Virtually every facet 
of the men's existence was influenced by the climate. In 
addition, southern whites assumed that the troops were 
available to maintain order among their slaves if the 
occasion arose. This assumption influenced the disposition 
and duties assigned to the soldiers stationed in the South 
and required their presence long after the frontier had 
passed to the Trans-Mississippi West.
Much of the research material used in this study 
came from War Department records deposited in the National 
Archives. In addition, numerous printed government 
documents and personal papers, dealing with military and 
diplomatic events, were utilized. Also of value were the 
printed volumes collected by the Secretary of War prior to 
1850, which are housed in the Rare Bcokroom of the U. S. 
Military History Research Collection at Carlisle Barracks, 
Pennsylvania.
vii
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INTRODUCTION
Frederick Jackson Turner's seminal paper, "The 
Significance of the Frontier in American History", pre­
sented in 1893, described the westward movement of the 
frontier: "Stand at Cumberland Gap and watch the pro­
cession of civilization, marching single file - the 
buffalo following the trail to the salt springs, the 
Indian, the fur trader and hunter, the cattle-raiser, 
the pioneer farmer - and the frontier has passed by."1 
According to Turner, this process was repeated again and 
again as the frontier line moved across the continent. He 
gave some credit to the Army for its contributions to the
westward movement in his study, but the absence of the
2soldier from his procession was a striking omission.
Since Turner's address, historians have studied 
the history of the nation's frontier relentlessly. The
Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of 
the Frontier in American History," in The Frontier in 
American History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
T O 57J7 T 2:------
p Ibid., 16-17. William H. Goetzmann, Army Ex­
ploration in the American West, 1803-1863 (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1965). Goetzmann argues that 
the members of the United States Army's Topographical 
Engineer should be included in Turner's procession.
1
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2
activities of the numerous groups that helped to tame 
the wilderness have been minutely examined and recorded. 
The part played by the Army has not been neglected by 
historians, except for its activities on the southern 
frontier. The most logical explanation for this neglect 
is that the planter class and the institution of slavery 
have so fascinated historians that they have slighted 
other topics in the South's history.
The purpose of this study is to examine the 
activities of the Army in the southern section of the 
nation from 1739 to 1835. There is a definite lack of 
information concerning the role of the Army in the South 
during much of this period. The major episodes in­
volving the Army in the South - the War of 1812, the 
Indian wars, Jackson's Indian Campaigns, and the Indian 
removals - have been amply recorded, but other events 
in the history of the Army in this area have been virtu­
ally neglected.
The term "South" as it is used in this study 
refers to the geographic area encompassed by the present 
states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, 
Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. An examination of 
the duties assigned to the officers and men of the United 
States Army stationed in this area reveals that they per­
formed similar functions and encountered the same basic 
problems.
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These seven states presented certain common 
characteristics that influenced the duties assigned to 
the Army. First, each had an exposed coastline with 
rivers which allowed easy access to the interior.
Second, all seven possessed a large area of unsettled 
lands with a distinguishable frontier line. Third, a 
potentially hostile Indian population lived within the 
states or on their borders. Fourth, the number of 
slave3 living in the states were large enough to worry 
the whites. Finally, the region’s peculiar climate 
presented the soldiers with a serious health problem.
The exposed coastline with its commercially 
important harbors and large navigable rivers leading 
into the interior of the nation prompted first the states 
and then the Federal government to provide a system of 
defense. The War Department decided that a system of 
permanent fortifications, garrisoned by regular troops, 
was the beat method of protecting the coast. The soldiers 
were assigned not only the task of guarding the maritime 
frontier, but also of enforcing the Federal revenue laws, 
and aiding state and local officials in the enforcement 
of laws when called upon to do so. Thus, the soldiers 
represented not only Federal power and authority but 
they also bolster the state and local authorities when 
the need p t o s q.
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In the southern region the primary duty of the 
Army, as in the rest of the nation, was to guard the 
frontier. This task was complicated by the fact that 
the southern frontier often coincided with an ill- 
defined and disputed international boundary. Until the 
United States gained control of the provinces of Bast 
and West Florida and the western boundary of the Louisiana 
Purchase was definitely fixed, the officers and men of 
the Army were plagued with diplomatic as well as military 
problems. The most obvious indication of the importance 
of its role is that the Federal government deemed it 
appropriate to station approximately one-half of the 
nation*s military force in the South.
The southern Indians represented the most per­
sistent problem faced by the Army. The Indian tribes 
were considered to be foreign nations by the United 
States government, but the Secretary of War was res­
ponsible for Indian affairs. Thus the Army bore much of 
the responsibility for maintaining friendly relations with 
the tribes. Army officers worked with Indian agents to 
negotiate a number of treaties with the various tribes. 
After the treaties were negotiated and ratified, the 
Army wa3 responsible for seeing that they were observed 
by both sides. In many instances, the enforcement of 
the treaties placed the Army in the delicate position of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
opposing the wishes of the white population and support­
ing the rights of the Indians* The Indian problem in the 
southern states would eventually end when the Indians 
were removed during the 1830's.
The presence of a large slave population brought 
persistent requests from southerners for the maintenance 
of permenent garrisons throughout the South. Their pleas 
were usually made privately and in carefully guarded terms. 
Southerners feared slave insurrections, but they did not 
want the existence of those fears widely known. The War 
Department issued standing orders to commanders in the 
southern states to render aid to the local officials, in 
the event of an insurrection, if it was requested.
Finally, the Army faced a number of serious 
health problems which were unlike those faced in other 
sections of the nation. The South*s climate directly 
influenced the duties of the soldiers and in many in­
stances took their lives. The annual sickly season in 
the South spared no class of individuals, but the.members 
of the Army appear to have been one of the groups most 
seriously effected. Throughout the periou under study, 
various plans were suggested and tried in an effort to 
reduce the number of sick at the military posts in the 
South.
Many of the functions performed by the Army in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the South were similar to those rendered by soldiers in 
other sections of the nation. The most significant 
differences were caused by the South's "peculiar in­
stitution" and its "peculiar climate." Despite the 
fact that the routine duties of the Army in the South 
were similar to those performed in other areas does not 
preclude their being studied. As on other frontiers, 
the presence of the Army was extremely important in the 
development of the South.^
The officers and men of the Army, during quiet 
periods, performed valuable functions such as mapping the 
new territories, building roads, erecting forts, and en­
forcing treaty obligations with foreign nations and Indian 
tribes. In addition they executed numerous trivial tasks 
as a matter of routine. When viewed singly, the countless 
jobs performed by the soldiers do not appear to have any 
particular significance. But when taken collectively, the 
varied services performed by the Army were a significant 
contribution to the settlement of the southern frontier
^The list of works dealing with the activities 
of the Army on the frontier is almost inexhaustable. 
Unfortunately the vast majority of these studies deal 
solely with the Indian campaigns and neglect the other 
services performed by the Army. Two exceptions to this 
general rule are by Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of 
the Republic: The United States Army on ihe frontier,
T7g3=riggTirew Tork:" fSe S E c H H l H T o T T  19597153---
Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States
Army in ihe Development of~the flortkwest, IB15-1860 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 19^7).
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as they were on other frontiers.
The Army, with its centralized organization and 
the authority of the Federal government behind its 
actions, was able to perform functions beyond the means 
of the individual settler and his neighbors. In many 
instances, the Army was the only symbol of the Federal 
government, or the authority of any kind, on the frontier. 
The Army’s presence and its contributions are important to 
the settlement of the South and it deserves more than 
merely passing interest from frontier and military 
historians.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER I
THE ARMY MOVES SOUTH
The history of a nation* s army normally recounts 
the events of the battles and campaigns, with some con­
sideration given to its organization and administration, 
in which the force was involved. These studies are 
valuable in determining why certain battles or specific 
wars are won or lost, but they reveal little about the 
activities of a particular force when it is not actively 
engaged in fighting a war. In the period from 1789 to 
1835, the soldiers of the Regular Army of the United 
States participated in ninety-one battles and actions. 
Seventy-twj of these actions occurred during the War of 
1812, the remaining nineteen battles and skirmishes took 
place during the forty-one years when the nation was not 
formally at war.1 Although some of the engagements lasted 
for several days or a few weeks, there were long periods 
when the soldiers had sufficient time to engage in
1Prancis B. Heitman, Historical Register and 
Dictionary of the United States Army (Urbana: University
of IllinoisTress, 1965), il, 391 -94". Hereinafter cited 
as Heitman.
8
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activities, other than fighting, that were directly related 
to the welfare of the nation.
To avoid any appearance of idleness on the part 
of the troops, the federal government assigned an infinite 
number of duties to the officers and men of the Regular 
Army. The primary emphasis was placed upon the task most 
commonly performed by a standing army, protecting the 
nation against armed aggression. In order to accomplish 
this goal, the Army was responsible for three major areas: 
guarding the nation against foreign invasion; protecting 
the frontier settlements from attacks by hostile Indians; 
and quelling domestic insurrections.
A number of secondary tasks were added to these 
primary duties and became a part of the normal peacetime 
routine5 The soldiers engaged in activities such as: 
building roads, bridges, and military posts; enforcing 
the nation’s revenue laws; upholding treaty obligations; 
conducting surveys of the national boundaries; participating 
in scientific expeditions; enforcing state and local laws; 
and cultivating crops in order to provide food for the 
garrison. Since these duties were not confined to a 
specific section, a soldier transferred from one post to 
another probably did not notice much change in his daily 
life.
In the South from 1789 to 1835 the Army usually 
performed its duties efficiently. The activities were
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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many and varied, often providing services that could not 
have been performed by any other group, but normally they 
received little public notice. Generally the only time 
public attention focused on the activities of the Army 
in the southern states was when Indian troubles flared-up 
or when officers committed acts of questionable legality.
Much of the history of the Army in the South has 
been obscured by the emphasis placed upon a few prominent 
officers. The person who attracted the most attention in 
the period before the War of 1812 was General James 
Y/ilkinson. During and after the war, the nation watched 
the activities of General Andrew Jackson until he resigned 
from the Army in 1821. Prom that time until the outbreak 
of the Second Seminole War in 1835, the regulars were 
involved in only two activities that prompted much comment, 
Indian removal and the nullification crisis.
General James Wilkinson's career is an inextricable 
part of the history of the Army in the South. His rep­
utation was clouded by a number of qxiestions that remain 
unanswered to this day. From the Conway Cabal during the 
American Revolution to the Burr Conspiracy, Wilkinson was 
involved in one controversy after another. His name was 
associated with conspiracies, intrigues and treason. His 
actions were reviewed by military courts of inquiry, con­
gressional investigating committees and civil courts. In 
spite of all of the charges and countercharges, the General
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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always maintained his position and occasionally managed 
to improve his situation.
General Wilkinson resigned his position as Clothier
General of the Continental Army in 1781, and turned his
attention to a variety of commercial ventures. In 1783
he moved his family to Kentucky and quickly established
himself as one of the most influential men in the rapidly
growing territory. During this period Wilkinson became
involved in a series of negotiations with the Spanish
officials at New Orleans. Wilkinson initiated the
correspondence in 1786 in an effort to obtain permission
to use the port of New Orleans as an outlet for the products
2of the Mississippi Valley.
Through a series of letters and a personal visit 
to New Orleans in 1787 he received the privilege of selling 
his goods at the Spanish port. In exchange for this priv­
ilege, he not only declared his allegiance to the Spanish 
Crown on August 22, but stated that he would work to detach 
the disaffected western territories from the United States 
and ally them with Spain. ̂
2James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson 
(Washington, 1811), II, 10^-11, 115^137 Hereinafter 
cited as Memoirs.
^William R. Shepherd, "Wilkinson and the Beginnings 
of the Spanish Conspiracy,” American Historical Review, 12 
(Oct. - July, 1903-1904), 490-506. Gives the English 
translation of Wilkinson's oath and the basic parts of 
the text of his memorials to the Spanish Governor Stephen 
Miro and the Intendant Martin Navaro. A harsher translation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Wilkinson was not the only American suspected of 
planning to separate the western regions, specifically 
Kentucky and Tennessee, from the United States. At 
different times a number of prominent frontiersmen were 
either actually engaged or were accused of involvement 
by their political opponents in separatist activities.
Before 1800 the names of such men as William Blount, John 
Sevier, Judge Harry Innes and Aaron Burr were mentioned 
as participants in different conspiracies. The fact that 
some of the leading citizens were negotiating with Spanish 
officials seems to have been well-known among the people of 
the western territories. Although the men dealing with 
Spain were charged with treason by their political opponents, 
their intrigues apparently did not affect their later
Acareers. Whether Wilkinson intended to actively work for
of Wilkinson's Memorial is contained in Temple Bodley, 
"Introduction*' to Reprints of Littell' s Political Trans­
actions in and concerning Kentucky, anoT letters "of 
George Nicholas to bis Friend in Virginia, also General 
Wilkinson's Memorial. Pilson <3Tub Publications, No. 3^. 
Louisville, 1926, cxix-cxxvii. Wilkinson's oath is given 
on cxxxvii-cxxxix.
4Wilkinson's friend and lawyer, Harry Innes, was 
made a Federal Judge; his friend John Brown was elected 
to the United States Senate;, his business partner Peyton 
Short accepted a federal appointment as did his friends 
Judge Muter, Samuel McDowell and James Brown. Thomas R. 
Hay and M. R. Werner, The Admirable Trumpeter: A
Biography of General James‘"Wilkinson (Garden City: 
Doubleday, Doran anST dompany, 1941), 107-108. William 
Blount was expelled from the United States Senate, but 
was elected speaker of that body while impeachment pro­
ceedings were being carried forward in the U. S. Senate. 
William H. Masterson, William Blount (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1954), 339. Aaron
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the separation of Kentucky is impossible to determine.
It is probable that he viewed his agreement only as a 
means of gaining concessions from the Spanish that would 
advance his own commercial interests.
For the next four years Wilkinson tried to make 
his various business ventures pay dividends. Despite hard 
work, constant maneuvering, and foreign arrangements, he 
found himself falling further and further into debt. By 
1791 Wilkinson was probably thinking of returning to 
military life, because in that year he took part in two 
punitive expeditions against the Indians north of the 
Ohio River.
The Indian tribes living in the Old Northwest 
presented the new Federal government with one of its most 
pressing problems. The attention of the Army was focused
Burr was elected to the office of Vice President after it 
was rumored that he was involved with Blount. For an 
interesting discussion of early Kentucky politics see 
Patricia Watlington, The Partisan Spirit: Kentucky
Politics. 1779-1792 (New ^ork: 3£theneum, 1972).
5Hay and Werner in Admirable Trumpeter assessed 
Wilkinson’s activities with Spain in the following way. 
"In his desire for personal gain Wilkinson had started 
the Spanish Conspiracy in American History. In fact, 
he was the Spanish conspiracy: while he was active the 
conspiracy was very much to the fore, and when he was 
biding his time or engaged elsewhere the conspiracy 
languished. At intervals in the years that followed, 
the Spanish conspiracy had greater or less vitality 
and importance as Wilkinson’s personal necessities were 
greater or less. The ambitions and desires of his 
competitors and opponents were also a factor in keeping 
the "conspiracy alive." 88.
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on this area after peace was obtained with the Indians of 
the Southwest by a treaty signed August 7, 1790.^ In an 
effort to subdue the Indians north of the Ohio, a force 
tinder the command of General Josiah Harmar marched against 
the Indians in October of 1790. Harmar was defeated by 
the Indians and withdrew from the Indian country to await 
new orders.
Following Harmar's defeat, two small expeditions
consisting of volunteers from Kentucky crossed the Ohio
in an effort to check the Indian outrages. In mid-May
of 1791 a force commanded by Brigadier General Charles
Scott, with James Wilkinson as second in command, crossed
the Ohio River in search of the hostile Indians. The
Kentuckians destroyed crops and villages and returned
home with a few captives at the end of June. The second
Kentucky expedition, commanded by Wilkinson, marched against
the Indians on August 1, 1791, and remained in the field
for twenty days. The expedition burned a village and seme
crops and captured some Indians, without producing a full- 
7scale battle.’ narmar’s expedition was a total failure
gJames Ripley Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. £3. 
Army. 1783-1812 (Princeton: Princeton University Press,19475, 4V. Hereinafter cited as Jacobs, U. Army.
7The details of Harmar's expedition are in Jacobs,
U. S. Army. 40-65. The two minor expeditions are recounted 
Tn Tames Ripley Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, Ma.ior-General 
James Wilkinson (New York: The Macmiii'an Company, 1938),
112-13~ hereinafter cited as Jacobs, Warrior.
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whereas the two smaller expeditions were considered com­
pletely successful.
On October 22, 1791, President Washington appointed 
Wilkinson to fill a vacancy in the rank of Lieutenant 
Colonel in the United States Army. The appointment was 
readily accepted by Wilkinson, who probably saw it as an 
opportunity to save his failing business career. He wrote 
to a friend that he accepted the position because of his
Qgreat need for "Bread and Fame."
In an effort to explain the appointment of a man 
with Wilkinson's reputation for participating in question­
able ventures, Washington told Alexander Hamilton that the 
action was one of expediency. The President believed that 
if Wilkinson held a responsible position it would "feed
his ambition, soothe his vanity and by arresting discontent
oproduce a good effect."
Wilkinson was suspicious of the motives behind 
the appointment and felt that it might be an attempt to 
end his correspondence with the Spanish at New Orleans.10 
It is inconceivable that Washington did not know that 
Wilkinson had been treating with the Spanish as it was
^Wilkinson to Peyton Short, Dec. 28, 1791 (not 
sent), Innes Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress, XXIII.
qQuoted in Hay and Werner, Admirable Trumpeter. 109.
10Wilkinson to Carondelet, Dec. 15, 1792, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
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common knowledge in Kentucky. The President probably saw 
the appointment as an opportunity to turn the dealings to 
the advantage of the United States rather than a way to 
terminate the connection. Certainly the thought of a dis­
contented officer in the Army was a brighter prospect 
than a discontented James Wilkinson operating on his own 
without the control of any higher authority.^ ̂
Wilkinson accepted the commission on November 5,
1791, and promptly took the oath of allegiance required 
of all officers:
I do solemnly swear to bear 
true allegiance to the United States 
of America, and to serve them honestly 
and faithfully, against all their 
enemies or opposers whosoever, and 
to observe and obey the orders of 
the President of the United States 
of America, and the orders of the 
officers appointed over me, according 
to the articles of w a r .  ”*2
Thus James Wilkinson, possibly a subject and definitely
a pensioner of Spain, returned to the Army after an absence
of ten years.
11The same fear prevailed in 1802 when Wilkinson 
attempted to obtain the position of Surveyor-General. He 
requested the support of the Secretary of War, who wrote 
on the letter "Such a situation would enable him to 
associate with Spanish agents without suspicion.” Wilkinson 
to Dearborn, May 30, 1802, quoted in Jacobs, Tarnished 
Warrior, 199-
12J. PCallon, The Military Laws of the United 
State3 (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 1863), 897”
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Fortunately for the new lieutenant Colonel's career,
his appointment came late enough that he was not associated
with the disaster that "befell the second expedition the
Federal government dispatched to quiet the Indians in the
Old Northwest. In October, 1791, General Arthur St. Clair
marched against the Indians with a large force composed of
regulars and militia. The force was soundly defeated the
next month and the survivors were driven back into Kentucky. ̂ ̂
The two major military operations undertaken by the Federal
government had suffered humiliating defeats and the two
small expeditions composed of Kentucky volunteers had been
successful. All four of the expeditions had served Lieutenant
Colonel James Wilkinson well.
On January 1, 1792, General Harmar resigned his
commission, even though a military court of inquiry had
cleared him of any misconduct in the direction of his 
14expedition. On March 5, 1792, James Wilkinson was 
appointed to fill the vacancy created by Harmar's res­
ignation and General St. Clair resigned his commission as
15a result of his defeat by the Indians. Thus in the span 
of two days Wilkinson advanced from Lieutenant Colonel to
1^Jacobs, U. S. Army, 85-123.
1^Heitman, I, 501.
1 *5Heitman, I, 1037, 917; Hay and Werner, Admirable 
Trumpeter, 113.
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the position of acting commanding general of the United 
States Army.
When Congress was informed of St. Clair's defeat?
it took steps to provide a larger military force to
adequately protect the frontier. The existing regiment
of artillery and the two infantry regiments were to he
brought up to their authorized strengths. In addition,
three new infantry regiments were to be recruited for three
years service, to be discharged at an earlier date if peace
was concluded with the Indians. Also four troops of light
dragoons were to be recruited and if the situation required
16they might serve dismounted.
To command the enlarged Army, President Washington
reviewed the qualifications of all of the Revolutionary
War ranking officers who were still alive. He drew up a
roster of officers with his comments on each man's abilities
17and shortcomings.
1^Callan, The Military Laws of the United States,
92-93. '
17The list included the names of Major General 
Benjamin Lincoln, Major General Frederick Baron De Steuben, 
Major General William Moultrie, Brigadier (but by Brevet 
Major) General Lachlan McIntosh, Major General (by Brevet 
Anthony Wayne, Major General (by Brevet) George Weedon,
Major General (by Brevet) Edward Hand, Major General (by 
Brevet) Charles Scott, Major General (by Brevet) Jedediah 
Huntington, Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Brigadier 
General Mordecai Gist, Brigadier General James Irvine,
Brigadier General Daniel Morgan, Brigadier General Otho 
Williams, Brigadier General Rufus Putnam, Brigadier General 
Charles Pinckney. Washington added that "The above and 
foregoing closes the list of All the General officers who 
as has been observed from age - want of health - disinclination,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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On March 9 he submitted the list to his cabinet 
for their consideration. Included were the names of an 
impressive array of officers, but most of them were either 
too old, did not desire the appointment, or were too in­
experienced for such an important command. The President 
probably preferred Light Horse Harry Lee for the command, 
but his name did not appear on the list. The selection 
of Lee was ruled out for two reasons: (1) he had not held
a high rank during the Revolution; and (2) he was from
Virginia, which already had its share of high-ranking Federal 
18office holders. The one officer who seemed to meet most
of the requirements was Anthony Wayne.
President Washington’s opinion of Wayne was not
altogether flattering:
. . . more active and enterprising 
than Judicious and cautious. No 
economist it is feared: - open to
flattery - vain - easily imposed 
upon the liable to be drawn into 
scrapes. Too indulgent (the effect 
perhaps of some of the causes just 
mentioned) of his officers and men.
- whether sober - or little addicted 
to the bottle, I know not.19
or peculiar circumstances, can be brought into view; from 
whom to chuse [sic] an officer to command the troops of the 
U. S." Comments on Officers to succeed A. St. Clair, sub­
mitted to Cabinet March 9, 1792, in Worthington C. Ford (ed.), 
The Writings of George Washington (New York: G. P. Putnam’s,
TS91), XIl75SS-14.
18Harry E. Wildes, Anthony Wayne. Trouble Shooter 
of the American Revolution (New York: Harcourt. Brace
S a r S o . r T O I T T  '3 4 H = W .—
19-'"Comments on Officers to succeed A. St. Clair, 
submitted to Cabinet, Mar. 9, 1792", Ford (ed.), The 
Writings of George Washington. XII, 507-508.
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The President's comments on the interim commander of the 
western army, James Wilkinson, were similar, ". . . as he 
was hut a short time in service, little can be said of 
his duties as an officer. - He is lively, sensible, pompus
a
and ambitious, but whether sober or not is unknown to me."“u 
The President could not afford to make a bad 
appointment. The two costly defeats in the Northwest had 
been a severe blow to the prestige of the new government 
and it was essential that it not suffer another. Wayne had 
his shortcomings, but they could be overcome: the Secretary
of War and the secretary of the Treasury could control any 
reckless spending; and any movement without adequate pre­
parations could be stopped until proper precautions had 
been taken. Despite his faults, Wayne had one invaluable
asset which none of the other officers possessed. He had
21"a dominating desire to meet and annihilate the enemy."
Wayne received the appointment on March 5, 1792.
He remained in Philadelphia for several months arranging 
for supplies, enlisting men, and gathering information on 
the Northwest. The General was not a3 impetuous as 
President Washington had feared, and it was only after 
months of rigorous training that he moved with his force 
against the Indians.
2QIbid., 511.
21 Jacobs, U. S. Army, 127.
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The expanded army was called the Legion and when 
General "Mad" Anthony Wayne brought it west to fight, it 
was a different type of force than those that had pre­
viously advanced against the Indians. It was not the 
poorly disciplined collection of regulars and volunteers 
that Generals Harmar and St. Clair had led against the 
Indians. The volunteers were still present, but the men 
of the Legion formed a solid core of well-trained soldiers.
While Wayne gathered supplies at Philadelphia and 
forged an army from the motley band of recruits at Legion- 
ville, Wilkinson remained in command of the regular forces 
on the frontier. As he waited for the new commander to 
arrive, Wilkinson supervised the daily routine of the Army 
and kept a watchful eye on the Indians. His actions 
attracted the attention of President Washington who requested 
Secretary of War Henry Knox to convey his approval to the 
General. Washington wrote: "General Wilkinson has dis­
played great zeal and ability for the public weal since he 
came into the service. His conduct carries strong marks of
attention, activity, and spirit, and I wish him to know the
22favorable light in which it is viewed."
While managing the routine business of the Army, 
Wilkinson found ample time to exercise his talents for 
intrigue. He dispatched a spy into the territory occupied
22Washington to Knox, Aug. 13, 1792, in Ford (ed.), 
The Writings of George Washington. XII, 158.
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"by the hostile Indians and he reopened his correspondence 
with the Spanish officials at New Orleans. Both of these 
ventures seriously strained the relations between Wilkinson 
and Wayne.
General Wilkinson ordered Reuben Reynolds, a
soldier disguised as a deserter, into the Indian country
to gather information about their movements and intentions.
Reynolds emerged from the wilderness and proceeded to
Pittsburgh to report his findings to General Wayne. The
commanding general considered the report to be virtually
worthless and indicated that the venture had been a waste
of time and effort. Wilkinson was angered and humiliated
by the treatment his agent received from General Wayne. Any
possibility that the differences between the two officers
might be reconciled was lost as Wayne's suspicions that
Wilkinson had resumed his correspondence with the Spanish
23government grew.
The commanding general was correct, Wilkinson had 
revived the correspondence and was playing his new situation 
for all it was worth. In December of 1791 he wrote to 
Governor Miro hinting of things to come: "My private
interests, the Duty which I owe to the country I live in 
and the aggrandizement of my family have determined me to 
accept the appointment, and it is most probable, as soon
^■^Marion Morse Davis, "Three Island," Michigan 
History Magazine. XII (July, 1928), 513-53.
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as St. Clair is known of that I shall be promoted the Chief 
24-command. "
A year later he wrote Governor General the Baron 
de Carondelet urging him to take advantage of the oppor­
tunities offered by his new position. He referred to an
"incompetent Secretary of War . • . and ignorant commander
25in chief . . .  a contemtible union."
The Spanish Crown rewarded Wilkinson for his efforts
on their behalf. In 1792 he received $2,600 from New Orleans
26as a part of his pension from Spain. In 1794 the Spanish
governor sent an additional $12,000 to Wilkinson, $4,000
was a part of hi3 pension. The remaining $8,000 was to be
used to defray the expenses incurred in Wilkinson’s efforts
to breakup an expedition against Spanish territory. This
expedition, sponsored by the French, was purported to be
27led by George Rogers Clark. Rumors of these dealings 
spread through the western territories and aroused the 
suspicions and distrust of General Wayne. The commanding 
general kept a constant watch on the activities of his 
subordinate.
^Wilkinson to Miro, Dec. 4, 1791, A. G. I.,
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2374.
25Wilkinson to Carondelet, Dec. 15, 1792, Ibid.
26Statement of Wilkinson account (undated), Ibid.
27Carondelet to Wilkinson, Aug. 6, 1794, Archivo 
Historico Nacional, Madrid, Estado, leg. 3898.
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On August 20, 1794» the Legion broke the strength 
of the Indians at the Battle of Fallen Timbers. However, 
it was not until August 3» 1795 that the chiefs of the 
defeated tribes gathered at Greenville and signed the 
Treaty of Greenville. The treaty brought peace to the
settlements of the Old Northwest and freed the members
28of the Army for duties elsewhere.
For the next year the Army performed the routine
duties of a garrison force and occupied the posts that
the British evacuated according to the provisions of the
recently concluded Jay's Treaty. In the Southwest the
Indians were restless and there was growing concern in the
state of Georgia for the safety of its frontier settlements.
The actions of the Spanish continued to worry the Federal
29government, despite the signing of Pinckney’s Treaty.
Throughout this period the commanding general and 
hi3 second in command labored to discredit each other. 
General Wayne hoped to obtain positive proof that Wilkinson 
was actually working for the Spanish and was unfit to hold 
his high rank in the Army. Wilkinson tried to prove that
^Jacobs, U. S, Army, 153-81.
29The text of Pinckney's Treaty is in Hunter Miller 
(ed.), Treaty and Other International Acts of the United 
States of America (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1931), IT ,  318-45. The treaty was signed on Oct. 27, 1795 
and proclaimed on Aug. 2, 1796. Samuel Flagg Bemis, 
Pinckney*3 Treaty. A Study of America's Advantage From 
Europe * sDistress (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press,
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Wayne’s military ability was greatly overestimated and 
therefore he should not be the commanding general= Both 
officers traveled to Philadelphia to argue their cases 
before the administration. Wilkinson informed Baron 
Carondelet that he was going to the capital in 1796 "to 
keep down the military establishment, to disgrace my 
commander and secure myself the command of the Army."^
General Wayne was making his second journey to the 
capital to counter the actions of Wilkinson, when he died 
on December 15» 1796.^1 His death left General Wilkinson 
in command of the Army and his appointment as commanding 
general was approved by President John Adams when he took 
office in March of 1797.^
Wilkinson was in Philadelphia when General Wayne 
died and he remained in the capital until the new admin­
istration took office in 1797. It can be assumed that he 
devoted his time to gathering support and trying to quiet 
the storm that had been raised by his fight with General 
Wayne. It appears that he was successful in convincing the 
new President that the rumors were politically motivated.
^Wilkinson to Carondelet, Sept. 22, 1796, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
■jiHarry E. Wildes, Anthony Wayne, 458-62.
^^Richard H. Kohn, "General Wilkinson’s Vendetta 
with General Wayne: Politics and Command in the American
Army, 1791-1796," The Pilson Club History Quarterly,
XXXXV (Oct., 1971)7^67^7?: -------
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President Adams, no stranger to political rumors and personal 
abuse, was aware of the stories that were circulating con­
cerning Wilkinson’s dealings with Spain. He assured the 
General that he would have the opportunity to defend himself 
against the charges if it became necessary. Adams confided 
to Wilkinson that "nobody escaped accusation" in public 
life.33
Assured of the President's support, Wilkinson 
left the capital shortly after the inauguration. He re­
turned to the frontier and assumed the responsibility for 
distributing the troops to provide for the defense of the 
frontier settlements. The Army that Wilkinson commanded 
was no longer organized as the legion. Congress passed a 
law abolishing that organization on May 30 and it became 
effective on October 31, 1796. According to the provisions 
of the act, the Army was to consist of four regiments of
Infantry, two companies of light dragoons and the corps of
34artillerists and engineers. The attention of the commanding 
general and the activities of the Army would be concentrated 
on an area with which Wilkinson was very familiar, the 
Southwest frontier.
Wilkinson's dealings with the Spanish not only
33Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, 154-56.
4̂J Callan, The Military Laws of the United States,
114-17.
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kept him informed about the affairs of the southern 
frontier but paid him handsome dividends. Since 1790 
the Spanish officials at New Orleans had sent at least 
$32,000 up the Mississippi River to pay for the services 
rendered by Wilkinson. Of this sum the general had per-
•5*5sonally received at least $26,000. ' By 1796, however,
payments were more difficult to obtain, although Wilkinson
would try to use every boundary dispute, possible foreign
alliance, and in one final effort, the Burr Conspiracy, to
extract more gold and silver from the Spanish officials.
The General apparently wanted his dealings with
Spain to lie idle for awhile after he became commanding
general. At this time he turned down an extremely attractive
offer from the Spanish, a large land grant in the Illinois
Country and an annual bounty of $4,000.^ The General
advised the Spanish officials to fulfill their obligations
under Pinckney’s Treaty and to terminate their correspondence
with him for the present. However, he hinted that he might
become the governor of Natchez, and this would afford ample
17opportunity for making new plans.J
Wilkinson’s reference to Spain’s obligations under 
Pinckney’s Treaty concerned the running of a new boundary
15Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 158.
^Carondelet to Wilkinson, Apr. 20, 1797, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
17■"Power to Gayoso, Dec. 5, 1797, American State 
Papers, Miscellaneous, II, 107-109.
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line between the United States and Spanish Florida. On 
September 16, 1796, Andrew Ellicott, the American boundary 
commissioner, started fo Natchez to begin surveying the 
boundary. Ellicott was a surveyor with an impressive record. 
He had surveyed the Ian; ceded by Maryland and Virginia to 
form the nation's capital and was subsequently selected to 
survey the boundary line between the United States and the 
Spanish Floridas according to the terms of Pinckney's 
Treaty. He secured a military escort at Pittsburgh to 
accompany him to his ultimate destination below Natchez.^ 
The party's first indication that things might not proceed 
smoothly occurred when they arrived at Chickasaw Bluffs.
The commandant of the Spanish post was not expecting the 
party and appeared to be embarrassed by their arrival at 
his station.
Immediately Ellicott's suspicions were aroused.
He reported to his superiors: "First, the commandant and
officers appeared, (or affected,), to be almost wholly 
■unacquainted with the late treaty between the United States 
and his Catholic Majesty: and Secondly no preparations
O Qeither had been, or were making to evacuate that post."
•30
Andrew Ellicott, The Journal of Andrew Ellicott 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1952), 5. Hereinafter cited
as Ellicott.
39Ibid.« 34-35. Chickasaw Bluffs was located at 
present-day Memphis.
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The party proceeded down the river from Chickasaw 
Bluffs and reached the Spanish post at Walnut Hills on 
February 19, 1797. The Americans were astounded when the 
Spanish fired a cannon to prevent their boats from passing 
the fort. The commandant appeared to be totally unaware 
of the treaty and was only satisfied after Ellicott produced 
an authenticated copy of the document in Spanish.4<“*
The day after leaving Walnut Hills, Ellicott 
received a letter from the Spanish Governor Manuel Gayoso 
de Lemos, describing conditions in the Natchez district.
The Governor foresaw no difficulty in running the boundary 
line. But the Spanish were not yet ready to evacuate 
their posts because they lacked sufficient boats to trans­
port their men and supplies. The disturbing part of the 
Governor's letter concerned the party's military escort:
"I find it indispensable to request you to leave the 
troops about the mouth of Bayou Pierre, where they may be 
provided with all their necessaries. . . . "  Ellicott 
considered the request improper, but he complied to avoid 
offending the Spanish officials. On February 24 the
surveying party, without its escort of thirty soldiers,
41landed at Natchez.
On February 29 the Americans camped on a hill 
about one quarter of a mile from the Spanish fort and
40Ibid.t 37-38. Walnut Hills was located at present- 
day Vicksburg.
41Ibid., 39-40.
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two days later they raised the American flag at their camp.
In a short time the Governor ordered the flag lowered.
Ellicott refused and preparations were made to prevent any
attempt that might be made to lower it by force. While the
Americans were making camp, information was received from
confidential sources that seemed to confirm Ellicott's
suspicions of the Spanish actions.
He learned that the Governor General, the Baron
de Carondelet, the principal commissioner for Spain, had
privately declared that the treaty would not be implemented.
In addition Governor Gayoso had written to a friend that
the "treaty was not intended to be carried into effect, and
that delay on their part would reduce it to a dead letter."
Finally, it was rumored that the territory had already been
or soon would be ceded to France. As a consequence of these
reports, Ellicott tried to determine the attitude of the
inhabitants of Natchez. He found that a "large majority"
4.2were in favor of becoming citizens of the United States.
The surveying party was in a precarious position: 
isolated deep in Spanish-held territory; the Spanish 
officials apparently in no hurry to execute the terms of 
the treaty; some of the local inhabitants openly hostile; 
and the Indians in the vicinity of Natchez threatening the 
American camp. In order to provide for the security of 
his party, Ellicott requested permission to move his military
42Ibid.. 44-45.
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escort from Bayou Pierre to Natchez. He assured the
Spanish that there would "be no incidents between the
43American and Spanish soldiers.
In answer to Ellicott*s request, Governor Gayoso
apologized for the activities of the local Indians and
suggested that it was probably an outgrowth of the raising
of the flag over the American camp. He stated that he
alone was responsible for maintaining order in the territory
and he would see that the Americans were safe in their
present position. Gayoso informed the American commissioner
that Governor Carondelet would be unable to fulfill his
duties as Spanish commissioner because of the pressing nature
of his duties as Governor General. Therefore he would be
acting in Cardondelet's place as the Spanish commissioner
for running the boundary line.
Gayoso stated that the military escort could move
from its camp to Lofftus' Cliffs below Natchez, where the
marking of the boundary line would begin. The treaty had
specified escorts for the commissioners, but in Gayoso*s
opinion this meant on the line and not at other locations.
Consequently, he could not permit the landing of American
44troops at Natchez.
Contrary to the wishes of the Governor, Ellicott 
ordered his military escort to join him at Natchez. Shortly
^^Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 11, 1797, Ibid., 46.
44Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 12, 1797, Ibid., 49-51.
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before the force arrived, Governor Gayoso reluntantly
consented to their being stationed in the vicinity of
the town. Within a few days the presence of the troops
seriously strained the relations between the Americans and
the Spanish. The dispute developed when the Americans
arrested a number of deserters from the United States Army
45who had sought refuge in Spanish territory.
The Governor virgorously protested these activities 
and requested that the men be freed. Ellicott informed 
Gayoso that his conduct would be guided by three consid­
erations: (1) all deserters who entered the country after
the date set by the treaty for the evacuation of the posts 
were liable to arrest; (2) all deserters who had come to 
the territory before the date set for the Spanish withdrawal 
would not be bothered; and (3) all persons found in the area
considered to belong to the United States against whom there
46were executive proclamations would be arrested.
Shortly after the arrival of the military escort, 
the prospects for a speedy withdrawal of the Spanish seemed 
to be improving. The Spanish removed the artillery from 
the fort at Natchez and carried it to the boat landing. But 
on March 22 the pieces were returned to the fort and re­
mounted. Ellicott demanded an explanation from Gayoso.
45Ibid., 55.
46Ibid., 55-56.
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The Governor stated that this was simply a way to store 
the pieces that were being removed from the fort at Walnut 
Hills. At the same time other supplies were being shipped 
from Natchez to the Spanish fort on the Arkansas. He in­
formed Ellicott that the Spanish had been demolishing the 
fort at Walnut Hills as a part of a treaty concluded with 
the Indians, but he had suspended these operations and
nothing further would be done until the American troops
47arrived at the post.
Ellicott was not convinced by the Governor's ex­
planation. He had watched the strange movements of the 
artillery pieces from his tent, and had seen no stores 
brought to Natchez from Walnut Hills. In addition, he 
knew that instead of demolishing the fort the Spanish 
were making improvements. Finally, the idea was absurd 
that supplies would be shipped from Walnut Hills to Natchez 
and then transported back to the fort on the Arkansas
48River.
On March 25 Governor Gayoso informed Ellicott that 
he was sending a letter to Lieutenant Piercy Smith Pope 
who was advancing down the Mississippi River from Fort 
Massac. The letter ordered the Lieutenant to halt at the 
point where the letter was received and remain there until 
permitted to continue by the Governor. Gayoso hoped that
^Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 23, 1797, Ibid., 58-60. 
48Ibid., 60.
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Ellicott would sign the letter to give it added authority.
Ellicott refused the Governor’s request. Instead
he sent a letter to Pope informing him of the situation at
Natchez. He believed the Governor's order was unwarranted,
since enough time had elapsed to allow the Spanish to
evacuate their positions. Ellicott no longer felt that
the removal would come in a "reasonable length of time."
He advised Pope that under the circumstances "the sooner
49you are here the better."
On March 29 Governor Gayoso issued a proclamation 
to the people of the Natchez district that seemed to con­
firm Ellicott's fears and aroused the anger of a number of 
the inhabitants. The proclamation stated that the Spanish 
would retain possession of the country until the people 
were assured of their rights to their real property. There 
would be no interference with religious matters, but there 
was to be no public worship other than Roman Catholic. The 
people of the district would not be disturbed in their 
daily activities because of any debts they might have 
acquired. The proclamation was designed to draw support
from two important groups in the district, property owners 
50and debtors.
49Ellicott to Pope, Mar. 25, 1797, Ibid., 63-64.
50Ibid., 65-67. Also a copy of Gayoso's pro­
clamation enclosed in Ellicott to Secretary of State,
Apr. 14, 1797, Southern Boundary MSS, U. S. and Spain,
Andrew Ellicott, 3vols., correspondence (1796-1804), I, 
National Archives, Records of Boundary and Claims Commissions 
and Arbitrations. Record Group 76. Hereinafter cited as 
Southern Boundary MSS.
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This proclamation caused a stir among the residents 
of the district who wanted to become citizens of the United 
States. Suspicious of the Governor*s motives they re­
quested that Ellicott take some action on their behalf. 
Ellicott informed Gayoso of the feelings of the concerned 
citizens and closed by saying:
I do not pretend to say that their 
apprehensions are well founded, it 
is possible they are not, but your 
objections to my escort being sta­
tioned with me, your hauling back 
and remounting the cannon at this 
place, your dispatching Capt. Minor 
to delay the arrival of the American 
troops; at this place, added to your 
proclamation however well meant, 
have had a contrary effect.51
Governor Gayoso responded that those who had
expressed a desire to live under American rule were not
being persecuted by the Spanish as Ellicott had been
informed. The sole purpose of the proclamation was to
calm the people and outline the "political arrangements
between His Majesty and the United States of America.”
He pointed out that the Governor General of the province
found it necessary to consult the King on one important
point concerning the evacuation of the military posts.
The Spanish officials interpreted the treaty to mean that
the posts would be demolished when evacuated. On the other
hand the United States expected the posts to be surrendered
^Ellicott to Gayoso, Mar. 31, 1797, Ibid., 68-69. 
Also Southern Boundary MSS, I.
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intact. This important issue could only be settled by
GOthe representatives of the two governments.
The agitation caused by the governor’s proclamation
was so great that Ellicott feared that the citizens might
take some forcible action against the Spanish government.
As a consequence of these fears, the officer in command of
the American escort began to enlist recruits from among the
local residents. This action brought a strong protest from
the Governor. Ellicott replied that he would require
additional time to consider the situation before giving 
53his reply. With this inconclusive reply all discussion 
of the matter was dropped and the recruits remained in the 
Army.
Ellicott also tried to locate Lieutenant Pope and
his detachment. On April 17 he received a letter from the
Lieutenant stating that the soldiers had halted their journey
at Walnut Hills upon receiving the letter from Governor
Gayoso. Ellicott wrote to Pope telling him to leave Walnut
Hills if bloodshed could be avoided:
. . . the proper place for yourself, 
and detachment to be stationed is at 
this post - here you can be of more 
service to the United States than at 
any other place on the river. Nine 
tenths of the inhabitants . . .  are 
firmly attached to the United States;
52Gayoso to Ellicott, Mar. 31, 1797, Ibid., 70-72.
■^Gayoso to Ellicott, Apr. 13* 1797, Ibid.« 74-75; 
Ellicott to Gayoso, Apr. 13, 1797, Ibid.. 76.
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"but until your arrival, have no 
rallying point, in case of a rupture 
"between the United States and his 
Catholic Majesty, which the conduct 
of Governor Gayoso I am under the 
necessity of concluding cannot be very distant.54
Ellicott informed the Governor that he had requested
Pope to move to Natchez and Gayoso reluctantly gave his 
55permission. One week later lieutenant Pope and his command 
reached the landing at Natchez. The next morning Pope's 
force and Ellicott's escort joined forces and made their 
camp on a high hill overlooking the Spanish fort and 
government house. For a time the tensions eased and there 
was very little activity on either side.
On May 2 Lieutenant Colonel Guillimard, the sur­
veyor for the Spanish government, arrived at Natchez.
Ellicott was informed that the Spanish would be ready to 
cooperate in the running of the boundary in a few days. 
Despite these assurances, the next day a large number of 
laborers went to work repairing the fort and mounting 
additional pieces of artillery. On May 7 a detachment of 
approximately forty men arrived to reinforce the garrison.
Two days later Guillimard and a number of officers left for 
Walnut Hills with a boatload of equipment.
5Ellicott to Pope, Apr. 14, 1797, Ibid.. 77.
55Jack D. 1. Holmes, Gayoso: The Life of a Spanish
Governor in the Mississippi Valley 178^-1799 (Gloucester: 
Peter SmitK, 1968), 183. Holmes says that Pope commanded 
the military escort that had accompanied Ellicott at the 
beginning of his journey.
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While Ellicott waited in Natchez to begin running 
the boundary line and watched the feverish Spanish activ­
ity, he did what he could to speed the survey. He pro­
tested the numerous delays only to be informed by Gayoso 
that ’’both you and the commander General of this province 
will be informed of the time that the boundaries are to be 
d e t e r m i n e d . G a y o s o  indicated that the survey would not 
begin until Carondelet received appropriate orders from 
higher authorities, presumably from the King himself.
At this time Ellicott learned from an informant 
that Governor General Carondelet planned to take some sort 
of action against the Americans and their supporters in 
the Natchez district. Carondelet had told Philip Nolan 
that the situation at Natchez was becoming serious and
". . .he was determined to quiet them by giving the
57Americans lead, and the inhabitants hemp." The infor­
mant reported that the Baron had ordered a large camp laid 
out at Baton Rouge and that a contractor had been engaged 
to supply provisions for the troops.
Again Ellicott protested the failure of the Spanish
58to fulfill the terms of Pinckney’s Treaty. Gayoso in­
formed him that the pressure of events was so great that
56Ellicott to Gayoso, May 11, 1797, and Gayoso to 
Ellicott, May 11, 1797, in Southern Boundary MSS, I.
57Ellicott, 85.
•'^Ellicott to Gayoso, May 16, 1797, Ibid., 86-89.
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the running of the line and the evacuation of the posts
59would have to he postponed.
On May 16 a company of grenadiers arrived in
Natchez and after resting a day and a half went on to 
60Walnut Hills. Three days later more soldiers en route
to Walnut Hills passed Natchez. The inhabitants of the
province watched the Spanish military preparations with
apprehension. The citizens talked of attacking the
Spanish, but were told that such an act might provoke a
war between the United States and Spain and consequently
do more harm than good.
On May 24 the Spanish Governor General issued a
proclamation informing the people of the Natchez district
that the provisions of the treaty could not be fulfilled
at the present time. The reason given for the delay was
the reported activities of the British forces in Canada.
It was rumored that the British planned to cross the
territory of the United States and attack upper Louisiana.
3ecause of this threat to her territory, Spain was in-
61creasing her defenses along the Mississippi. The Governor 
General’s proclamation only served to increase the anger 
of the people of the Natchez district who were attached to 
the United States interest.
59Gayoso to Ellicott, May 17, 1797, Ibid.. 90.
6QIbid., 83-84.
61Proclamation of Baron de Carondelet, May 24,
1797, Ibid., 94-95.
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In order to provide additional troops to occupy the 
posts thr.t the Spanish were suppose to be evacuating, a 
detachment of regulars began to descend the Ohio toward 
the Mississippi. On May 26 two companies of the 3d regiment 
of Infantry and a handful of artillerists left Port 
Washington under the command of Captain Issac Guion.
While the troops were resting at Fort Massac on the Ohio 
River, Captain Guion learned that instead of abandoning 
their posts, the Spanish were strengthening their position 
at Walnut Hills and planning to seize Chickasaw Bluffs.
These reports were probably a result of the troop movements 
that Ellicott had observed at Natchez. Upon learning of 
the Spanish preparations, Guion promptly set his force in 
motion in an effort to counter the Spanish plans. The 
Americans reached "the infirnal [sic] bluffs," at present- 
day Memphis, on July 24 and immediately began to construct 
a military post.^2
As Guion moved south, the situation at Natchez 
became more explosive each day. The events leading up 
to the climax centered around the actions of an itinerant 
Baptist minister named Barton Hannon.^ Governor Gayoso
6 ?"Military Journal of Captain Isaac Guion, 1797- 
1799” in Seventh and Eighth Annual Report of the Director 
of the Department of Archives and History oF ike State oF 
Mississippi fromjDctober 1, 1507 to October 1_, 19^8 (Nash­
ville: Brandon Printing Company,"T909j, 46. Hereinafter
cited as Guion.
63eiIlicott gives his name as Hannah, 99.
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gave the minister permission to preach a sermon, provided 
he avoided discussing political issues.
On June 4 a large crowd gathered at the American 
camp to hear his sermon. Hannon was greatly impressed by 
the success of his sermon and on June 9 he ventured into a 
"disorderly part" of Natchez in an apparent effort to extend 
his ministry. His religious zeal, heightened by the 
influence of liquor, aroused the anger of a number of 
Irish Roman Catholics, who took offense at the minister's 
remarks about their religion. After being beaten by the 
Catholics, Hannon went to Governor Gayoso and demanded 
justice. In an effort to prevent further trouble, the 
Governor ordered Hannon confined at the fort in the stocks.^
Many of the citizens of the district were certain 
that Gayoso had violated the rights of an American citizen 
and that he was determined to enforce the laws of Spain at 
.any price. 3y the morning of June 10 the Spanish governor 
and his family, accompanied by several Spanish officials, 
had taken refuge in the fort. By nighfall the population 
was in open opposition to the Spanish government and there 
were suggestions that the Spanish fort be assualted.
The actions of the Spanish and the people of Natchez
^Ellicott, 99-100. See Jack D. L. Holmes (ed.), 
Documentos ineditos para la hi3toria de la Luisiana,
179^-1BlO (Madrid, 19^3),~T17-55, contains the diary 
of Captain Manuel de Lanzo "Diario de la Revolutiar de 
Natchez, 1797.” See also the Case against Hannon, A. G. I., 
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 163-a.
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placed Andrew Ellicott and Lieutenant Pope in an extremely
delicate position* On May 31 Governor General Carondelet
issued a second proclamation in which he charged that the
United States was contemplating military action against
Lower Louisiana, As proof, Carondelet cited the American
troops gathered on the Ohio River, probably Guion’s force,
and the presence at Natchez of the boundary commissioner
and his military escort. He asserted that if the United
States had no hostile intentions, they would leave Natchez
and try to stop the British force advancing against Upper
Louisiana. Only when this was done would the Spanish
surrender the posts and lay down the weapons which the
65Americans had forced them to take up. As additional 
proof of the intentions of the Americans, Carondelet pointed 
to the fact that the citizens of the Natchez district were
in open revolt against Spanish authority because of the
66jailing of Hannon.
Governor Gayoso considered the incident involving 
Hannon to be what Pope and Ellicott were waiting for to 
begin the revolt. On June 12 Pope seemed to substantiate 
this conclusion when he issued a letter of congratulation
65Proclamation of Carondelet, May 31, 1797, in 
Ellicott. 101-103; Holmes, Gayoso, 189• For Ellicotts 
comments see Ellicott to Pickering, June 4, 1797, Southern 
Boundary MSS, I.
66For a Spanish account of the revolt see Captain 
Manuel de Lanzo*s diary in Holmes (ed.), Documents de la 
Luisiana.
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and support to the people of Natchez. The lieutenant def­
initely favored the citizen’s position, but militarily he 
was in no position to offer support if hostilities began.
The small American force would be greatly outnumbered by 
the troops that the Spanish could assemble in the district 
in a matter of a few days. In fact Governor Gayoso had
requested additional troops to reinforce the garrison at
68Natchez on the day Pope issued his proclamation.
While the military forces of both nations bided
their time and made preparations, the people were discussing
69an attack on the fort. On June 17 an incident occurred 
which could have resulted in a war between the United States 
and Spain if it had not been handled properly. Shots were 
exchanged between the members of a Spanish patrol and a 
group of men advancing on the hill that overlooked the 
Spanish position. No one was wounded during the brief
67Proclamations of Pope and Ellicott, June 12, 1797, 
in Pope Papers, Missouri Historical Society. Ellicott makes 
no mention of this proclamation in his journal or the report 
on the Southern Boundary, but states that he decided neither 
to encourage nor discourage the rebels, Ellicott, 104-105.
In fact Governor General Carondelet had alerted the militia 
units of Lower Louisiana. Holmes, Gayoso, 192, cites 
certificates of Carondelet, New Orleans, Aug. 5, 1797,
A. G. I., Papeles de Cuba, leg. 23. Lieutenant Pope is 
reported to havesaid that the Spanish would not evacuate 
the posts without "being first damnably flogged." Quoted 
in D. Clayton James, Ante-bellum Natchez (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 195b), 69.
68Gayoso to Carondelet, June 12, 1797, A. G. I., 
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 43-
69Holmes (ed.), Documents de la Luisiana, Lanzo’s
diary.
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encounter, but the situation had reached the stage where
it was essential that coder heads prevail. Ellicott issued
orders that no further incidents were to occur between the
70Regulars and the Spanish garrison*
Ellicott and Gayoso held a number of private confer­
ences in an effort to solve the problem peacefully. By the 
nineteenth the details of a settlement were worked out 
sufficiently so that Gayoso felt safe in ordering Colonel
Guillimard and Sub-lieutenant Juan Ferrusola, both of whom
71had just arrived from Nogales, to proceed to New Orleans.
On June 20 Ellicott and Gayoso held a secret meeting and
reached a tentative agreement for settling the dispute. At
this meeting Ellicott protested the landing of any additional
Spanish troops on the east side of the Mississippi above the
thirty-first degree of latitude, except for the purpose of
72obtaining provisions.
The day after their secret meeting Ellicott and the 
Governor met with a committee composed of citizens of the 
district and negotiated a general settlement. The Spanish 
Governor agreed to a number of conditions: (1) none of the
individuals who had acted as citizens of the United States 
would be persecuted or prosecuted for their actions; (2) none 
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in the event of Indian attack or internal riot; (3) no one
would be taken out of the district for trial; and (4) the
neutrality of the people was guaranteed. In turn, the
committee, on behalf of the citizens of the district, agreed
to live under Spanish law until the Spanish evacuated the 
73province.
With this agreement the "revolt" at Natchez was
over and the district remained under Spanish control until
the boundary line was marked and the Spanish garrisons
removed. Despite the peaceful solution of the problem of
joint Spanish and American occupation of Natchez, friction
continued between the supporters of the two powers. The
presence of Lieutenant Pope and his detachment seems to
have been the major source of trouble.
The specific actions of Pope are unclear but they
caused Andrew Ellicott to ask Secretary of State Timothy
Pickering an interesting question:
Is it possible to find a Military 
Gentlemen in our army possed of sobriety, 
talents, and prudence? I have only to 
add that for the honor of the United 
States it will be necessary to send 
officers to this country who are not
Ellicott, 114-18; Holmes, Gayoso, 194-195;
Gayoso's proclamation of June 22, 17$?, is in the Gayoso 
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscript, Louisiana 
State University Library, Baton Rouge; and in Clarence E. 
Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, V: 
Mississippi (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1337),
11-12.
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Apparently Pope suffered from recurring fevers,
drank too much and caused considerable trouble and was
not the type of man to occupy a position of responsibility
75in a delicate situation.
Pope's conduct was such that Governor Gayoso sent
a protest to his immediate superior, Captain Guion at
Chickasaw Bluffs. The Captain ordered Pope to alter his
conduct so as not to give offense to Governor Gayoso or
76to any of the citizens of Natchez. In a letter to Gayoso
the Captain stated:
I am sorry to hear that the Officer 
heretofore commanding the troops of 
the United States at Natchez, has given 
either to the inhabitants of that district, 
or to the subjects of his Catholic Majesty, 
the smallest just cause of uneasiness or dis­
content; at all events this will no longer 
be the case as his orders are to observe 
a different conduct and his superior officer 
will I hope shortly be there to command in 
person.77
Ellicott to Secretary of State, July 4, 1797, 
Southern Boundary MSS, I. His reference to Pope's mental 
condition had apparently been observed by his fellow 
officers because Pope bore the nickname "Crazy." Holmes 
in Gayoso, l83n. speculates on the "interesting combination" 
of "Crazy" Pope being selected by General "Mad" Anthony 
Wayne to head the movement to Natchez.
75Holmes, Gayoso, l83n; Pope died of fever near 
Natchez on July 11, 179$ see Cushing to Williamson, July 22, 
1799, Letters Sent, Cushing, Record Group 98 (National 
Archives).
76Guion to Pope, Aug. 24, 1797, and Guion to Gayoso, 
Aug. 27, 1797, in Guion, 41.
77Guion to Gayoso, Aug. 27, 1797, Ibid., 41.
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Captain Guion expressed the hope that the Governor had 
already issued the necessary orders to begin the evacuation
JO
of the Spanish posts.
The Captain was to be disappointed in his hope of
arriving at Natchez in a short time and in his expectation
that the Spanish would quickly evacuate their garrisons
north of the boundary line. Before the Captain arrived,
Governor Gayoso was promoted and removed from the Natchez
district. On July 29, 1797, Governor Gayoso relinquished
his post to his adjutant, Stephen Minor, and went to New
Orleans to assume the duties of Governor General of 
79Louisiana.
On August 19 Governor General Gayoso informed 
Captain Guion that the Spanish had not evacuated their 
posts and the decision to do so would have to be made by 
the two governments and not by their representatives on 
the frontier. On October 3 Captain Guion acknowledged the 
receipt of the Governor's letter and declined to quarter 
his force at Villa Gayoso, a Spanish fort twenty-five miles 
from Natchez, until he was fully acquainted with other 
sites in the district.
In an effort to reassure Gayoso of the peaceful 
intentions of the Americans, he stated, "As far as it 
depends on me, and is consistent with the dignity of the
78Ibid.
79Holmes, Gayoso, 198-99.
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United States and the comfort and safety of the troops, 
the harmony and tranquility subsisting between the two
gonations shall not be disturbed."
Captain Guion and his detachment did not leave
Chickasaw Bluffs until November 9. Thirty men remained
to occupy Fort Adams and the balance of the detachment
moved rapidly down the river toward Natchez. The force
did not occupy Walnut Hills because the Spanish still
held that position. The troops arrived at the Natchez
landing on December 6 and made their camp on the site
of Ellicott's first camp, about one thousand yards from
81the Spanish fort.
The Captain's duties once he reached Natchez had 
been outlined in his orders. He was to combine his de­
tachment with the force commanded by Lieutenant Pope. 
After assuming command of the entire force, he was to see 
that the Spanish carried out the provisions of Pinckney's
80Guion to Gayoso, Oct. 3» 1797, in Guion, 47. 
Villa Gayoso had originally been called Cole’s dJreek 
when established by Gayoso after 1789. As a result of 
his efforts in founding the post, the inhabitants re­
quested and received permission to change the name.
"Diary of Stephen Minor, 1792," quoted in Manual Serranoz 
y Sanz (ed.), Documentos historico de la Florida £ 
Luisiana, siglos XVI al SVllI (MadricT: Liberia General,
1$12), 419.
81 Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, in 
Guion, 68-69. Captain Guion halted at Walnut Hills on 
Dec. 1 to inquire whether or not the commanding officer, 
Captain E. Beauregard, was prepared to surrender the post 
to the United States. Guion to Beauregard, Dec. 1, 1797, 
Ibid., 59.
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Treaty and administer the civil law until the Governor 
of the Mississippi Territory could arrive at Natchez.
After the arrival of the Governor, Captain Guion and 
his men were to assist in marking the "boundary line 
between the United States and the Spanish possessions.
This assignment proved to be more complicated than 
it appeared. Captain Guion faced the problem of dealing 
with the Spanish officials and the equally difficult task 
of dealing with the American Commissioner, Andrew Ellicott.
The first controversy with the Spanish was a result 
of Guion's efforts to fortify the American camp. The 
American wrote that the reasons for the precautions were 
obvious to him even if they were not apparent to the 
Spanish. He concluded "that you are intirely [sic] 
ignorant of being in any Danger, I doubt not seeing that 
you are snug in Garrison, - But I am not so certain that 
my camp is in perfect security, or that hostility to it 
is not meditated-" Guion stated that the citizens of 
the district would be reimbursed for any property damaged 
by the Americans, but the complaints were a result of 
Spanish actions. The whole situation could have been 
avoided if the Spanish had evacuated the garrison according
O pto the provisions of the treaty.
The Spanish made an effort to establish cordial 
relations on three issues effecting the American soldiers
Q p
Guion to Minor, Jan. 3, 1798, Ibid., 60-61.
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by offering to allow Lieutenant Pope to cut timber from 
tbe King's Swamp, located on the west side of the Miss­
issippi, to construct buildings for the troops; the 
buildings at Villa Gayoso to serve as quarters for the 
Americans; and whatever might add to the comfort of the 
troops. Now that the Americans were attempting to build 
an adequate camp, Guion could not understand the Spanish 
protests. He asked Adjutant Minor why he "so strenuously 
endeavor to find offense in our making a camp comfortable 
when your real desire is to contribute all in your power 
to that comfort? and besides when you tell us that you are
O  *3
very shortly to abandon the country."
The American officer lamented the fact that he
was more versed in the duties of the military than the
"intrigues of a court." He implored Gayoso to fix the
time of removal so that the relations between the two
nations might not be strained by something he might say
in his correspondence.^ On January 28 two boats filled
with troops and stores passed Natchez on their way south
from Walnut Hills, and Guion speculated that the evacuation
85had finally begun.
®\uion to Minor, Jan. 6, 1798, Ibid., 62-63.
Guion*s italics.
84.Guion to Gayoso, Jan. 5, 1798, Ibid., 63-64.
85Guion believed that within a month he would be 
able to report that the posts were completely evacuated 
and in the hands of the Americans. Guion to Mitchell,
Feb. 3, 1798, Ibid., 65-66.
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The Captain informed the Secretary of War that 
he had been assured by Captain Minor that the buildings 
would be left in the same condition as when occupied by 
the Spanish. He described the fort at Natchez as poorly 
planned, with little command of the river, and almost in 
ruins. He recommended that a new post be established below 
Natchez, near the new boundary line. Guion stated that 
because of their critical situation, the citizens were 
anxious for some type of government to be established by 
the United States. The Spanish troops were being with­
drawn and stationed at a strong new post being constructed 
at Baton Rouge. The main problem now facing his command 
was a general shortage of clothing, especially lightweight 
summer uniforms. He recommended that linen short coats 
be issued to the troops stationed in the southern section 
of the nation, because the summer heat was so great that 
it sickened the soldiers who were required to work in 
woolen uniforms. To illustrate the situation, he reported
Ogthat the temperature on February 22 had been 78 degrees.
The movement of the troops observed at Natchez 
was indeed the beginning of the long awaited evacuation 
of the Spanish posts. The Captain wrote to Major William 
Kersey, who was en route to Walnut Hills, informing him 
of an arrangement between himself and Captain Minor.
86Guion to Secretary of War, Feb. 25, 1798, Ibid., 
68-69. ----
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All the King's or public buildings 
without the Forts or Redoubts, and 
exclusive of Block houses which are 
for defence 3hould be estimated or 
appraised as well as the Walnut Hills 
as at this and other places in this 
district. To this effect one or 
more persons are to be chosen on 
each side whose opinion or evaluation 
will be committed to writing. . .
Guion requested that Kersey make the evaluation, in qua­
druplicate, and send the information to Natchez in order
Qrj
to speed the evacuation of the territory.
On March 23, 1798, the Spanish evacuated the post 
at Walnut Hills. The fort was occupied by an express 
rider from Natchez and seven Americans from the neighborhood. 
The United States troops under Major Kersey had not arrived 
in time to take formal possession. One week later the 
Spanish soldiers left Natchez and moved south of the pro­
posed line. The buildings at Natchez were left as they 
had been when occupied by the Spanish, and Guion placed a 
small guard in the fort. With the removal of the Spanish
garrison, Captain Guion was free to turn his attention to
88other problems.
While engaged in the lengthy negotiations with the 
Spanish officials, Guion was confronted with the extremely 
difficult situation of dealing with Andrew Ellicott. The
87‘Guion to Kersey, Mar. 12, 1798, Ibid., 71-72.
O Q
Guion to Major Constant Freeman, Mar. 27, 1798; 
Guion to Wilkinson, Mar. 30, 1798, Ibid.. 73-74; and Guion 
to Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798, Ibid., 77.
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American commissioner had grown jealous of the position he
had come to occupy during the year he had been living in
Natchez. Ellicott's description of Captain Guion revealed
his feelings:
But it unfortunately happened, that 
the Commandant who superceded Mr.
Pope, was much indisposed by an 
inflammatory complaint on one side 
of his head, and face, at the time 
of his arrival, that evidently had 
an effect upon his understanding, 
which was naturally very far above 
mediocrity: in this state, he was
immediately surrounded by a number 
of unworthy characters, who took 
advantage of his situation, to 
prejudice his mind against the 
permanent committee, and other 
friends of the United States; who 
were treated by him in the most 
opprobrious manner.°9
The permanent committee Ellicott referred to had
been set up during the Natchez revolt and had relied
heavily upon the commissioner's advise and directions.
After inquiring by whose authority the committee met and
terming its meetings "improper and seditious", Captain
Guion ordered the committee to dissolve. Ellicott wrote
that many of the citizens believed that Guion wanted to
establish a military government once the Spanish left the
district. Ellicott feared that his arrest was contemplated
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Guion*s letters indicate that he was also dis­
satisfied with Ellicott*s actions concerning the Indians 
of the Natchez district. On February 3 Guion told Samuel 
Mitchell, agent to the Choctaw Indians, that Ellicott had 
been premature in telling the Indians about the supplies 
to be given them by the United States. The Indians were 
growing restless and more insistent in their demands for 
the goods which had not yet arrived at Natchez. The Captain 
wrote that Ellicott "is so far the cause of Indian impor­
tunity, he should bear the trouble when they come in here, 
but which he is not always willing to do. I have no doubt 
but that supplies will be sent for the Chocktaws [sic] this
spring or summer following, yet much trouble is avoided by
q inot holding anything up to view until within reach."
When Gayoso informed Ellicott that the Spanish were 
ready to begin their evacuation, the American commissioner’s 
suspicions were aroused concerning their intentions. He 
believed that the letter only concealed the Spanish in­
tentions to continue their delaying tactics. On January 31
his suspicions were confirmed by a letter shown to him by 
92Stephen Minor.
The letter from Governor Gayoso to Captain Guion
91Guion to Mitchell, Feb. 3, 1798, in Guion. 65-66.
92Gayoso to Ellicott, Jan. 10, 1798, in Ellicott, 
167-68, and Southern Boundary MSS, II. For Ellicott*s 
suspicions see Ellicott, 169.
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stated "that he would come up to Natchez, and make the 
arrangements with him for furnishing the military escort, 
and supplying it with provisions, likewise a plan for 
running the boundary." This communication evoked a 
sharp response from Ellicott in which he stated that the 
letter to Guion was " . . .  wholly unnecessary, as he is 
not the person appointed to carry that part of the treaty 
into effect. My instructions, and those to the surveyor,
1 am fully persuaded will be sufficient guide to us in the
execution of the business, without any foreign or domestic 
94advice."
Captain Minor informed Gayoso that he had com­
mitted a diplomatic blunder in addressing the letter to 
Captain Guion. The American officer had spread the story 
throughout Natchez and had greatly exaggerated his own 
importance. The episode greatly embarrassed Ellicott, 
since it appeared that an officer of the Army was placed 
in a higher position than a special commissioner from the
State Department. Minor reported that Ellicott was ex-
95tremely angry over the incident.
Ellicott decided to run the boundary line despite
93Ellicott, 169.
9^Ellicott to Gayoso, Feb. 1, 1798, Ibid., 170- 
71 and also in Southern Boundary MSS, II; and Ellicott 
to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.
9^Minor to Gayoso, Jan. 27, 1798, A. G. I.,
Papeles de Cuba, leg. 215-6 as cited in Holmes, Gayoso,
2 33.
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any attempt by Gayoso to further delay the starting date
96and the possibility that Guion might withhold his escort.
On April 9 Ellicott*s party left Natchez for the point on
0*7the Mississippi from which the boundary was to be run.
Captain Guion was glad to be rid of the Commissioner. 
He wrote General Wilkinson that "Ellicott went from here . . . 
to Willings Bayau [sic] where he now is doing little or 
nothing; he has very much lessened himself and sullied the 
commission given him by his conduct before and since his
arrival here - I did not believe it *till I saw it, and
98supposed it calumny." With the departure of the Spanish 
and then Ellicott*s party, life in the Natchez district 
took on a fixed routine for the soldiers.
In his report to General Wilkinson, Guion summa­
rized the nature of his civil duties: "I am constantly
perplexed with all kinds of business, complaints for abuse, 
slander, arrest for debts, thefts, and the whole catalogue
of vexations, and happy am I to find that a government for
99this country had been formed by the General Government."^
^Ellicott to Pickering, Feb. 10, 1798, and Ellicott 
to Pickering, Feb. 25, 1798, Southern Boundary MSS, II.
^Guion to Y/ilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 80-82 
and Ellicott, 177.
98Guion to Wilkinson, May 5, 1798, in Guion, 81.
99Ibid., 82. For the new system of government re­
ferred to by Guion see "An Act for an amicable settlement 
of the limits with the State of Georgia, and authorizing 
the establishment of a government in the Mississippi 
Territory," in F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and State 
Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and other Organic laws
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For a short time Captain Guion contented himself
with the duties of a military and a civil administrator.
He worried with countless details concerning commerce,
the maintenance of law and order, and the settlement of
countless c l a i m s . H e  moved troops throughout the
district, sought supplies for his men ‘because of the
failure of his contractor, pleaded for clothing for his
men because they were "naked", and watched the activities
101of the neighboring Indians.
Guion*s major concern was the unrest among the
Indians since the departure of the Spanish. The Captain
attributed the Indian agitation to Spanish and French
agents who were encouraging the tribes to test the firmness
102of the United States. Because of these problems the 
Captain urged that a reliable interpreter be sent to him 
so he could deal more effectively with the tribes.
of the States, Territories and Colonies, now or heretofore 
forming tke United Statesof America (Washington! Government 
Printing 6£fice, 1909), iV, 20^5-2027. The act was approved 
on Apr. 7, 1798.
100For example see, Guion to Clark, May 5, 1798, 
in Guion. 83. Guion to John Wilkins, Quarter Master 
General, May 9, 1798, Ibid., 86. Guion to the Secretary 
of War, June 13, 1798t~T5Td., 91-92.
1 0 1 -‘(iuion to Quarter Master Craig, May 9, 1798;
Guion to James O ’Hara, May 9, 1798; Guion to Kersey,
May 10, 1798; Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid.,
83-88. ---
102Guion to Mitchell, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 87-88.
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He requested that Samuel Mitchell send two men to 
the Spanish fort on the Tombigbee to determine if the 
Spanish had left that post and moved below the new boundary- 
line. Guion expressed the belief that the delays caused 
by Gayoso in marking the line were a part of a Spanish plan 
to aid French designs against the district. He closed with 
the assurance that "we will soon have a respectable military 
force in the Country, and things must then have an Issue.
In an effort to provide for the security of Natchez 
and the surrounding country Guion requested a detachment 
from Walnut Hills to reinforce his command. He blamed all 
of the problems of his office on the French:
The french are beyond doubt 
meditating a stroke at this country; 
and the Dons are secretly abbeting 
the business - I would recommend it 
to you, to have an eye to some of 
the people left at your Garrison 
when the Dons left it.104
To protect the party running the boundary line 
from possible Indian attacks, Guion dispatched Ensign 
John McClary with a detachment of soldiers from Natchez 
to their camp. The troops were not to be employed as 
laborers or "drudges" unless such work was directly 
connected with their duties as soldiers. The soldiers 
were to be drilled regularly and kept in constant readiness
1°3lbid.
10^Guion to Kersey, May 15, 1798, Ibid., 88-89.
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105to meet any threat that might present itself.
In fact, the soldiers would not he used in cutting
the line because Ellicott and Gayoso had decided that slaves
would be used for the heavy work. They made this decision
because the summer heat had taken a heavy toll among the
members of both parties, and it was believed that the slaves
could withstand the heat.^^ On May 31 Governor Gayoso
arrived at the point where the boundary party was working
and approved the initial location of the thirty-first 
107parallel. The commissioners of the two nations continued
their work and pushed on to St. Mary's in Spanish East
10RFlorida, reaching there on February 26, 1800.
^Guion to McClary, May 19, 1798, Ibid., 89-90.
The Captain quoted Article 6 of the Standing General Orders 
of May 22, 1797 to remind the Ensign of his obligation to 
his men. "To abstract a soldier from his professional 
duties, and to subject him to the orders of persons not 
attached to the Army, or to impose upon him menial laborious 
services is an abuse of authority, a breach of contract, 
and a deep injury to the service, because it authorizes 
neglegence in the soldier and in effect destroys his arms 
and his clothing - This practice is therefore positively 
prohibited.”
10^Holmes, Gayoso. 234; Ellicott, 180.
1<̂ Ellicott to Pickering, June 19, 1738, Southern 
Boundary MSS, II. Ellicott, 180. Moniteru de la 
Louisiana (New Orleans), June 11, 1798. Holmes, Gayoso,
TW.
10REllicotts; correspondence with the Secretary 
of State is contained in Southern Boundary MSS, II, and 
his account of the operation is contained in Ellicott, 
181-279. Ellicott to Dunbar, Apr. 18, 1800, in Eron 
Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar 
(Jackson, Press of the Mississippi Historical Society,
1930), 105-106.
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Apprehensions concerning the intentions of the
Choctaws increased steadily during June. Governor Gayoso
warned the commissioners that the Indians would try to
block the running of the line and drive the Americans out
of the territory. Ellicott considered this report as
merely an attempt by the Spanish to further delay the
109fulfillment of the treaty obligations. But Governor
Gayoso and Captain Guion both felt that there was a definite
possibility of an attack upon the small party of men on
the boundary line.1"10
Reports came to Natchez from Samuel Mitchell that
the unrest was caused by Spanish agents who were telling
the Indians that the Americans would take all of the land
above the line for their own use and that the Indians
111should hold out. Captain Guion did not believe that 
the Choctaws would take such a stand without encouragement 
from the Spanish.
Many of the Indians who had expressed feelings of 
hostility toward the United States had moved; either below 
the new boundary line; or to the Spanish post on the Tombigbee,
109Ellicott, 181.
110Holmes, Gayoso, 235-36. Guion to Secretary of 
War, June 13, 1798, in Guion, 91-92. Guion to Wilkinson,
June 23, 1798, Ibid., 193—$5- The military escort with 
Ellicott consisted of thirty men under the command of 
Lieutenant McCarty.
111Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, in Guion,
93-95. Guion to Secretary of War, July 9» 1798, ibid.,
98-99.
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Fort St. Stephens. The post was well within the territorial
limits of the United States but was still garrisoned by
about thirteen Spanish soldiers. The fort was only ninety
miles from the Spanish town of Mobile but it was a twelve
day march from Natchez. The inhabitants of the area were
well disposed toward the United States and required some
type of protection from the Spanish and Indians. Captain
Guion recommended the construction of a post in the area
112to counteract the activities of the Spanish.
While Guion tried to keep the Indians from starting
a war, his civil administration, by his own assessment was
going smoothly. He informed the Secretary of War:
The people of this district, who 
when left to the unbiased exercise 
of their own judgement, are in the 
majority above the ordinary capacity 
of like numbers in most of the States, 
anxiously look for the laws and officers 
of government for this country. They 
are, and have been remarkably tranquil, 
their situation fairly considered; a 
few turbulent and busy spirits excepted; 
yet the arrival of the governor, Judges, 
etc would add much to their satisfaction, 
and my case.113
112 Ibid. Peter J. Hamilton, "St. Stephens*, 
Spanish Fort and American Town,** Transactions of the 
Alabama Historical Society, 1898-^, III, 227-1T. 
Hamilton stages that Fort St. Stephens was transferred 
to the United States by the Spanish on May 5, 1799* The 
United States would eventually establish Fort Stoddert 
to replace Fort St. Stephens, American State Papers, 
Military Affairs, I, 163.
113Guion to Secretary of War, June 13, 1798, in 
Guion. 91-92.
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Guion's assessment differed greatly from the comments 
made by Ellicott in his Journal. Ellicott attributed the 
good order at Natchez to the activities of the permanent 
committee he had helped organize and not to the efforts 
of Guion. Ellicott wrote that the committee did not listen 
to the advise of pretended friends nor did it heed the abuse 
of its opponents. Because of its wise actions the committee 
was able to maintain order in Natchez despite the fact that: 
"the shadow of the Spanish jurisdiction, which had remained 
in the district since the termination of the commotion, was 
withdrawn in January, 1798, and the inhabitants left without 
law or government, till September following, I never heard 
of a single outrange being committed in the territory except 
by the Commondant, and one or two other officers."11^
As the boundary party moved east, Captain Guion 
continued to watch the activities of the Indians and the 
Spanish agents. Many of the chiefs had come to Natchez 
to talk to Guion and declare their "friendly disposition 
and intention." Despite these assurances, the Captain 
feared that some of the Choctaws and the Huwanies, who 
had long been attached to the Spanish, were contemplating 
hostilities. One indication of their feelings was that 
the Huwanies, who lived in the Choctaw territory, had 
burned their corn and moved south to the border of Lake
1 U Ellicott, 167.
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115Pontchartrain.
On July 29 Guion received information from the
Tombigbee region that Colonel Benjamin Hawkins, agent
to the Creeks, had left his post because of threats made
against him by the Indians. The Captain maintained that
the Indian problems were caused by the activities of the
Spanish, whose efforts were connected with some French
plan to attack the region. Guion suggested that the
Indian problems might be eliminated if the tribes were
played against one another. To accomplish this the Choctaws
should be conciliated and brought under the influence of
the United States. Since the Choctaws and the Creeks were
enemies, there existed the possibility of using the Choctaws
to divert the attention of the Creeks from the Amer XCcUiS •
Captain Guion never tried his plan because he was relieved
of further responsibility for Indian affairs by the arrival
1 1of Governor Winthrop Sargent.
115Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1798, in 
Guion. 98-99. Guion's reference to the Huwanies probably 
referred to the Yowanni people. In addition to these two 
spellings these Indians were referred to as the Haiowanni, 
Youone, Hewanni and the Ewany. Their capital was located 
on the east side of the Chickasahay River and was called 
Yowanni. H. S. Halbert, "District Divisions of the 
Choctaw Nation," Report of the Alabama History Commission 
"k° the Governor of Alabama, flKomas id.""Owen (ed.). I 
XMontgomery, 190T7, 380-81.
11^Guion to Samuel Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1798, in 
Guion, 101-102. The system of government established by 
Congress made the territorial governor the superintendent 
of Indian affairs. F. N. Thorpe (ed.), The Federal and 
State Constitutions, 2026.
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By the middle of September Captain Guion was
replaced as the commander at Natchez by Colonel John
Francis Hamtramck and assumed command of the troops
117stationed at Loftus Heights. On September 25 General 
Wilkinson arrived at Natchez and personally assumed the
responsibility for directing the activities of the American
*1 *1 fttroops in the area.
Governor Sargent and General Wilkinson quickly 
turned their attention to organizing the civil and military 
affairs of the territory. The two officials became involved 
in a heated controversy concerning the right of the troops 
to occupy certain buildings received from the Spanish, 
but not a part of the district’s fortifications. The 
building in question was located in Natchez, and Governor 
Sargent wanted to use it as a courthouse. General 
Wilkinson refused to order the troops to turn the buildings 
over to the civil authorities. The controversy soon spread 
to include the public buildings at Villa Gayoso occupied by 
soldiers.
The controversy began in September 1798, and was 
not resolved until the next spring when the troops were 
moved out of Villa Gayoso and all but a small guard in
117Sargent to Ellicott, Sept. 10, 1798, Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), The Mississippi Territorial Archives, 
1798-1803 (Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 1^05),
I, 45-46. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, MTA.
118Guion to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1799, in 
Guion, 102-103.
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the old Spanish fort was removed from Natchez. Sargent
had gained control of the public buildings, but only after
threatening to send his correspondence with Wilkinson to
119the proper governmental department.
The other controversy arose over the transfer of
Lieutenant Andrew Marschalk from Natchez to Walnut Hills.
The Lieutenant possessed the only printing press in the
territory and had contrived to bring this fact to the
attention of Governor Sargent. The Governor arranged
the transfer of the officer and his printing press to
Natchez so that he could print the laws of the Mississippi 
120Territory. Apparently Marschalk*s activities while he 
printed the laws angered his superiors, and he was ordered 
from Natchez before he finished his printing assignment.
By late October, 1799, when he sold his printing press and
left Natchez, Marschalk had finished printing the first
119Sargent to Pickering, Sept. 29, 1798, in 
Rowland, MTA, I, 57-58; Sargent to Captain John Heth,
Feb. 23, 1?$9, Ibid., 136; Sargent to Pickering, Mar. 13, 
1799, Ibid., 11 C>—1'11; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 3, 1799, 
Ibid.. 130; Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 17, 1799, in Rowland, 
MTA. I, 138-139, Sargent to Pickering, Apr. 20, 1799. Ibid., 
T39-44. ----
120Marschalk to L. A. Besancon, Sept. 2, 1837, 
in Madel J. Morgan, **Andrew Marschalk* s Account of 
Mississippi's First Press," Journal of Mississippi 
History. VIII, 146-48; Marschalk to Sargent, Sept. 30,
1798, in William B. Hamilton (ed.), "The Printing of 
the 1799 Laws of the Mississippi Territory," Journal 
of Mississippi History, II, 92.
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121thirty-five laws.
With the exception of the controversy concerning 
the public buildings and the transfer of Marschalk, 
Wilkinson and Sargent worked well together. The Governor 
concurred in Wilkinson's recommendation that Loftus Heights 
should immediately be fortified. He also tried to help the 
General eliminate the problem of desertion which according 
to the Governor was so great as to "hazard the loss of 
almost all our Little Army in this Country." In an effort 
to make desertion more difficult, Sargent issued a pro­
clamation requiring passports for all foreigners and the
ipOregistration of newcomers to the area.'
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the 
members of the Army remained scattered across the nation's 
vast frontier. Except for the old Spanish towns on the 
Mississippi, the small garrisons were located far in advance 
of the white settlements on the nation's borders. The Army 
was expected to perform two important functions: guard the
international borders; and protect the isolated white 
settlements from sporadic Indian attacks. Neither of 
these duties required much military activity on the part 
of the Army and it did not appear that there would be any 
purely military activities in the immediate future.
121 Sargent to Cushing, July 21, 1799, in Howland, 
MTA. I, 158-59; Sargent to Pickering, Oct. 13, 1799, Ibid.,
T7S-81. -------
122Sargent to Wilkinson, Jan. 8, 1799, in Rowland, 
MTA. I, 100-102; Sargent to Pickering, Jan. 15, 1799, Ibid.. 
104-106; Sargent to Wilkinson, Mar. 17, 1799, Ibid., 114-15. 
Sargent's italics.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER II
THE OCCUPATION OF LOUISIANA
The new century began peacefully for the members of 
the United States Army and with all indications pointing to 
a long period of calm. Only a few isolated incidents in­
volving hostile Indians disturbed the routine of Army life. 
The soldiers continued the monotonous task of building and 
improving the posts that marked the limits of the nation.
In the preceding decade the Army had advanced far 
into the wilderness, well beyond the settled areas, in an 
effort to secure the nation’s borders. It would be a 
number of years before the vast area passed over by the 
soldiers would be completely settled. Therefore it is not 
surprising that the military posts were considered to be 
permanent installations. However, the forts established 
before 1800 were only the first in a series of works con­
structed to protect the ever advancing frontier.1
By December of 1803 the soldiers were once again 
on the march, pushing the military frontier still further
1For the names and date of construction of the 
posts in the South see Appendix I. For other posts see 
Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military Posts of 
the United States, 17H9-18$5~ TMadi3on: The State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964).
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west and ever ahead of the encroaching settlers. The posts 
constructed in the 1790*s were abandoned as they outlived 
their usefulness, and new posts were established to meet 
the needs of an ever changing situation. The process of 
establishing and subsequently abandoning posts in the 
interior of the nation was repeated time after time as 
the country increased its territorial holdings and settlers 
continued to push the settlement line westward.
The only interior posts in the South that remained 
in existence for any length of time were of two types:
(1) those that were established in areas with large numbers 
of potentially hostile Indians, such as Forts Stoddert, 
Mitchell, and Hawkins; and (2) those that offered the 
surrounding population a measure of protection from large 
concentrations of slaves, such as Baton Rouge.
Initially the military frontier in the South moved
in two directions at the same time, west and south. The
movement south stopped when the United States acquired the
land bounded by the Gulf of Mexico and constructed permanent
fortifications to guard the coastline. The movement west
2did not end until the continent had been crossed.
The first indication that the tranquil period might 
be broken came when rumors began to circulate that Spain 
had transferred Louisiana to France. The transfer had been 
agreed to by the two countries in the Treaty of San Ildefonso,
2Ibid.
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signed on October 1, 1800.^ The treaty was a preliminary 
agreement and accomplished no transfer of territory. The 
agreement was secret because Spain was afraid that if news 
of the treaty reached the United States, the territory 
might be lost before France could take possession. On 
March 21, 1801, the representatives of Spain and France 
signed the treaty of Aranzuez which confirmed the agreement 
reached at San Ildefonso.^
News of the two secret agreements did not reach the 
United States until early 1802. The reaction was one of 
anger and dismay. Possession of the mouth of the Mississippi 
River by weak Spain was one thing, its possession by ag­
gressive France was something that required serious con­
sideration. President Jefferson summarized the situation:
Spain might have retained it quietly 
for years. Her pacific dispositions, 
her feeble state, would induce her to 
increase our facilities there, so that 
her possession of the place would be 
hardly felt by us, and it would not 
perhaps be very long before some 
circumstance might arise which might 
make the cession of it to us the price 
of something of more worth to her. Not 
so can it ever be in the hands of France.
^A. P. Whitaker, "Spanish Policy towards the 
Retrocession of Louisiana," American Historical Review, 
XXXIX (April, 1934), 454-76.
4A. P. Whitaker, The Mississippi Question, 1795- 
1803, A Study in Trade, Politics and Diplomacy (Gloucester: 
Feter Smith, 1F52), 184-86.
5Jefferson to Robert Livingston, Apr. 18, 1802, 
in Paul L. Ford (ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson 
(New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1904-05), IX, 364-^5.
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The Western, settlers were concerned about what
might happen if France should gain control of New Orleans.
They depended upon the Mississippi River to transport their
products to market. If the right to use the river was ever
denied, the results would be disastrous. In the much quoted
passage by Jefferson, he stressed the importance of the
river not only for the western farmers but for the nation:
There is on the globe one single spot 
the possessor of which is our natural 
and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans, 
through which the produce of three 
eights of our territory must pass to 
market, and from its fertility it will 
ere long yield more than half of our 
whole produce and contain more than 
half our inhabitants. France placing 
herself in that door assumes to us 
the attitude of defiance.6
If the attitude of France was defiant, the attitude 
of the United States Army was relaxed and unconcerned. From 
1801 to 1803 the soldiers were occupied with a number of 
routine jobs, such as: escorting parties through the
wilderness; marking the Chickasaw boundary line; assisting 
Indian agents with projects among the various tribes; 
cutting roads through the wilderness; constructing buildings 
for the Indian factory system; cleaning, repairing, and 
packing arms; protecting postriders and travelers on the 
Natchez to Nashville road; moving personnel and stores 
from one post to another; building warehouses at the
6Ibid., 364.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
71
military posts; and cutting timber for the use of the 
7garrisons.
While the soldiers labored in the wilderness, 
the commanding general, James Wilkinson, was negotiating 
treaties with Southern Indian tribes. Wilkinson’s duties 
as commanding general of a force stationed at widely 
scattered posts should have completely occupied his 
attention, but he was given other responsibility. In 
June of 1801 he was ordered to open negotiations with
the Southern Indian tribes. Wilkinson’s diplomatic efforts
8would keep him in the wilderness for almost two years.
General Wilkinson and his fellow commissioners, 
Colonel Benjamin Hawkins and General Andrew Pickens, first 
attempted to arrange a treaty with the Cherokees when they 
met at Southwest Point. The proposed treaty provided for
7Sargent to Wilkinson, Apr. 8, 1800, Dunbar 
Rowland, The Mississippi Territorial Archives, 1793—
1803 (Nashville: Brandon Printing Co., 190$}, i, 220;
Hereinafter cited as LIT A. Secretary of War to Edward 
Butler, Mar, 10, 1801, m  Letters Sent Relating to 
Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Records of the Office of 
the Secretary of War, Record Group 107, National Archives 
Microfilm Publication, M6, Roll 1, 44. Hereinafter cited 
as SWLS. Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Oct. 23,
1801, ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Thomas Butler,
Apr. 16, 1802, Ibid., 192; Secretary of V/ar to Commanding 
Officer at Chickasaw Bluffs, July 20, 1802, Ibid., 252-53; 
Secretary of War to A. D. Abraham, July 30, 180^, Ibid., 
252; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 10, 1803, Ibid.,
25; Secretary of War to Abraham, Sept. 9, 1802; Ibid., 281- 
82; Secretary of War to Abraham, Nov. 11, 1802, Ibid., 319- 
20; Secretary of War to Abraham, Dec. 14, 1802, ibid., 332- 
33.
QSecretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1801,
Ibid., 87.
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the cutting of a road from the Tennessee River to the
highlands. But the Indians, reluctant to allow the Americans
on their lands, refused to have anything to do with the 
gproposal.
Failing to reach an agreement with the Cherokees, 
the commissioners moved on to Chickasaw 31uffs where they 
conferred with the Chickasaw chiefs. On October 24, 1801, 
a treaty was signed whereby the Indians received seven 
hundred dollars in merchandise for allowing a road to be 
opened across their lands. The road was to be built by 
details of thirty soldiers working in monthly shifts from 
the Mero district of Tennessee to the settlements near 
Natchez. The trail would be fairly typical of the early 
roads that were cut through the wilderness. The Secretary 
of War outlined how the trace should be cleared, "not 
exceeding sixteen feet in width and not more than eight 
feet of the sixteen to be cut close to the ground, and 
smoothed for passengers. . . .
qAmerican State Papers, Indian Affairs (Washington: 
Gales and Seaton, 183^), I, 648-53, 656, 663. Hereinafter 
cited as ASPIA. General Pickens was named in place of 
William R. Davie who was named in the original commission. 
Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 15, 1o01, SWLS, Roll 1, 
87.
^ASPIA, I, 651-53; Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Law3 and Treaties (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 190^), II, 41-42; Secretary of War to 
Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803, in Clarence E. Carter (ed.),
The Territorial Papers of the United States; Volume V,
The Territory of Mississippi, 1793-1817 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1937), 187.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
73
After concluding the successful negotiations at 
Chickasaw Bluffs, the commissioners proceeded to Fort 
Adams to meet with the Choctaw chiefs. Wilkinson and 
his associates persuaded the Indians to allow the con­
struction of a road from Fort Adams to the Yazoo River.
In addition, the chiefs agreed to accept the old boundary 
line between their territory and the United States.1"1
When the roads provided for in the treaties with
the Chickasaws and Choctaws were completed, communications
between Nashville and the southwest would be greatly improved.
In an effort to protect the postriders and travelers on the
road, small detachments of soldiers were stationed along
the route. In 1303 the mail was carried from Natchez to
Nashville at the rate of fifty miles a day. By 1805 mail
was being carried over the route by postriders who were
1 2expected to cover 120 miles every twenty-four hours.
The commissioners proceeded from Fort Adams to 
Fort Wilkinson, near Milledgeville, Georgia, where they 
opened a conference with the Creeks on May 24, 1302. In 
exchange for 310,000 in gifts and the promise of annuities, 
the Creeks ceded their land in the Ockmulgee Forks to the 
United States. This cession pushed the western boundary
11The treaty was signed on Dec. 17, 1801, ASPIA,
I, 648-53; Xappler, Indian Affairs, II, 42-43*
12Postmaster General to Claiborne, Feb. 15, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186; Postmaster General to 
Pratt, Dec. 9, 1805, m  Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 44.
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of Georgia further west.1^
Upon concluding the treaty with the Creeks, Colonel 
Hawkins and General Pickens returned to their homes.
General Wilkinson moved to Port Confederation, a frontier 
post located on the Tombigbee River, where he again met 
with the Choctaws. By the terms of a second treaty, signed 
on October 17, 1802, the Indians ceded their lands between 
the Tombigbee and Chickasawhay rivers. They also agreed 
to the establishment of a new boundary line and the cutting 
of a highway through their lands. In return the United
14States agreed to establish a trading house for their use.
Following the negotiations with the Choctaws,
Wilkinson established a camp at the mouth of the Yazoo
River. From this location he personally supervised the
work of the soldiers who were marking the boundary line
between the territory of the United States and the land
15held by the Choctaws. The marking of this line was
^ASPIA, I, 668-69; Kappler, Indian Affairs, II,
44-45.
1 ÂSPIA, I, 681-82; Kappler, Indian Affairs, II,
47. The trading house was finally established at I?ort 
St. Stephens, Ora B. Peake, A History of the United 
States Indian Factory System, 1795-1o2T~(Denver: Sage
BToks",“ T5577, ------------------
16Wilkinson to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1802, Rowland, 
MTA, I, 514. Claiborne to Dearborn, Nov. 16, 1802, Ibid., 
552. Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 
1801-1816 (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of1
Archives and History, 1917), I, 230-32. Hereinafter 
cited as Rowland, WCC.
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extremely important to the settlers living along the
Mississippi River. The new Governor of the Mississippi
Territory, W. C. C. Claiborne, stated: "the line embraces
a much larger tract of fertile land than was expected and
is consequently highly satisfactory to the citizens in
this quarter."1^
Although the settlers considered the achievements
of Wilkinson in the last two years to be important, he was
dissatisfied. He did not feel that his talents and energy
had been utilized to the best advantage. In September of
1802 he expressed a hope that he would "be able to promote
measures, more extensive in their salutary consequences to
17this territory and the United States." He estimated that
he had traveled sixteen thousand miles on government
1 8business during 1802 and 1803.
The General was probably correct in feeling that 
his services might have been used to better advantage. The 
negotiations with the Indians were important, but Colonel 
Hawkins and General Pickens probably would have been just 
as successful without vVilkinson's help. Certainly the 
General found enough to do on arriving at the Yazoo:
"^Claiborne to Dearborn, Jan. 17, 1303, Rowland,
ME A, I, 581.
1 7Wilkinson to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1802, Ibid., 
515. ----
18James Wilkinson, Memoirs of My Own Times 
(Philadelphia: A. Small, 1816), I, vii.
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"I regret to find here, the road cutting entirely neglected,
and to learn that everything Military, is in disorder. . . .
I feel for the public service and for the discipline and
19subordination of the troops.”
The supervision of the road construction had been
assigned to Colonel Thomas Butler in April. The Secretary
of War had ordered that details of soldiers working for
sixty days at a time were to cut the road from Natchez to
Tennessee. As compensation for their labor the soldiers
were to receive frocks and overalls and ten cents extra
20pay for each full day of work. Wilkinson reported that 
work had come to a standstill because Colonel 3utler ’’has 
arrogated himself unwarrantable consequence, and instead 
of doing his duty, has in my Judgement done injustifiable 
acts, and now under the plea of indisposition has gone to 
the North-ward.”^
While supervising the work of the soldiers on 
the boundary line and restoring a semblance of military 
order, Wilkinson was faced with a problem involving the 
nation’s foreign relations. The problem concerned the 
method of transporting supplies to the southern garrisons
19Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 232.
90Secretary of War to Butler, Apr. 16, 1802, SWLS, 
Roll 1, 191-93.
21Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 11, 1802, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 232.
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located in the interior. Some of the posts were located
on rivers that flowed through Spanish territory before
they emptied into the Gulf of Mexico. As a result, it
was possible that American goods passing through the
territory to the posts might either be subject to duties
or prevented from passing entirely by the Spanish officials.
On August 6, 1802, Governor Claiborne touched upon
the same problem. He suggested to the Secretary of War
that a trading house for the Choctaw Indians be established
at some location on the Tombigbee River. He mentioned that
trouble might arise because the right to navigate Mobile
Bay was not secured to the United States. However, he
could foresee no lasting difficulty on this point because
of "the present friendly and accomodating disposition
of the Governor General of Louisiana towards the U.
States. . . .”22
The Governor’s optimism was a bit premature. On
October 28 he received a letter from William S. Huling,
American vice-consul at New Orleans, reporting that the
American right of deposit had been withdrawn. In addition,
permission had been denied for the military stores destined
2 3for Fort Stoddert to pass through Spanish territory. 
Claiborne immediately sent a protest to the Governor General
22Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 6, 1802, Ibid.,
153-54.
23Huling to Claiborne, Oct. 18, 1802 and Claiborne 
to Huling, Oct. 28, 1802, Ibid., 207-208.
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of Louisiana and informed James Madison of the closing.2^
The letter from Huling was prompted by the issuance
of a proclamation by the acting intendent of Louisiana,
Juan Ventura Morales, ending the American right of deposit
at New Orleans. As far as the western farmers were concerned,
the right of deposit was the most important part of Pinckney's
Treaty. When the right of deposit was withdrawn the
settlers who were most effected threatened to take matters
into their own hands if the government could not resolve
the problem. The situation was made even worse by the news
that on October 15, 1802, Charles IV, King of Spain, had
ordered the territory of Louisiana transferred to the
25properly accredited representatives of Napoleon.
The outcry from the west was not as great as
Jefferson feared it would be and certainly not as loud
as the Federalists might have hoped for. A letter from
Bourbon County, Kentucky, indicated the mood of at least
one frontiersman: "Our country is in a state of perfect
tranquility, the confidence the people has in the president
and I may add in Congress too, are so firmly fixed that
they will not move in any direction but that pointed out
26by the General Government."
2^Claiborne to Lon Manuel de Salcedo, Oct. 28, 1802 
and Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 29, 1802, Ibid., 209-11.
25Whitaker, Mississippi Question, 186.
P6John Allen to John Breckinridge, Feb. 15, 1803, 
in Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1803, Manuscript 
Division, Library of Congress.
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The government was for the time being doing
nothing openly, but behind the scenes it was striving
for a satisfactory settlement. The administration's
policy of patience had the support of one of the powerful
Kentucky papers, The Palladium. The editor wrote on
January 27, 1803: "one sentiment only prevails on this
subject, a perfect reliance on the justice of the Federal
Government. and a determination to support its decision,
27let it cost what it will." Despite the strong support 
voiced in favor of the governments dictates, some citizens 
demanded that it take military action against the Spanish.
One Kentuckian wrote: " . . .  I believe there are
few (if one) who would not cheerfully give his aid in 
bringing Mr. Intendant and his adherents to condine [sic]
oQ
punishment. . . . "  Even the Palladium carried an 
assessment of the state's military strength which might 
be used if peaceful means failed. The militia returns 
for 1802 showed that there were 26,605 officers and men 
enrolled and that they were armed with 11,157 rifles and 
2,923 muskets.
In February rumors reached Washington that seemed 
to verify the reports that the western settlers were 
prepared to act without the consent of the government. The
27Palladium, Jan. 27, 1803. Editor’s italics.
p Q
Achilles Sneed to Breckinridge, Dec. 20, 1802, 
Breckinridge Papers, Jan. - Sept., 1803.
2^Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803.
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reports said that a man named Wilson was raising an
expedition in the neighborhood of Pittsburgh. Its purpose
was to descend the rivers and take possession of the city
of New Orleans. Although the Secretary of ’War expressed
doubts about the validity of the reports, he could not
risk the possible consequences if his judgement was
incorrect. He issued orders to the commanders of the
American posts on the Ohio and Mississippi rivers to stop
0̂any expeditions that might try to descend the river.
The Secretary informed General 'Wilkinson that the commanders 
had been ordered "to use all prudent means in their power to 
prevent the passage of any armed force not authorized by 
the government which may attempt to pass down either of 
those rivers." If an expedition was mounted, the 
Secretary told Wilkinson to "consider it your duty to 
use all the means in your power to prevent it."^
The extent of the dissatisfaction was indicated 
by the President when he wrote that "remonstrances and 
memorials" were circulating throughout the western regions 
and that a great many citizens were signing them. The 
President accepted the discontent in the West as natural 
and honest, but the excitement in other areas he attributed
^Secretary of War to Thomas Cushing, Feb. 19,
1803, SWLS, Roll 1, 366.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson. Feb. 18, 1803, 
Ibid., 363-66.
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to other motives:
In the seaports it proceeds from a 
desire for war which increases the 
mercantile lottery; in the federalists 
generally, and especially those of 
Congress, the object is to force us
into War if possible in order to 
damage our finances, or if this 
cannot be done, to attach the western 
country to them, as their best friends, 
and thus get again into power.32
At least one member of the President’s own party
doubted the wisdom of the policy followed by the adminis­
tration. Governor Claiborne publicly endorsed the actions 
of Jefferson, but privately suggested to James Madison that
it might be best to seize New Orleans by force. He believed
that six hundred well-armed members of the territorial 
militia could probably take the city if they were opposed 
only by Spanish troops. He suggested that there were a 
number of citizens in Orleans and along the coast who would 
support the Americans if hostilities started.^
The major reason the citizens of the West were 
dissatisfied was because the government did not appear 
to be doing anything to regain the right of deposit.
Jefferson recognized this factor when he wrote: "The
measures we have been pursuing being invisible, do not 
satisfy their minds. Something sensible therefore was
82Jefferson to Monroe, Jan. 13, 1803, in Ford 
(ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 418.
^Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 3, 1803, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 253.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
-iAbecome necessary. . .
The sensible action that Jefferson proposed to 
take was the purchase of New Orleans and if possible the 
Ploridas. When James Monroe and Edward Livingston were 
successful not only in purchasing New Orleans but also 
the rest of Louisiana, the discontent in the West died 
quickly. The treaty which ceded Louisiana to the United 
States was signed on April 30, and finally proclaimed on 
October 21, 1803.^
While the commissioners were negotiating with 
the French, a battle was being waged in the United States 
Congress for the support of the west. The fight was 
between the Federalists, who were trying to win support 
in the west, and the Jeffersonians who were working to 
retain the support of the west. The Federalist Senator 
from Pittsburgh, James Ross, introduced a series of res­
olutions designed to win the support of the western settlers. 
Ke proposed that the United States assert its right to freely 
navigate the Mississippi River and its right to deposit on 
the isle of New Orleans.
In addition to asserting the nation's rights, the
■^Jefferson to Madison, Jan. 13, 1803, in Ford 
(ed.), The Works of Thomas Jefferson, IX, 418.
35Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties and other 
International Acts of the United States of America 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, l93i)> ll,
498-515.
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resolutions authorized the President to call into service 
50,000 militia men, to be drawn from Georgia, South 
Carolina, Ohio, Kentucky, Tennessee and the Mississippi 
Territory. These men along with the regular land and 
naval forces were to be used by the President to seize 
and hold some place on the isle of New Orleans. The site 
seized was to be used as a place of deposit for American 
products. In order to finance the other resolutions, Ross 
proposed that Congress appropriate five million dollars.^
Ross *s resolutions were defeated by a vote of 
15 to 11. Ross was the only Senator even remotely connected 
with the interests of the west to vote for the resolutions. 
Senator John Breckinridge of Kentucky offered a counter 
proposal, which probably represented the administration's 
point of view.
Breckinridge's plan authorized the President to 
call out 80,000 militia and to enlist volunteers, when and 
if he deemed it necessary. The militia levy was to be 
apportioned through all of the states not just among the 
western states and territories. More importantly, there 
was no mention of seizing any portion of Louisiana. The 
scheme was adopted by unanimous vote. At the same time it 
provided additional troops, Congress provided funds to 
construct fifteen gunboats to be used on the Mississippi
Annals of Congress, 7th Cong., 2nd Sess..
95-96.
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•17River or in the southern waters of the United States.
Upon learning of the passage of the Breckinridge 
resolutions, General Wilkinson expressed the fear that 
Spain might he angered. He suggested that Spain might 
transport a force of one thousand men to Louisiana from 
Cuba. However, he assured the Secretary of War that he
■ ) Qwould be ready to open an offensive if ordered to do so.
The Louisiana Purchase was a major coup for the 
United States and a total vindication of President 
Jefferson's patient pursuit of a peaceful solution to 
a problem that might have led to war with both France 
and Spain. The dire prediction of a resident of New 
Orleans that, "The Kentucky men have often wished for 
an opportunity of sacking New Orleans, and the day may
■JQnot be far distant," was not to be.
While the turmoil raged over the transfer of 
Louisiana to France and the closing of the deposit, the 
Army went about its daily business as if nothing out of 
the ordinary was happening or even expected. In fact the 
strength of the force seemed to be melting away. On May 14, 
1800, Congress had authorized a force of 4,436 officers and
37Ibid.. 119.
3®Wilkinson to Dearborn, July 24, 1803, Wilkinson 
Papers, the Boston Public Library, as cited in James R. 
Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army. 1783-1812 
(Princeton: Prince tonTTni vers ity Pre ss, 194 y ) , 2^1.
^ Palladium, Jan. 20, 1803, "Extract of a letter 
from a very intelligent gentleman at New Orleans, dated 
the third instant."
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men. By December 24, 1801, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn
reported that there were 4,051 men of all ranks present for 
40duty. The reason the Army was below strength was that 
vacancies which occurred were not filled as an economy 
measure.
As an additional economy measure, the Secretary
of War issued an order cn March 20, 1801, Just sixteen
days after Jefferson's inauguration, that the two companies
of United States Dragoons were to serve on foot. He stated
that the order was issued as a result of the President's
decision to eliminate an unnecessary expense. The horses
belonging to the Dragoons were to be sold and the money
deposited in the Treasury and their arms and furniture
41were to be returned to the public stores.
General Wilkinson was informed of the decision and 
ordered to arm the men and order them to garrison the posts 
in Tennessee. This move freed the infantry stationed in 
Tennessee to move to the mouth of the Ohio to await another
40American State Papers. Military Affairs 
(Washington: Gales and Seaton, 1932), I, 154-56.
Hereinafter cited ASPMA.
41Secretary of War to the Commanding Officer of 
Dragoons in Georgia, Mar. 20, 1801 and Secretary of War 
to the Commanding Officer of Dragoons in Tennessee,
Mar. 20, 1801, SWLS. Roll 1, 47. The two companies 
of Dragoons had been authorized in 1796, J. P. Callan,
The Military Laws of the United States (Philadelphia:
g7"w .' em^s,"TBS4T7 ttt-t t:---------
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42assignment. The dismounted dragoons were finally stationed 
at South West Point.
On March 16, 1802, the authorized strength of the 
Army was reduced to 3,287, and by the end of the year the 
actual strength was 2,873. By December, 1803, when the 
Army was called upon to occupy the Louisiana Territory, 
its actual strength had dwindled to 2,486.
While Congress and the Administration struggled 
with the problem of what positive action should be taken 
with regard to Louisiana, the tempo of the Army's activ­
ities increased. On January 19, 1803, Governor Claiborne 
purchased forty-three acres of land near Washington, 
Mississippi. The site was to be used for the construction 
of a new fort to protect the vicinity of Natchez.^ The 
people of the Natchez area had been forced to rely on the
troops at Port Adams for protection since the troops were
44withdrawn from the town on March 10, 1800. The new site 
was occupied by a company of soldiers from Port Adams. The
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 20, 1801,
SWLS, Roll 1, 47-48; Secretary of War to Caleb Swan,
5ug7 3, 1802, Ibid., 100.
^Claiborne to Secretary of War, Jan. 19, 1803, 
Rowland, WCC. I, 261-62; Claiborne to Secretary of War,
Peb. 15, 1803, Ibid., 268-69. For additional information 
on the location and establishment of Port Dearborn see 
Chapter VI. See also Secretary of War to Claiborne,
Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 110-12 and Claiborne to Dearborn,
Mar. 2, 1803, Ifbid., 276.
44Sargent to Wilkinson, Mar. 10, 1800, Rowland,
MTA, I, 214-15.
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troops started a blockhouse in January and completed the 
45work by May.
On February 18, 1803, General Wilkinson wrote to
Governor Claiborne from Fort Adams that the marking of
the Choctaw boundary line was finished.^ On the same
day Secretary of War Dearborn wrote to inform the General
that he could expect to be sent on another mission to the
Indians. The Secretary’s letter also warned of the reported
activities of Wilson and contained the order to stop him 
47if possible. Three days later the Secretary issued an
order directing Wilkinson to hold a meeting with the
Choctaws. He was to try to arrange the cession of the
Aftlands bounded by the Yazoo and the Big Black rivers.
Before the Secretary's order arrived at Fort Adams, 
Wilkinson was able to supervise the various projects being 
carried out in the area. In addition to the work on the 
blockhouse at Washington, the works at Fort Adams were 
being improved. The War Department ordered an engineer 
to Fort Adams to plan and supervise the work. Two companies
45̂Claiborne to Secretary of War, Jan. 19» 1803, 
Rowland, WCC, I, 261-62; Wilkinson to Claiborne, May 10, 
1803, Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 215-18.
46Wilkinson to Claiborne, Feb. 18, 1803, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 271. The cost of marking the line was $2,155.00.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 18, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, V, 186-88.
48Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 21, 1803, 
Ibid., 189.
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of soldiers were assigned to aid in the construction of
43the fortifications.
Governor Claiborne was concerned about the safety 
of the territory. On May 2, 1803, he made several sugges­
tions to General Wilkinson as to how and where the regulars 
should be deployed. On May 10 Wilkinson informed Claiborne 
that he would not divide his force into a number of small 
units and scatter them throughout the territory. He 
believed that when they were completed, the works at Fort 
Adams would make it impossible for a large force to pass 
that point on the river.
The new works were to be constructed of bricks, 
timber, and earth. The troops were to make the bricks 
and dry them in the sun and cut the timber in the neigh­
boring swamps. Since it was impossible for the troops 
to work in the swamps or the hot sun after the end of 
June, it was essential that those two jobs be completed 
immediately. To speed the gathering of materials, Wilkinson 
had ordered the troops who were working on the road to 
Nashville to return to Fort Adams.
In his effort to consolidate his force, General 
Wilkinson declined to send troops to reoccupy Walnut Hills, 
unless it was absolutely necessary. He based his decision 
on two points: the position offered no military advantages
49Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803, 
Ibid., 212-14.
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but several disadvantages; and a great number of soldiers 
had died when the position was last occupied. Also he 
refused to send additional troops to occupy the new block­
house at Washington, preferring instead to leave that task 
to the local militia force. Wilkinson did retain one small
detachment at 3ayou Pierre, a force he considered necessary
50to defend that part of the frontier.
On April 16 Dearborn issued an order that took
Wilkinson away from his efforts to direct the nation’s
defenses on the Mississippi frontier and sent him back
into the wilderness. The Secretary instructed the General
to proceed to the Creek Nation, where he would join Colonel
Hawkins in a meeting with the Indians. The purpose of the
negotiations was to persuade the Creeks to extend their
cession of land between the Oconee and Ockmulga rivers so
51that the latter would be the boundary.
In addition to arranging a treaty with the Creeks, 
Wilkinson was to determine the attitude of the Spanish 
concerning the transportation of supplies through their 
territory above Mobile. If the Spanish would not permit 
supplies and men to pass through their territory, the 
supplies would have to be shipped overland at considerable
50Wilkinson to Claiborne, May 10, 1803, Ibid.,
215-18.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803, 
Ibid., 212-14.
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expense to the government and the Choctaw factory would
52"become virtually useless.
The desire of the Secretary of War to obtain some 
definite statement from the Spanish concerning the use of 
the Mobile River was understandable. Spanish policy con­
cerning the use of their rivers and ports was continually 
changing. On March 3# 1803, Governor Claiborne reported 
that the port of New Orleans was partially open to 
Americans. But the Governor did not indicate what policy 
might apply at other places and he did not believe that
New Orleans would be completely opened until the Spanish
5 3Crown ordered it.
Before departing for the conference with the 
Creeks, General Wilkinson received a letter from Intendant 
Juan Morales concerning the use of the Mobile River by 
American vessels. Morales had granted the "free passage 
of Army provisions into the Mobile River.'* However, the 
permission was not a continuing grant and in his reply to 
Morales, Wilkinson requested that the Spanish establish 
some system to govern the passage of supplies in the 
future. He suggested that the United States be allowed 
to send one unarmed boat into the Mobile in the spring 
and autumn. The vessel was to carry a certificate from 
the Secretary of War or the Commanding General stating
5 3Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 3» 1803, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 275.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
91
that it was employed solely in the public service of the
United States.
The General alluded to the fact that: "the public
service of the United States is liable to embarrassments,
delay and unnecessary expense by the circuitous route
which supplies for the support of our establishments on
the Mobile and Tombigby [sic] are obliged to take."
Wilkinson also requested that the Americans living above
the Spanish territory on the Tombigbee, Alabama and Mobile
rivers be granted the privilege of free navigation on
54those rivers to the Gulf of Mexico.
In late July General Wilkinson proceeded to the
vicinity of Port St. Stephens where he met with the
Choctaw chiefs at the village of Hoe Buckintoopa. On
August 31, 1803, an agreement was reached that provided
for the cession of approximately 853*760 acres of land
by the Choctaws. In return the United States would pay
the overdue bills that the Indians owed the British firm
55of Panton, Leslie and Company. After concluding the
54Wilkinson to Morales, July 6, 1803, Carter, 
Territorial Papers. V, 219-21. The letter from Morales 
to Wilkinson has not been found. Peake says: "Goods
which ordinarily would be sent to Port Saint Stephens 
by the way of Mobile were sent to New Orleans and up the 
Mississippi or were sent overland from Natchez by pack 
animals if trouble developed with the Spanish at Mobile." 
A History of the United States Indian Pactory System, 93.
55Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 16, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers. V, 213. Kappler, Indian 
Affaira. II. 51. Arthur H. De Hosier, The Removal of 
the dkoctaw Indians (Knoxville: University of Tennessee 
Press, 1976), 31.
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treaty, Wilkinson remained in the Tombigbee region to
direct the retracing and remarking of the boundary line
between the United States and the Choctaw Nation.
On July 18, 1803, President Jefferson wrote to
Governor Claiborne inquiring whether or not he would be
able to proceed to New Orleans and take possession of that
territory for the United States. The President also asked
if three companies of regulars from Port Adams would be
sufficient to man the fortifications in the neighborhood 
56of the city. On August 12 Governor Claiborne accepted
the appointment as commissioner to receive Louisiana from
the French. In addition, he stated that the three companies
57of regulars "should be ample.” On July 15 the Secretary
of War had ordered the commanding officer at Port Adams to 
be prepared to transfer four companies of soldiers and a 
large supply of stores that were being sent to New Orleans 
from Philadelphia.^®
On September 9 Daniel Clark, a resident of New
56Jefferson to Claiborne, July 18, 1803, Clarence 
E. Carter (ed«), The Territorial Papers of the United 
States, IX, The Territory of Orleans, 1851-1812 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1940), 5.
57Claiborne to Jefferson, Aug. 12, 1803, Ibid., 
11-12, On Aug. 24 Governor Claiborne again wrote to 
the President to express his gratitude for the appoint­
ment and answered a number of questions the President 
had posed concerning Louisiana. Ibid.. 16-25.
58Order cited, Ibid., 71n.
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Orleans, addressed a letter to the Secretary of State
that contained some unsettling news. The letter was an
answer to a communication from the President requesting
information about Louisiana. Clark reported at great
length about affairs in the territory, and in the course
of the report, he stated that there were 5,440 militia in 
59Louisiana. If the Spanish decided to contest the French 
surrender of Louisiana to the United States, the militia 
combined with the regular Spanish troops in the province 
would constitute a powerful force.
On October 5 the Secretary of War stated that there 
were rumors that Spain might oppose or try to delay the 
efforts of the United States to assume control at New 
Orleans. After the delaying tactics employed by the 
Spanish at Natchez, there was every reason to believe 
that the rumors were valid. As a consequence of these 
fears, General Wilkinson was ordered to have enough boats, 
provisions, field pieces, and other equipment ready for 
the use of not only the regulars but for five hundred of 
the best militia from the Mississippi Territory.̂ 0
Wilkinson, being absent, could not supervise the 
activities at Fort Adams. Therefore Governor Claiborne 
assumed the responsibility for directing the preparations
59Daniel Clark to Secretary of State, Sept. 8,
1803, Ibid.. 28-47.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 5, 1803, 
Ibid.. 71.
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for the trip to New Orleans. The Governor gather informa­
tion from a variety of sources: from Captain Edward Turner
concerning preparations at Port Adams; from Daniel Clark 
with regard to possible delays on the part of Spain; and 
from a traveler who said that the fortifications at New 
Orleans were virtually useless and that the Spanish
regulars could not furnish an adequate garrison for the
 ̂ 61 defenses.
Claiborne realized that he was assuming duties
that were not a part of his office, but he justified his
military questions on the basis that:
These are enquiries which would come 
more regularly from General Wilkinson, 
but he has not yet returned to this 
territory, and as the utmost dispatch 
is required by Government in this 
affair, it is my duty not to looseone moment unnecessarily.
On October 31 a commission was issued which 
appointed Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson as 
agents on behalf of the United States to receive Louisiana. 
On the same day lengthy instructions were issued to both 
men by which they were to govern their conduct before and 
after the territorial transfer.^
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Nov. 18, 1803* 
and Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, I, 
284-90.
^Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland, WCC, 
I, 288. ---
^Commission of W. C. C. Claiborne and James 
Wilkinson as Agents, Oct. 31* 1803, Territorial Papers.
IX, 94; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Oct. 31, i803,
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General Wilkinson was to occupy the military posts 
in the province as soon as they were transferred to the 
United States, but those in New Orleans and its vicinity 
were to be garrisoned first. It was anticipated that 
Wilkinson would have a force composed of six companies 
of regulars and a hundred militia, from the Natchez district, 
with which to work. After the territory was transferred 
the government of the territory would be in the hands of 
Governor Claiborne.
The foregoing instructions were based on the 
assumption that the territory would be surrendered without 
opposition. However, if Spain should resist American 
occupation, the General and Governor Claiborne were to 
decide whether or not to seize the territory. If the use 
of force was decided upon, Wilkinson was to use the regulars 
at Fort Adams and as many, militia as could be gathered in 
the neighborhood of Natchez. In issuing these orders the 
Secretary of War calculated that between six and nine 
hundred militia could be raised and that the regular force 
would number between three and four hundred. He considered 
his force adequate to seize New Orleans.
The Secretary informed Wilkinson that the Governor 
of Tennessee had been instructed to raise five hundred men 
and send them to Natchez. These troops were to be used if 
the General felt they were necessary. If the troops were
Ibid.. 91-94; Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803,TEH.. 96-98.
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not employed in taking New Orleans, the General could use
them as he saw fit. As an added precaution, the Governors
of Kentucky, Tennessee and Ohio had been instructed to
have 6,000 men ready to march if necessary.^
Despite the detailed instructions from the Secretary
of War, General Wilkinson would not to able to supervise
the preparations at Fort Adams for some time. Captain
Turner, the commanding officer at Fort Adams, informed
Governor Claiborne that a letter from Wilkinson, dated
October 27. stated that he would leave Pensacola in three 
65days. On November 26 Claiborne reported that he expected 
the General to arrive at Fort Adams at any time. On 
November 11 the General left Fort St. Stephens for Mobile. 
From there he would travel to New Orleans and then up the 
Mississippi to Fort Adams.
While he waited for Wilkinson, Governor Claiborne 
became more concerned about the possibility that the 
Spanish would resist American occupation of Louisiana.
He applauded the decision to order the mounted infantry 
from Tennessee as "a wise and provident measure, as that
64.Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 31, 1803,
Ibid., 96-98. Secretary of War to Sevier, Gerard and 
fZHin, Oct. 31, 1803, SWLS. Roll 2, 250.
65Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Rowland,
WCC. I, 295.
66Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid.,
297-98. ----
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reinforcement will at all events be useful, if they arrive 
in time as an addition to our little Army. . . In
addition to the militia from Tennessee the Governor 
arranged for some of the Mississippi Territorial militia 
to move to New Orleans.
The Governor clearly missed the presence of General 
Wilkinson. He informed Albert Gallatin that:
The Government having placed 
(and with great propriety too) their 
principal reliance on General Wilkinson 
for the management of a Coup De Main if 
it should be deemed expedient, I cannot 
describe to you the painful anxiety 
which I feel at the absence of this 
experienced and valuable officer. I 
indulge however some hope that his 
speedy arrival will relieve me from 
my present embarrassment.6®
The Governor told the militia Captains that he would 
accept the services of any company, to act as volunteers, 
to escort the Commissioners to New Orleans.^ As a safe­
guard against delays, Claiborne wrote:
I deem it good policy for the 
American Commissioners not to proceed 
to New Orleans until our Army is ready 
to move: - with a number of brave men
at our command, the negociations [sic]
^Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid., 287.
C Q Claiborne to Gallatin, Nov. 18, 1803, Ibid.,
293* Claiborne’s italics.
^Claiborne to Clark, Nov. 21, 1803, Ibid.,
295-96.
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may be considerable [sic] accelerated 
if delays should be attempted.70
Claiborne continued his preparations for the
movement to New Orleans. On November 26 he reported
that fourteen boats were ready at Fort Adams and that
71in a few days the soldiers would complete six more.
Two days later Claiborne reported that the response from
the militia had not been as great as he had hoped, but he
anticipated that two hundred men would eventually volunteer.
He estimated that when the two hundred men joined the
regulars at Fort Adams the force would be about five 
72hundred men.
On November 29 Daniel Clark sent word to Claiborne
and Wilkinson from New Orleans that the French would take
73possession of the territory the next day. J The day after 
the French took possession of Louisiana, Governor Claiborne 
embarked about one hundred militia at Natchez for Fort 
Adams. He anticipated that eighty more men, moving by 
land, would join him at the fort. Claiborne stated that 
the troops from Tennessee had not arrived but were on the 
way. He also reported that General Wilkinson had arrived 
in New Orleans on the twenty-fifth and was expected to
71Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 26, 1803, Ibid., 
297-98. ----
72Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 29, 1803, Ibid., 299.
73Clark to Claiborne and Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 125.
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74arrive at Port Adams at any moment.
The movement from Fort Adams was delayed until
sufficient transportation could be arranged for all of
the men and supplies. Claiborne informed the Secretary
of State that he had assembled one hundred and sixty
volunteers and expected about forty more to join him
before the force marched. He estimated that the combined
force numbered between four hundred and fifty and five
hundred, exclusive of the Tennessee militia which had not
yet arrived.^
On December 10 the two commissioners and their
military escort began the movement down the river on
76eighteen boats and two barges. By December 15 the
Americans reached a point approximately two miles above
the city of New Orleans where they prepared their camp.
The total strength of the force that Wilkinson commanded
77was about three hundred and fifty men.
At noon on December 20 Commissioners Claiborne
7 A.Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 1, 1803, Howland, 
WCC. I, 300-301.
75Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 5» 6 and 7, 1803» 
Ibid.. 303-305.
76General Order, Dec. 8, 1803 and General Order, 
Dec. 10, 1803, in General James Wilkinson’s Order Book, 
Dec. 31t 1796 - March 8, 1808, Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, Record Group 94, National Archives 
Microfilm Publication, M654.
77General Order, Dec. 19» 1803, General James 
Wilkinson's Order Book.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
100
and Wilkinson took possession of the province of Louisiana
for the United States. The formal transfer was greeted
with mixed emotions by the onlookers in the Place d' Armes;
78some cheered but most watched in silence.
General Wilkinson reported that the transfer was 
accomplished peacefully and the town was quiet. He 
stationed one hundred and seventy men throughout the city 
to maintain law and order. The General's force numbered 
four hundred and fifty men, and from that number be pro- 
posed to maintain three distinct patrols in the town.
The General stationed his men at points where he thought 
trouble might occur. He cautioned the soldiers to be on
their best behavior and to be friendly and considerate to
80the local residents. Wilkinson soon discovered that the 
maintenance of discipline was difficult in New Orleans.
In his first General Order the General mentioned that most 
of the men on guard at Fort St. Louis had left their post 
to explore the city. The few soldiers remaining in the
78Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 20, 1803, Rowland,
WCC. I, 306-307. Governor Claiborne wrote: "The standard
of"my country was this day unfurled here, amidst the re- 
interated acclamations of thousands." But some reports 
indicate that there was little enthusiasm on the part of 
the crowd, Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana (New 
York: Goupil & Co. of Paris, 19^4),”Tl, 284-86.
79Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Dec. 20, 1803, 
Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 138-39.
80General Order, Dec. 20, 1803 and General Order, 
Dec. 25f 1803» General James Wilkinson's Order Book.
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81fort were so drunk that they were unable to move.
The celebrating by the American soldiers was prob­
ably inevitable, but it could have destroyed the discipline 
of the small force. As a result, Governor Claiborne issued 
an order banning the sale of wines, spirits, or other 
strong liquor to soldiers. The order strictly prohibited 
sales to non-commissioned officers and privates without 
the written permission of an officer. The permit was to 
be addressed by name to the individual who was selling the
liquor. Any person who was found guilty of violating the
82order was subject to a fine not to exceed fifty dollars.
The principal concern of the Commissioners was 
the continuing presence of the Spanish in New Orleans. 
Wilkinson and Claiborne filed a joint report on this 
problem on December 29. The transfer of the province 
had gone smoothly. However, the Spanish were still in 
the city and their presence was causing some problems and 
uneasiness. The Spanish still occupied the barracks, 
magazines, hospital, and public storehouses. The repeated 
requests of the Americans for the Spanish to vacate the 
buildings had gone unheeded. The Americans had occupied 
only the forts at Plaquemine and the blockhouse at the Balize. 
The other posts would be occupied as soon as possible.
81 General Order, Dec. 20, 1803, General James 
Wilkinson's Order Book.
O p
Order of the Governor, Dec. 24, 1803, Rowland,
WCC, I, 311-12.
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Wilkinson had determined that the militia from 
Natchez would he retained a little longer at New Orleans.
The General believed that additional troops were necessary 
since there were still about three hundred Spanish soldiers 
in the city. If he dismissed the militia, the regulars 
would be outnumbered by the Spanish, a situation that would
make "the possession of the city somewhat precarious."
Besides, in addition to the large number of Spanish
soldiers present in the city, there were reports that
Spain was gathering troops on the Mexican frontier. The 
military build-up in Mexico was apparently being made with
Q
a view to encroaching on the ceded territory. J
The Commissioners reported on January 3, 1804, that 
orders had been issued for the surrender of the posts of 
Concordia, Attakapas and Opelousas to the United States.
The Americans had obtained the use of only a part of the 
barracks, "but the more eligible portion of those buildings" 
was still occupied by the Spanish troops. The French and 
Spanish still retained possession of the storehouses and 
magazines. The American supplies were still 3tored aboard 
the boats that had transported them from Natchez. Wilkinson 
rented private storehouses in the city in an effort to save
®^Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Dec. 27,
18C3, in James Alexander Robertson, Louisiana under 
the Rule of Spain, France and the United Spates, 1^85- 
1867 (Cleveland; The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1911), il,
IS^I.
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Q J
the provisions from the elements.
General Wilkinson was preparing to return to the
capital as soon as possible, but he was detained by the
delays encountered in taking possession of the military
facilities. Also he faced the perplexing problem of
which officer to place in command when he left New
Orleans. Wilkinson's assessment of his subordinate's
was dismal at best:
Wadsworth is interdicted the exercise 
of authority, Turner is the only 
officer who can be trusted with the 
distant and delicate command at 
Natchitoches - Gregg, Cooper &
Mughleriburgh remain - the second is 
at Placquimenes [sic] tho unfit for 
a separate command - the first is 
utterly destitute of education, 
manner, & intelligence, and poor 
Mughleriburgh's devoted to drink, 
with good disposition but feeble 
intellect - Bowyer with his company 
a fine one, is daily expected from 
the Mobile, but this officer tho 
greatly superior to Gregg labours 
under the same disqualification.°5
In another letter of the same date, the General
reported that his men occupied the ground floor of the
barracks, but the Spanish still possessed the second floor.
The building was without heat and the men were falling ill
84Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Jan. 3,
1804, Carter, Territorial Papers. IX, 149-50.
85Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3, 1804, 
Ibid., 150-51. The officers referred to were Aaron Gregg, 
Henry L. Cooper, Decius Wadsworth, Edward Turner, Henry 
Muhlenberg, and John Bowyer.
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as a result of their exposure to the weather. The hospital, 
which the Americans desperately needed, was still occupied 
by the Spanish. The sick list showed that fifty-nine 
non-commissioned officers and privates were ill, and one 
man had died the previous night.
The Americans possessed none of the public 
buildings in New Orleans, although the post of Plaquemine 
and St. Jean had been occupied. The next day a detachment 
was to move to Attakapas and Opelousas and take possession 
of those posts. The French had not ordered the delivery
of the Illinois country and it appeared that it would take
a few days longer to procure the necessary order. In an
effort to curtail expenditures, Wilkinson had dismissed
86the militia force from Mississippi.
3y January 9 the Commissioners reported that the 
situation had not improved. The French had not issued 
the necessary orders for the surrender of Natchitoches 
or the posts in Upper Louisiana. The delay was attributed
to the failure of the Spanish Commissioners to order the
transfer by their post commanders. They reported, however, 
that it was likely that the orders would be delivered the 
next day.®^
The situation in New Orleans reported in the joint
86Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 3» 1804,
Ibid.. 152-53.
87Claiborne and Wilkinson to Secretary of State,
Jan. 9, 1804, Ibid.. 155-57.
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communication to the Secretary of State was different in 
tone than the one addressed to the Secretary of War by 
Wilkinson. He stated that he had discharged the militia 
because of "their importunity, their impatience, the 
irregularities into which they were running and the expense 
they occasioned." Three regulars had died since the third 
of the month, but the number of men on the sick list was 
declining. Because of the necessity of maintaining a 
constant guard, many of the men had not spent more than 
one night in bed. He expected that the men would be 
afforded some relief by the arrival of the troops from 
Mobile.
The General said that he would be unable to leave 
New Orleans until the objects in his commission had been 
fulfilled and that would require time because conditions 
in the city were dangerous: the Spanish had more troops
than the Americans had; the French Prefect, Mr. Laussat, 
was involved in a dispute with some of the French officers; 
the conduct of a group from Bourdeaux, unidentified in the 
sources, endangered the public safety; and the tensions 
between the white citizens and the free people of color 
were growing. All of these factors had convinced the 
General that a strong garrison was required in the city.
Wilkinson observed that "our puny force has become 
a subject of ridicule." One example of how inadequate his 
force was and the rapidity with which events could move was
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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recorded by the General:
A few nights since some person observed 
that the Governor or the General had 
given leave for the demolition of the 
stockade which surrounded the city, 
and by 8 o'clock the next morning, 
before the operation was noticed by 
our guards, which occupy the center 
of the city, and the Ports St. Charles 
and St. Louis near the River, not one 
stick was left on a line of one and a 
half miles, and a House in one of the 
rear redoubts was rased to its foundation 
and the materials carried off.
Wilkinson related that two of his officers were to 
be tried by courts martial: Captain Aaron Gregg for allow­
ing a prisoner to escape from confinement; and Captain 
Henry Mughleriburgh for leaving his post contrary to direct 
orders. The General apologized for the freedom of his 
communication and the views it contained but he felt that
the Secretary should be aware of the situation that existed 
88in New Orleans.
On January 16 General Wilkinson reported that the 
order for the delivery of the posts in Upper Louisiana had 
been received. This information had been sent to Captain 
Amos Stoddard, who was waiting at Fort Massac to occupy the 
posts when the Spanish evacuated them.
Wilkinson said that the possibility existed that 
problems might develop with the French. A French ship 
carrying soldiers and refugees from Santo Domingo had
®®Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 11, 1804, 
Ibid.. 159-61.
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landed at the Balize. With the approval of Governor
Claiborne, the General had ordered the commanding officer
at Plaquemine to prevent the ship from ascending the river.
The ship was detained for two reasons: (1) there was
sickness aboard that might spread to the local population;
and (2) it was feared that the arrival of French troops
might upset the delicate balance that existed in the 
89province•
A company of regulars commanded by Lieutenant
Henry Hopkins was ordered to occupy the posts at Attakapas
and Opelousas. To provide for the continuation of the
civil government in the area after the removal of the
Spanish Commandant, Governor Claiborne appointed Hopkins
to the post of Civil Commandant. The Governor believed
that the young officer was well suited to meet the
responsibilities of his dual office, because he was a
"young man of prudence, good information, and possesses
some knowledge of the French language.*' Thus Lieutenant
Hopkins assumed the duties not only of military commander
of the district but also civil commandant, a position
identical in authority and responsibilities to that occupied
90by the former Spanish Commandant.
^Wilkinson to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1804, 
Ibid., 164-66. See also Claiborne and Wilkinson to 
Secretary of State, Jan. 17, 1804, Ibid.t 166-67.
90Claiborne to Hopkins, Jan. 20, 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 336-38; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804,
TEId.. 344-49.
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By the final week of January the situation had not 
changed appreciably. The Americans were still sharing the 
barracks with the Spanish troops, and the magazines and 
storehouses still contained the French and Spanish 
supplies. There appeared to be no preparations on the 
part of either group to withdraw. Expenses were high 
because it was necessary to rent quarters and storehouses 
and repair the various public buildings. Wilkinson wrote: 
"everything which could be neglected by the Spaniards after 
the cession of this province has been neglected, and we 
find everything out of repair."
The American soldiers were relatively comfortable.
Although two men were seriously ill, the sick list was
decreasing. The men had built fireplaces and chimneys
in the barracks to provide heat against the cold weather.
The General reported that there was snow on the ground and
that the temperature the previous night had dropped to
thirty degrees. The troops were complaining about their
pay, which for some was fifteen months in arrears. A
detachment had not been sent to Natchitoches because the
garrison at New Orleans was too small to furnish an adequate
garrison for the new post. The reinforcements from Mobile
had not arrived because contrary winds had prevented them
91from entering the Mississippi.
91Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Jan. 24, 1804, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 168-70.
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On January 23 General Wilkinson ordered Captain 
Amos Stoddard to take possession of the military posts 
in Upper Louisiana. The next day Governor Claiborne in­
formed the Captain that he was to act as the Civil 
Commandant for the district. Claiborne told Stoddard 
that he would possess "the same powers in civil matters 
which heretofore were exercised by the first Civil
Commandant of the District of Upper Louisiana under the
92Spanish Government. . . ."
On February 17 Governor Claiborne informed
Secretary of State James Madison that the Spanish and
French forces were still in New Orleans. The representatives
of the two powers spoke of a speedy evacuation, but the
Governor feared that further delays were likely. Ten days
later the Commissioners reported that the Spanish had
finally begun to remove their cannons from some of the
posts in the area. The Spanish Governor of Florida,
Vincente Folch, was in New Orleans and he indicated that
3ome of the troops in the city would be embarked for
Pensacola in three or four days. He predicted that a
complete evacuation would be effected in approximately 
94twenty days.
^Wilkinson to Stoddard, Jan. 23» 1804, Ibid.,
170-71. Claiborne to Stoddard, Jan. 24, 1804, Rowland,
WCC, I, 350. Claiborne*s italics.
93Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 31» 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 352-55. Claiborne to Wilkinson, Feb. 13, 1804,
Ibid., 371.
94Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 17, 1804, Ibid.,
376-77. Claiborne and Wilkinson to Madison, Feb. 27,
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General Wilkinson dispatched Captain Turner and a
detachment of regulars to occupy the post at Natchitoches.
On February 25 Governor Claiborne appointed Captain Turner
as Civil Commandant of the District of Natchitoches on the
Red River* Turner’s appointment meant that three officers
exercised not only military but also civil authority in
95three districts of Louisiana.
On March 11, Wilkinson and Claiborne reported that
a part of the Spanish troops had departed and arrangements
were being made for the removal of the remaining soldiers.
Various Spanish officials had assured the Americans that
96the final evacuation would be accomplished by March 20.
While the Spanish were preparing to leave Louisiana, the
United States was increasing its military strength. The
Secretary of War informed General Wilkinson that two
companies of marines and three companies of soldiers were
97on their way to New Orleans.
The Spanish forces did not complete their removal 
by March 20 as Governor Claiborne had been assured. On
1804, in Robertson, Louisiana under the Rule of Spain,
France and the UnitecT"States. 1785-1807, II t 2^2-93.
95 Claiborne to Turner, Feb. 25, 1804, Rowland,
WCC. I, 385-86.
^Claiborne and Wilkinson, Mar. 11, 1804, Robertson, 
Louisiana under the Rule of Spain, France and the United 
States. f785-lb0T7~XI, 293^95".
97Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New 
Orleans, Mar. 15, 1804, SWLS. Roll 2, 197.
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April 7 Governor Claiborne expressed his exasperation in 
a letter to James Madison. He wrote: "the Spanish forces
are still here, preparations for an evacuation are making, 
but with all the sloth peculiar to Spanish operations." 
Within two days the Governor was able to state that the 
Spanish troops, numbering about three hundred officers and 
men, had finally departed for Pensacola. The only Spanish 
soldiers remaining were .a company of dragoons destined for 
Mexico, and a company of infantry that made up the guard 
for the Spanish boundary commissioner, the Marquis Casa de 
Calvo.^®
While the Spanish prepared to evacuate Louisiana 
the members of the Army were actively engaged in a number 
of duties in the new territory. William Dunbar was pre­
paring to explore the Red and Arkansas rivers at the re­
quest of President Jefferson. He was to have an escort of 
one officer, a sergeant and ten enlisted men. The .Secretary 
of War cautioned that none of the soldiers accompaning
qqDunbar should be intemperate in their habits.^ The ex­
pedition was finally cancelled because Congress failed to 
appropriate the necessary funds. Instead of exploring the 
two rivers, Dunbar took a smaller expedition up the Washita
qa^Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 7, 1804, Rowland, WCC. 
II, 83-84. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 9, 1804, Ibid.,
88-89.
99Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at New 
Orleans, Mar. 31, 1804, SWLS, Roll 2, 208 and Secretary 
of War to Commanding Officer at New Orleans, Apr. 19,
1804, Ibid.. 226.
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River. The expedition was composed of Dunbar, one officer, 
a sergeant and twelve enlisted men supplied by Colonel 
Freeman from the garrison at New Orleans.100 While Dunbar 
was preparing his expedition, Wilkinson was conducting a 
military inspection of Lake Ponchartrain.101
Claiborne availed himself of the opportunity 
offered by the presence of Governor Folch in New Orleans 
to try to resolve the problem of transporting goods through 
Spanish territory to Fort St. Stephens. Claiborne re­
quested permission for goods to pass to and from the factory 
without paying duties or being stopped by Spanish officials.
Folch denied the request but promised to present the
102American case to the King for his consideration.
Upon receiving Folch's reply, Claiborne told the 
Secretary of War that the problem could be resolved if the 
United States would occupy the territory east of the 
Mississippi to the Perdido River. The Governor believed 
that the United States had a valid claim to this area under 
the provisions of the treaty that ceded Louisiana to the 
United States. Upon further consideration, Claiborne advised
100Duribar to Jefferson, May 13, 1804, Eron Rowland 
(ed.), Life. Letters and Papers of William Dunbar (Jackson: 
Press of the Mississippi historical Society, 1930), 130-33; 
Dunbar to Jefferson, Aug. 18, 1804 and Dunbar to Jefferson, 
Oct. 14, 1804, Ibid., 139-41.
101Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 7, 1804, Rowland,
WCC, II, 83-84. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 10, 1804,Ibid.. 89.
102Claiborne to Folch, Mar. 7, 1804, Ibid., 19-20. 
Folch to Claiborne, Mar. 15, 1804, Ibid.. 38.
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Joseph. Chambers, the factor at Fort St. Stephens, to ship 
his goods through Mobile and if necessary pay the duties 
demanded. He cautioned Chambers to lodge a formal com­
plaint with the Spanish if he was required to pay duties 
on government property.10-̂
When he returned from inspecting Lake Ponchartrain, 
Wilkinson took time to renew his dealings with the Spanish.
He approached Governor Folch and requested that his pension 
be increased to $4,000 a year, and that the $20,000 in 
arrears be paid in full. In exchange for these payments, 
Wilkinson would write some reflections on Louisiana that 
might be helpful to the Spanish. Folch did not have the 
funds necessary to meet the General's demands, but he sent 
Wilkinson to Casa Calvo who could use a portion of his 
boundary commission funds to pay the General. Casa Calvo 
accepted Wilkinson's offer and paid him $12,000, for which 
Wilkinson produced his reflections.10^
Wilkinson's reflections were of little value to the 
Spanish as they recommended policies which would be virtually 
impossible for Spain to carry out. At the same time he
10^Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 15, 1804, Ibid.,
39-40. Claiborne to Chambers, Mar. 21, 1804, Ibid..
52-53.
104Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1574; I. J. Cox, "General 
Wilkinson and his“ITater Intrigues with the Spaniards," 
American Historical Review, XIX (June, 1914), 794-814.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
114
prepared his reflections for Casa Calvo, Wilkinson pre­
pared another version for President Jefferson. The General 
was playing both ends against the middle, a game at which 
he was a master. Before he left New Orleans for Washington 
the General assured Folch that he would determine the 
President's views concerning Spain. Wilkinson promised 
to communicate the views tc Folch as soon as possible.10^
On April 28, 1804, with his money from Casa Calvo 
invested in sugar speculations and his report for Jefferson 
prepared, Wilkinson left New Orleans for Washington.10^
This trip was the fourth that Wilkinson had made to the 
capital since 1796. When he returned to the frontier a 
year later, he would be the Commanding General of the 
Army as well as the Governor of the Louisiana Territory.
The situation in Louisiana was improving when 
Wilkinson left New Orleans. Lieutenant James B. Many had 
occupied the post and the district of the Arkansas and 
Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar had occupied the district of 
Ouachitas. The two officers would exercise both civil 
and military authority -until permanent arrangements could
10^Folch to Someruelos, Apr. 10, 1804, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papele3 de Cuba, leg. 1574.
1 ̂ Deposition of William Simmons, American State 
Papers, Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and Seaton,
TS3TT7 it* 11^. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 28, 1804, Howland, WCC. II, 118.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
107be made for the government of the districts. The 
American troops stationed in New Orleans were healthy 
and well disciplined. On May 4 one hundred marines
10Rarrived in the city to bolster the depleted garrison.
The officers and men stationed at the various 
posts were occupied with the problems of maintaining law 
and order throughout the territory. Captain William Cooper, 
commanding officer at Plaquemine, was required to enforce, 
a number of regulations. He stopped a number of armed 
vessels at his post that were attempting to ascend the 
river. He also detained vessels that were engaged in 
transporting slaves into the region, and perhaps most
109importantly he quarantined a ship with smallpox aboard.
The officers commanding in the outlying districts found 
themselves occupied with few military duties but numerous 
civil responsibilities.110
107'Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 14, 1804, Rowland, 
WCC, II, 96. Claiborne to Bowmar, May 15, 1804, Ibid.,TO.
108Claiborne to Dearborn, May 5, 1804, Ibid., 129. 
Claiborne to Turner, May 6, 1804, Ibid., 131-32.
10^Claiborne to Cooper, Apr. 14, 1804, Ibid., 9o. 
Claiborne to Cooper, Apr. 14, 1804, Ibid., 99. Claiborne 
to Manor Bore, n.d., Ibid., 113-14. Claiborne to Cooper, 
May 9, 1804, Ibid.. 1357"
110See for example: Claiborne to Turner, May 6,
1804, Ibid., 131-32. Claiborne to Hopkins, May 9, 1804, 
Ibid., 1^7. Claiborne to Hopkins, May 29, 1804, Ibid., 
168-169.
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Governor Claiborne was concerned about the activ­
ities of the Spanish. By mid-May there were six former 
Spanish officials, fifteen army officers, a company of 
dragoons, and a detachment of infantry still in New Orleans. 
Spanish supplies, powder, balls, and arms filled the public 
warehouses and there was a large train of artillery in the 
p a r k . ^  The dragoons were expected to leave before the 
end of the month but the remaining Spaniards were expected 
to remain through the summer.
The Spanish officials at Mobile had detained some 
of the provisions shipped from New Orleans to Fort Stoddard. 
The contractor had finally been forced to pay a duty of 
twelve percent on the supplies before they were released. 
The*‘furs being shipped from the factory at Fort St.
Stephens had been stopped and the same duties exacted upon 
them. The products being exported by the citizens living 
above Mobile were subject to the duties, which the citizens 
were paying reluntantly. In addition, it was reported that 
the Spanish were fortifying Pensacola and Mobile. When the 
new works were completed, five or six hundred Spanish troops
would be stationed at the former post and a battalion of
112artillery and a company of dragoons at the latter.
111Claiborne to Madison, May 13» 1804, Ibid.,
146-47. Claiborne to Madison, June 27, 1804, Ibid.,
227-29.
11^Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 20, 1804, Ibid.,
108.
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During the first week of June Lieutenant Colonel 
Constant Freeman arrived in New Orleans with three additional 
companies of infantry, and assumed command of the troops in 
Louisiana. Governor Claiborne reported that the Colonel 
was pleased with the discipline of the troops and he pre­
dicted that Freeman was an excellent choice for the com­
mander at New Orleans. The Colonel was an experienced 
officer, he had a good knowledge of the French language,
• I 1 *5and, a final point in his favor, he was a Catholic.
By late June Claiborne wrote:
I cannot too highly approve the 
General conduct of the Army: the
officers act with propriety and the 
troops are under excellent discipline,
Colonel Freeman commands with prudence 
and dignity and I am, persuaded his ...
conduct will be perfectly satisfactory.
The Governor realized the difficult position that
the officers of the Army occupied when they were assigned
to administer the civil government of a district. He told
the Commandant of Ouchita, Lieutenant Joseph Bowmar:
It is one of the serious incon­
veniences of the present state of 
things in this country that we are
under the necessity of being governed
as nearly as possible, by a system,
in most points incongenial with the 
principles of our own Government by 
Laws to which we are almost utter 
strangers, and forms a practice as .
intricate as they are new to us. . .
11^Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9, 1804, Ibid., 199.
4 J 4
Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid.P
217-19.
115Claiborne to Bowmar, June 27, 1804, Ibid.,
223-27.
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The only advice the Governor could give was to consult 
him if questions arose that the Lieutenant was unable 
to answer.
On July 16, 1804, Governor Claiborne requested
that an officer and about twenty enlisted men be stationed
at the Balize. The detachment was to assist the revenue
inspector who was stationed at the Balize. The soldiers
were to prevent the entrance into "this province of Negroes
whose characters and conduct have given serious alarm to
the good inhabitants." The Governor did not expect the
detachment to remain at the Balize after October 1, 1804,
when the law prohibiting the importation of slaves into
116Louisiana was to take affect.
The Governor instructed the Commanding Officer at 
Plaquemine, Captain Abimall Y. Nicoll, to inspect all 
ships ascending the river to determine whether any of 
the crew had been landed between the Balize and Plaquemine. 
The Captain was also to inspect all ships descending the 
river to determine whether or not there were any runaway 
slaves aboard the ships. All runaways discovered were 
to be detained until claimed by their owners. The man 
who discovered the runaway could charge eight dollars for 
the recovery. The slave was to be furnished with one 
ration per day while at the fort. All expenses were to
11^Claiborne to Freeman, July 16, 1804, Ibid.. 
250-51. Claiborne to Freeman, July 17, 1804, ancl 
Claiborne to Captain Johnson 1st Pilot at the Balize,
July 18, 1804, Ibid.. 254-58.
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be paid by the slave's owner before he could take the 
slave away. The Captain was also to inform people as­
cending the river that they were required to register at
the Mayor's office within twenty-four hours after arriving 
117in the city.
In Orleans Territory the period from June until
December of 1804 was spent in consolidating the position
of the United States and watching the activities of the
Spanish to the east and to the west. Governor Claiborne's
solution to all of the problems with Spain was fairly
simple. He suggested that: "the marching of a few
thousand troops to the western frontier of Louisiana would
make Spain tremble for her Mexican possessions, and promptly
113yield to our just claims."
For the soldiers stationed in the South who were 
not actively involved in the occupation of the Louisiana 
Purchase, the period from November of 1803 until September 
of 1805 was a period of idleness. The soldiers were occupied 
with maintaining the military posts and waiting to see how 
the situation to the west would develop. The one thing 
that might have required any activity on the part of the 
officers and men was an order to cooperate with civil 
authorities in the enforcement of "An act for the more
117Claiborne to Nicoll, July 25, 1804, Ibid., 262-63. 
118Claiborne to Secretary of State, Oct. 22, 1804, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 312-13.
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effectual preservation of peace in the ports and harbors
of the United States.” The officers were required to give
assistance when it was requested by civil officers, but it
119appears that no requests were made.
Conditions were so relaxed in the South that
apparently the War Department was not in communication
with some of the troops. The Secretary of War addressed
a letter to the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson that
contained a strange request:
*Enclosed herewith I send you a 
communication for the officer command­
ing the troops on the sea coast of 
Georgia. Should there be any stationed 
in that quarter of the state, I will 120 
thank you to forward it to the officer.
The lull in the Army's activities in the area
outside of the Louisiana Purchase was a result of several
factors: (1) the Army's limited manpower made more than
one large operation virtually impossible; (2) the lack of
transportation facilities did not allow rapid movement of
men or supplies from one part of the nation to another; and
(3) the limited funds available to the War Department meant
that only the most important operations could be undertaken.
A letter from the War Department to General Wilkinson
revealed the situation confronting the commanding general.
11^Secretary of War - Circular, June 19* 1805,
SWLS, Roll 2, 342.
120Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at 
Fort Wilkinson, June 22, 1805, Ibid.. 345.
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Wilkinson was to adhere to the most rigid economy in all 
of his actions and to make no unnecessary expenditures.
He was to establish no permanent posts or incur any
120"considerable expense for work or buildings at present."
For a few months the activities of the Army were 
virtually at a standstill. Time was required to determine 
how the Army should be employed on the frontier and what 
it was expected to accomplish. Before any definite plans 
could be made, events occurred that required the attention 
of the Army. The temporary calm was dispelled by reports 
of growing problems between the United States and Spain.
120Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 19> 1805, 
Ibid.. 319-21.
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CHAPTER III
PROBLEMS WITH THE 
SPANISH AND AARON BURR
The acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase put a 
severe strain upon the limited resources of the Army, which 
had to divert troops to occupy it. Although only a small 
portion of the territory was initially occupied, new posts 
were established that required men to garrison them. Within 
the limits of the present state of Louisiana seven new posts 
were established between 1803 and 1806; by contrast, in the 
rest of the nation only eight other posts were founded.
While the Army established fifteen posts, it abandoned 
three and another was washed away by the Atlantic Ocean.
The net gain of eleven new posts in only four years meant 
that the strength of many of the older garrisons were re­
duced to a bare minimum. Consequently, the pace of the 
Army's activities slowed, while decisions were made con­
cerning its future assignments.1
1See Appendix for posts in the South. Information 
concerning other forts was taken from Francis Paul Prucha,
A Guide to the Military Posts of the United States, 1789- 
T895 (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
T9S7)• Fort Greene located on Cockspur Island was washed 
away by the action of the sea in 1804.
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The Army's period of inactivity was brief. But 
during that time the relations between the civil and 
military officials in New Orleans were strained to the 
breaking point. The conflict arose over the question of 
whose authority was supreme, and where the powers of one 
official stopped and those of the other one began.
The disagreement resulted from the occupation of 
certain buildings in the city by the military, specifically 
the house in which Colonel Freeman and his family were 
living. On May 14 Governor Claiborne requested that the 
Colonel vacate the house so that the district court might 
use it. The Colonel's residence seemed to be the only 
suitable public building in town and the court could not 
be denied its use. The Governor closed with a strong 
statement:
I sincerely wish it were in 
my power comfortably to accomodate 
the civil a3 well as the military 
authorities. But as it is not, the 
civil officers may of right claim a 
preference in the occupation of 
public buildings not attached to the Barracks.2
At the time, Freeman was living in a building that 
had originally been a school, but the Spanish had used it 
as a hospital and a barracks. After Freeman moved in, the
2Claiborne to Freeman, May 14, 1805, in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 
. 1801-1816 (Jackson: Mississippi Department of“Archives
and History, 1917), III, 56. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, 
WCC.
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artificers attached to his command had made numerous
repairs in an effort to make the quarters livable. Since
there were no quarters available in the barracks, Freeman
declined to move until the Secretary of War authorized
him to rent other accomodations. He informed the
Governor, "I shall expect orders from the Head of the
Department to which I belong - to those I will pay the
most implicit obedience."^
Governor Claiborne was not satisfied by Freeman's
response, and his reply contained a threat:
I deem it proper to declare that 
your continuance in your present 
Quarters is not agreeable to me.
Since by so doing the Federal 
Court for this district is sub­
jected to great inconveniences. . . .
I deem it proper further to inform 
you that to myself (for the present) 
more properly belongs the care and 
disposition of the public buildings 
not appertaining to the military 
establishment, and I am assured 
Sir, that your conduct on this 
occasion will not be approved by 
the President, to whom our corre­
spondence together with Judge Hall's 
communication will be submitted.4
The next day Claiborne sent a long letter to the
Secretary of State outlining the jurisdictional dispute
over the Colonel's house. In the letter he touched upon
freeman to Claiborne, June 2, 1805 and Claiborne 
to Freeman, June 3» 1805, Ibid.. 62-66; Freeman to 
Claiborne, June 5» 1805, Ibid., 72.
4Claiborne to Freeman, June 5, 1805, Ibid., 72-73.
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the subject that probably bothered him as much as the
question of where the court would meet or where Colonel
Freeman would live. Colonel Freeman had refused the
Governor’s request to increase the garrison at Fort St.
John until he could determine whether or not the increase
was justified. Because of this apparent affront to his
authority as Territorial Governor, Claiborne asked the
Secretary of State to define his position:
The line of demarkation between my 
powers, and those of the officers 
who may command the troops in this 
quarter be distinctly marked. . . .
But while the Army is stationed in 
the interior of this Territory, I 
should presume that a requisition 
from the Governor ought to be viewed 
as binding on the officer command- 
ing . . . .  where a military force 
is requisite for the protection of 
society or the support of the Laws.
I think the Governor should have 
authority to command such force and 
not be dependent upon the will or 
disposition to oblige of a Colonel,
Major or Captain who may happen (often 
by merit but sometimes by chance) to 
be the commanding officer.
The Governor's argument was based upon his position
as the commander of the territorial militia. Since the
coordination of the efforts of the militia and the regulars
in the event of an emergency was essential, he felt that he
should have the authority to determine the disposition of 
5the troops.
5Claiborne to Madison, June 6, 1805, Ibid., 76- 
78. ----
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The dispute between Claiborne and Freeman soon 
expanded to include the New Orleans City Council. The 
council had ordered property owners to pave the sidewalks 
and repair the gutters on their property. If the improve­
ments were not made, the council would order it done at 
the owner’s expense. As a result of improvements made to 
streets adjoining the military barracks, the United States 
owed the city $642.00. When the bill was presented to 
Governor Claiborne, he immediately sent it to Colonel 
Freeman along with a bitter note: "as you appear to
suppose that you have particularly, in charge the buildings 
of the United States in this city, or rather those in which 
troops have at any time been stationed I presume you will 
feel no difficulty in adjusting this account as a public 
age nt. . . •"
The following day, June 13, Claiborne demanded 
that Freeman acknowledge the receipt of the Governor's 
letters. He stated, "my communications to you are always 
official, and therefore an acknowledgement of their re­
ceipt will at all times be expected." On the same day 
Claiborne acknowledged a letter from Freeman by saying, 
"your last letter is now before me. It is unfortunate 
that we cannot understand each other." Any hope for a
7settlement of their differences was rapidly disappearing.
^Claiborne to Freeman, June 12, 1805, Ibid., 91-92.
7Claiborne to Freeman, June 13» 1805, Ibid., 93; 
Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Ibid., 95.
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Within a week Governor Claiborne touched a sen-
itive nerve and evoked a sharp note from Colonel Freeman.
Claiborne suggested that the troops destined for Pointe
Coupee and Natchitoches be ordered to respect the civil
authorities and the rights of the citizens. In light of
their previous correspondence the Governor's letter implied
much more than it actually said. The letter brought an
indignant reply from Colonel Freeman, "I flatter myself
that the officers under my command will never require an
order to respect the civil authorities, or the rights of
otheir fellow citizens."
In mid-June Governor Claiborne had inquired if 
Colonel Freeman planned to move the troops to the country, 
and if so when the move would be made. Since the sickly 
season was beginning, the question was probably prompted 
by a genuine concern for the health of the soldiers. How­
ever, by July Claiborne suggested that only one company of 
regulars was needed in New Orleans since the city was quiet 
and a regular police was maintained by the civil author­
ities. He recommended that the troops not needed could 
be put to work either on the fortifications at Plaquemine 
or constructing a new fort below New Orleans on the 
Mississippi. If they were not required at those places, 
they should be sent to strengthen some of the frontier 
posts. Claiborne believed that some of the troops should
Q
Claiborne to Freeman, June 20, 1805, Ibid., 100- 
101; Freeman to Claiborne, June 21, 1805, Ibid., 1'02.
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be stationed at Port Adams, which was presently garrisoned
by only twelve men. At Port Adams the troops would be in
a position to defend New Orleans or move against Florida
if trouble developed with the Spanish. He was correct in
his assumption that the troops would be useful at other
locations. It is equally certain that the Governor would
have been glad to see Colonel Freeman and his men out of 
qNew Orleans.
The controversy between the two men delayed the 
improvements ordered by the New Orleans City Council.
Neither Freeman nor Claiborne considered themselves author­
ized to pay for the repairs. Claiborne asked that the 
Federal government pay the bill in full as soon as possible. 
He requested that the Council suspend any additional repairs 
on property held by the United States until he received an 
answer from the government. However, he feared that the 
delay in the settlement of the account would hinder the 
completion of the project, which was necessary to maintain 
the health of the city.10
While Claiborne and Freeman argued over unpaid
^Claiborne to Freeman, June 12, 1805, Ibid., 91; 
Claiborne to Madison, July 27, 1805, Ibid., 136-38, also 
in Sron Rowland, Life, Letters and Papers of William Dunbar 
(Jackson: Press of the iiissi'ssippi Historical Soclety,
1930), 148-150. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, William 
Dunbar.
10Claiborne to Freeman, June 13, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 95; Claiborne to Madison, July 27, 1805, Ibid., 
115-38.
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tills and the disposition of the public buildings, the 
Army was fulfilling its assignments. One of the most 
important jobs was to determine exactly what the United 
States had purchased from Prance. To accomplish this 
task a number of expeditions were sent into the vast new 
territory to gather information. For the most part the 
expeditions were composed of officers and men from the 
Regular Army. In some cases civilians with special 
scientific skills accompanied the parties, but generally 
the work was done by the soldiers.
The explorations began as soon as the United States 
took possession of Louisiana. In 1804 a party under the 
joint command of Meriwether Lewis and William Clark started 
on a trip that would take them from the Mississippi River 
to the Pacific Ocean. In the same year William Dunbar 
took a small party up the Washita River to collect in­
formation. In 1805 Wilkinson sent Lieutenant Zebtzlon 
Montgomery Pike up the Mississippi River in an effort to 
find the source of the river, and he ordered his son, 
Lieutenant James B. Wilkinson, to establish a post at the 
mouth of the Platte River.
In the South an expedition was prepared to explore 
the Red and Arkansas rivers. A similar operation had been 
suspended the previous year because of a lack of funds.
On March 25, 1805, Secretary of War Henry Dearborn wrote 
to William Dunbar telling him to begin preparations to
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explore the two rivers. The Secretary cautioned that if 
expenditures for the expedition exceeded $2,000 it might 
be cancelled again. The commanding officer at Port Adams 
would furnish an escort for the expedition upon Dunbar's 
requisition.11
On May 4 Dunbar informed Dearborn that he would 
begin his preparations immediately. Colonel Freeman at 
New Orleans would have to supply the men for the escort 
because the garrison at Port Adams was too small to allow 
the detachment of any soldiers. Dunbar suggested that it 
would be best to investigate only one river at a time, 
because the passage of the river twice would offer a 
better opportunity to collect information. After con­
sidering Dunbar's recommendation, President Jefferson 
agreed and requested that the Red River be explored first.
Dunbar stated that Captain Richard Sparks would be 
assigned to command the military part of the expedition if 
the Secretary felt that he was qualified. The Secretary 
recommended that Sparks should receive $1.50 a day and his 
expenses, in addition to his normal pay and emoluments if 
he accepted the appointment.^ On May 25 President Jefferson 
wrote to Dunbar to suggest that Colonel Freeman assist in
11Dearborn to Dunbar, Mar. 25, 1805, Rowland,
William Dunbar, 150-52.
12Dunbar to Dearborn, May 4, 1805, Ibid.. 148-50; 
Dearborn to Dunbar, May 24, 1805, Ibid., 152-53.
1^Dearborn to Dunbar, July 10, 1805, Ibid., 156.
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the command of the expedition. At the same time the
President stated the principle reason for the trip, "the
work we are now doing is, I trust, done for posterity, in
14such a way that they need not repeat it.”
The President's letter caused some confusion when
it reached Natchez. Dunbar found that Colonel Constant
Freeman, the only Colonel Freeman he knew, was unaware of
any plans for him to join the party. Dunbar wrote to
Jefferson in an effort to determine who the President 
15meant. While awaiting an answer from the President, 
he proceeded with the arrangements at Natchez.
In December Dunbar was able to report that two 
boats were ready to sail and the escort had been gathered.
He recommended that Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines be appointed 
as the second in command, as he possessed the necessary 
skills to do the party's geographical work.^ The year 
ended with the expedition's preparations almost completed.
While Dunbar was outfitting his party at Natchez, 
Governor Claiborne was completing the necessary arrangements 
at New Orleans. Since it was possible that the party would 
pass through Spanish territory, it was necessary to secure 
a passport. Claiborne requested a passport from Casa Calvo,
1^Jefferson to Dunbar, May 25, 1805, Ibid., 174-77. 
^Dunbar to Jefferson, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 182-84.
1^Dunbar to Jefferson, Dec. 17, 1805, Ibid., 185-88.
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and assured the minister that the purpose of the expedition
was purely scientific. One or two Spanish officers would
he allowed to accompany the expedition as observers. Casa
Calvo replied that he would issue the passport upon Dunbar’s
request. Whether any Spanish official would join the
party would be determined by the Commandant General, to
17whom the matter had been referred.
Governor Claiborne was not only successful in 
obtaining a passport for the Red River expedition, he 
also obtained permission for the United States mail to 
pass through Spanish West Florida. The route was estab­
lished to improve communications between New Orleans and 
Washington. The mail was always irregular and agonizingly 
slow and some improvement was necessary to govern the 
territory properly. In January President Jefferson in­
formed Claiborne that a new mail route was to be laid out 
between the two cities. It would run from Washington down 
the eastern side of the mountains to Georgia, then west to 
New Orleans by way of Fort Stoddert.
Between the Fort and the mouth of the Pearl River 
the new route passed through about seventy miles of Spanish 
territory. The proposed line had not yet been authorized 
by Congress, but the President was certain that legislation
17Claiborne to Casa Calvo, July 11, 1805, Rowland, 
WCC, III, 119-20; Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 15, 1805, 
ibid.. 128-29; Claiborne to Dunbar, July 29, 1805, Ibid., 
TTP42. ----
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would be passed in the coming session. To facilitate the 
passage of all types of mail it would be necessary to open 
a road from Georgia to the Pearl River. But before the 
new road was opened, the President proposed "a mail of 
letters only** carried by horseback over the existing 
Indian trails. It was hoped that the distance between 
the Potomac and the Mississippi could be covered in twelve 
days. However, before anything could be done, permission
18to pass through the territory of Spain had to be obtained.
In June Governor Claiborne received a letter, 
written in mid-March, from the Postmaster General inquir­
ing about the arrangements for carrying the mail through 
West Florida. The Governor replied that the Spanish would 
probably allow the passage of postriders through their 
territory. To facilitate the crossing of Lake Ponchartrain
by the postriders, the Governor had arranged for the op-
19eration of a ferry.
In July Governor Claiborne informed President 
Jefferson that the Spanish had no objection to the mails 
crossing their lands. In addition, they had promised to 
protect Iruc x X u c i  o tO uac best of their ability. The
18Jefferson to Claiborne, Jan. 7, 1805, Clarence 
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United 
States. Vol. IX, 4?he territory of*~Crleftnci, 1803-lSl 2 
(Washington: “Government Printing Office, 1§4o;, ^63- 
64. Hereinafter cited as Carter, Territorial Papers.
19Claiborne to Postmaster General, June 7, 1805, 
Rowland, WCC, III, 83-84.
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postriders had been in New Orleans twice, but no regular 
schedule had been established. Claiborne predicted that 
the mail would soon be carried over the entire distance 
in twelve or fourteen days. He recommended that bridges 
be built at all fords where there was the slightest possi­
bility of flooding, so that the road would be open in all
20types of weather.
During the next few months Governor Claiborne and 
the Army officers on the frontier probably wished that the 
mails ran more frequently and on a regular basis. The 
officials were called upon to solve problems that required 
constant communications with Washington. But in most cases 
the men made their decisions on the basis of orders issued 
months before and in some instances they operated with 
virtually no instructions from their superiors.
The problems confronting the civil and military 
authorities were the result of Spanish activities in 
Mexico, West Florida, and within Louisiana itself. Several 
Spanish officials were still living in New Orleans and 
conducting the duties of their offices. On the western 
frontier a border dispute was developing that threatened 
the friendly relations that existed between the two nations.
20Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Ibid., 
124-27; Marquis de Casa Calvo to Claiborne, July 16, 1805, 
Ibid., 130; Governor Folch's reply is contained in 
dlaiborne to Madison, Aug. 9, 1805, Ibid., 156-57.
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To the east the Spanish were charging duties on American 
goods being shipped to and from the American territory.
On July 15, 1805, Governor Claiborne requested 
information about the progress of the negotiations at 
Madrid concerning the western boundary of Louisiana. 
Claiborne was certain that the Spanish would demand the 
Mississippi as the dividing line between the two countries. 
He was certain, however, that Spain would relent in her 
demands when she realized that the United States was pre­
pared to hold the territory between the Mississippi and
21the Sabine rivers by force, if it became necessary.
The treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States 
was vague about the western limits of the territory. The 
first difficulties had developed in the vicinity of 
Natchitoches, where the border with Mexico presented 
American slaves with an opportunity to escape. The run­
aways had sought refuge at Nacogdoches, but after the
Americans had protested the activities the slaves had
22been returned to their owners. Yet the indefinite
boundary was a continuing source of irritation and worry
to both nations. Governor Claiborne said:
In receiving possession of 
the ceded territory, the American 
Commissioners would have been much 
relieved, had the limits thereof
21Claiborne to Madison, July 15. 1805, Ibid., 127-28. 
22Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 8, 1805, and Casa 
Calvo to Claiborne, n. d., Ibid., 155-56.
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been precisely ascertained, but 
these being uncertain, the com­
missioners thought it best to 
demand Louisiana as described 
in the Treaty.23
The troops at Natchitoches kept a watchful eye 
upon the activities of the Spanish along the Sabine River. 
Since early May reports had been made concerning Spanish 
activities on the eastern side of the river. On May 1 
Doctor John Sibley, a resident of Natchitoches, reported 
that a Choctaw hunting party had encountered Spanish 
troops at the Bay of St. Bernard. The troops were con­
structing two forts, one at the mouth of the Trinity River 
and the other at Matogordo. The Indians had been told to 
abandon the Americans and rejoin the Spanish. The officers 
had said that they would soon be building forts at
Opelousas, Attakapas, Natchitoches, and finally New 
24Orleans. On May 3 Captain Edward Turner sent a similar
25report to General Wilkinson. At the end of May an informer 
reported that he had seen Spanish troops at the Orkekesaw
2 ̂Claiborne to Secretary of War, Aug. 11, 1805, 
Ibid., 162-64. The treaty with Prance had incorporated 
the language of the Treaty of San Ildefonso in defining 
the limits of Louisiana. Hunter Miller (ed.), Treaties 
and Other International Acts of the United States of1 
America (Washington: Government PrintingOffice, T§31),TT, 538-509.
^John Sibley to Secretary of War, May 1, 1805, 
American State Papers, Foreign Relations (Washington: 
tales and Seaton, 1832), 11, 69^ Hereinafter cited as 
ASPFR.
^Turner to Wilkinson, May 3> 1805, Ibid., 690-91.
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26and that more troops were expected to join them.
With reports that five hundred families and a 
large number of troops had arrived at St. Antonio, con-
27cern about the Spanish build-up continued through July.
On September 30 Turner stated that a Spanish colonel and 
two companies of soldiers were supposed to be coming to 
Nacogdoches. One of the companies would reinforce the 
garrison at Oreoquisas and the other was to be divided 
between Nacogdoches and Adaes. He also had learned that 
six hundred families were coming from Spain to settle at 
Matogordo.
The information that the Spanish had erected a 
fort at the confluence of the Trinity and Snow rivers, 
about one hundred and twenty miles from the American 
settlement, had been vertified by men employed by the 
Indian agent at Natchitoches. The disturbing part of 
Turner's letter was the section that concerned the Spanish 
occupation of Adaes. This small settlement was about 
twenty miles from Natchitoches, and the Americans con-
p Osiaered it to be within their territorial limits.
Turner's information was confirmed by an American living 
at Nacogdoches, who said that two companies of soldiers 
were expected by the Spanish.
26Sibley to Secretary of War, May 31, 1805, Ibid. 
2^Sibley to Secretary of War, July 2, 1805, Ibid.
a Q
Turner to Wilkinson, Sept. 30, 1805, Ibid. 
2^Johnson to Sibley, Oct. 3, 1805, Ibid.
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Governor Claiborne personally protested the 
occupation of Adaes to Casa Calvo and asked that the 
soldiers be immediately withdrawn from the village. The 
Governor argued that the post was an appendage of 
Natchitoches and should have been surrendered with 
that post.
Casa Calvo heard the protest with polite attention. 
In reply, the Spanish Commissioner stated that the Gov­
ernor* s argument concerning Adaes was incorrect.
Natchitoches was the furthest post up the Red River 
considered by the Spanish to be within the Province of 
Louisiana. Adaes and Bayou Pierre, although close to 
Natchitoches, were considered to be within the Province 
of Texas. Casa Calvo promised that if the two settlements 
were found to be within Louisiana when he traced the bound­
ary, they would be turned over to the United States. The 
Spanish Commissioner assured the Governor that there were 
no Spanish troops closer to Natchitoches than those 
stationed at Nacogdoches.-^0
Despite Claiborne's protest, reports of Spanish 
activities continued to be made by officers on the frontier. 
Captain John Bowyer, stationed at Opelousas, stated that 
Spanish troops, perhaps numbering 800, were on the Calcasieu 
River on the eastern side of the Sabine. Bowyer seriously
^°Claiborne to Secretary of War, Aug. 11, 1805, 
Rowland, WCC, III, 162-64.
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doubted that figure but he knew that there were definitely 
troops east of the Sabine. The Captain stated that the 
troops from Nacogdoches maintained a regular patrol along 
the Sabine River.
While attempting to determine what the Spanish 
were doing on the frontier, Claiborne was trying to rid 
himself of a Spanish official living in New Orleans. The 
official was Juan Morales, Paymaster General of the Spanish 
Army and Intendant of East and West Florida, who had issued 
the order revoking the American right of deposit in 1802. 
While living in New Orleans, Morales was selling land in 
East and West Florida, a practice which Claiborne con­
sidered a direct insult to the United States. The sales 
were not only insulting but the ownership of the land being 
sold was disputed. Both the United States and Spain claimed 
the area of West Florida and negotiations were in progress 
at Madrid to settle the dispute. After being informed that 
Morales intended to continue his activities in New Orleans,
Claiborne strongly suggested that Morales move to Spanish 
32Territory.
The controversy over Morales continued because 
^1Bowyer to Freeman, Oct. 13, 1805, ASPFR, II,692.
32Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 3> 1805, Rowland, 
WCC, III, 146; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 9, 1805, and 
Casa Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1805, Ibid., 159-61;
Casa Calvo to Claiborne, Aug. 7, 1805 and Claiborne to 
Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid.. 172-75.
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Claiborne was dissatisfied with the answer he received from 
Casa Calvo. Claiborne finally agreed to allow the Intendant's 
office to remain open long enough to settle any unfinished 
business. However, no additional land west of the Perdido 
River was to be sold. These were the only conditions upon 
which Morales could be permitted to remain. Morales con­
sidered Claiborne's conditions to be unacceptable because 
they infringed upon the rights of his commission.
The American Governor refused to alter the con­
ditions, and stated that if the Intendant did not abide 
by them, his departure would be demanded. Claiborne 
summarized the rights that Morales possessed:
His Catholic Majesty could not authorize 
Mr. Morales to exercise any official acts 
within the territories of the United 
States, or to open a land office within 
their limits. If the Paymaster General 
of the Spanish Army is solicitious that 
his authority should remain unshackled, 
why does he not retire to the dominions 
of His Catholic Majesty, and depart 
from a territory within which he has 
no right to continue his residence, 
much less to exercise official functions.
Claiborne concluded with-a- statement that indicated that
he was serious:
The customary passports shall be 
prepared, and I will cheerfully 
afford your Excellency such conduce 
to the speedy and comfortable con­
veyance to some post within the do­
minions of His Catholic Majesty.33
■^Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Aug. 17, 1805, Ibid., 
174-75* Claiborne's italics.
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The problem surrounding Morales and his activities 
was resolved on January 11, 1806. Acting upon Presidential 
orders, Governor Claiborne directed Morales and all indi­
viduals attached to his office to leave the territory 
34immediately. The controversy with Morales did not 
directly effect the men of the United States Army, but 
indirectly it influenced the lives of the civilians and 
soldiers who lived above the Spanish Floridas. Morales, 
as the Intendant for East and West Florida, was the official 
with whom the Americans dealt concerning the duties charged 
on products shipped through the Spanish ports.
However, the growing concern about the Spanish 
military preparations diverted attention from the problem 
of duties charged on American products. The military 
activity on the frontier overshadowed the differences 
between the American military and civil officials, and 
for a month or two they managed to put aside their dif­
ferences and work together with a degree of cooperation.
On July 26 the Mayor of New Orleans, Doctor John 
Watkins, sent three decrees passed by the City Council to 
Governor Claiborne. The Council wanted: (1) the destruction
^Claiborne to Morales, Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid.,
238-39. The President's order was to apply to all 
persons holding commissions or retained in the service 
of Spain; Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18,
1805, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34; Claiborne 
to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, and Morales to Claiborne,
Jan. 11, 1806, Ibid., 563-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
142
of the old Custom House; (2) the evacuation and demolition 
of the forts in the city in order to eliminate the stagnant 
water that surrounded them and endangered the health of the 
city; and (3) the withdrawal of Federal troops from the 
lower rooms of the Hotel de Ville in order to provide 
space for the city guard.
The Governor answered that the old Custom House 
was national property and could not be turned over to the 
city until the Federal commissioners decided the validity 
of land claims. The forts fell into the same category as 
the Custom House, but Claiborne agreed that all of them, 
except Forts Charles and St. Louis, could be levelled.
These two forts were occupied by American soldiers, who 
could not be removed except by the order of the President. 
However, the Governor had no objection to draining the 
ditches around the forts, provided it did not damage the 
fortifications. Regarding the third request, the Governor 
felt that if a guard was needed during the day, it would 
be best to use the regular troops. If the quarters were 
needed for the night watch and the guard at the jail,
35Claiborne would consent to the removal of the troops.
Within a few days, the Mayor requested that the 
old public school building be used for its original purpose. 
The Governor admitted that the building was no longer under 
his control. Colonel Freeman still occupied the building
35Claiborne to Watkins, Aug. 2, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 143-45.
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and the Secretary of War had not decided whether or not
the Colonel should relinquish his quarters. The Governor
promised to refer the Mayor's request to the President.^
On August 4 Claiborne referred the requests from
the City Council to the Secretary of State, with one comment
of his own. He suggested that the forts within the city be
evacuated. The works afforded little or no protection to
the city and a better location on the Mississippi River
37should be selected and fortified.
Governor Claiborne's letter to Colonel Freeman was 
milder and more concilitory than h i s  earlier communications. 
The Governor requested that Freeman permit the draining of 
ditches, but only under his personal supervision. He stated 
that because the Hotel de Ville was the property of the 
city and the rooms were needed for the night watch, the 
troops should be withdrawn and quartered in the barracks. 
With regard to Freeman's house, Claiborne wrote:
When it is convenient for you 
to remove from your present quarters, 
you will much oblige me, if you would 
deliver the key to the Horible. Judge 
Hall. But I wish not that you should 
subject yourself to any inconvenience 
by an early removal, since it is not 
expected, that the district court (for 
whose accomodation the building is in­
tended) will be in cession for several 
weeks.
■^Claiborne to Watkins, Aug. 3, 1805 and Claiborne 
to Madison, Aug. 3» 1805, Ibid., 147-48.
37Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 4, 1805, Ibid., 149.
*3 O
Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 8, 1805 and Claiborne 
to Watkins, Aug. 8, 1805, Ibid., 176-78.
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The barracks should have been large enough to
house the troops, as the number of soldiers in the city
was barely adequate to meet the demands made upon them.
On August 14 Claiborne requested that a non-commissioned
officer and four privates accompany him on a trip up the
Mississippi. The following day he told Freeman, "Being
aware of the weakness of the troops and supposing that
you could illy spare even a small detachment, I should
not have made the request of yesterday, had I not been
compelled to take with me a barge. . . . "  The Governor
reduced the number of men required for his escort to 
39four. While the soldiers in Louisiana were concerned 
with the activities of the Spanish, the other troops in the 
South were occupied with routine duties at their garrisons.
Occasionally the troops were called upon to perform 
duties other than those associated with their day-to-day 
existence. On September 4, 1805, the Secretary of War 
ordered the commanding officer at Fort Wilkinson to remove 
a number of white settlers occupying land that belonged to 
the Creek Indians. The Indians had protested to the Federal 
government and the settlers had been ordered to move. If 
the officer determined that the order had not been obeyed, 
he was to use whatever means were necessary to remove them.
He was ordered to treat similar incidents in the same manner. 
Orders such as these would become increasingly common until
39Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 14, 1805, Ibid., 165; 
Claiborne to Freeman, Aug. 15, 1305, Ibid., 168-69.
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the Indians were finally removed from the South in the
1830's. The removal of squatters was the one duty that
would involve the Army in numerous controversies with the
white settlers.^0
The activities of the troops across the southern
frontier increased as the reports of a Spanish military
build-up continued to circulate. In addition to the news
received from western Louisiana, information was obtained
that additional troops were being moved into the Floridas.
In late August Governor Claiborne stated that the Spanish
Fort at Baton Rouge had been repaired, but it had few
military advantages as it was commanded by high ground,
not more than a quarter of a mile away. In addition the
fort was poorly constructed and could not be adequately
41manned by a force of less than a thousand men.
One month later Governor Claiborne informed Madison 
that he considered the conduct of the Spanish to be hostile. 
He believed that the Spanish Court was encouraging such 
attitudes by its officials. The Governor requested the 
results of the negotiations in Madrid, since "I have not 
been honored with an official letter from you, for two
40Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort 
Wilkinson, Sept. 4, 1805, in Records of the Office of the 
Secretary of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military 
Affairs, 1800-1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2, 
375- Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
41Claiborne to Madison, Aug. 27, 1805, Rowland,
WCC, III, 183.
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months past. . . . "  On October 8 Claiborne told Doctor 
Sibley that the newspapers seemed to indicate the likeli­
hood of a rupture between the United States and Spain.
However, he refused to believe the accounts in the press
42until they were confirmed by the Secretary of State.
On October 16 Secretary of War Dearborn informed
Wilkinson that there was every reason to believe that
Pensacola was to be reinforced by five or six hundred men.
Officers stationed on the Lower Mississippi and on the
Mobile were cautioned to be on the alert for any Spanish 
41activity. At the end of October Claiborne reported the
arrival of six hundred soldiers at Pensacola, with more
expected to reinforce the posts at Mobile and Baton 
44Rouge. An additional complication was that the mails
between New Orleans and Port Stoddert were frequently
delayed. One postrider had been killed and another wounded
45and the route could no longer be considered safe.
The Spanish continued to halt American vessels and 
exact a duty of twelve percent on imports and exports at 
Mobile. The duties were charged on goods belonging to
^Claiborne to Madison, Sept. 25, 1805, Ibid.,
190; Claiborne to Sibley, Oct. 8, 1805, Ibid., 19£.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 16, 1305, 
SWLS, Roll 2, 333-86.
^Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805, 
ASPPR, II, 692.
45Claiborne to Gideon Granger, Post Master General, 
Oct. 17, 1805, Rowland, WCC, III, 202-204.
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civilians and to the United States government. Claiborne
issued protests to Intendant Morales and Governor Folch,
since he did not know which of the officials had directed
46that the duties be charged.
On October 24 the Governor sent some distrubing 
news to his superiors in Washington. He had obtained 
positive proof that four hundred soldiers had arrived 
in Pensacola and more men were expected to arrive in a 
few days. He had also learned from a reliable source 
that three hundred men were to be sent to Baton Rouge . 
and eight hundred men had been stationed, on the Texas 
frontier.
As proof of the Spanish build-up, Claiborne stated 
that a New Orleans merchant had contracted to deliver 4,000 
barrels of flour to Mobile. The same man had also pur­
chased a large quantity of leather in order to fulfill a 
contract for 4,000 pairs of shoes. Claiborne intended to 
ask Governor Folch the meaning of the military activity.
Claiborne was certain that peace could be maintained, 
but in the event war broke out the Governor made several 
recommendations for the defense of New Orleans. He sug­
gested that Fort St. John commanding the mouth of Bayou 
St. John, be repaired and strengthened since it was in 
ruins. If repaired, it could stop the passage of troops
46Claiborne to Morales, Oct. 22, 1805, Ibid., 205; 
Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 24, 1805, Ibid., 211-13.
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and ships from Pensacola and Mobile. Colonel Freeman did
not agree with the Governor, and even if he had, he did
not have the money necessary to repair the works. Claiborne
also suggested that Fort St. Philip be strengthened and
gunboats be stationed on the Mississippi River and the
47lakes around New Orleans.
On October 30 Claiborne dispatched a number of 
documents, collected by Doctor Sibley, that verified that 
the Spanish had established a fort on the Trinity River.
There were also two depositions from several American
43citizens recounting outrages committed by Spanish soldiers.
The depositions stated that on two different occasions
Spanish soldiers had stopped Americans and confiscated
some of their property. The first incident involved three
people who were traveling between Natchitoches and Opelousas.
They were stopped within fifteen miles of Opelousas Church
by five Spanish soldiers who took one of their horses and
then retreated toward Nacogdoches. The second incident
involved a group of traders who were transporting furs to
New Orleans. They were detained by a detachment of Spanish
troops who confiscated eighteen horses and 1,000 deer skins
49before marching in the direction of Nacogdoches. On the
^Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 24, 1805, Ibid., 211-13*
i O
Claiborne to Madison, Oct. 30, 1805, Ibid., 215.
49Deposition of Gaspard Bodin, Lewis Bodin, and 
Andrew Chamer, Oct. 2, 1805, and Deposition of Francis 
Robar, Oct. 3, 1805, in ASPFR, II, 694-95.
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same day Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that six
hundred troops had arrived at Pensacola and a new Governor
General of the Province of Texas had arrived at St.
50Antonio.
In the midst of the Spanish build-up, the problems 
between the military and the civil officials in New Orleans 
erupted again. The troops stationed in the city had in- 
terferred with the city guard. The Governor told the Mayor 
that the incident was probably the result of a misunder­
standing on the part of the troops. He hoped that similar 
events would not occur again in the future. However his 
closing statement indicated that he and Freeman had not 
resolved their differences:
I will endeavour to remedy the 
Inconvenience complained of by the 
citizens; - But whatever I may do 
on the occasion, must be by way of 
Request, for it is not admitted by 
the officer commanding here, that 
the Governor has any control over the military.51
On November 26 Claiborne informed the President that 
he and Freeman had reached an agreement to end the existing 
problems. The Governor believed that the troops stationed 
in New Orleans had behaved as well as any other troops in 
similar circumstances. He observed that it was virtually 
impossible for a commander to maintain the discipline of
50Claiborne to Secretary of War, Oct. 30, 1805, 
Rowland, WCC, III, 215-16.
51Claiborne to Watkins, Oct. 31, 1805, Ibid., 219- 20. ----
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his troops when they were stationed in a city. Claiborne 
felt that this was especially true in New Orleans where 
"the temptations to dissipation are so various, and the 
means of evading the attention of officers so easy." For 
this reason he recommended that the troops be removed from 
the town.^
The Governor was not only interested in restoring 
the discipline of the troops and ridding himself of Colonel 
Freeman, he was also concerned about the safety of the 
city. Rumors were circulating in New Orleans that the 
Spanish would soon take some action against the Americans. 
The Governor believed that the rumors were greatly exag­
gerated, but he had definite information concerning some 
of the preparations: (1) Mobile and Pensacola had been
strongly fortified and at the latter place barracks were 
being constructed to accomodate 4,000 soldiers; (2) two 
hundred troops had been ordered to reinforce the garrison 
at Baton Rouge; and (3) Doctor Sibley had reported that 
two hundred and twenty soldiers had recently arrived at 
Nacogdoches and would soon move to fortify a position 
only fifteen miles from Natchitoches.
Claiborne thought that the Spanish were definitely 
planning to attack Louisiana. The number of regular troops 
available to defend the province were few and the reli­
ability of the local militia was questionable. Claiborne
^Claiborne to Jefferson, Nov. 6, 1805, Ibid., 227- 
28. ----
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felt that the Creole portion of the population would
support the United States, but the French and Spanish
speaking parts of the population were certain to support
Spain. To adequately defend the province, especially the
city, the Governor made a number of recommendations: (1)
that reinforcements be sent as soon as possible; (2) that
Fort St. John and Plaquemine be repaired; (3) the troops
at Fort Adams be transferred to Pointe Coupee; (4) the
soldiers in New Orlesins be stationed at Fort St. John
and at other positions above and below the city, not to
exceed six miles; and (5) that rallying points for the
militia be established. He believed that these preparations
would allow for a proper defense until more troops could be 
53gathered.
On November 7 Governor Claiborne reported that he
believed that Spanish soldiers were present in the city
and that they were being watched. Five days later he
wrote, "I have received but one letter from the Department
of State for three months past, and in that nothing was
54said as to our relations with Spain.”
On November 20 the Secretary of War issued in­
structions to guide the conduct of the commanding officer 
at Natchitoches. He was to warn the Spanish commander not
^Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 5» 1805, Ibid., 225-
27.
^Claiborne to Dearborn, Nov. 7, 1805, Ibid., 229; 
Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 12, 1805, Ibid., 230-31• 
Claiborne's italics.
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to encroach upon American territory east of the Sabine 
River. The Americans were to maintain patrols in the 
area east of the river to protect American citizens from 
Spanish activities. If armed men were found in the area, 
who were not under the authority of the United States, 
they were to be arrested. Spanish subjects arrested east 
of the Sabine were to be turned over to the commander at 
Nacogdoches, provided he promised to punish them. If such 
a promise was not made, the individuals were to be placed 
in the custody of the civil authorities for trial. The 
officer was to use every means, short of actual force, to 
see that the Spanish commander restored the confiscated 
property of the citizens of the United States.
Six days later the Secretary of War instructed 
General Wilkinson to determine the meaning of the Spanish 
activities in Texas. The directive authorized the General 
to direct the proper officers to obtain reliable in­
formation about Spanish movements in progress or already 
completed in a number of areas: (1) within the boundaries
of Louisiana; (2) between the Rio Brazos and the American 
posts west of the Mississippi River; (3; within the region 
bounded by the Red River and the Gulf of Mexico, especially 
at Nacogdoches and the Bay of St. Bernard; (4) and finally, 
at St. Antonio.
55Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at 
Natchitoches, Nov. 20, 1805, SWLS, Roll 2, 397-99.
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The officer or officers assigned to the task were 
to draw funds from the War Department to meet expenses.
The Secretary suggested that the individuals making the 
reconnaissance might disquise themselves as hunters and 
traders in order to maintain secrecy and afford the mission 
a chance of success. Dearborn requested that the coast 
line of the Bay of St. Bernard, for a distance of forty 
or fifty miles, be checked carefully to determine if any 
operations were in progress.^
General Wilkinson must have been delighted to be 
placed in a position to exercise his talents for intrigue. 
However, the assignment was ambitious - St. Antonio was 
approximately 360 miles from Nachitoches and the Bay of 
St. Bernard was about 300 miles away.
While the troops in Louisiana watched the Spanish 
and tried to determine their intentions, the soldiers in 
the east were occupied with routine duties. Some of the 
soldiers from Port Wilkinson were assisting Colonel 
Hawkins in running and marking the boundaries of a re­
served tract at Ocmulgee Old Fields. After the boundary
was marked, the soldiers were to assist in building a
57temporary building on the tract•
While the portion of the troops from Port Wilkinson 
were assigned to cut a line through the wilderness, a
56Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 26, 1805, 
Ibid.. 399-400.
57Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort 
Wilkinson, Nov. 27, 1805, Ibid., 404.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
154
number of men from Port Stoddert were directed to help
transport the United States mail. The men were involved
in an experiment to determine whether it was better to
carry the mail between Fort Stoddert and New Orleans by
land or water. A detachment of soldiers, all able to
handle small boats, were assigned to the water route
while the postriders moved overland. The experiment was
to last three months, when a decision would be made as to
58which method was best. The test was a result of the 
trouble encountered by the postriders on the land route 
between the two post offices.
On December 5, 1805, the. Secretary of War issued 
an order to remove the troops from the city. It was hoped 
that the transfer would eliminate the source of trouble 
between the military and civil authorities in New Orleans. 
To facilitate the movement, Colonel Freeman was to find a 
suitable site for the new post near the city; a distance 
of not more than four miles was suggested. If possible, 
the new location was to be opposite the city on the west 
bank of the Mississippi and include the magazine. The 
Secretary believed that a tract of land ranging in size 
from ten to twenty-five acres would be sufficient for the 
new post. Freeman was also to recommend what should be 
done with the military buildings within the city. Spec­
ifically, should they be torn down and the materials used
58Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort 
Stoddert, Nov. 29, 1805, Ibid., 406.
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at the new site, or should they be left standing and rented 
to local residents?
Four days after the Secretary of War issued the 
directive to Freeman, Claiborne sent a letter to Madison 
that contained some disturbing news. His secretary, John 
Graham, had just returned from Pensacola, where he had 
presented a protest of the duties charged at Mobile.
Governor Folch informed Graham that American trade on 
the Mobile would be treated in the same way as Spanish 
trade on the Mississippi. On the surface this answer 
appeared to be satisfactory, but Claiborne feared that the 
Spanish might use the pretext that foreign vessels with 
Negroes on board were not allowed to pass New Orleans as 
a reason for continuing the regulations at Mobile. If 
this happened, Claiborne predicted that the settlements 
on the Tombigbee River would be ruined by the twelve percent 
duty. More distressing than the duties, was the extent of 
the military preparations being made by the Spanish. Graham 
stated that there were eight hundred soldiers in and around 
Pensacola. Improvements were being made at the fort that
59Secretary of War to Freeman, Dec. 5, 1305, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, IX, 541-42. The military buildings in 
New Orleans were: (T7 the military barracks, a row of
brick buildings large enough to house 1,200 to 1,500 men;
(2) the military hospital; (3) the cavalry barracks, con­
sisting of two brick buildings; (4) the powder magazine, 
a brick building on the opposite side of the Mississippi; 
and (5) the public school house, occupied by Freeman. 
Claiborne to Jefferson, Oct. 23, 1805, Rowland, WCC,
III, 207-11.
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commanded the entrance to the bay. However, the forti­
fications near the city were in a state of disrepair. At 
Mobile there were about one hundred and fifty soldiers, and 
the fort within the city had recently been repaired. As 
added protection for the city, a blockhouse was being 
constructed on Dauphin Island to guard the entrance to 
Mobile Bay. To improve their communications, the Spanish 
were building a series of signal towers between Mobile and 
Pensacola. In addition, more troops were expected at 
Pensacola to reinforce the Florida garrisons.^
The Spanish continued their preparations and the
Americans continued to watch and wait. The only incident
that caused any trouble was the order for Spanish officials
to leave the territory. On February 1 Morales and his
61party left for Pensacola. However, Claiborne’s letter 
of the tenth of January informing Casa Calvo of the order 
did not reach the Marquis because he was touring the 
western part of Louisiana. Consequently, on February 6, 
two days after the Marquis returned to the city, Claiborne 
sent a second letter informing him of the President's order.
Casa Calvo was not pleased with the order and re­
quested an interview with Claiborne to discuss the subject.
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Dec. 9, 1805, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 542-43.
61
Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, III, 260-61.
62Claiborne to Madison, Feb. 6, 1806, Ibid., 260- 
61; Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Jan. 10, 1806, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, IX, 563-64.
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The Governor refused to dehate the President’s order and
told the Marquis not to delay his departure for more than
a few days.^ On February 8, the day he refused to discuss
Casa Calvo*s departure, Claiborne requested a passport for
64Dunbar’s Red River expedition.
The Spaniard considered the order to leave the
Province of Louisiana an instilt to himself and his King.
Again Claiborne refused to debate the issue but stated
that the United States had intended no insult. He pointed
out that the continued residence of the Spanish officials
was a liberal indulgence granted only because of the friendly
relations that existed between the two nations. The
President believed that the ministers had been allowed
stifficient time to conclude the duties of their commissions.
The Marquis was to depart on or before the fifteenth of 
65February. On February 12 Claiborne issued a passport 
to Casa Calvo, who immediately left for East Florida.^
On the day he issued the passport to Casa Calvo, 
Claiborne informed William Dunbar that the Spanish had
^Claiborne 
WCC, III, 261-62.
to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Rowland
64Claiborne
262-63.
to Casa Calvo, Feb. 8, 1806, Ibid.,
65Claiborne
263-64.
to Casa Calvo, Feb. 11 , 1806 , lb id.,
66Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Feb. 12 
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refused to issue his party a passport. Dunbar was told
that "under the existing circumstances between the two
countries, it remains with you to act on the occasion as
67you shall think proper." The preparations at Natchez
were completed and the leaders of the expedition hoped to
be able to take advantage of the spring high water. The
expedition finally left Natchez without a passport on the
twenty-eighth of April. Colonel Freeman was in command of
the expedition, with Captain Sparks as second in command,
and Lieutenant Enoch Humphreys was the geographical 
68assistant. The rest of the party consisted of Doctor 
Curtis, two non-commissioned officers, seventeen privates, 
and a black servant. The party entered the Red River on 
the third of May and ascended the river to Natchitoches, 
approximately one hundred and eighty-five miles from the 
Mississippi. The expedition reached the post on the 
nineteenth, where they delayed for a few days, because 
information had been received that the Spanish would oppose 
their passage of the river. As a result of the hostile 
disposition of the Spanish, the strength of the party was 
increased by twenty soldiers drawn from the garrison. On 
June 2 the reinforced expedition resumed its journey up the
67Claiborne to Dunbar, Feb. 12, 1806, Rowland, 
William Dunbar. 190.
^®Dunbar to Jefferson, May 6, 1806, Ibid., 194-95. 
Lieutenant Gaines who had originally been designated as 
the geographical officer declined to accompany the ex­
pedition at the last minute.
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Red River. Five days later Doctor Sibley warned them that
a detachment of Spanish troops had left Nacogdoches to
intercept the Americans and force them to return. The
party continued to ascend the river until the twenty-
ninth of July, when they encountered a large force of
Spanish cavalry.
At a long conference between the commanders of
the two forces, the Spanish officer announced that he was
determined to stop the Americans from moving further up
the river. The Americans reluctantly agreed to return to
Natchitoches because they were greatly outnumbered by the
Spanish. Before turning back, the expedition had traveled
six hundred and thirty-five miles from the mouth of the 
69Red River.
On March 18 an order was issued by the Wax Depart­
ment that was a direct result of the unexplained Spanish 
movements in Texas. Henry Dearborn informed Wilkinson that 
Spanish troops were on the move and the post at Natchitoches 
required reinforcements. The General was to order Colonel
Thomas Cushing to proceed directly to the frontier post with
70two companies of soldiers. On the same day that the order 
was issued to bolster the garrison at Natchitoches, Claiborne
69Reuben Gold Thwaites (ed.), Early Western 
Travels, 1748-1846, Vol. XVII, Part IV of Jameses Account 
o£ S. H. Long’s Expedition, 1319-182<T~(Cleveland: The 
Arthur H. Clark Co., 1905), 5(5-71. Dunbar to Dearborn,
Sept. 6, 1806, Rowland, William Dunbar, 348.
70Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Mar. 18, 1806,
SWLS, Roll 2, 437.
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sent a plea to the President for more troops to defend
New Orleans.
Claiborne was concerned primarily about the
activities of Vincente Folch, the Spanish Governor of
Florida. The Spaniard was supervising the work on the
defenses of Mobile and conferring with the local Indian
chiefs. According to Claiborne, the defenses at New
Orleans were not strong enough to withstand an assualt
and the gunboats that were supposed to guard the rivers
and lak«B had not arrived from Kentucky. He insisted that
the presence of a strong military force was essential to
71the safety of the city.
In a second letter of the same day to Jefferson,
Claiborne reported that an American vessel loaded with
supplies for the factory at Fort St. Stephen had been
stopped at Mobile. The Governor offered a solution to
the problem at Mobile that ran counter to the ideas of
President Jefferson. He believed that further discussion
of the situation with the officials in Florida was a waste 
72of time. He felt "that to obtain for our fellow citizens 
a free and uninterrupted use of the waters of the Mobile, 
we must have recourse to force, and perhaps the sooner the
71 Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Rowland, 
ICC. Ill, 271.
72Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 18, 1806, 
Ibid.. 271-72.
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73expedient is resorted to, the better.”
One week later the Governor reported that Judge
Harry Toulmin had arrived in New Orleans from Mobile with
information on conditions in that area. The Judge stated
that the garrison at Fort Stoddert was running short of
supplies. In addition, Claiborne was convinced that the
Spanish at Mobile were trying to arouse the Indians against
the Americans and were distributing gunpowder to the 
74tribes.
On April 8 Claiborne stated that he had no recent
intelligence from Natchitoches. The last report received
from the area asserted that the Spanish troops were camped
on the western bank of the Sabine River. Major Moses Porter
had ordered a company of infantry stationed west of
Natchitoches, within the area claimed as a part of the
Province of Texas by the Spanish. Claiborne did not know
what orders had been given to the officer in command of 
75this company.
Claiborne informed the Secretary of War that 
Governor Folch was attempting to acquire a train of artillery 
left in New Orleans when the French evacuated the town. The
^Claiborne to Jefferson, Mar. 18, 1806, Ibid.,
273.
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Mar. 25, 1806, 
Ibid., 281.
75Claiborne to Secretary of State, Apr. 8, 1806, 
Ibid., 285.
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Spanish Governor suggested that the French should turn 
the artillery over to her ally since it appeared that a 
war between the United States and Spain was likely. The 
artillery would then be transported to Mobile to strengthen 
that location. The French Consul, one Desforgues, informed 
Folch that he would not deliver the artillery to Spain or 
the United States without orders from his government.
Claiborne was convinced of the French official's 
sincerity and felt that he would abide by his decision.
The Governor reported that he would not allow the artillery 
to be moved to any place possessed by the Spanish, unless 
ordered to do so by the President. Also he would not allow
the United States Army to have it unless the territory of
76Orleans was invaded. The disposition of the train of
artillery was settled in December when the United States
purchased twenty-four pieces of brass ordnance from France.
Dearborn ordered Wilkinson to divide the pieces between
77New Orleans, Natchitoches and Fort Adams.
On April 26, 1806, the Secretary of War advised 
Claiborne of the steps that were being taken to provide 
for the security of Louisiana. The fortifications in and 
around New Orleans were to be improved and a number of 
gunboats were to be stationed on the approaches to the
76Claiborne to Secretary of War, Apr. 8, 1806,
Ibid., 286.
77Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 8, 1806,
SWLS, Roll 3, 102.
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city. To supplement the existing garrisons, six addi­
tional companies had been ordered from St. Louis, and 
were expected to arrive in early May. In addition to 
the six companies of artillery, two hundred recruits were 
on their way to New Orleans to fill the depleted ranks of 
the companies already stationed in Louisiana. On the same 
day the Secretary informed Colonel Freeman that an engineer 
was being ordered to the city to determine how its defenses
7 o
could be improved.
The Secretary outlined a plan to supply the troops 
at Fort Stoddert and the factory at Fort St. Stephens with­
out passing through Mobile. The details of the project 
were contained in the orders issued to the commanding 
officer at Fort Stoddert. An officer with six or eight 
enlisted men was to find a suitable route, as near the 
boundary line as possible without being in Spanish ter­
ritory, from the Fort to the Pascagola River.
Once the road to the river was found, the soldiers 
were to descend the river to its mouth, eliminating 
obstructions as they traveled. If large vessels could 
use the waterway, then supplies would be sent from New 
Orleans. The scheme called for the supply boat to be 
escorted from New Orleans and up the river by a gunboat. 
Such an escort was essential since the Pascagola flowed
78Secretary of War to Claiborne, Apr. 26, 1806, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 627-28; Secretary of 
War to Freeman, Apr. 26, 180^7 SWLS, Roll 2, 457-59.
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through a part of the Spanish Ploridas. If it was deter­
mined that this method of transportation was feasible, the 
officer was to request a shallop load of provisions and a 
gunboat from Colonel Freeman.
The Secretary authorized the establishment of a 
temporary storehouse at the landing on the Pascagola if 
it was considered necessary. Ke cautioned the officer 
not to divulge the plan to anyone but the factory agent.
The officer commanding the exploring party was to be
cautioned not to make any unnecessary communications to
79anyone he might meet on the river.
Many of the residents of Orleans Territory were 
apprehensive about the possible outcome of the negotiations 
at Madrid between the United States and Spain. The re­
presentatives were trying to determine the limits of the 
province known as Louisiana. The treaty between the United 
States and France had incorporated the language of the 
treaty of San Ildefanso, "the colony or province of 
Louisiana, with the same extent that it now has in the
80hands of Spain and that it had when France possessed."
While the diplomats talked in Spain, rumors were rife in 
Louisiana.
Governor Claiborne's report of July 15 that Spain 
79Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort 
Stoddert, Apr. 26, 1806, SWLS. Roll 2, 455-56; on the 
28th Colonel Freeman was informed of the plan, Secretary 
of War to Freeman, Apr. 28, 1806, Ibid., 459.
30Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts 
of the United States of America. II, 568-509.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
would demand the Mississippi River as the boundary was only 
the first of a number of statements that the United States 
might lose that portion of Louisiana lying west of the 
river. On August 8, 1805, Doctor Sibley reported that 
certain individuals were spreading a rumor that the 
United States would not retain Louisiana much longer. On 
August 23 Governor Claiborne, who was traveling through 
the country, reported that the citizens were very dis­
turbed by the news that all of the land west of the 
Mississippi had been ceded to Spain. Despite his repeated 
assurances that there was no basis for the reports, many
O 4of the citizens were not convinced.
Three days later Claiborne stated that the news 
of the retrocession of Louisiana had been circulating in 
New Orleans before he left. He had conferred with Casa
Calvo in an effort to determine if the rumors had any basis
in fact. The Spaniard had replied that he did not know the 
source of the rumors concerning the province. However, he 
understood that the negotiations at Madrid had failed and 
James Monroe, the American minister, had left the city.
Casa Calvo related that the Spanish Minister of State had 
told him that Spain wished to make the "Mississippi River 
the boundary, and in time it was expected that, that ob.ject 
would be attained."
81 Sibley to Secretary of War, Aug. 8, 1805, ASPFR, 
II, 691; Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 23, 180^,
Rowland, WCC, III, 180-81. Claiborne's italics.
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Governor Claiborne attributed the gossip to the
Spanish officials still living in New Orleans. He believed
that their removal from the territory was necessary in
order to lessen the rumors and solidify the citizens in
their support of the United States. Claiborne closed with
the request that "I should indeed be pleased to have it
hinted to me, that in my character as commissioner or
Governor, I could on this occasion, take (if necessary)
82compulsory measures.”
The request by Governor Claiborne and the failure 
of Monroe's mission to Madrid caused the Secretary of State 
to issue the order for all Spanish officials to leave 
Louisiana. Regarding the presence of Casa Calvo in New 
Orleans, the Secretary wrote:
As the pretext for the Marquis 
remaining as a commissioner for 
delivering possession has ceased, 
or seems to be exchanged for another 
arising from his character of comm­
issioner for setting limits, it may 
be proper to remark that he has never 
been accredited in any such character 
and that no arrangement has ever been 
proposed to us for setting such a 
commission on foot, that the Marquis 
and nearly all his attendants are 
military characters, some of them 
of considerable rank, and that as 
long as such a difference of opinion 
continues respecting the lines to be 
run, there can be no necessity forthe commission.
O p
Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 26, 1805, 
Rowland, WCC, III, 182-83. Claiborne's italics.
ft }Secretary of State to Claiborne, Nov. 18, 1305, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 533-34.
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On the basis of this letter, Claiborne ordered Juan Morales
and Casa Calvo to leave the Territory.
Exaggerated stories circulated throughout the South
that clashes had taken place between the Americans stationed
at Natchitoches and the Spanish forces based at Nacogdoches.
The Charleston Courier stated that Major Moses Porter had
driven a large Spanish force back across the Sabine River
after they refused to leave voluntarily. The account also
related that Porter had met five hundred Spanish troops
marching to reinforce the post east of the Sabine, and
after a sharp engagement the Spanish had been routed and
84driven across the boundary.
The published story bore little resemblance to
what had actually happened. Major Porter, acting on the
orders of the Secretary of War, had requested that a
detachment of Spanish soldiers move west of the Sabine
River. When an unsatisfactory reply was received, Porter
dispatched Captain Turner and sixty men to remove the
Spanish. After the intruders were removed, Turner's
command was ordered to patrol the area between Natchitoches
85and the Sabine to prevent further intrusions.
On February 6 Turner reported that the Spanish 
commander had agreed to withdraw his force to the western
84"Extract of a letter from the town of Washington, 
M. T. dated Feb. 18," Charleston Courier, Apr. 4, 1806.
85Porter to Secretary of War, Feb. 3, 1806, ASPFR,
II, 798; Porter to Turner, Feb. 1, 1806, Ibid., 798-99.
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bank of the river within six days. He had also agreed 
that no more Spanish patrols would enter the area. Turner 
stated that he would escort the Spanish to be certain that 
they actually recrossed the river. After this was accom­
plished, the Americans would begin their patrol of the
c36disputed territory.
Although no armed hostilities had actually occurred 
along the Sabine, the situation was tense. The presence 
of someone with more experience in handling delicate dip­
lomatic situations than Major Porter possessed was required. 
On May 6 the Secretary of War ordered General Wilkinson to 
leave St. Louis and proceed to the Territory of Orleans 
"with as little possible delay as practicable." Wilkinson 
was to assume command of the regulars and all of the militia 
and volunteers that might assemble in the area. He was to 
employ "all of the means in your power, repel any invasion, 
of the territory of the United States, east of the river 
Sabine: or north, or west of the bounds of what has been
called West Florida." If any hostile acts had taken place, 
Wilkinson was to take steps to counteract the Spanish. He 
was to keep the War Department informed of his actions and 
of the activities of the Spanish.
Wilkinson was to do everything in his power to avoid 
hostilities and his conduct was to be governed by the
Turner to Porter, Feb. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 799; 
Statement of Joseph Maria Gonzalez, Feb. 6~, 1806, Ibid.
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intentions of the Spanish. He was to consider:
Any attempt on the part of his 
Catholic Majesty's officers to disturb 
the existing state of things, by en­
deavoring to occupy any new posts, 
east of the Sabine, a westward or 
northwestward of the former boundaries, 
of what has been called West Florida, 
must be considered by the government 
of the United States, as an actual 
invasion of our territorial rights 
and will be resisted as such.°'
The construction of the defenses at New Orleans
was delayed by the lack of a qualified engineer who could
be stationed in the city. On June 9 Secretary Dearborn
requested that Wilkinson decide upon the best location
for two blockhouses to be built on the flanks of the 
88city. Despite the fact that he was urgently needed at
Natchitoches and New Orleans, Wilkinson did not arrive at
89Natchez until the seventh of September.
At Natchitoches Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Cushing, 
who had superceded Major Porter, ordered Colonel Herrera, 
the commander of a large Spanish force that had recently 
crossed the Sabine River, to retire to his own country's 
territory. Cushing stated that the reinforcements that had
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 6, 1806, SWLS, 
Roll 3» 4-8. A quote from the Kentucky Gazette in the 
Charleston Courier of June 16, 1856, reported that Wilkinson 
had been ordered to Louisiana with all of the troops from 
St. Louis.
88Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 9, 1806 and 
Secretary of War to Freeman, June 9, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3. 
25-28.
89James R. Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior Major-General 
James Wilkinson (New York: Macmillan Company, i938),£29.
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recently arrived at Natchitoches were to provide for the
defense of the territory actually surrendered to the United
States. He assured the Spaniard that the movements were
not motivated by any hostile intentions.
Colonel Herrera answered that he had crossed the
river in order to prevent the territory that rightfully
belonged to Spain from being taken by the United States.
He warned that if hostilities resulted, the responsibility
would rest with Cushing, because he had no intention of
onfighting the Americans unless his force was attacked.
On August 8 Captain Turner said that Governor
Herrera considered the removal of the Spanish troops
east of the Sabine River to be a hostile act. The Captain
was concerned because a large body of Spanish troops was
marching in the direction of Natchitoches. If the force
continued to move at the same pace, they would be within
twelve miles of the American post by nightfall. As
additional proof of the hostile intentions of the Spanish,
Turner had recently learned that the Red River expedition
qihad been turned back by a Spanish patrol.
The Spanish continued their build-up along the 
Sabine. On August 16 Governor Claiborne and Cowles Mead, 
the Acting Governor of the Mississippi Territory, learned
90Cushing to Herrera, Aug. 5, 1806 and Herrera 
to Cushing, Aug. 6, 1806, ASPFR, II, 801.
91Turner to Claiborne, Aug. 8, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, III, 382.
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that an armed force had crossed the Sabine in order to
establish a post at Bayou Pierre. They promptly issued
a joint statement that summarized their view of the
situation. They resolved on the following measures:
(1) the force should be compelled to move west of the
river; (2) the territorial militia should be called into
service if more troops were required; (3) the presence
of Governor Claiborne at Natchitoches might speed the
raising of the militia; (4) the Governor would send as
many of the militia from the Mississippi Territory as
possible if the Spanish should threaten New Orleans; and
(5) the Mississippi Territory would furnish one hundred
mounted infantry if hostilities started at Natchitoches.
The two officials expressed their regrets that
General Wilkinson had not yet arrived to carry out the
military preparations. However, they stated that upon
his arrival, they would surrender the direction of the
92military activities to him. The following day Claiborne 
stated that the Spanish force was preparing to establish
O ' }a camp near Natchitoches. J The next day he informed the
Secretary of War that he feared no danger from Mobile or
Pensacola and was proceeding to the frontier to supervise
94the operations there until Wilkinson arrived.
92Statement of Governor Claiborne and Cowles Mead, 
Aug. 17, 1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 696-97.
93Claiborne to Richard Claiborne, Aug. 17, 1806, 
Rowland, WCC, III, 378-79.
94Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 18, 1806, Ibid., 381.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
172
Reports that the Governor of Texas was on the 
march with nine hundred men circulated throughout Louisiana, 
This large force was supposed to be within fifteen miles of 
Natchitoches and determined to reoccupy their former posi­
tion. To meet this threat, a large number of United
QKStates troops had been ordered to the western frontier.
On August 29 Richard Claiborne informed the Secretary of
State that he had no knowledge of the location of the
Governor of Texas and his force.^
When Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchitoches,
he dispatched a letter to Colonel Herrera protesting a
number of Spanish actions: (1) the Spanish attack upon
Colonel Thomas Freeman and the Red River expedition; (2)
the arrest of three American citizens within twelve miles
of Natchitoches and their detention at Nacogdoches; (3) the
harboring of runaway slaves; and (4) the occupation of
United States territory by Spanish troops. The Governor
warned that if these activities continued "the sword must 
97be drawn.M
Colonel Herrera answered Claiborne's letter 
politely but firmly. His troops were on the east side
95Two letters published in the Charleston Courier 
of Sept. 29, 1806. One was from Pinckneyville, dated 
Aug. 18 and the other was from Fort Adams, dated Aug. 25.
96h. Claiborne to Secretary of State, Aug. 29,
1806, Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 681-82.
97Claiborne to Herrera, Aug. 26, 1806. ASPFR,
II, 801-802.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
173
of the Sabine in order to preserve the territory that had 
always been and was still Spanish, The Red River expedition 
had not been attacked but merely ordered to return to 
American soil. The three citizens who had been arrested
had twice been discovered observing Spanish activities
98and had been sent to Nacogdoches for questioning.
On August 28 Governor Claiborne wrote to Dearborn 
that no offensive action had been taken by the Americans 
against the Spanish. Claiborne intimated that he felt 
that the intruders should be forcibly expelled from their 
position. However, Colonel Cushing was determined to take 
no action as long as the Spanish remained in the disputed 
territory, but if they crossed into the “acknowledged limits 
of the territory of the United States" he would move against 
them.^
Within a week Claiborne reported that there were 
1,200 Spanish soldiers stationed at Bayou Pierre and 
three hundred more were moving to join them. The report 
was based on a report from Lieutenant John Du Forest who 
had just returned from the Spanish Camp. He stated that 
there were eleven companies in camp, each consisting of 
one hundred and ten men. Claiborne believed that the United
^^Herrera to Claiborne, Aug. 28, 1806, Ibid., 802.
99Claiborne to Dearborn, Aug. 28, 1806, Rowland,
WCC, in, 386-90.
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States regulars already at Natchitoches, those ordered 
from Port Adams and the local militia could force the 
Spanish to retire. The Governor based his opinion on 
the fact that the large Spanish force was composed pri­
marily of militia c a v a l r y . D e s p i t e  the optimistic 
assessment of the situation by Claiborne, the negotiations 
continued in an effort to resolve the conflict without 
bloodshed.
On September 18 Captain General Don Menesio 
Salcedo sent a letter to Claiborne assuring him that 
the Spanish did not intend their activities to be hostile. 
The Spanish officers had no plans to establish any new 
posts in the disputed area, but were only trying to prevent 
the seizure of the land by the Americans. They would 
continue to patrol the disputed area in an effort to prevent 
any settlements being made by the citizens of either side. 
Salcedo closed with a warning, "I must also repel all 
aggressions of the American Government, and act conformably 
to the strictest accomplishment of the first obligation of 
my station."101
General Wilkinson's arrival at Natchitoches pro­
bably prevented the controversy from developing into open
^^Claiborne to Dearborn, Sept. 4, 1806, Ibid.,
396-99.
101 Salcedo to Claiborne, Sept. 18, 1806, American 
State Papers. Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1832), I, 205-2^1 Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
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warfare. Governor Claiborne distrusted the Spanish and
had suggested on more than one occasion that the problems
with Spain could be solved with military force. On the
other hand, Wilkinson had the ability to use the right
mixture of threats and persuasion to accomplish his goals.
On September 24 Wilkinson addressed a letter to
Antonio Cordero in which he outlined the history of the
controversy concerning the boundary. He then recited the
Secretary of War's instructions of the sixth of May to
him. It was on the basis of these orders that he demanded
that the Spanish troops withdraw. Wilkinson concluded by
saying that his orders were absolute and he would sustain
the American claims to the land against any force that
102might oppose them. Five days later Cordero informed 
Wilkinson that his letter had been referred to Salcedo for 
his consideration.10-̂
During the first week of October the tense situ­
ation seemed to be relaxing. Cordero informed Claiborne 
that the American slaves would be returned to their owners
and that Herrera had been ordered to release the three
104American citizens. General Wilkinson was able to dis­
charge all of the militia that had been called into service,
102Wilkinson to Cordero, Sept. 24, 1806, ASPFR,
II, 803-804. -----
10^Cordero to Wilkinson, Sept. 29, 1806, Ibid., 804. 
104Cordero to Claiborne, Oct. 2, 1806, Carter, 
Territorial Papers. IX, 683.
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except one hundred dragoons and mounted infantry. He was 
prompted to take the action for reasons of economy and 
because the Spanish had recrossed the Sabine. The General 
retained the dragoons in order to observe the activities 
of the Spanish.10^
On October 4 Wilkinson told Cordero that he was 
advancing toward the Sabine River with a force of regulars. 
The purpose of the advance was to "demonstrate the pre­
tentions of the United States to the territory east of 
the river." He assured the Spanish official that the 
movement had no aggressive motives. He observed that the 
Spanish should not object to the American's presence in 
the disputed region since they were on the west bank of 
the Sabine, some sixty miles in advance of their post 
at Nacogdoches.10^
On October 11 Cordero told Wilkinson that without 
further instructions from his superiors he was bound to 
consider the Arroyo Hondo as the eastern boundary of Texas. 
In addition, he pointed out that even if the American
movement to the Sabine was peaceful, his duty required
107that he oppose any incursion into the area.
105Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 4, 1806, 
ASPFR, II, 803.
106ffiikingon to Cordero, Oct. 4, 1806, Ibid., 804. 
107Cordero to Wilkinson, Oct. 11, 1806, ASPMA,
I, 205.
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On October 21 Wilkinson revealed his intentions 
to the Secretary of War. He planned to propose that both 
sides withdraw their forces from the disputed area, and 
return to the positions that they had occupied at the time 
the province was surrendered to the United States. If 
this scheme was agreed to by both parties, the Americans 
would return to Natchitoches and the Spanish to Nacogdoches, 
thereby creating a neutral zone between the two posts. If 
the Spanish refused to agree to his proposal, Wilkinson
1 oftwould govern his conduct according to existing conditions.
The Spanish agreed to accept Wilkinson's plan and 
both sides withdrew from the disputed territory. The 
location of the western boundary of Louisiana was left to 
the diplomatic officers of the two countries. The agreement 
establishing the neutral ground was probably a satisfactory 
arrangement as far as the officers on both sides were con­
cerned, with the possible exception of Governor Claiborne.
War was averted and the officers had maintained the claims 
of their governments.
The agreement concerning the neutral zone at the 
Sabine River freed Wilkinson to turn his attention to a 
problem that was developing in the nation's interior. The 
troops of the regular Army would soon be called upon to 
counteract the plans of Aaron Burr, the former Vice-President 
of the United States. The actual purpose of Burr's scheme
10®Wilkinson to Secretary of War, Oct. 21, 1806, 
ASPFR. II, 804.
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is still open to question, but in all probability it was 
directed toward seizing Spanish territory in the south­
west, and possibly detaching a part of the United States. 
Whatever he was planning, there is little doubt that 
General Wilkinson was well informed as to the former 
Vice President’s intentions. As early as May 23, 1804, 
Wilkinson had addressed a letter to Burr that indicated 
the two men were holding secret meetings. He wrote, "to 
save time of which I need much and have but little, I
propose to take a bed with you this night, if it may be
109done without observation or intrusion.”
Burr had traveled through the western territories 
during 1805 and had been received with all of the ceremony 
befitting a former vice President of the United States.
He had traveled as far as New Orleans where he stayed for 
ten or twelve days before starting back to St. Louis. Upon 
leaving he intimated that he would return to the city in 
October.1^  After his journey through the West, Burr pro­
ceeded with his preparations. By the summer of 1806 he
had raised $50,000 and could state that his plans were
111proceeding rapidly.
109Wilkinson to Burr, May 23, 1804, in Worthington 
Chauncy Ford (ed.), "Some Papers of Aaron Burr," Proceedings 
of the American Antiquarian Society, XXXIX (Apr. - Oct.,
1919), 122.
^Claiborne to Jefferson, July 14, 1805, Rowland, 
WCC, III, 124-27.
111Samuel H. Wandell and Meade Minnigerode, Aaron 
Burr (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1925), II, 68-7B.
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On July 29 3urr outlined his plan in a coded letter
to Wilkinson. His force would descend the Mississippi to
its mouth, where it would be joined by English ships and a
part of the United States Navy. Burr would leave for the
West in August; money was available and boats were being
constructed to carry the party South. He predicted that
between 500 and 1,000 men would be collected at the Falls
of the Ohio. Within a month the force would reach Natchez
and from that time on their actions would be determined by
existing circumstances. In all of this, Wilkinson was to
112share. Only Aaron Burr would hold a position above him.
The letter from Burr did not reach Wilkinson until 
early October. By that time the General was in his camp 
at Natchitoches and unable either to forward or hinder 
Burr's preparations. The extent of the preparation was 
revealed in a report from Lexington, "Colonel Burr has 
engaged every shipwright at Marietta, at double time, and 
high wages, to build 15 gunboats, to row 32 oars, and a 
schooner of 120 tons, to draw only 5 1/2 feet of water."11
Suspicions concerning Burr's activities were wide­
spread:
Colonel Burr for some cause or
other, has during the last 1 8~~months,
112Burr to Wilkinson, July 29» 1806, American 
State Papers, Miscellaneous (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, 1834), I, 4?1. Hereinafter cited as ASPMis.
11^Lexington, Kentucky, Oct. 2, in Charleston 
Courier, Oct. 28, 1806.
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been traversing *to and fro' in the 
western country. . . .  Colonel Burr 
is now gone to the westward. It has 
long ago been intimated, that he is 
preparing to effect something in that 
quarter-supposed to be a separation 
of the western states etc. from the 
Union.114
Whether or not Wilkinson intended to take an active
part with Burr is impossible to determine. It seems likely
that he was more than willing to let Burr play his game and
see how things worked out before making his decision. The
General's standing with the administration was not high and
this might be his opportunity to regain the President's 
115favor. Not only could his position with his own govern­
ment be improved, but he could possibly renew his dealings 
with Spain.
Wilkinson wrote to Governor Folch to inform him of 
the projected attack upon Spanish territory. He stated 
that Burr first planned to attack Baton Rouge and then 
the provinces of Mexico. He assured Folch that he would 
do everything in his power to prevent Burr's attack.11^
On or about November 18, in an effort to cover all possible 
alternatives, Wilkinson sent Walter Burling, one of his
^ ^ Charleston Courier. Oct. 28, 1806, Editor’s
italics.
115ASPMis, I, 539-56 contains Wilkinson's testimony 
at Burr's trial. See also Reports of the Trials of Colonel 
Aaron Burr: In the Circuit~Court oT~the United S^Eates,
Summer Term, TH07, 2 vols. (New York: Da Capo Press, 1969)*
116Wilkinson to Folch, Dec. 6, 1806, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 2375.
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aides, to Mexico City with a letter to Viceroy Iturrigaray.
He described how he had stopped Burr's attack on the coast
of Mexico, and requested that the Viceroy reimburse him
for the expenses incurred in halting Burr. The General
estimated that $111,000 would just about cover the cost
of his services.
Iturrigaray had already learned about the proposed
attack and he was certain that he had the means at his
disposal to repel the Americans. Therefore the Viceroy
returned Burling with a letter thanking the General for
his efforts on the behalf of S p a i n . A l l  that Burling
had accomplished was to accumulate a bill for expenses
amounting to $1,500, which was eventually paid by the
118United States government.
After warning the Spanish officials, Wilkinson
turned his attention to spreading the alarm throughout
the United States. He informed the President that he had
11 qdiscovered a plan to attack Vera Cruz. He informed
Colonel Freeman at New Orleans to be alert to a possible
attack upon that city. The General did not elaborate on
120the possible assault or by whom it may be made. Wilkinson
117"Extract of a letter from New Orleans received 
at New York," Charleston Courier, Jan. 20, 1807, Walter F. 
McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy (New York: Dodd, Mead,
& Co., 1 9 S U,T^6T.------- -----
118Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior, 234.
119James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson 
(Washington: 1811), II, Appendix, XCV.
120Wilkinson to Freeman, Oct. 23 and Nov. 7, 1806, 
Ibid.. Appendix XCIX and Cl.
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told Cushing that the plot was thickening but most people
were unconcerned. He closed with "My God. What a situation
121has our country reached. Let us save it if we can."
Five days after issuing his warnings to Cushing and Freeman, 
Wilkinson sent a translation of Burr's letter to the 
President.
The letter that Wilkinson enclosed to cover Burr's 
communication was designed to convince Jefferson of the 
existence of:
A deep, dark, and widespread 
conspiracy, embracing the young 
and the old, the democrat and the 
federalist, the native and the 
foreigner, the patriot of *76 and 
the exotic of yesterday, the 
opulent and the needy, the ins 
and the outs.'22
The President was not taken in by his commanding 
general's letter, but he did consult his cabinet to 
determine what actions 3hould be taken. After the meeting 
he ordered that armed bands descending the Ohio and Miss­
issippi rivers should be arrested. To accomplish this, 
the commanders at the various military post3 were ordered 
to watch for and stop any suspicious activities. If it
was deemed necessary, the militia could be called out to
12 3assist the regulars in suppressing the activities.
121Wilkinson to Cushing, Nov. 7, 1806, Ibid., 
Appendix XCIX.
1^Wilkinson to Jefferson, Nov. 12, 1806, Ibid., 
Appendix C.
123Cabinet Memoranda, Nov. 25, 1806, cited in 
McCaleb, Aaron Burr, 195.
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On November 27 President Jefferson issued a 
Proclamation announcing the existence of a conspiracy, 
it enjoined all citizens and officials to aid in stopping
1 OAthe conspirators and in arresting their designs. Ad­
ditional orders were issued to the officers stationed along
the Mississippi to stop anyone who might be preparing an
expedition against the territory of any nation at peace 
with the United States. Their instructions authorized 
the officers to call out the militia if additional troops 
were retired.125
In addition, Wilkinson was ordered to dispose of
the troops in such a way as to prevent any unlawful action
against New Orleans or any other location. He was to do 
everything in his power to protect the territory of the 
United States and Spain. The Secretary noted that Burr 
was generally felt to be the leader of the expedition, but
126the General's name was often associated with the activities.
Wilkinson warned Governor Claiborne of the conspiracy 
on the same day that he sent Burr's letter to Jefferson.
124Proclamation of the President of the United 
States of America, Nov. 27, 1806, James D. Richardson 
(ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents: 1789-1902“(Washington: Government 5r in-ting 
(5'ffi'ce, 1'503)7T7 TO=405.
125Secretary of War to Lt. Swearinger, Nov. 26,
1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 105-106; Secretary of War to Freeman 
and Commanding Officer at Fort Adams, Nov. 28, 1806, Ibid.,
109.
126Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 29, 1806,
Ibid.. 107-108.
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He told Claiborne, "You are surrounded by dangers of which
you dream not and the destruction of the American Union is
seriously menaced. The storm will probably burst on New
Orleans, when I 3hall meet it and truimph or perish." To
ensure that Claiborne was properly impressed with the
extent of the conspiracy, Wilkinson wrote that it "implicates
thousands and among them some of your particular friends as
127well as my own." The Governor, who was overly suspicious
of everyone and everything, was duly aroused and frightened
by Wilkinson's letter.
While the instructions passed from the capital to
the frontier, Wilkinson was busy. In mid-November Major
Porter and forty artificers arrived in New Orleans from
Natchitoches to begin repairing the forts and defensive
works of the city. It was expected that eight hundred
troops would soon arrive from the western frontier. Two
companies of soldiers normally stationed in New Orleans
returned to the city after spending only five days at 
128Natchitoches.
On November 18 it was reported that Cowles Mead
had refused General Wilkinson's requisition for five hundred
129territorial militia. Apparently some of the citizens
127Wilkinson to Claiborne, Nov. 12, 1806, Rowland, 
WCC, IV, 55-56.
128Report from New Orleans dated Nov. 25 in 
Charleston Courier, Dec. 13, 1806.
129Report from Natchez dated Nov. 18 in Charleston 
Courier. Jan. 14, 1807.
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were not overly impressed with the extent of the suspected 
conspiracy. The comments of one resident of Natchez 
summarized a portion of popular opinion:
The promoters of all this, are 
falling fast into contempt, by every 
description and class of people.
Wilkinson is vastly unpopular here, 
in consequence of his having made a 
requisition of several hundred men, 
when not wanted, and lately repeating 
the farsical act. - The affair is too 
barefaced and contemptible to be 
patiently born with. . . .  We want 
not the parade of Wilkinson nor to 
feel and participate in the perpetual fears of Claiborne. . . . 130
Despite the opposition of the citizens of the
Mississippi Territory, General Wilkinson continued his
propaganda campaign about the dangers posed by the party
descending the river. He stated that unless "reinforced,
New Orleans will certainly fall before Colonel 3urr."1^1
At New Orleans preparations were being made to
withstand the anticipated assualt upon the city. On
December 4 Colonel Freeman was ordered to examine the
public buildings in the city to determine the number of
troops that could be housed in them. He and. the military
agent were to determine what repairs were necessary to put
the buildings in good condition, the length of time required
to make the repairs, and the cost of rennovating the
"Extract of a letter from Natchez to a gentlemen 
in this city, dated Nov. 25, received the last mail" in 
Charleston Courier, Jan. 16, 1807.
1^ Charleston Courier, Jan. 19, 1807.
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structures. The military agent was ordered to provide
four hundred entrenching tools, one hundred hatchets, and
a supply of timber to be used by the troops in repairing
the public buildings and fortifications.
The repairs at Fort Charles were to be supervised
by Major Porter and those at Fort Louis by Major Abimall
Nicoll. As laborers and workers were hired they were to
1 12be assigned to the two officers in equal proportions.
The next day additional orders were issued, the lines of
the various works were to be laid out and the superintending
officers were to be told how they were to be constructed.
Freeman was to supervise all of the works and dispose of
the workmen and materials in such a way as to speed the
construction. The Colonel was to assign men to cut trees
to be made into abatises and placed around the redoubts.1^
Not all of the work was being performed by the soldiers as
there were a number of Negro workers employed by the Army
to work on the fortifications.1^
On December 6 General Wilkinson wrote to Claiborne:
Under circumstances so imperious 
extraordinary measures must be resort­
ed to, and ordinary forms of our civil 
institutions must, for a short period,
112Garrison Order, Dec. 4, 1806, in Orders Garrison 
of New Orleans, 1806; Army Commands, Record Group 98 
(National Archives).
1 ̂ General Order, Dec. 5, 1806, Ibid.
1 ̂ General Order, Dec. 10, 1806, Ibid.
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yield to the strong arm of military 
law. . . .  I most earnestly entreat 
you to proclaim martial law over this 
city its ports and percints. [s[ic]135
On December 16, 1806, Governor Claiborne issued a
proclamation against unlawful combinations that strongly
resembled President Jefferson*s proclamation. The following
day he declared to the Secretary of State, "but in no event
will I take upon myself to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeus corpus and to proclaim martial law."^^
The Secretary of War issued orders to the commanding
officers at New Orleans and Fort Adams to arrest anyone who
appeared at their posts and who were in apparent violation
1 57of the nation's laws. By the time these orders were
issued the entire crisis seemed to be well in hand. On
the twenty-seventh of December President Jefferson told
Senator William Plummer of New Hampshire: "there was no
room to doubt the integrity, firmness and attachment of
Wilkinson to our government . . .  the conspiracy would be
crushed, extensive as it was, with little trouble and
1 ̂ 8expense to the United States.”
1 55Wilkinson to Claiborne, Dec. 6, 1806, Rowland, 
WCC, IV, 46-47.
1-^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 17, 1806, Ibid., 68.
1 57Secretary of War to Commanding Officer Fort 
Adams, Dec. 20, 1806, SWLS, Roll 3, 109-110; Secretary 
of War to Freeman, Dec. 20, 1806, Ibid.. 110.
1 38William Plummer, Memorandum of Proceedings in 
Senate, 1803-07* E. S. Brown (ed.), (New York: "T^oT, 543-44.
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In New Orleans, however, the situation was becoming 
unmanageable. For all intents and purposes Wilkinson had 
suspended the civil authority. During the crisis a number 
of individuals were arrested because of their suspected 
association with Burr. When Judge Workman ordered them 
released on writs, Wilkinson had them arrested again and 
smuggled out of town. Judge Workman finally resigned in 
disgust because of the lack of support he received from 
the civil authorities, and Wilkinson had him arrested. 
Wilkinson was apparently becoming the victim of his own 
fears of disaster.
President Jefferson wrote of Wilkinson’s conduct:
My general has trodden the law 
in the dust, set at naught my courts 
to their faces; and swaddled my 
governor in his sash, and laid him 
to bed, like a great baby. . . .
This general felt himself in a most 
uncommon predicament, from which 
nothing could extricate him but 
uncommon measures. I would blame 
the general but that I am so glad 
to think what a scrap I’ve got out of by his means.139
The high-handed methods employed by Wilkinson 
angered a number of New Orleans residents but many others
159J. H. Daveiss, **View of the President’s Conduct 
concerning the Conspiracy of 1806,** I. J. Cox and H. A. 
Swineford (ed.), Quarterly Publication of the Historical 
and Philosophical society of Ohio, ffllll TXpr. - 3ept., 1^17), 
125. In relation to Wilkinson's actions in New Orleans, 
Jefferson wrote: HThe defence of Orleans against a land
army can never be provided for according to the principles 
of the constitution, till we get a sufficient militia 
there." Jefferson to Gallatin, Nov. 22, 1807, Paul L.
Ford, The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 15̂ 5)', X, 5^8.
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took the threat presented by Burr in the light in which
Wilkinson presented it. One citizen wrote in January:
The military means of defense here 
are in readiness - the regular 
troops and militia are alert. . . .
Wilkinson and his regulars - and 
the true Americans9 are determined 
to fight and I fear much blood will 
be spilt. Perhaps this may be my last letter.140
Ten days after the prediction of a full scale armed 
conflict, Aaron Burr surrendered to the civil authorities 
of the Mississippi Territory. On February 3 the Grand 
Jury at Natchez that was hearing Burr*s case returned no 
indictments on any of the charges brought against him. 
However, the Federal Judge, Thomas Rodney, refused to 
release Burr from bail and ordered him to appear in court 
each day. Burr was fearful of being transferred to New 
Orleans where he would probably be tried before a court 
martial selected by General Wilkinson. Consequently, he 
failed to appear in court on the sixth of February. The 
next day Governor Williams of the Mississippi Territory 
declared him to be a fugitive.
Burr fled from Natchez in a southeasterly direction, 
hoping to reach the Gulf and take a ship out of the country. 
On February 18 he was recognized and his presence was re­
ported to Lieutenant Edmund P. Gaines at Fort Stoddert.
140"Extract of a letter from a gentleman in office 
in New Orleans to his correspondent in this city, dated 
the 7th Instant," Charleston Courier. Jan. 31, 1807.
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The next day Gaines, accompanied by a detachment of 
soldiers, met Burr and his two traveling companions on 
the road. After ascertaining his identity, Gaines ar­
rested Burr on the authority of the President's proclama­
tion. Burr was taken to Port Stoddert where he was held 
until March 5, when he and an escort of nine soldiers 
left by ship for Washington.
The entire Burr Conspiracy was blown completely 
out of proportion by a number of individuals, but the 
primary offender was James Wilkinson. Fearful that his 
position as commanding general was in jeopardy, he had 
taken a situation that was only remotely dangerous and 
magnified it until even he lost touch with reality. When 
the actual size of Burr's force became known, Wilkinson 
seemed to be a fool rather than the savior of the west.
By early January the size of the force was be­
ginning to come to light, Jefferson told Wilkinson that 
he did not believe the number of men had ever reached five 
hundred. The President stated that he had never seen any
positive proof that indicated more than one hundred men
142had joined his former Vice President. Late in January
^ 1Cowles Mead to Secretary of War, Jan. 19, 1807, 
in Third Annual Report of the Director of the Department 
of Archives and History of the State of Mississippi 
TTTashville: Press of Brandon Printing Co., 1905;, 64-66.
This volume consists of letters concerning the Burr 
Conspiracy. Wandell and Minningerrode, Aaron Burr, II, 
161-71.
1 ̂ Jefferson to Wilkinson, Jan. 3, 1807, in Albert
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the Secretary of War wrote to inform Wilkinson that he
had authentic information that Burr* a force could not
143amount to more than six hundred men. On February 3, 
Dearborn stated that Burr's entire force consisted of ten 
boats with only six men on each, amounting to the formi­
dable force of sixty men.
To stop this small band of men, Wilkinson had 
assembled about 1,000 regulars, a naval force, and three
or four hundred militia men in the vicinity of New 
145Orleans. The force of approximately 1,000 regulars 
represented about one-third of the total strength of the 
United States Army. The remaining troops were stationed 
along the frontier from Portland to New Orleans and from 
Michilimackinac to Vincennes. The Secretary of War's 
letter of the third of February instructed Wilkinson to 
distribute the troops at the various posts as soon as the 
turmoil surrounding Burr had subsided. He suggested that 
six companies be retained at New Orleans, one company at 
Plaquemines, four at Natchitoches, two on the Mobile and
E. Bergh (ed.), The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (Washington: 
The Thomas Jefferson Memorial Association, 19t>7), XI, 127-30.
143 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Jan. 21, 1807,
SWLS. Roll 3, 117-20.
144 Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 3, 1807,
Ibid.. 126-28.
145Secretary of War to House of Representatives,
Jan. 9, 1807, ASPMA, I, 207.
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146Tombxgbee, and the remainder at Fort Adams. Two weeks
later Wilkinson was ordered to detach an escort for an
expedition being prepared to explore the Arkansas River 
147to its source.
General Wilkinson had played the Burr Conspiracy 
for all it was worth and had discredited himself in the 
eyes of many citizens. However, the actions of the 
officers and men resounded to the credit of the Army.
They had responded quickly and efficiently to the Pres­
ident's call to oppose Burr and his expedition. Although 
the expedition did not materialize on the scale that had 
been predicted, the potential for gathering such a party 
did exist.
Aaron Burr was the type of man who could inspire 
other men to follow him to fame and fortune and there were 
many men on the frontier willing to follow such a leader. 
What stopped the frontiersmen from joining Burr is open 
to speculation. But one thing is certain, the news that 
Wilkinson was gathering a large force to oppose the 
expedition was well known across the nation. Even the 
most adventuresome frontiersman must have hesitated when 
faced with the prospect of encountering a large well-armed 
force of regulars.
1^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 3» 1807, 
SWLS. Roll 3, 126-28.
147Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Feb. 13, 1807,
Ibid.. 132.
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On April 10, 1807, the Secretary of War informed
Wilkinson that he would be summoned to Richmond, Virginia,
14.8to testify against Burr. On May 20, the General left
New Orleans for Richmond vowing that he would convict
Burr, that "little arch traitor" and "damned and pickled
villain."1 ̂  With the departure of Wilkinson from New
Orleans, Colonel Thomas Cushing was left in command of
1 *50the troops on the southern frontier. ^
The arrest of Burr, the tentative agreement on the 
Sabine and the departure of the commanding general, left 
the situation in the South relatively quiet. The Army 
was left to untangle itself and try to return to a more 
or less normal existence. The troops returned to their 
isolated frontier posts to await some other assignment 
that would break the monotonous routine of garrison duty.
148Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807, 
Ibid.. 161-62.
149Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior. 237.
1 ̂ Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Apr. 10, 1807, 
SWLS. Roll 3, 161-62.
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CHAPTER IV
FORTIFYING, GUARDING AND 
EXTENDING THE NATION’S FRONTIERS
The end of the Burr episode brought the start of 
a period of peace to the frontier. The problems on the 
western border of Louisiana had temporarily been resolved, 
the southern Indians were quiet for the moment, and only 
the problem of duties at Mobile remained unsettled. From 
March of 1807 until the outbreak of the War of 1812, the 
principal activities of the Army would be directed toward 
improving the nation's fortifications and garrisons. 
Occasionally the normal routine of garrison life was dis­
rupted by orders to perform duties that were out of the 
ordinary.
A large-scale building problem was started across 
the South, with the most ambitious projects at Charleston 
and New Orleans. Initially the Wax Department expected 
that the fortifications would be built by civilian workers, 
but as costs rose the soldiers were called upon to perform 
more and more of the construction work. All of the con­
struction, whether by civilians or soldiers, was to be 
supervised by Army engineers. Captain Alexander Macomb
194
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was the engineer assigned to direct the work planned for
Charleston Harbor, However, no engineer had been found to
superintend the work at New Orleans.1
For the works at New Orleans the skilled laborers
were hired in other cities, usually at Philadelphia and
Washington. The bricklayers, masons and carpenters were
sent to begin the works even before an engineer had been
assigned to New Orleans. The unskilled workers were hired
2by the military agent from among the local residents.
The absence of a qualified engineer delayed the 
beginning of work at New Orleans, and construction at 
Charleston could not get started because the state of 
South Carolina had not ceded a site for the fortifications 
to the United States. The cession did not take place until 
August of 1807, and little work, other than acquiring
Secretary of War to Jonathan Williams, May 11, 
1807 and Secretary of War to J. Williams, May 11, 1807, 
in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters 
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record 
Croup 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 3, 178-79* Hereinafter cited 
as SWLS. Roll 3 is filled with letters sent by the 
Secretary of War during 1807-1808 concerning the con­
struction of new fortifications and the improvement of 
existing garrisons. It is especially valuable for in­
formation concerning the purchase of materials.
2Secretary of War to William Linnard, Military 
agent for the Middle Department, Feb. 7, 1807, Ibid.,
131• Directs him to hire a brickmaker, and two to four 
assistants; a master mason and six or eight assistants 
to go to New Orleans for one or two years service. 
Secretary of War to Abraham, Apr. 11, 1807, Ibid.. 162- 
63, encloses a contract for two master masons and three 
black assistants; three brickmakers and four bricklayers.
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materials, was accomplished.^ While waiting to begin 
construction in Charleston, Macomb supervised the building 
of a Federal arsenal at Rocky Mount, South Carolina.^
The workers for the project at Charleston were hired by 
the military agent, lieutenant Robert Roberts, from avail­
able labor in the city. This force was to be increased by
the transfer of workers from Rocky Mount when that project 
5was completed.
At New Orleans there were problems with the con­
tract workers, the bricklayers refusing to work during the 
summer of 1807. The Secretary of War directed the military 
agent, Abraham, to consult the United States District 
Attorney to determine if their contract required them to 
work, or whether they could be dismissed without compen­
sation. ̂
By the spring of 1808 the Secretary of War was 
complaining about the lack of progress in the fortifications 
and the mounting expenses. He informed Abraham that the
^American State Papers. Military Affairs (7 Vols. 
Washington! Gales and Seaton, 183^-1861), 1, Report on 
Fortifications, Dec. 8, 1807, 223-24. Hereinafter cited 
as ASPMA.
ASecretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 20, 1807, SWLS, 
Roll 3, 169. ----
^Secretary of War to Roberts, May 11, 1807, Ibid.. 
180; Secretary of War to Macomb, June 22, 1807. Ibid.,
199.
^Secretary of War to Abraham, Aug. 14, 1807, Ibid., 
216. ----
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
197
commanding officers at posts where works were being erected 
would be ordered to assign soldiers to assist the civilian 
workers. They would receive one extra gill of spirits and
7an extra ten cents a day as compensation for their work.
In April the Secretary told Macomb: "Let the workmen
complete the buildings and magazine at Rocky Mount. There 
has been already time and money enough expended at that
Q
place to have built a small city."
Unless they were called upon to work on the forti­
fications, the building program did not effect the daily 
routine of the enlisted men. Normally their activities 
were confined to the tasks of a garrison force: daily
drills, guard duty, and policing the post. Occasionally 
they performed light manual labor not directly associated 
with the duties of a soldier.
At Natchitoches the men were required to guard 
the Indian trading post in an effort to prevent robberies. 
In addition a few of the soldiers were ordered to aid the
factor in packing the pelts and furs before they were
qshipped to New Orleans. At Port St. Stephens the soldiers 
assisted the factor in repairing his storehouse so that the
7Secretary of War to Abraham, Mar, 1, 1808, Ibid.,
301.
Q
Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 25, 1808, Ibid.,
336.
qSecretary of War to Commanding Officer at 
Natchitoches, Mar. 24, 1807, Ibid.. 148.
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supplies would be secure. Also, the troops were to con­
struct bridges over the creeks on the road from the Oconee 
River to the post. The existing road was in such a bad 
state of repair that during 1;he rainy season supplies 
could not be moved to Fort St. Stephens.10 The type of 
work that the soldiers were expected to perform was in­
dicated by an order to supply the garrisons at Chickasaw 
Bluffs and on the Arkansas River with a dozen axes and a 
dozen spades.11
However, not all of the assignments called for 
manual labor on the part of the soldiers; at times they 
were required to enforce Federal laws and regulations.
On July 3» 1807, orders were issued to all officers 
commanding posts in the nation's ports to assist revenue
officers in the enforcement of President Jefferson's
12Proclamation of July 12. The proclamation ordered all 
armed British ships to leave the ports of the United States. 
If the order was not complied with, all communications with 
the ships were to be stopped and no provisions were to be
10Secretary of War to William Boote, June 16, 1807, 
Ibid.. 197.
11 Secretary of War to Swearinger, May 7, 1807,
Ibid.. 176.
12Secretary of War to Burbeck, July 3, 1807, Ibid., 
201. Order of July 3, 1807, in Order Book for the Garrison 
at Fort Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811, Army Commands, Record 
Group 98 (National Archives).
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acquired in American ports.1  ̂ Apparently the soldiers
were not needed to enforce the proclamation because there
is no indication of such activities.
In late July Captain Edmund P. Gaines was ordered
to send a party to explore the area between the Tennessee
River, both above and below Muscle Shoals, and the Tombigbee
River. The purpose of the expedition was to determine how
far up the Tombigbee River boats could navigate and the
distance from that point to the Tennessee. The information
collected was to be communicated to the War Department as
soon as possible. The Secretary requested that Gaines
lead the expedition, provided his other duties would not
14suffer during his absence.
The summer and fall of 1807 passed with little or
no activity on the part of the Army. In late October the
Secretary of War tried to correct one of the most persistent
complaints of the soldiers by ordering that the troops be
paid on a regular basis. The paymaster of the Army was
warned that further incidents of late payments would be
15investigated by the War Department.
1^Proclamation, July 2, 1807, James D. Richardson 
(ed.), A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the 
Presidents, 1789-1897~TWashington: GovernmentPrinting
Office, 1896T7T,"T22-24.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, July 31, 1807,
SWLS, Roll 3, 209.
15Secretary of War to the Paymaster of the Army,
Oct. 29, 1807, Ibid.. 230-31.
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On November 30 orders were issued to the commanding
officer at New Orleans to remove, a number of settlers who
had moved onto land that belonged to the United States.
He was to prevent the settlers from returning after they 
were removed and prohibit any new intrusions.1®
On February 1, 1808, the officers of the Army were
ordered to assist the revenue officers in the enforcement
of the Embargo Act passed by Congress in December. How­
ever, the assistance of the soldiers at the southern posts
17was not required. Instead of helping enforce the Embargo, 
the soldiers at New Orleans and those at Fort Adams were 
engaged in cleaning and oiling the muskets that were stored 
at the posts. All of the weapons that required repairs 
were to be boxed and prepared for shipment to one of the 
nation's arsenals.1®
The War Department anticipated that the construction 
in and around New Orleans would begin in earnest as an 
engineer had finally been found to supervise the work.
The engineer who had agreed to go to New Orleans was Colonel 
J. Foncin, who was to receive a compensation of five dollars
1®3ecretary of War to Commanding Officer at New 
Orleans, Nov. 30, 1807, Ibid., 238.
17Secretary of War to Commanding Officers at New 
Orleans, Fort Johnston, North Carolina, and Fort Johnson, 
South Carolina, Feb. 1, 1808, Ibid.. 288.
18Secretary of War to Kingsbury, Feb. 8, 1808,
Ibid.. 289.
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19a day from the time he left Washington. Poncin’s in­
structions were to try to complete the important works 
at Plaquemine and those at the mouth of the Bayou St.
John’s before .beginning any new projects. He was to 
obtain building materials from the military agent and 
was authorized to draw upon Major William MacRea for 
soldiers as laborers.^
Whatever expectations the Department had nourished 
were disappointed, for Poncin was back in the capital by 
early June. He had fallen ill shortly after arriving at 
his station and had decided to return to the North to regain 
his health. His departure left the works incomplete, and 
the task of finishing them fell on Major MacRea. The 
Department directed MacRea to follow the plans already 
laid out and to seek any assistance that Governor Claiborne
might be able to offer him. In the meantime efforts would
21be made to find another engineer.
To the east, in the Mississippi Territory, the 
soldiers were engaged in a different type of activity.
At Port St. Stephens there were still problems in trans­
porting supplies to the post. The contractor was to decide
19Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 16, 1808, Ibid., 
292; Secretary of War to Poncin, Feb. 18, 1808, Ibid., 294.
20Secretary of War to Poncin, May 22, 1808 and 
Secretary of War to MacRea, May 22, 1808, Ibid., 350-51.
21 Secretary of War to MacRea, June 6, 1808, Ibid.,
359.
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22how to transport the provisions to the fort. The troops 
nearby Port Stoddert were ordered to remove a group of 
intruders from the Cherokee lands on the Georgia frontier. 
The operation was to begin as soon as the boundary line 
between the state the Indian lands was marked by Return J. 
Meigs.^
In April 1808, Macomb now a Major, was informed
that a site at Five Pathon Hole near Savannah had been
obtained for the fortification and the site for the work
at Savannah would be acquired soon. The Major was to
supervise the construction of the works intended to protect
Savannah, with as little delay as possible. He was also
to begin the works at Smithville on the Cape Fear River and
the battery at Old Topsail Inlet near Beaufort, North
Carolina. Macomb was to give his personal attention to
24the completion of these works. In July Macomb was
instructed to procure sufficient materials to build
barracks to accommodate four companies at Charleston and
25three companies in the Savannah area.
22Secretary of War to William Linnard, Feb. 22, 
1808, Ibid.. 295.
^Secretary of War to Boote, Feb. 24, 1808, Ibid.,
314.
24Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 11, 1808, Ibid.,
324-25.
^Secretary of War to Macomb, July 8, 1808, Ibid.,
383.
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Soon troops were on the move from Highwassee in 
Tennessee to Savannah. At Highwassee these men had acquired
some experience in construction, and they were expected to
26put their knowledge to work at their new post. Their
commander, Captain George Armistead, was told that upon
arriving at Savannah he was to do everything in his power
to help with the works at that city and at Five Fathom
Hole. He was to detach as many men as possible from his
27command for fatigue duty each day.
For the Army as a whole, the most significant
event of 1808 was an increase in size authorized by
Congress in April. The authorizing act added five infantry
regiments, one regiment of riflemen, one regiment of light
artillery, and one regiment of light dragoons to the Army.
The authorized strength of the Army was increased from 
283,287 to 9,921. In addition, a chaplain was authorized
for each brigade. The increase was not as important as it 
appeared because the units were never fully recruited. For
instance, only one company of light artillery was raised,
29and its horses were sold in 1809 as an economy measure.
Secretary of War to Armistead, June 30, 1809,
Ibid.. 373« Secretary of War to Shefsall, July 1, 1808,Aid., 375. Secretary of War to Armistead, Oct. 12, 1808, Aid., 427.
27Secretary of War to Armistead, Oct. 12, 1808,
Ibid.. 427.
28J. F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United 
States (Philadelphia: G. W. Childs, 7U5?), 266-2
29̂Fairfax Downey, Sound of Guns: The Story of
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In late autumn the activity of the Army began to 
increase as the nation’s foreign relations deteriorated.
On November 30, 1808, orders were issued to all commanders 
of permanent fortifications to inspect their cannons and 
ammunition to be sure that they were ready for service on 
the shortest notice.^0 The following day all commanding 
officers were ordered to give amply notice to their con­
tractors so that supplies could be purchased.^1 The next 
day Wilkinson was ordered to New Orleans to take command
of the force being gathered there to defend the city
32against a possible invasion. On December 6 the Secretary 
of War ordered that boats be prepared to transport troops 
from Norfolk to New Orleans.^
But for the soldiers not engaged in some sort of 
activity that broke the monotony of garrison duty, the 
time passed slowly. The soldiers engaged in a number of 
diversions, some of which resulted in the establishment of 
stringent regulations at some of the posts. At Port
American Artillery from the Ancient and Honorable Company 
to ike Atom Cannon and Guided MlssTe (New York: McKay,TfcSTT 63-̂6.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Nov. 30, 1808, 
SWLS, Roll 3, 453.
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 1, 1808, Ibid 
32Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1808, Ibid 
456-57. Por the results of this build-up see Chapter 8.
■^Secretary of War to Saunders, Dec. 6, 1808, SWLS, 
Roll 3, 457.
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Johnston, North Carolina, for example, the commanding 
officer prohibited artificers, musicians, and privates 
from leaving the area attached to the garrison. The reason 
for the restriction was apparent from the last paragraph of 
the order:
The degrading habit of drunkenness 
is not sufficient to disgrace them, in 
addition to that crime they must for 
the amusement of the citizens show which 
is the greatest black guard and by way 
of proving and deciding the point turn 
out in the public place to be found there 
commence hostilities, the object of which 
is to bruise, mangle, disfigure and in­
jure each other. . . . these are crimes 
which would disgrace a vagabond much less the soldier.34
At New Orleans, where discipline was always difficult
to maintain, a similar order was issued in February of 1809.
The commander ordered that no more than four men from each
company would be granted passes on the same day. The men
who left the post were to be accompanied by a non-commissioned
officer, who was to be held responsible for the conduct of
the soldiers. All of the men were to return to the garrison
35by four o'clock in the afternoon.
The officers and men stationed at Raleigh, North 
Carolina, took an active interest in the presidential 
election of 1808. During the congressional elections the
-^Garrison Orders, June 27, 1308, Order Book for 
the Garrison of Fort Johnston.
35Garrison Orders, Feb. 14, 1809, Orders, Garrison 
of New Orleans, 1808-1809, Army Commands, Record Group 98 
(National Archives).
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question had been raised as to. whether or not the troops 
should be allowed to vote. With the approach of the 
election of the presidential electors, the subject became 
even more heated because the number of troops had increased. 
However, it was discovered by the officers that a majority 
of the..men would vote for the Federalist candidate, who 
was opposed by the officers. When this fact was revealed, 
the soldiers were assembled and marched out of town, where 
those soldiers who wished to vote for the Federalist ticket 
were held until the voting was concluded. The officers re­
turned to town with the soldiers who would vote properly.
The citizens were so aroused by this obvious trick that the 
soldiers were finally withdrawn by their officers.^
There were not many similar incidents to relieve 
the routine of soldier life. The drudgery of life is 
illustrated by the garrison orders, issued in New Orleans.
The companies of artillery and infantry within the city 
were to be drilled four hours each day, two in the morning 
and two in the afternoon. One month later another order 
was issued reminding the officers of the previous order
and adding that a commissioned officer should supervise
37the drill of each company.
^"Extract of a letter to the editor of the Raleigh 
[North Carolina] Minerva, dated Nov. 16, 1808," in 
Charleston Courier, Nov. 30, 1808.
37Garrison Order, Feb. 18, 1809, and Garrison 
Order, Mar. 8, 1809, Orders, Garrison of New Orleans, 
1808-1809.
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The construction of the coastal fortifications 
continued slowly and unevenly. Macomb was instructed to 
pay attention to all of the works in his district and not 
just the fortifications at Charleston. He was to see that 
the works in Georgia were started, and William MacRea was
Q
assigned the task of supervising the works.
On February 17 two new Brigadier Generals, Peter
Gansevoort and Wade Hampton, were appointed as a part of
the military build-up. The new generals joined Wilkinson
as the ranking officers of the Army and were assigned to
direct the Army*s numerous operations while Wilkinson was
39occupied at New Orleans.
The commanding officer at Ocmulgee Oldfields was 
instructed to remove a number of intruders from the Indian 
lands on the frontier of Georgia. He was also told not to 
disturb two of the settlements in the area until he re­
ceived further orders. In addition to removing intruders
from Indian lands, the soldiers at Ocmulgee were construc-
40ting their own barracks and building a public sawmill.
At Fort St. Stephens there were still problems
^Secretary of War to Macomb, Jan. 24, 1809,
SWLS. Roll 4, 18; Secretary of War to MacRea, Feb. 11, 
1bCi9, and Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 11, 1809,
Ibid., 28-29.
39Secretary of War to Gansevoort and Hampton,
Feb. 17, 1809, Ibid., 34.
40Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at 
Ocmulgee Oldfields, Feb. 27. 1809, Ibid.. 38; Secretary 
of War to Smith, Mar. 20, 1809, Ibi3TT"33.
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getting the factory's goods through the Spanish port.
Captain Gaines was informed that the proper department
would take steps to obtain the release of the goods being
detained at Mobile. In March Gaines was appointed
assistant military agent for Fort Stoddert, and all of
the problems of supplying the troops north of the thirty-
41first parallel rested with the young officer.
One of the problems that Gaines would encounter in 
trying to supply the troops at Fort Stoddert was exem­
plified by his own company. The 1808 clothing allowance 
for his men had not been delivered. On February 15, 1809, 
the Secretary of War reported that the clothes were stored 
at Fort Adams and told Colonel Thomas Cushing: "I will
thank you to have it forwarded to him by way of New Orleans 
as the superintendent of military stores is not allowed to 
send him clothing to make up for the deficiency of that
year." Apparently the men were still wearing the clothes
42issued to them in 1807.
Gaines had to be extremely careful in his actions 
so that he did not anger the Spanish officials at Mobile.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 17, 1809, Ibid., 
49; Secretary of War to Gaines, Mar. 29, 1809, Ibid.. 5i.
J A
Secretary of War to Cushing, Feb. 15, 1809,
Ibid* t 33* The clothing allowance per year as established 
in 1801 was 1 uniform coat, 1 woolen vest, 2 woolen over­
alls, 4 woolen socks, 1 hat, 4 shirts, 2 linen overalls,
4 pair of shoes, 1 blanket, 1 forage trousers. In 1815 
the allowance had been changed only in that the 1 pair 
of forage trousers were eliminated, ASPMA. I, 802.
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On May 4 the Secretary of War cautioned General Wilkinson:
The same disposition continues in the 
Executive to maintain the friendly 
relations subsisting between the U. S. 
and the neighboring colonies- At all 
times desirable, it is pecularily [so?] 
in the present interesting crisis of 
our foreign relations to preserve a 
good understanding and to avoid any 
cause of collision or complaint-43
In June of 1809 the recruiting parties that had
been operating in an effort to reach the level authorized
by Congress for an ’'additional military force” were ordered
to report to their assigned stations with their recruits.
Upon their arrival the recruits were to "labor and assist
in erecting, repairing, and preserving the public works,
buildings and property a3 a primary object.
The work at the various garrisons was increasingly
assigned to the soldiers as the War Department tried to
eliminate the cost of hiring workers to build the new
fortifications. General Hampton was told: "The work
which can be done by the troops will not only expedite
the completion of the fortifications, but diminish the
expense: these are favorite objects to which too much
45attention cannot be paid.”
^Secretary of War to Wilkinson, May 4, 1809, 
SWLS. Roll 4, 98.
44Secretary of War to Hampton, June 30, 1809, 
and Secretary of War to Wilkinson, June 30, 1809, Ibid., 
155-56.
^Secretary of War to Hampton, July 15, 1809, 
Ibid.. 174.
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The Secretary expressed the same opinion when he
authorized the payment of drafts drawn on the War Department
for work done at another garrison: "It is presumed that
his expenditures will not be of any considerable amount,
as most of the labor ought to be performed by the garrison,
and the necessary timber can be obtained for the cutting
46and hauling nearby." In August the commanding officers
were ordered to assist the health officers in enforcing
the recent Act of Congress relative to a quarantine. If
additional instructions were required, General Hampton was
47to be consulted.
The approach of cooler weather and the depletion
of the appropriations for fortifications caused construction
at many of the posts to be suspended or radically cur- 
48tailed. Even work at the important works in the harbor 
of Charleston, except at Port Pinckney, were stopped.
Major Macomb was informed that expenditures totaling 
$110,000 had already been made for the works in South 
Carolina. This sum greatly exceeded the Major's initial
4-6Secretary of War to Linnard, Sept. 30, 1809,
Ibid.. 210.
47Secretary of War to Armistead, Aug. 12, 1809,
Ibid.. 196.
48Secretary of War to Gratiot, Oct. 26, 1809,
Ibid., 214, concerns the supervision of work at Port 
Joimston, North Carolina; Secretary of War to Kelly,
Oct. 29, 1809, Ibid.. 216, work suspended at Port 
Johnson and Oak Island.
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estimate of $75,000, and it appeared that more expenditures 
would he necessary before the works were completed. As a 
consequence, the hired laborers were to be discharged and 
the work confined wholly to Fort Pinckney. To replace the 
civilian workers at the site, he was to make the best 
possible use of the soldiers.
On September 10 General Wilkinson was ordered to 
Washington to face a court of inquiry into the disaster 
that had befallen his command at New Orleans. General 
Hampton relieved Wilkinson and assumed command of all of
the troops in the Territory of Orleans and the Mississippi
50Territory.
At New Orleans, Fort Adams and Columbia Springs 
the soldiers were occupied with collecting and inspecting 
muskets, rifles, pistols and swords. The weapons were to 
be cleaned and those that required repairs were to be boxed 
for shipment by sea to one of the nation’s arsenals.^ At 
New Orleans the soldiers were to make minor repairs to the 
hospital until it could be determined whether or not to 
completely rennovate the building. Orders were also given 
that finally settled the question of where the commander of
49 Secretary of War to Macomb, Nov. 1, 1809, Ibid., 220. ----
50Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 10, 1809, 
and Secretary of War to Hampton, Sept. 10, 1809, Ibid.,
206. ----
^Secretary of War to Cushing, Nov. 28, 1809, Ibid., 
233; Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 13, 1809, Ibid., 24^.
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the troops in New Orleans would live. If a site could be 
found and bricks purchased at a slight cost, the soldiers 
were to build the commander a house. At Fort Stoddert the 
soldiers were assigned the task of either repairing or 
making new carriages for the six pound cannons at the 
post.^
Except for those soldiers caught up in the problems 
at Terre au Boeufs, the year 1809 was quiet, and 1810 held 
little promise that it would be different. One historian 
of the Army, William A. Ganoe, wrote of 1810, after 
skipping the proceeding year completely:
In 1810 little of account happen 
for the Army. The uniform was radi­
cally changed to single breasted coats 
without facings and with silver lace 
along the buttonholes. There was 
also prescribed the silk hat (much 
like the civilian one at present) 
with a cockade on the side.
West Point's faculty was in­
creased by teachers of "drawing 
and of the French language."53
With this statement he moved on to 1811 and a
discussion of the United States on the eve of the War of
1812. The Army was not involved in any activities that
would bring fame and glory to its officers and men during
1810, but it accomplished more than simply changing the
52Secretary of War to Pike, Dec. 5, 1809, Ibid., 
237; Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 30, 1809* Ibid.* 
253.
^^William A. Ganoe, The History of the United 
State8 Army (New York: D. Appleton-Century Company,
Inc./ 1 W T ,  112.
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design of its uniform. The adoption of the new uniform 
was probably the least important event of the year for 
the officers and men who were required to spend most of 
their time on the frontier engaged in hard manual labor.
The process of building and repairing fortifi­
cations and abandoning the posts that had outlived their 
usefulness continued during the first months of 1810. 
Instead of building a fort to protect the area of the 
St. Mary’s River, the War Department decided to assign a 
number of gunboats to patrol the surrounding waters. To 
supplement the boats, heavy cannons mounted on traveling 
carriages would be stationed at the mouth of the river.
In order to house the guns when they were not being used, 
an arsenal was to be built. The barracks near Washington, 
North Carolina, were no longer needed and were to be sold
and the money placed in the treasury. The lease was to be
54surrendered to the owner of the land.
While one site was being sold, the War Department 
ordered that the land at Old Topsail Inlet, on which the 
fort at Beaufort, North Carolina, stood, should be pur­
chased. The government’s agent, Brian Hellen, was told to 
purchase the six acres and have the deed made out to the 
President. He was cautioned not to pay more than two
^Secretary of War to Bourke, Feb. 6, 1810, SWLS, 
Roll 4, 275; Secretary of War to Orr, Jan. 30, 1810, Ibid., 282.
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hundred dollars for the site, and less if possible.
At Fort Johnston, Major Joseph G. Swift was ordered
to remove all of the government's buildings onto the site
recently ceded to the United States by North Carolina.
His expenditures for the movement, improvement of existing
facilities, and the construction of new buildings was not
to exceed $5,000. Swift was to assume command of the
troops and garrison until the work was completed in order
to speed the work by utilizing the soldiers stationed at 
56Beaufort.
At Charleston the construction work had been 
dragging, and in March Macomb was informed that appropri­
ations for construction in South Carolina had been exceeded 
and all work except the mounting of cannons should be 
suspended. However, in April he was ordered to complete 
the barracks and cisterns at Castle Pinckney. By May 
Macomb was authorized to spend an additional $20,000 to 
complete Castle Pinckney; the sum was to include the 
covering of Fort Littleton which required a little addi­
tional work to complete it. He was ordered to suspend 
work on the buildings at Rocky Mount and turn the public 
property over to the commanding officer. In June the
^Secretary of War to Hellen, Mar. 14, 1810, Ibid.,300.
56Secretary of War to Swift, Apr. 9» 1810 and 
Secretary of War to Roberts, Apr. 9, 1810, Ibid., 316- 
17.
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Secretary of War again cautioned Macomb not to exceed the
57$20,000 appropriation.
In Louisiana the work on the fortifications was
not moving much more rapidly than at Charleston. On
April 3» 1810, the Secretary of War informed the military
agent, William Swan, that it had been expected that the
works would have been completed at an earlier date. The
Secretary said:
The monies expended in that country 
for this object, have far exceeded 
every calculation and unless the
works can be finished with a small
additional expense, the authority 
of this department must be interposed 
to Arrest the p r o g r e s s . 58
By mid-May Major MacRea was informed that the funds
for the works had been exhausted and that he was to stop
construction. The existing works were to be secured and
all workers were to be discharged. If any other work was
necessary, it should be performed by the troops stationed
at the sites. An additional source of labor was made
available when corporal punishment was abolished. Instead
of d^ath, offenders were sentenced to hard labor or
59solitary confinement.
57Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 6, 1810, Ibid., 
293; Secretary of War to Macomb, Apr. 14, 1810, Ibid., 332; 
Secretary of War to Macomb, May 8, 1810, Ibid., 340; Sec­
retary of War to Macomb, June 4, 1810, Ibid., 367.
^Secretary of War to Swan, Apr. 3» 1810, Ibid., 31 3«
^Secretary of War to MacRea, May 18, 1810, and 
Secretary of War to Swan, May 18, 1810, Ibid., 353;
Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810, Ibid., 349-50.
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In the spring the War Department announced that 
it was prepared to issue the yearly supply of clothes to
the troops, "but it could not do so because it had re­
ceived no recent returns from the various commanding 
officers stating the quantities required. General Hampton 
was informed that the present issue would be filled by 
using the last available returns, whifch indicated that 
there were 1,166 men under his command. If the clothing 
sent on the basis of the old returns was not sufficient, 
the soldiers would be forced to wear their old uniforms.
In addition to the delay of the clothing issue, the pay
of the soldiers was in arrears.^0
The problems .concerning the clothing issue and 
the payment of the soldiers was fairly typical of the 
administration of the Army. One observer, Lynton Caldwell 
has stated: "Jefferson's reluctance to insist upon an
energetic, well-organized federal administration system . 
had left a legacy of military incompetence in the Army 
and administrative ineptitude in the War Department."^1 
The War Department was not inept, it was simply too small 
to meet the countless demands made upon it. In 1812 the 
Department consisted of only the Secretary and a dozen 
clerks. These thirteen men were responsible for directing 
the activities of the Army and managing the nation's
^Secretary of War to Smith, Feb. 22, 1810, and 
Secretary of War to Hampton, Feb. 23, 1810, Ioid.t 286-87.
61Lynton K. Caldwell, The Administrative Theories
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Indian affairs. By 1821 the size of the Department had
62been increased to include twenty clerks.
Leonard D. White has observed:
The Secretary of War was not 
only the head of the department, 
attending as such to the claims 
of pensioners, the grant of military 
land warrants, and the supervision 
of Indian agents, he also had to act 
in a strictly military capacity as 
adjutant general, quartermaster 
general, commissary general, pay­
master, and as appellate authority 
for review of courts martial. . . .
The Secretary and his clerks spent most of their time
processing hundreds of letters, dealing with countless
subjects, that were addressed to the Department. As a
result, the small staff had insufficient time to devote
to the important task of directing the activities of the
Army.*’4
In 1813 efforts were made to improve the admin­
istration of the Army by the creation of a General Staff.
of Hamilton and Jefferson (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1944), ilT.
^^Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study
in Administrative History. 1H(5T-1829 (rtew York: The S'ree
Press," 1955), 215, 234. For administrative studies of 
the War Department during other periods see: Leonard D.
White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History,
1789-1801" (llew York: The Free Press, 1$65); and Leonard
L. Whi'fce, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative
History. 18£9-TS£l (New~?orkT theFree Press, 1^65).
^"Vhite, The Jeffersonians, 235.
64Ibid.
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But this designation was misleading because the members 
of the General Staff were the civilian and military 
officials concerned with the housekeeping functions of 
the Army. At the same time each military district also 
had its own staff which duplicated those of the General 
Staff.65
After the War of 1812 the members of the General 
Staff remained in Washington and acted as advisors to the 
Secretary of War. This marked the beginning of a bureau 
system within the Army and brought a degree of organization 
and expertise to the administration of the Army. However, 
the administration still did not operate efficiently and 
breakdowns were frequent. During the late 1820's the 
issuance of regulations to govern the various branches of 
the Army was an effort to improve the administration of 
the Army. Despite the various feeble attempts to improve 
the management of the Army, the system continued to function 
poorly. The soldiers continued to suffer from the effects 
of a faulty administration until a more efficient system
65The General Staff included: the adjutant and
inspector general, and two assistants; the quartermaster 
general; the commissary general of ordnance, and three 
assistants-; the paymaster of the army; and the assistant 
topographical engineer. ASPMA, I, 385-392. Included in 
the district staff were: the district commander; adjutant
general and inspector general; assistant quartermaster 
general; deputy commissary of ordnance; engineers, surgeons; 
judge advocates; chaplains; paymasters; deputy commissary 
of purchases; and military storekeepers. "Rules and Re­
gulations of the Army of the United States," May 1, 1813, 
Ibid., 425-ff.
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was finally established during the Civil War.
On June 22, 1810, two paymasters were appointed, 
one for the Territory of Orleans and the other for the 
Mississippi Territory. The action was prompted by a 
memorial from the officers in command of the survivors 
of the Terre au Boeufs episode. The petition stated that 
the troops had not been paid during the period from June 
of 1809 to March of 1810. When they had finally been 
paid, it was only for the period to the end of 1809. The 
Secretary of War requested that Mat least during the 
summer and autumn months, the troops at this and every 
other post where it may be practicable may receive their 
pay monthly as it shall become due.M The law required 
that the payments be made at least every two months if 
not more frequently.^
By July the Secretary of War felt that the problem 
of paying the troops was solved, and it was assumed that 
there would be no further delays. However, there were 
still problems concerning the clothing issue. Although
supplies of clothes were stored at New Orleans, returns
67had still not been received for some of the garrisons.
^Secretary of War to Brent, June 22, 1810, SWLS, 
Roll 4, 385; Secretary of War to Brent, June 23, 181^ 
Ibid., 387.
^Secretary of War to Cushing, June 29, 1810, 
Ibid., 391-92; Secretary of War to Cushing, July 13,
1810, Ibid.. 404; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 19, 
1810, and Secretary of War to Coxe, July 19, 1810, Ibid., 
407-408; Secretary of War to Irvine, July 27, 1810,
Ibid.. 411-12.
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While many of the soldiers went unpaid and wore their old 
uniforms, they continued to execute a variety of orders.
On March 2, 1810, General Hampton was instructed 
to remove his troops from the vicinity of Natchez during 
the summer months. The Secretary of War suggested that 
they be moved north into the forests, where they might 
avoid the sickness so prevalent in the South. The move­
ment could be made without endangering the security of 
New Orleans. There was no cause to think that the troops 
would be called upon to descend the river during the 
coming months.
One week later the Secretary cautioned the General 
not to mix the new soldiers arriving at his camp with the 
old soldiers who were still recovering from their exper­
ience at Terre au Boeufs. Again he suggested that the 
troops be removed: "This is the secret of health to every
army on earth. None particularly so to that which you 
command, and in that climate. I should prefer another
hundred leagues north to the hazard even of an imaciated
„68 camp. . . . "
In an effort to improve the quality of the rations 
issued to the men, the Secretary of War authorized the 
military agents to supply the troops with pulse or some 
kind of vegetables. They were also to exchange the ration
68Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 2, 1810, Ibid., 
289-90; Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 9, 1810, Ibid.. 
296-97. ----
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of bread for cornmeal, because the flour tended to sour 
in the summer months. In addition, the occasional sub­
stitution of vegetables for other parts of the ration 
might be permitted if the commanding officer of a specific 
post agreed. On April 27, 1810, orders were issued to 
send the summer clothes, medicine and hospital stores to 
the troops on the Mississippi, if it had not been done 
already.^
At Charleston the soldiers were busy not only 
with construction work but were also employed in the 
armory. Under the direction of officers, the men inspected 
the arms, cleaned the muskets, pistols, and swords, and 
painted the ordnance. Any weapons found to be unserv-
70iceable were to be shipped to Springfield for repairs.
Many of the tasks performed by the troops were 
trivial and-were undertaken merely to avoid the appearance 
of idleness. The men 3pent long hours engaged in boring 
jobs that accomplished little, other than adding to the 
drudgery of their daily lives. While many of the soldiers 
labored on important projects, many others were engaged in
69 Secretary of War to Morrison, Mar. 5, 1810,
Ibid.. 293; Secretary of War to Morrison, May 15, 1810, 
Ibid.. 347; Secretary of War to Cushing, May 16, 1810,
Ibid... 349-50; Secretary of War to Irvine, Apr. 27, 1810, 
ibid.. 333. Pulse is the edible seeds of peas, beans, 
lentils, and similar plants having pods; or a pottage 
made of meal or pulse.
70 Secretary of War to Smith, Mar. 22, 1810 and 
Secretary of War to Irvine, Mar. 22, 1810, Ibid., 305.
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an endless round of frivolous chores.
In the Mississippi Territory the soldiers were 
engaged in an activity that was becoming increasingly 
important. They were protecting the white settlers from 
the Indians and the Indians from the white settlers. In 
March the Secretary of War informed Governor William 
Blount that steps had been taken to eliminate the problem 
of Indian raids upon the people from Tennessee who wished
71to trade with Mobile. But more importantly, the Army
was removing white intruders from lands still held by the
Indians. As early as March 4, 1809, Thomas Freeman had
informed the Secretary of the Treasury that trouble was
developing in Madison County in Mississippi Territory.
Settlers had moved onto the Indian lands, and the Indians
were threatening to remove them by force if the United
72States did not take some action. On March 28, 1810, the 
Secretary of War requested a legal opinion from Caesar 
Rodney, asking if the United States had the right, under 
their 1806 treaty with the Cherokee, to eject the whites.
He told the Judge: "let me add that an early decision is
very desirable, as measures are required to be taken without 
delay.
Secretary of War to Blount, Mar. 6, 1810, Ibid.,
293.
72Freeman to Secretary of the Treasury, Mar. 4, 
1809, Clarence E. Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of 
the United States. V: The Mississippi Territory
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1^37), 720-22.
^Secretary of War to Rodney, Mar. 28, 1810, Ibid.,
310.
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On May 4 the Secretary sent a letter to General 
Hampton advising him that the intruders should he removed 
from the lands in Madison County. He recommended that 
the troops from the post at Highwassee be moved into the 
area below the Muscle Shoals in order to be in a position 
to act against the invaders. These troops would be re­
inforced by two companies drawn from Natchez. The 
soldiers were to establish a new post:
The post at the Highwassee ceases, 
from the settlement of the country 
to be either important or useful.
Occupying a more advanced post in 
the neighborhood of the public 
lands most intruded on, will more 
essentially secure them, at the 
same time that it will protect 
the rights of our own citizens, 
a3 well as those of the Indians.
Hampton was to arrange the movement and select the 
site for the post. He was cautioned: "In the present
undetermined state of our foreign relations, our object 
is in all necessary movements, and in preserving generally
74the present state, to incur as little expense as possible."
On May 20, 1810, Governor Holmes of the Mississippi
Territory informed James Neelly, agent to the Chickasaws,
that the subject of the intruders was before the Secretary
of War. The Governor felt that the order to remove them
75would be given during the course of the summer.
^Secretary of War to Hampton, May 4, 1810, Ibid.,
338-39.
^Holmes to Neelly, May 20, 1810, Clarence E.
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On June 15 the necessary orders were given to 
Lieutenant Colonel Robert Purdy, who commanded the force, 
to remove the trespassers from the Indian lands. In 
Axigust Purdy was ordered not to select a permanent site
for the new post until he was certain that it was
76healthy. On September 13 the removal of another group 
of whites in the same area was authorized. The order came 
at a critical moment. The Indians, angered by the in­
trusions, were attacking whites traveling through their 
lands. These attacks had caused the Indian agent to post
notices advising travelers to use only the public trace
77or their safety could not be guaranteed.
The process of removal was carried out with relative 
mildness. Colonel Purdy was told that if widows and 
orphans, who did not possess the means of removing them­
selves, were found among the intruders, he was to afford 
them all of the assistance he could. In addition, if their 
immediate removal meant that they would be forced to leave
Carter (ed.), Territorial Papers of the United States, VI: 
The Mississippi Territory (tfashiruFFon: Government PrinTTne
S m ce, ’191977 ' 68.
"^Secretary of War to Holmes, June 15, 1810, SWLS, 
Roll 4, 380; Secretary of War to Hampton, June 15, 1810, 
in Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 70-71; Secretary of 
War to Purdy, July 7, 1810, SWL’5’7 Roll 4, 396-97; Sec­
retary of War to Purdy, Aug. 20, 1810, Ibid., 421-22.
77Holmes to Neelly, Aug. 5, 1810, Carter,
Territorial Papers, VI, 95.
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their crops behind they should be allowed a reasonable 
time to harvest them. If the troops found others during 
the removal process who fell into this category, the 
officers were to use their discretion in deciding what
to do, and were ". . . to be governed by considerations
78of clemency and humanity as occasion may require.”
The soldiers were involved in other removals in
Louisiana. Settlers had moved into the neutral ground
between the Sabine River and the Arroyo Hondo. A force
of an equal number of Spanish and American soldiers were
ta cooperate in a joint operation to remove the intruders.
At New Orleans whites had filtered back onto the public
land at the batture and had to be removed by the 
79soldiers.
In an effort to gether more information about the 
means of communication between Mobile and the Tennessee 
rivers, two expeditions were dispatched from Fort Stoddert 
in the summer of 1810. Captain Gaines, who had made a 
similar exploration the previous year, was to proceed by 
water and land to Highwassee and return to Fort Stoddert
78Secretary of War to Smyth and Purdy, Oct. 18, 
1810, SWLS. 449-50; See "Petition to the President and 
Congress by Intruders on Chickasaw Lands," Sept. 5, 1810, 
in Carter, Territorial Papers. VI. 106-13. The petition 
bears the names of 450 settlers who were occupying the 
Indian lands.
79Secretary of War to Cu3hing, May 24, 1810, SWLS, 
Roll 4, 358; Secretary of War to Jefferson, June 4, 1816, 
Ibid.. 367-68.
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by water. A second party was to follow the Indian trails 
overland to Highwassee and return with Gaines by water.
The parties were to be no larger than absolutely necessary 
so as not to alarm the Indians, who were to be informed of 
the purpose of the expeditions. The Secretary of War 
ordered:
The commanding officer of each detach­
ment will keep a journal of his pro­
ceedings in which are to be stated as 
correctly as practicable, the daily 
progress he makes, the distances from 
points on the route, the quality of
the soil, the kind of timber and face
of the country, the rapidity of the 
current and the depth of water, with 
such other remarks as he may deem 
useful or necessary to gain a full 
knowledge of the Country.80
The detachments could not have been made at a
worse time, because there was trouble developing around
Port Stoddert that could have endangered the friendly
relations between the United States and Spain. On June 20,
1810, Cayetano Perez, commandant of Mobile, informed
Maximiliano de St. Maxent, temporary governor of West
Florida, that a plot against Mobile was contemplated by
81some of the residents in the area of Port Stoddert. The 
plot involved a secret organization called the "Mobile
80Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Port 
Stoddert, June 23, 1810, Ibid., 386; Secretary of War to 
Hampton, July 13, 1810, Ibid.. 404; Secretary of War to 
Blount, June 28, 1810, Ibid.. 390.
81Perez to St. Maxent, June 20, 1810, A. G. I., 
Seville, Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568.
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Society." Upon receiving this information, St. Maxent 
requested that Richard Sparks, the commander of Port 
Stoddert, stop the expedition, if he could. This was 
apparently the first indication that Sparks had that a 
plot existed to attack Mobile. He immediately began an
investigation to determine if the reports had any valid-
.. 82 xty.
Sparks found that the information from St. Maxent 
was essentually accurate and he informed the Secretary of 
War of the existence of the plan. The conspirators con­
templated disabling the army at Port Stoddert, seizing the 
arms stored there, and capturing Mobile. The inhabitants 
of the area strongly supported the plan because of the 
continual problem presented by the Spanish possession of 
Mobile. Sparks stated that he was virtually without troops, 
since he had sent two detachments to the Tennessee River and 
"owing to an unaccountable aversion which the soldiery have 
to this place, they uniformly refuse to re-enlist here.
The manner in which the Garrison has suffered from deser­
tions will appear to you Sir no doubt remarkable." Sparks 
requested that his force be reinforced as soon as possible 
by four companies of infantry and one company of artillery.^
82St. Maxent to Sparks, June 15, 1810, in Carter 
Territorial Papers, VI, 77; Sparks to St. Maxent. June 27, 
1810, A. G. I., SeviTXe, Papele3 de Cuba, leg. 1568;
Sparks to St. Maxent, June 36, 1877, Ibid.
8 ̂Sparks to Secretary of War, July 12, 1810, in 
Carter, Territorial Papers. VI. 79-82, Sparks’ italics.
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As a consequence of the letter from Sparks, the 
Secretary of War ordered General Hampton to send him re­
inforcements. However, the troops should wait until late 
autumn “before making the move unless it became necessary 
to send them sooner. In an effort to protect the men 
from disease, the General was cautioned to send only 
veteran troops to Fort Stoddert and not recruits. A 
letter was sent to Sparks informing him that he would be 
reinforced. The Secretary hoped that the efforts to open 
the new means of communication by the Tombigbee and the
Alabama to the Mobile would eliminate any need for illegal
84action on the part of the citizens.
If immediate reinforcements were required at Fort 
Stoddert, General Hampton was authorized to detach two 
companies of riflemen from Highwassee. If such a detach­
ment were made, additional troops could be sent from the
camps on the Mississippi River to reinforce the command 
85at Highwassee.
The problems around Mobile were soon complicated 
by a series of events at Baton Rouge. In the fall the
Sparks mentioned that a large number of American deserters 
were living in the Mobile district. Sparks to St. Maxent, 
June 27, 1810, A. G. I., Seville,Papeles de Cuba, leg. 1568.
84Secretary cf War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in 
Carter, Territorial Papers. VI, 101-102; Secretary of War 
to Sparks, Aug. 24, 1sT0, SWlTg-, Roll 4, 426.
85Secretary of War to Hampton, Aug. 22, 1810, in 
Carter, Territorial Papers, VI, 101-102.
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United States troops occupied a portion of Spanish West
Florida. The occupation was a direct result of a rebellio
by a number of settlers in the Baton Rouge District of
West Florida. On October 27 President Madison issued a
proclamation authorizing the occupation of the territory
below the Mississippi Territory and east of the Mississipp
River to the Perdido River. The action was taken because
the United States claimed the area was included in the
purchase of Louisiana from France and because the settlers
had indicated their desire to become a part of the United 
86States. Governor Claiborne was designated to receive 
the territory from the rebels and incorporate it into 
Orleans Territory. To support the Governor when he moved 
into St. Francisville and Baton Rouge, a large military 
force was assigned to act as his escort.
On October 19 General Hampton was ordered to have 
all of the effective troops in the vicinity of Washington, 
Mississippi Territory, held in readiness to descend the 
river. The troops were to take four pieces of artillery 
with them when they marched. In addition to the troops, 
all of the public boats and gunboats on the river were to 
be held ready to transport the troops. The contractor was
86Proclamation of the President, Oct. 27, 1810, 
in James D. Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents, 17^9-189T“( Washington: 
Government’ Printing office,”" 1856), 1, 480-81 • Isaac 
J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813: A
Study i:T̂ 57t.- Amencan Diplomacy (Gloucester; Peter Smith,
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to be notified so that he could have one month’s provi-
87sions collected for the force.
Governor Claiborne was in Washington, D. C., when 
his commission was issued and he moved rapidly across the 
country in order to receive the territory as soon as 
possible. The officers at the various frontier posts 
were ordered to offer him every assistance as he jour­
neyed to Mississippi. On October 27 the Secretary of War 
informed Hampton that Claiborne was to take possession of 
the "country laying South and East of the Mississippi as
OO
a part of the Territory of Orleans." Claiborne could 
requisition as many of the forces on the Mississippi River 
as he required to support him. During the operation the 
troops were not to be allowed to go into any town in whose 
"vicinity they might be camped." They were to respect the 
rights and property of the citizens and to be "obedient to 
the civil authority."
On November 2 orders were issued to the commander 
at Natchez by which he was to govern his conduct if Governor 
Claiborne had not arrived by the time the letter reached 
Natchez. He was to consult Governor Holmes, and if the 
latter recommended in writing that the territory should
^Secretary of War to Hampton, Oct. 19, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 4, 452.
88Secretary of War to the Commanding Officers at 
Posts and Stations on the South West Frontier, Oct. 27,
1810, Ibid., 458; Secretary of War to Hampton or the 
Commanding Officer on the Mississippi, Oct. 27, 1810,
Ibid.. 459-60.
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be taken without waiting for Claiborne, the officer was 
to: "proceed with or detach from your command, under a
suitable officer, such number of troops as may be deemed 
necessary, take possession of and occupy the post of Baton
gqRouge in the name and behalf of the United States."
On November 5 the Secretary of War sent a copy of the
President's proclamation to the commanding officers
90stationed on the Mississippi.
While the troops in the western part of the
Mississippi Territory were preparing to move into West
Florida, the soldiers in the eastern part of the Territory
were again ordered to evict the intruders in Madison
County. At the same time Colonel Smyth was warned to
keep his soldiers from becoming farmers on the frontier.
Officers and soldiers were permitted to keep cattle and
hogs, but the Secretary of War cautioned that the raising
of the stock was to be kept within bounds and should not
91result in speculation or injury to the service.
While the troops were being concentrated in and 
around Washington, some of the posts were woefully under 
strength. At the post at the English Turn, there were
89Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the
troops on the Mississippi, Nov. 2, 1810, Ibid., 460-61.
90Secretary of War to Commanding Officer of the
troops on the Mississippi, Nov. 5, 1810, Ibid., 463.
91 Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 2, 1810, Ibid.. 
461; Secretary of War to Smyth, Nov. 9, 1810, Ibid.,463- 
64.
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one sergeant, and four privates; at Chickasaw Bluffs and 
at the Arkansas, there were a total of two corporals and 
six privates. At Port St. Stephens there was only one 
private, who was apparently attached to the factory at 
that post. The Secretary of War questioned whether or 
not these small posts were essential. If they were 
needed, they should be supplied with provisions for
q pseveral months at a time in order to reduce expenses.
Governor Claiborne arrived at Natchez on December 1
and immediately conferred with Governor Holmes concerning
the appropriate actions to be taken. They decided that
Claiborne should take possession of the territory as
quickly as possible. Therefore, he ordered Colonel John
Covington, commanding the troops on the Mississippi, to
have two hundred and fifty to three hundred troops ready
to march to Pointe Coupee on the west side of the river.
The troops were to be held there until ordered to cross
into the District of Baton Rouge. The remaining troops
were to be prepared to follow the governor and his escort.
The next day Claiborne increased his request to include
seven to eight hundred men to move "with all possible
dispatch." But at "least" two hundred and fifty were to
q-\move to Pointe Coupee at once.
92Secretary of War to Hampton, Nov. 19, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 5, 3; Secretary of War to Mason, Aug. 31,
TBTU, SWLS. Roll 4, 428.
93Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 1, 1810, and Claiborne 
to Covington, Dec. 1, 1810, in Dunbar Rowland (ed.),
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On December 7 Claiborne stated that he had taken
possession of St. Francisville without any opposition.
If he encountered resistance at Baton Rouge, "the troops
of the United States will be commanded to take the fort."
Five days later Claiborne reported that he had taken
possession of Baton Rouge on the tenth without resorting 
04.to force.
The disturbance at Baton Rouge was the subject of 
some concern at Fort Stoddert and Mobile. The Spanish 
officials and Colonel Cushing, who had been sent to command 
at Stoddert, were afraid that the Mobile Society might 
seize this opportunity to move against Mobile. Cushing 
was informed that if the Spanish should voluntarily offer 
to abandon any of the posts in the area described in the
President's proclamation, he was to garrison them with
95troops from his command.
In orders of the same date the Secretary stated:
"the reinforcement of Fort Stoddert have for its object 
the security of the post and the preservation of the public
Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne. 1801-1816 
(.Jackson: State Department of Archives and History,
1917), V, 34-37. Hereinafter cited as WCC. Claiborne 
to Covington, Dec. 2, 1810, Ibid., 38-3$* Claiborne's 
italics.
94Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 7, 1810, Ibid.. 46-50; 
Claiborne to Smith, Dec. 12, 1810, Ibid.. 53-56. Claiborne's 
italics.
95 Secretary of War to Cushing, Dec. 21, 1810,
SWLS. Roll 5, 24.
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peace but more particularly the prevention and defeat of 
a military enterprise against the Spanish posses­
sions. . .
On December 21 Colonel Sparks informed Claiborne
that he suspected that the people in the vicinity of
Port Stoddert would use the revolt in West Florida as
an excuse to attack Mobile. In an effort to stop the
citizens from attacking the Spanish, he had sent Captain
Gaines to Mobile to guard the fort. However, the Spanish
had eighty to one hundred men posted in the fort, a
formidible structure mounting thirty-six pieces of heavy
artillery, surrounded by a deep ditch and with walls that
97were eighteen feet thick.
Claiborne had ordered Colonel Cushing to take 
possession of Mobile if the Spanish would voluntarily 
withdraw. But he had also informed Sparks that if the 
Spanish did not surrender the fort on demand he was to 
await further orders as to what actions he should take.
If Sparks learned that any of the settlers were contem­
plating an attack upon Pensacola, he was to do everything
98possible to stop them.
96Secretary of War to Hampton, Dec. 21, 1810,
Ibid.. 25.
97^'Sparks to Claiborne, Dec. 21, 1810, Rowland, 
WCC. V, 73-75.
98Claiborne to Sparks, Dec. 23, 1810, Ibid.,
76-77.
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Fortunately for the continued existence of peace,
Colonel Cushing arrived at Mobile before the American
troops began a war. Colonel Sparks had called out the
militia in his district, in addition to sending Captain
Gaines with a force of fifty regulars to demand the
surrender of Mobile. The Spanish Commandant had refused
the demand, and Colonel Sparks had sent a company of
mounted riflemen to support the regulars. Also, he was
preparing to send the remaining troops, both regulars
and militia, from Fort Stoddert to join Gaines at Mobile.
This was the situation Colonel Cushing found when he
arrived at Mobile. Dismissing the militia, he decided to
99await instructions.
On January 24 the Secretary of War informed General 
Hampton and Colonel Cushing that plans had been made to 
take possession of "all or any part of the territory lying 
east of the River Perdido, and south of the state of 
Georgia and the Mississippi Territory.” This action was 
to be taken only if the Spanish officials agreed to 
surrender their control to the United States. General 
George Matthews had been authorized to negotiate with the 
Spanish and to supervise the occupation if the occasion 
presented itself. He was to be supported by the Army and
99Cushing to Claiborne, Jan. 8, 1811, in Carter, 
Territorial Papers, VI, 167-68; Holmes to Secretary of 
State, Feb. 2, 1811, Ibid.. 173-75.
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Navy if he requested their help. If such a surrender was
offered before Matthews arrived, the two officers were to
occupy the territory until General Matthews arrived.1^0
The Spanish declined to surrender the town and
Cushing withdrew his foree from Mobile to Port Stoddert
upon orders from General Hampton. Judge Harry Toulmin
wrote of the removal: ”1 regret this step, - as I fear
that many of the citizens at Mobile have so far committed
themselves with the Spanish officers - that they may now
101feel their displeasure.”
The occupation of West Florida between the 
Mississippi and the Perdido rivers removed a situation 
that had been causing problems since the United States 
first occupied the Louisiana Purchase. As the new year 
began, the troops were returned to their garrisons to 
resume the dreary peacetime routine. There were thirty- 
nine companies with a strength of approximately 2,300 
soldiers stationed in the southern part of the country.
For most of these men the rest of the year would be a
102period of relative inactivity. The removal of the
1 ̂ Secretary of War to Hampton and Cushing,
Jan. 24, 1811, SWLS. Roll 5, 41-42; Secretary of War 
to Smith, Jan. 26, 1811, Ibid.. 54. Both letters 
were marked confidential.
^01Toulmin to the President, Feb. 6, 1811, in 
Carter, Territorial Papers. VI. 175-77. Toulmin's 
italics.
102Secretary of War to Irvine, Feb. 12, 1811, 
SWLS. Roll 5, 58-61,
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intruders in the Mississippi Territory continued. The 
commanding officer was given discretion to grant indul­
gences in point of time to the individuals occupying 
Indian lands. In South Carolina the work on the forti­
fications continued, but expenditures were to be held to 
S9 ,000 and completed as rapidly as possible. General 
Hampton was instructed not to make any expenditures for 
fortifications that might be erected in the territory 
acquired as a result of the President's Proclamation.1®^
On July 20 General Hampton was ordered to begin 
the construction of three roads, the only major undertaking 
of the year. The first road was to begin in the vicinity 
of Muscle Shoals and run to the Mobile. The object was 
to provide a means of transportation for the inhabitants 
of Tennessee to the Gulf. The second road was to run from 
Port Stoddert to Colonel Hawkins' station on the Flint 
River, and the third was to be opened from Port Stoddert 
to Baton Rouge. The roads were to be constructed by the 
troops under the general's command. Primary consideration 
was to be given to the road from the Tennessee to Port 
Stoddert, the others would be built as conditions would 
admit. The construction of the roads by soldiers was 
justified because: "The United States must have roads
1®^Secretary of War to Troup, Feb. 12, 1811, Ibid.. 
62; Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 9» 1811, Ibid.. 77; 
Secretary of War to Hampton, Mar. 14, 1811, Ibid.. 81.
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for the purpose of transporting their ordnance and military 
stores from one military post to another, . . ,H
The Secretary of War cautioned Hampton that the 
Indians should be informed of the reasons for the large 
number of soldiers moving through their territory so as 
not to alarm them. The Secretary envisioned a rapid com­
pletion of the road from the Tennessee by having the
troops from Highwassee work south and those from Port
104Stoddert work north. The construction of a trans­
portation system was important, but the condition of the 
nation'8 defenses required more than good roads.
As the nation drifted toward war with Bngland, the 
United States Army was also drifting. The only positive 
action that had been taken was the construction of a 
system of coastal fortifications. By 1812 there had been 
completed twenty-four forts and thirty-two enclosed 
batteries and masonry works, armed with 750 guns of all 
calibers. Theoretically this system would have required 
12,610 soldiers to man them adequately. In December of 
1811 President Madison asked that the military force be 
strengthened. He requested that the existing regiments 
be recruited to full strength and that 10,000 men be 
authorized for new regiments. In addition, he asked that
104Secretary of War to Hampton, July 20, 1811,
Ibid., 177-78.
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he be authorized to accept 50,000 Federal volunteers. To
finance the volunteer regiments the President requested
an appropriation of $3,000,000.
Congress responded to Madison's requests, but not
on the scale that he had wanted. They authorized the
President to accept 30,000 Federal volunteers, presumably
to come from the existing militia organizations. The
regular army was to be increased to 25,000 men, including
thirteen new regiments. To finance the volunteer re-
105giments, Congress appropriated $1,000,000.
While the appropriation was not as large as the 
President had requested, it represented a substantial sum 
when considered in the light of past appropriations for 
the military establishment. In the entire period from 
March 4, 1789. to December 31» 1809, the disbursements 
for the whole military establishment had amounted to 
only $ 3 0 , 9 4 1 , 6 6 9 . 4 7 . By the time war was declared, 
the Regular Army numbered only 6,744 men, not the 25,000 
men authorized by law. Most of this force was scattered 
along the coast and across the frontier, with the largest 
single concentration reported at Baton Rouge and Pass
10*5̂Ganoe, History of the United States Army, 113; 
Callan, Military Laws of t5e United Spates. 212-16. 220- 
221; Richardson. Messages and Papers. 1. 494; Niles 
Weekly Register. Dec. 7, 1BTT.
^^Report submitted to the House of Representatives 
Apr. 5, 1810, ASPMA. I, 268.
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Christian, where there were 1,244 soldiers. The second
largest concentration was in the harbor of New York,
107where 901 men manned the defenses.
Most of the officers who held high command in the 
Army before the war were either old veterans from the 
Revolution or influential politicians. During the War 
of 1812 the old revolutionary officers were typified by 
Henry Dearborn and William Hull. In writing of Dearborn 
a contemporary, Charles Peterson., summarized the weak­
nesses of most of the old officers:
Age had dampened his ardor, and 
weakened his energy: instead of
being the first to lead, he was 
content to delegate this task to 
others. Forty years had completely 
changed his changed his character.
In 1776 he had been distinguished
for promptitude and fire; in 1812 1Qg
he was remarkable only for inactivity.
In 1815 a report on the length of service of some
of the officers of the Army illustrated the prospects for
107'Report of the military force in June, 1812,
Ibid.. 319-20. The breakdown of the 6,744 men was as 
follows: St. Mary's River in Georgia, 194; Fort Hawkins,
73; New Orleans and Fort St. John, 143; Pass Christian 
and Baton Rouge, 1,244; Natchitoches, 89; Fort Hampton 
and Highwassee, 169; Fort Massac, 36; Belle Fontaine,
134; Fort Osage, 63; Fort Madison, 44; Vincennes, 117; 
Hichillimackinack, 88; Fort Dearborn, 53; Fort Wayne,
85; Detroit, 119; On the march to Detroit, 430; Charleston, 
175; New York, 901; Newport, 193; Boston, 131; and Fort 
Miffin, 65.
10SCharleston J• Peterson, The Military Heroes of 
the War of 1812. with a Narrative of theWar (5 ed., 
Philadelphia: William~A. Leavy k So., 184'$J. "He was
conquered by his own fears, not by the prowess of the 
enemy," 4.
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most officers. The number of years of service for the
eleven men surveyed ranged from twenty-five years for
Major William Beall to thirty-eight years for Colonel
Jacob Kingsbury. The age of the officers varied from
fifty-three to sixty-four years. The old officers had
seen long years of service and most of them were no
10Qlonger capable of effective leadership. *
Most of the appointments from civilian life fared 
little better than did the old generals with two excep­
tions, Jacob Brown and Andrew Jackson. Brown was a com­
petent militia general who trained his men rigorously 
and led them well. Jackson was atypical and fitted no 
single category. He possessed the same characteristic 
that President Washington had seen in Anthony Wayne, the 
"overwhelming desire to meet and annilate the enemy." 
Chambers wrote to Jackson: "There never, perhaps, was
a warrior of greater resolution than Jackson."110
Of more importance for the postwar Army was the 
rise to prominence of a number of young officers, such 
as Winfield Scott and Edmund P. Gaines, all of whom had
1Q9Niles Weekly Register. VII, Feb. 11, 1815; the 
officers, years of service and age were: General James
Wilkinson, 32, 63; General Burbeck, 30, 62; General 
Cushing, 32, 56; General Porter, 35, 57; General Bissell, 
27, 59; Colonel Freeman, 27, 63; Colonel Kingsburg, 38, 
57; Colonel Sparks, 27, 53; Major Pike, 32, 64; Major 
Whistler, 26, 58; Major Beall, 25, 59.
110Chambers, The Military Heroes of the War of 
1812. 197.
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been members of the Army prior to the war and had learned 
their trade well. The young men rose rapidly once the 
war began and they quickly demonstrated their competence 
and ability to command. There was no conclusive evidence 
produced by the War of 1812 as to whether Regulars were 
superior to militia or vice versa. The question revolved 
around leadership: If the troops were badly led they
performed poorly; if they were well led, they fought well, 
whether they were Regulars or militia. But the war was 
not the glorious affair that had been predicted in 1811 
and 1812 by the War Hawks. However, the Army gained one 
thing from the war at the Battle of Chippawa. Henry Adams 
wrote of this encounter: “Small as the affair was and 
unimportant in military results, it gave to the United 
States Army a character and pride it had never before 
possessed."111
But pride was of little tangible value, and on 
March 3, 1815, Congress drastically reduced the wartime 
Army. The force as outlined by Congress would have an 
authorized strength of 12,383 officers and enlisted men, 
and the regiment of dragoons disappeared from the Army's 
organization. The commissioned officers that were re­
tained must have served in the war, and preference was
111Henry Adams, History of the United States During 
the Administrations of Jefferson and Ma3ison Vols.. 
llew York: Charles Seritners, 1883-19^5, VlII, 45.
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112given to the graduates of the Military Academy.
During the war the country had been divided into 
nine military districts in an effort to achieve a more 
efficient organization of the Army. On May 17, 1815, the 
wartime districts were abandoned and the country was 
divided into two divisions, the Northern and Southern. 
Major General Jacob Brown commanded the former and Major 
General Andrew Jackson commanded the latter. Within each 
division there were smaller administrative units, con­
sisting of the old military departments. There were five 
departments in the North and four in the South, each com­
plete with its own staff system.
With the return of peace, the large concentrations 
of troops that had been gathered during the war were 
scattered across the frontier. In 1815 there was every 
reason to believe that the peace would not be broken, 
and the War Department expected that the problem of re­
turning the Army to a peacetime 3tatus could proceed at 
a leisurely pace. The new administrative system would be 
tested to the utmost as the Army was broken up into small 
units. Bor the common soldiers the return of peace meant 
the beginning of another round of thankless tasks to be 
performed.
112Callan. Military Laws of the United States, 
266-67. -------------------------
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CHAPTER V
THE ARMY ATTEMPTS TO BRING 
PEACE TO THE FRONTIER
The government's expectations of a period of 
quiet in which to return to a peacetime organization 
were not realized. Problems with the Indians continued 
after the war was concluded. On May 22 the Secretary of 
War ordered General Jackson to furnish an escort for the 
party that was to survey the boundary outlined in the 
Treaty of Fort Jackson.1 The task of maintaining peace 
along the Florida frontier was assigned to General Edmund 
P. Gaines. By June Gaines had assembled a force of about 
1,000 men along the frontier and was requesting additional 
troops in an effort to make an impression on the Indians.
In September Gaines requested a force of 6,000 men to aid
2in the work of surveying and marking the new boundary line.
1 Secretary of War to.Jackson, May 22, 1815, in 
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. letters 
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, Record 
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 107-109. Hereinafter 
cited as SWLS.
2James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Frontier 
General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana Staie tfniversiiy Press,
1$47), 57-58.
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The War Department anticipated trouble with the 
Indians and had authorized Jackson to make requests for 
militia from the states and territories until reinforce­
ments could be sent from other posts. The Indian opposition 
to the survey was attributed to the activities of a British 
agent, Colonel Edmund Nicholls. He had been working to 
persuade the Creeks to join the Spanish and British, and 
to denounce the Treaty of Port Jackson. He told the 
Indians they should demand that the United States abide by 
the agreements of 1811. He suggested that if the Indians 
supported the British these would be guaranteed.^
In an effort to conciliate the Indians, General 
Gaines was allowed to distribute provisions among the 
Indians who were without food. He was also to determine 
the Spanish opinion of Nicholl’s activities at Appalachicola. 
As additional assurances to the Indians, Colonel Benjamin 
Hawkins, the Creek Indian Agent, was ordered to accompany 
the commissioners when they marked the boundary. The War 
Department believed that his influence with the Indians 
might help to remove their objections to the running of 
the line. In August General Jackson was authorized to 
draw $40,000 from the War Department, if the hostile 
attitude of the Creeks make it necessary to extend more 
protection to the frontier. General Gaines estimated that
^Secretary of War to Jackson, June 12, 1815, SWLS. 
Roll 8, 155-56; Augusta Mirror. May 29, 1815.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
246
moving the troops to protect the commissioners would cost 
127,215. By November 1 it was reported that the commission­
ers were running the boundary lines without opposition
4from the Indians.
Throughout the rest of the South, the period from 
the end of the War of 1812 to December of 1815 was devoted 
to the job of returning to a peacetime status. On 
November 11 the Secretary of War informed the Quarter­
master General, Callender Irvine, that the peace estab­
lishment consisted of 9,980 men, exclusive of non-commis-
5sioned officers and musicians.
Early in 1316 the War Department began a survey 
to determine where new fortifications should be constructed 
and which of the existing fortifications should be improved 
and expanded. The Secretary of War requested that the 
governors of the various states have their legislatures 
cede the land needed if they had not already done so.^
The construction of the new works was a logical result of 
the War of 1812 when many of the permanent fortifications 
had been found to be inadequate. By May the sum of
^Secretary of War to Gaines, July 5, 1815, SWLS,
Roll 8, 196; Secretary of War to Hawkins, July 15, 1815, 
Ibid., 210-11; Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 25, 1815, 
TEH., 293-95; Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 4, 1815, 
Ibid.. 353-54; Georgia Argus. Nov. 1, 1815.
^Secretary of War to Irvine, Nov. 11, 1815. SWLS, 
Roll 8, 330. ----
^Secretary of War to Governors, Jan. 22, 1816,
427.
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$838,000 had been appropriated by Congress for the con­
struction of fortifications during 1816. The Secretary 
of War informed General Joseph G. Swift that it had been 
decided that the soldiers who worked on the fortifications 
were to receive an extra fifteen cents a day and an 
additional ration of spirits. The payments were to be 
made at the end of each month and would enable the soldiers 
to almost double their monthly salary. The construction 
of the works was delayed because Congress had authorized 
the President to employ a foreign engineer, General Simon 
Bernard, a French engineer, who was expected to arrive 
during the late summer or early fall. The work would not
7begin until he had conferred with Swift.
In addition to expanding the nation’s fortifi­
cations, the Army was also ordered to remove intruders 
on Indian lands. These settlers had moved onto the land 
while the troops were occupied elsewhere during the war.
On January 27 the Secretary of War informed the various 
generals that they were responsible for removing the in­
truders from both the public and Indian lands. All in­
truders on the public land3 were to be removed by military 
force if they did not obey the officer’s proclamation to 
leave. After the settlers left, their homes and all im­
provements were to be destroyed by the troops: "and that
^Secretary of War to Swift, May 2, 1816, SWLS.
Roll 9, 2; Secretary of War to JackBon, May 30, 1816,
Ibid., 23-24.
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every attempt to return shall be repressed in the same
_8manner.**
On January 29 Jackson was ordered not to remove 
the intruders on the public lands in Tennessee until 
Congress could act upon their petition for relief. In 
all other cases Jackson was expected to comply with the 
President's order. In March the Secretary stated that a 
bill for the relief of the intruders had passed the Senate 
and was before the House of Representatives. Until a 
final decision was made, Jackson was to suspend any 
operations against the settlers on public lands. Congress 
eventually passed a bill that provided relief for all of 
those individuals who had settled on public lands before 
the first of February. All other settlers were still 
subject to military removal. The relief law was to expire 
on March 25, 1817.9
In addition to enforcing the nation's laws, the 
President had determined that the soldiers should be put 
to work on the frontier. They were to begin cutting a 
road from the Tennessee River to Mobile and New Orleans. 
Jackson was to select the best route for the road and
o
Secretary of War to Generals Jackson, Macomb, 
Gaines, Smith and Brown, Jan. 27, 1816, SWLS, Roll 8, 435.
qSecretary of War to Jackson, June 29, 1816,
SWLS. Roll 8, 436; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 12, 
T5T5, Ibid., 469-70; Secretary of War to Hall, Sept. 25, 
1816, 3WE3, Roll 9, 150-51.
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assign the troops to the operation. The President be­
lieved the work "to be no less necessary to the discipline, 
health, and preservation of the troops, than useful to the 
public interest."10
While some of the troops were building the new 
road, others were assigned to stop the Indian raids into 
southern Georgia. The major source of trouble on the 
Florida border were the Indians living at an old fort 
located on the Apalachicola Biver. The fort had been 
abandoned by the Spanish and had become a refuge for 
Indians and runaway slaves. The fort was finally des­
troyed in July by a detachment of regulars under the 
command of Colonel Duncan Clinch.11
The destruction of the Negro fort temporarily 
eliminated the problems along the Georgia-Florida border. 
The troops spent the rest of 1816 trying to adjust to the 
new situation of being at peace. By the end of the year 
the troops had repaired their garrisons and were avail­
able for assignment to other duties. On January 14, 1817, 
the Secretary of War reported that the strength of the 
Army was 10,024. In the southern division, exclusive of
^Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 8, 1816,
SWLS. Boll 8, 466-67.
11Gaines to Clinch, May 23» 1816 and Loomis to 
Patterson, Aug. 13» 1816, in American State Papers,
Foreign Halations (Washington! Gales and Seaton, 1834),
IV, 558-60. Hereinafter cited as ASPFB. See also the 
discussion in Chapter X.
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the artillery, there were 2,653 infantry men; of this
force approximately half were stationed at the posts in
12Alabama and Georgia.
While the troops in Georgia and Alabama watched 
the Indians, the troops at Natchitoches began preparations 
to move to a new site. The decision was made after a 
recommendation by the Indian agent and memorials from 
the citizens of the town that the factory be removed.
The post itself was located on private property, for which 
the government was paying an annual rent equal to the 
value of the land. Jackson was ordered to select a new 
site on which to erect a new fort and factory. The post 
should be near the river and not above the obstructions 
to navigation. The Secretary cautioned Jackson to be 
certain that the new site was on public property and 
healthy. Once the site was selected, the soldiers should 
start to build the post immediately.1^
On August 15 General Jackson was authorized to 
requisition whatever tools his troops might need for 
opening the new road from Tennessee to Mobile. In 
September he was to have other troops begin working on
12American State Papers. Military Affairs 
(Washington: Sales and Seaton, 1832), I, 661-62.
Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
^Secretary of War to Jackson, July 1, 1816, 
and Secretary of War to Claiborne, July 1, 1816, SWLS.
Roll 9, 81-82.
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the road from Columbia, Tennessee, to Madisonville, 
Louisiana. Congress had appropriated $10,000 to repair 
that road and the road from Georgia to Port Stoddert. 
However, the Secretary had decided that all of the funds 
should he expended on only one of the roads.
It was not until May of the following year that 
the soldiers began to work on the road. The road from 
Madisonville to Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee River was 
to be opened by troops under the command of Lieutenant 
John Tarrant. The route they were to follow had been 
marked through the wilderness by Captain Hugh Young, an 
assistant topographical engineer. The assistant adjutant 
general of the 8th Military Department issued detailed 
instructions to Tarrant to guide him in the work on the 
road: (1) the path was marked by a single blaze on the
trees on the north and south side; (2) the road was to be 
thirty-five feet wide; (3) all streams, except the Pearl 
and Tombigbee rivers, were to be bridged; (4) all bridges 
were to be above the high water mark and framed; (5) cause­
ways were to be built through swamp grounds and were to be 
high enough to allow the passage in the wet season; (6) 
ditches were to be dug on each side of the causeway, four 
feet wide and three feet deep; (7) the width of the cause­
ways was to be twenty-seven feet; (8) at streams with firm 
sandy bottoms the road was to be cut down to the water at
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the best fording place near the bridge.1^
While the troops in the northern part of the
Mississippi Territory were building and repairing roads,
those in the southern part were watching the Indians.
They were also trying to stop the illegal cutting of
public timber. A large quantity of cedar and other timber
was being cut and floated down the Alabama and the other
rivers in the Territory to the Gulf of Mexico. The soldiers
were to patrol the public lands and prevent any further
thefts. The names of the individuals found cutting the
trees and any evidence collected were to be turned over
15to the District Attorney.
The year 1817 was to be an active period for the 
members of the Army as the Indians began to attack the 
isolated white settlements in southern Georgia. In 
February the Governor of Georgia, David Mitchell, reported 
that the Indians were stealing horses and one white man 
who was pursuing them had been killed. The Governor re­
quested that the troops that had been withdrawn from 
Forts Crawford and Gaines be returned to the posts. General 
Gaines informed the Governor that he coiald not stop the
14 „ _Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 24, 1816,
Ibid.a 148. Kirby to Tarrant, May 31, I8l?t in Letters
Sent, 8th Military Department, Army Commands, Record
Group 98 (National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LS8MD.
15'Secretary of War to Jackson, Nov. 4, 1816,
SWLS. Roll 9, 181.
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troops that were already inarching to Port Mitchell from 
the two forts. However, if it became necessary, he would 
order two companies of artillery, to serve as infantry, 
from Charleston. They would be ordered to stop the Indian 
raids and to remove all of the intruders from the Indian 
lands. Also the Secretary of War informed the Governor 
that General Jackson had been instructed to maintain a 
post on the Georgia-Florida border, either on the 
Chattahoochee or the St. Marks.
Throughout the month of February there were 
numerous reports of Indian raids. One letter stated 
that the writer had visited Fowltown on the Flint River 
where he had seen six hundred Negroes on parade. They 
were well furnished with arms, well disciplined and had 
elected officers. In addition, an equal number of Indians 
had joined the blacks. The Indians had expressed a desire 
to meet either the American soldiers or the Indians of 
William McIntosh in battle. They predicted that the out­
come would be different from their last encounter. At the 
same time, the people from St. Mary's appealed for a 
detachment of troops to be stationed in their town to 
protect them from the Indians. In addition, the soldiers 
would be able to remove the intruders from the Indian lands.
^Mitchell to Gaines, Feb. 5, 1817, and Gaines 
to Mitchell, Feb. 5, 1817, ASPMA. I, 681; Secretary of 
War to Mitchell, Feb. 1, 1817. SWLS. Roll 9, 234.
17'Perryman to Sands, Feb. 24, 1817 and Clarke 
to Gaines, Feb. 26, 1817, ASPMA. I, 681-82.
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In March reports of Indian raids continued to be
made to the officers stationed on the frontier. Some of
these stated that the reason the Indians were hostile was
because of the large number of Americans who were driving
the Indians from their land. Because of these intrusions,
the Indians believed that the Americans were violating
their treaty obligations. There were also rumors that
British agents were actively working to arouse the Indians.
One report, from a man who had lived in the Indian country
for fifty years, stated that the Indians believed that the
Americans were afraid of them. The basis for this belief
was the fact that Ports Crawford and Gaines had been
evacuated. He believed that a moderate force of regulars
stationed at Camp Crawford would be sufficient to quiet 
18the Indians.
On April 2 the Secretary of War informed the 
Governor of Georgia that a portion of the troops from 
Charleston were marching to the frontier. The Secretary 
was confident that General Jackson’s force was large enough 
to protect the southern frontier from the Indians in 
Florida.1^
As the soldiers gathered on the frontier, the 
Indians continued to attack the citizens of the border
18Arbuthnot to Commander of Port Gaines, Mar. 3, 
1817, Sands to King, Mar. 15, 1817, and Mitchell to 
Secretary of War, Mar. 30, 1817, Ibid.. 682-83.
^Secretary of War to Babun, Apr. 2, 1817* SWLS, 
Roll 9, 266.
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region. Those whites who had settled on the public lands
acquired by the treaty of Port Jackson had requested
military aid to stop the Indians from stealing their
cattle. General Gaines had referred their request to
the civil authorities. He advised the settlers not to
20take any rash actions against the Indians. Gaines told 
the citizens of Murder Creek, Alabama Territory, that the 
Indians were willing to abide by the same laws that gov­
erned the whites. During the numerous Indian raids on 
the border, seven settlers had been killed.
In September Major Daniel Twiggs demanded that the 
Indians surrender the warriors who had killed the white 
settlers. The Indians replied that they would discuss 
surrendering their warriors when the whites punished those 
who had killed Indians. They stated that the Americans 
still owed them three lives since ten Indians had been 
killed and only seven whites. The reply attempted to 
shift the blame for the raids to the runaway slaves living 
in Florida. The Indians stated that they had nothing to 
do with the raids or the Negroes, who had been sent by the 
British. The Indians feared that their lands would be 
ruined by the passage of the opposing armies over them 
if the United States attacked the Negroes. Major Twiggs 
was told by the Chief at Fowltown, located fiften miles
20Gaines to Secretary of War, Aug. 25» 1817, in­
cludes reply to citizens of Murder Creek, July 12, 1817, 
ASPMA. I, 684.
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above Port Scott and twenty miles above the border, not 
to cut any more timber east of the Plint River, The 
Chief said that the land belonged to the Indians and
21anyone who attempted to enter the area would be killed•
On October 30 General Gaines was authorized to 
move his troops from Fort Montgomery to Port Scott. How­
ever, if the Indians were not impressed by this show of 
force, he was to take no aggressive action until he re­
ceived additional instructions from the War Department.
He was cautioned not to attack the Indians if they re­
treated into Florida. While awaiting a settlement with 
the Indians, the troops were to remove the Indians who
PPremained on the lands ceded by the Treaty of Port Jackson.
The Indians continued their raids upon the settlers 
and finally they attacked the American troops. Gaines re­
quested a regiment of infantry and a squadron of cavalry
23from the Georgia militia. His requisition drew a prompt 
reaction from the War Department. He was told to confine 
his operations to those that could be executed by the 
regular troops tinder his command. He was informed that 
the President did not consider the invasion of Florida to
21Twiggs to Gaines, Sept. 17, 1817, Twiggs to 
Gaines, Sept. 18, 1817 and Gaines to Secretary of War,
Oct. 1, 1817, Ibid.. 684-85.
22Secretary of War to Gaines, Oct. 30, 1817,
Ibid.. 685-86.
23Gaines to Secretary of War, Nov. 9, 1817,
Ibid.. 686.
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be advisable at this particular time. The President feared 
that such an action would endanger the progress of the 
negotiations with Spain to settle the border trouble.
Gaines tried to determine which of the Indian tribes 
were hostile and which were friendly. He ordered the 
hostile Indians to move to the Suwannee River and the 
friendly Indians to remain on their land.2^
In the midst of the trouble on the frontier, a 
problem developed on the east coast of Florida. A con­
flict broke out between two groups trying to gain control 
of Amelia Island. The island was located in Spanish 
territory at the mouth of the St. Mary's River. There­
fore, its disposition caused the American's a considerable 
amount of concern as it was feared that the island would 
be used as a base for smugglers. In July the War Depart­
ment had ordered that an officer with a detachment of 
troops be sent to Point Petre from Charleston. He was to
maintain the peace in the area and to see that the revenue
25laws of the United States were enforced. By November 
the situation had become serious enough to require more 
troops. The entire command at Fort Johnston, North Carolina, 
was ordered to Point Petre to support the troops already
24Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 2, 1817 and 
Gaines to Indians, n. d., Ibid., 687-88.
25Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at 
Charleston, July 17, 1817 and Secretary of War to Jackson, 
July 17, 1817, SWLS, Roll 9, 317.
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there. In addition, the War Department requested that
the Governor of Georgia have a force of five hundred men
26ready to march to Point Petre if they were needed.
On November 12 General Gaines was ordered to
leave the frontier and proceed immediately to Point 
27Petre. On December 16 new orders were sent to Major
James Bankhead:
If the establishment on Amelia 
Island under Aury, is not already 
dispersed, it is the wish of the 
President, that the evacuation should 
take place without the application of 
actual force, if possible. How to 
effect this you will be the most com­
petent judge. . . . You are not to 
understand that if force should be 
ultimately necessary, that it should 
not be resorted to.
The major was told that the rebels at Amelia Island might
p Q
surrender if he threatened to use force against them.
On December 26 Gaines was instructed to return to
Fort Scott as soon as the situation at Amelia Island would
permit. The Secretary suggested that, if the general's
p g
Secretary of War to Wilson, Nov. 12, 1317, 
Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Nov. 12, 1817, 
and Secretary of War to Bankhead, Nov. 12, 1817, Ibid., 
397-98.
27'Secretary of War to Gaines, Nov. 12, 1817, 
Ibid.. 399.
28Secretary of War to Bankhead, Dec. 16, 1817, 
Ibid.. 427-28.
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force was large enough and if the terrain of the country
would permit, he might march through Spanish Florida to
29cooperate m  an attack upon the Indians. On the same
day General Jackson was ordered to proceed to Fort Scott
and assume command of the force gathered there. The
regular force numbered about 800 and 1,000 militia from
Georgia had been called into service.
The General was told that Gaines would attempt to
cross Florida to cooperate with him in an attack on the
Indians. The Secretary closed with instructions to:
Concentrate your force, and to adopt 
the necessary measures to terminate 
a conflict which it has ever been the 
desire of the President, from con­
siderations to humanity, to avoid, 
but which is now made necessary by their settled hostilities.30
The large force being concentrated at Fort Scott, had moved
from Fort Montgomery in late November. They had marched
over a road that they had constructed as they moved.
An idea of what action Jackson might take when he
reached Fort Scott was contained in his recommendation of
how to subdue the Indians. He suggested that the Indians
be followed into Florida and attacked in their refuge. The
idea of pursuing the Indians into Florida was not new.
^Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 26, 1817, Ibid.,
440.
^Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 26, 1817,
Ibid.. 439-40.
^1Mitchell to Secretary of War, Dec. 14, 1817, 
ASPMA. I, 688-89.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
260
Gaines had been told to "use sound discretion in the
propriety of crossing the line and attacking them and
32breaking up their towns." On December 16 the Secretary
had written to tell Gaines:
On receipt of this letter, should 
the Seminole Indians still refuse to 
make reparations for their outrages and 
depredations on the citizens of the 
United States, it is the wish of the 
President that you consider yourself 
at liberty to march across the Florida 
line and attack them within its limits, 
should it be found necessary, unless 
they should shelter themselves, under 
a Spanish post. In the last event, 
you will immediately notify thisdepartment.33
Jackson’s activities in Spanish Florida during the
spring and summer were extremely effective and brought an
end to the Indian war. He soundly defeated the Indians in
a number of small engagements; executed two Englishmen
captured among the Indians; and finally, he captured two
Spanish towns, St. Marks and Pensacola. He appointed one
of his officers as the civil and military governor of
Pensacola and established American revenue laws. The
General justified his actions thusly:
The immutable laws of self defense, 
therefore compelled the American 
Government to take possession of 
such parts of the Floridas in which
32Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 9, 1817, Ibid.,688.
■^Secretary of War to Gaines, Dec. 16, 1817,
Ibid., 689.
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the Spanish authority could not
he m aintained.34
While Jackson was pursuing the Indians through 
Florida, an incident occurred which tested the relations 
between the civil and military authority. A part of 
Jackson's force consisted of about 1,600 Creek warriors, 
under the leadership of General William McIntosh, a Creek 
half-breed. While the Creek warriors were assisting 
Jackson, a company of Georgia militia attacked a Creek 
village and killed most of the inhabitants, mainly old 
men, women and children. The entire incident was a re- 
gretable mistake on the part of the militia since they 
had attacked the wrong village. The incident might have 
passed almost unnoticed, except that General McIntosh's 
uncle, Chief Howard, had been killed in the raid. In 
addition, many of the young men with Jackson's army were 
from the village and had lost members of their families.
Upon learning of the attack upon the village, 
Jackson ordered the arrest of the officer who had commanded 
the troops, Captain Obed Wright. The General feared that 
the friendly Indians would leave him and return to their 
homes to protect their families. Jackson also feared that 
if Wright were not punished, the Indians might take some 
punitive action on their own. However, there was a problem
34 / vJohn S. Bassett (ed.), Correspondence of Andrew
Jackson (Washington: Carnegie Institution of Washington,
1 ^ 7 ) ,  I I ,  374-75.
35Niles Weekly Register. June 20, 1818, Vol. XIV.
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concerning Jackson's order to arrest Wright since his 
militia company had not been sworn into Federal service. 
Therefore, it was responsible to the state rather than 
the Federal authorities.
Wright was arrested by one of Jackson's officers 
and confined under military guard. A civil court ordered 
Wright's release and the Army officer complied with the 
order. Shortly after his release he was arrested again 
by order of the Governor of Georgia. The Governor in­
tended to have him tried by a Federal court. Both Jackson 
and Rabun felt that Wright should be punished, but they 
could not agree on the question of who should try him.
In their attempt to settle the dispute, the two 
men lost all ability to communicate with each other. 
Jackson informed the Governor that no state official had 
the right to issue military orders while he was in the 
field with a military force.^ The Governor considered 
Jackson's letter to be written in a haughty tone and 
stated that he would continue to issue orders:
When the liberties of the people of 
Georgia shall have been prostrated 
at the feet of military despotism, 
then, and not till then, will this 
imperious doctrine be tamely sub­
mitted to. You may rest assured, 
that, if the savages continue their 
depredations on our unprotected 
frontier, I shall think and act 
for myself in that re sp ec t.37
^Jackson to Rabun, May 7, 1818, ASPMA. I, 777.
37Rabun to Jackson, June 1, 1818, Ibid., 775.
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Both men submitted their views to the President 
for his opinion. On June 2 the Secretary of War informed 
Jackson that the trial of Wright by a court martial was 
preferable to a trial in the Federal court. It was be­
lieved that a trial by a jury in Federal court would be 
a mockery. The Secretary also suggested that all officers 
of the grade of captain who had accompanied Wright should 
also be arrested and tried. The following day the Governor 
of Georgia was told that "the defence of the Georgia 
frontier will be devised by the general commanding in 
that quarter.
In August it was reported that Wright would be 
tried under an 1802 law against killing Indians. By the 
end of the month Wright had broken his parole and fled 
from the United States. The last report concerning Wright 
said that he was living in Havana.
While Jackson and Rabun tested the division of 
authority between the civil and military authority on a 
large scale, a young lieutenant tested the same division 
without attracting much attention. In August the Mobile 
Gazette reported that Lieutenant Robert Beall had marched 
his troops through the city, destroyed the city jail, and 
freed the prisoners. The Lieutenant justified his conduct
■jQ
Secretary of War to Jackson, June 2, 1818 and 
Secretary of War to Rabun, June 3, 1818, SWLS, Roll 10, 
88-89. ----
39Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 15, 1818 and Nile3 
Weekly Register. Aug. 22, 1818, Vol. XIV.
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on the basis of the fact that the jail was located on the
40public hospital lot. On August 30 additional information 
appeared in a story in the New Orleans Gazette. Beall had 
petitioned the city’s governing body to remove the jail on 
two different occasions, but both pleas had been rejected.
In his second note he had stated that he would have to 
remove the building if it was not moved by the proper 
authorities. The Lieutenant set the fourteenth of July 
as the day of the removal. He requested that the prisoners 
be secured elsewhere, perhaps temporarily in the fort. On 
the appointed day, the soldiers marched from the fort, 
without arms, to the jail. During their march the soldiers 
were threatened by the citizens, and they went back to the 
post to get their weapons. They returned to the site and 
removed the jail while the citizens watched.^1
The officials of Mobile instituted a lawsuit against 
Beall for his destruction of the jail. The officer was 
granted a leave so that he could defend himself against 
the suit. The leave was to have expired on the first of 
May, 1819, but by the end of September nothing had been 
heard from him. In November there was still no word on 
Beall’s location or the outcome of his trial. With the 
November statement of the Adjutant of the Western Depart­
ment, Beall’s name disappears from the official
40Mobile Gazette, July 17, 1818•
41New Orleans Gazette. Aug. 20, 1818.
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42correspondence; lie was cashiered on December 4, 1819.
For the soldiers who were not involved in fighting
the Indians with General Jackson, 1818 was a quiet year.
Only at Amelia Island were the troops engaged in any
activities other than garrison duty. Major Bankhead was
ordered to speed the departure of the rebels and place
the island in the best possible state of defense. He was
to leave an adequate garrison on the island and then employ
the rest of his force in defending the frontier settle- 
43ments. The officer was informed that those individuals
who were leaving the island might be planning to attack
American vessels in an effort to interrupt the nation's
commerce. If he had positive knowledge of such intentions,
he was to detain the men and their vessels. He was
cautioned not to make any large expenditures when he
fortified the position. The troops were to perform the
44work using the materials at hand.
On May 14 Bankhead was instructed not to allow any
Glassell to Parker, Sept. 30, 1819 and Glassell 
to Butler, Nov., 1819» Letters Sent, Eastern Department, 
Vol. I, Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 
1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). Herein­
after cited as LSED. Francis B. Heitman, Historical 
Register and Dictionary of the United States Army 
tWashington: Govemment”Frinting office, 1303)» I* 202.
43 Secretary of War to Bankhead, Jan. 15, 1818,
SWLS, Roll 9, 458.
44 Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 12, 1818,
SWLS. Roll 10, 8; Secretary of War to Bankhead, Feb. 19, 
TST3, Ibid., 16.
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goods to be landed at Amelia until the proper entry forms
had been filled out and bonds given at the custom house
at St. Mary’s. In July the Major was told that his troops
would not be removed from the island during the summer.
He was to make the troops as comfortable as possible with-
45out building permanent barracks.
The troops assigned to watch for the illegal
cutting and shipping of timber had been having some
success. Orders were issued to Lieutenant Colonel William
Trimble, commanding the Eighth Military Department, to have
a naval officer examine the cedar logs held at Mobile. The
logs that were suitable for ship building were to be turned
over to the Navy, the others were to be sold at a public
sale. The money obtained from the sale was to be deposited
46m  the public account at a New Orleans bank.
The confiscation of the cedar timber was the sub­
ject of some controversy. Captain George Peters, who had 
seized the raft of logs, had been taken to court by the 
men who claimed it was their property. The Secretary of 
War ordered the District Attorney for the area to defend 
the officer on the behalf of the government. On Feb­
ruary 10, 1819, Peters was granted a furlough so that he 
might appear in court. In July he was granted an extension
45Secretary of War to Bankhead, May 14, 1818, Ibid.. 
78; Secretary of War to Bankhead, July 27, 1818, Ibid.. 106.
^Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 4, 1818, Ibid., 
25; Secretary of War to Trimble, Mar. 7, 1818, Ibid., 26.
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of his furlough so that he could continue his lawsuit at 
47Mobile.
Across the South the work of improving the 
nation’s fortifications resumed after the pause to subdue 
the Indians. The War Department decided to sell the land 
attached to Fort Charlotte at Mobile. General Bernard had 
decided that the fort offered no protection to the city 
and could be disposed of without damaging the defenses. 
Captain Gadsden was assigned to supervise the construction 
of the fortifications in Louisiana, and Nathanael Coxe
was appointed as the agent for fortifications in New Orleans
• - 48and was to follow the directions of the engineer.
In addition to the resumption of the work .on the 
fortifications the troops were ordered back to work cutting 
roads through the wilderness. In August the Secretary of 
War inquired about the progress of the road from the 
Tennessee River to New Orleans and Mobile and the pros­
pects of completing the work. He also asked what progress 
had been made on the road from Fort Hawkins to Fort 
Stoddert. At Baton Rouge the troops were to begin con- 
strucing the new barracks and fortifications at that site
^Secretary of War tc Crawford, Feb. 11, 1819,
Ibid., 246; Glassell to Arbuckle,. July 5, 1819> Glassell 
•fco deters, July 5» 1819» and Glassell to Butler, Nov. 2, 
1819» LSED. Peters died Nov. 28, 1819, Heitman, Historical 
Register, I, 786.
^Secretary of War to Williams, Mar. 31, 1818,
SWLS, Roll 10, 44; Secretary of War to Jackson, Apr. 22, 
j m  and Secretary of War to Coxe, Apr. 23, 1818, Ibid., 
62-63.
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as soon as an engineer could be assigned to lay out the 
work.^
On August 14 General Gaines was ordered to with­
draw the American troops from St. Marks and Pensacola.
The posts were to be surrendered to any Spanish official 
who was authorized by the Governor General at Havana to 
receive them. The surrender was to be made only if the 
officer was accompanied by sufficient troops to garrison 
the post and prevent the activities of the hostile Indians.
After the surrender, Gaines was to dispose of his 
force in such a way as to protect the frontier from fur­
ther raids by the Indians. Port Gadsden was suggested 
as a good location for a large portion of the troops, 
since it was a strong position that could be easily sup­
plied. The General was told to position his troops so 
that he could protect the frontier without calling upon 
the militia. The Secretary of War stated:
It is of great importance if the militia 
can be dispensed with, not to call them 
out into actual service as it is ha­
rassing to them and exhausting to the 
Treasury. Protection is the first 
object and the second is protection 
by the regular force.50
Secretary of War to Jackson, Aug. 11, 1818 and 
Secretary of War to Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1818, Ibid., 114; 
Secretary of War to Ripley, Sept. 4, 1818, Ibid., 136.
■^Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 14, 1818, 
Ibid., 116; Secretary of War to Bibb, July 13, 1818, 
Ibid., 96-97.
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To facilitate the protection of the frontier,
the President directed that the boundary line between
the United States and Florida be marked. The Secretary
of War issued a commission to William Lumpkin, authorizing
him to mark the line from the Appalachicola to the head of
the St. Mary*s River. The Secretary believed that it
would be better to delay the marking of the line until
the Indians had ceased their raids, thus eliminating the
51expense of a large military escort.
On September 8 the Secretary of War addressed a 
long letter to Jackson outlining his ideas concerning 
Florida:
St. Marks will be retained till 
Spain shall be ready to garrison it 
with a sufficient force, and Fort 
Gadsden and any other position in 
East or West Florida within the Indian 
country, which maybe deemed eligible, 
will be retained so long as there is 
any danger. . . .  A war with Spain . . . 
would in a few years, be an English 
war. . . .  We want time, time to 
grow, to perfect our fortifications, 
to enlarge our navy, to replenish our 
depots, and to pay our debts.52
On September 11 orders were issued that turned many 
of the soldiers into farmers. The order directed the com- 
maning officers at all posts and garrison to have the
51 Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Sept. 3, 1818 and 
Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 3, 1818, Ibid., 132-35.
52 Secretary of War to Jackson, Sept. 8, 1818, 
Ibid., 140-41.
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soldiers cultivate gardens. The gardens were to supply 
the needs of the hospitals and garrisons throughout the 
year. The vegetables that were grown beyond the amount 
needed for the use of the garrison could be sold to the 
commissary at the post. Profits from the sales were to 
be distributed among the enlisted men at the post on pay-
day.53
The year 1819 brought only one event of any real
significance for the members of the Army. The acquisition
of the Ploridas from Spain meant that the Army's manpower
would be spread in an even thinner line across the
frontier. Stephen Harriman Long estimated the length of
the frontier line in 1818 as 12,885 miles. By the end
of the year the Secretary of War reported that there were
8,668 men in the Army. The acquisition of the Ploridas
caused a pause in the Army's movements on the frontier.
As in the case of past territorial occupations, the United
States Army was forced to consider carefully the disposition
54of its limited force.
The running of the boundary line between the 
Ploridas and Georgia was suspended as it was no longer 
considered essential. General Gaines was instructed to 
suspend any new troop assignments on the frontier until
53Adjutant and Inspector Generals Office, Sept. 11, 
1818, Adjutant General Division of the South, Army Commands, 
Record Group 98 (National Archives).
54ASPMA, II, 38.
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he could obtain information as to the best locations for 
new posts. The General had been contemplating the estab­
lishment of a post somewhere on the southern frontier of
Georgia, west of the Okeefonoke Swamp. Now that post
55was no longer necessary.
In Florida itself the evacuation of the Americans 
had begun with the arrival of the Spanish troops. The 
Secretary of War regretted this, since it was expected 
that the Americans would reoccupy the territory by 
August. Colonel King was ordered to proceed with the 
evacuation but he was to hold his expenditures to a min­
imum. A report appeared in the Niles Weekly Register that 
stated that the Americans had left Florida on February 8 
and that they were relieved by 450 troops, white and 
black.^
Across the rest of the South the troops were busy 
%
cutting their way through the wilderness. The major pro­
ject was the road from the Tennessee River to Madisonville, 
Louisiana. The work was not progressing as rapidly as 
might have been desired, but the Secretary of War justified
55 Secretary of War to Lumpkin, Mar. 2, 1819; 
Secretary of War to Rabun, Mar. 2, 1819, Secretary of 
War to Gaines, Mar. 4, iSly, Secretary of War to Rabun,
Feb. 25, 1819, SWLS, Roll 10, 261-65.
^Secretary of War to King, Mar. 9, 1819, Ibid., 
270; "A letter from an Officer of the United States 
Army, dated "Cantonment Montpelier (A. T.), Mar. 12,
1819," Niles Weekly Register. Apr. 24, 1819, Vol. XVI.
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the delays:
The labor of the troops is the only 
means within the reach of the depart­
ment, of completing those roads, and,
as the troops are so employed only 
when they are not engaged in active 
service, it is impossible to state 
with accuracy when the roads willbe completed.57
In a letter written in September of 1818 Jackson 
had stated that about fifty miles of the lower end of the
road had been completed and forty miles at the upper end.
The hardest part of the work was believed to be completed, 
since the terrain covered by the ninety miles that were 
finished necessitated the building of numerous causeways 
and bridges. To speed the work, the number of men working 
south of the Tennessee River had been increased recently, 
and it was believed that the work would now proceed more 
rapidly.^
The pace of the work increased during the summer. 
More troops were dispatched to both ends of the road and 
additional supplies were sent from Bay St. Louis. The 
supplying of the troops in itself was a major operation. 
Wagons and carts were purchased and the supplies were 
shipped overland to the troops and other supplies were 
carried up the various rivers. On May 24, 1819, the
57*»Annual Report of the Secretary of War,**ASPMA. II, 100.
58Jackson to Secretary of War, Sept. 19, 1818, 
as seen in Nile3 Weekly Register. May 8, 1819, Vol. XVI.
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Assistant Deputy Quarter Master, Captain Thomas Hunt, was
ordered to ship 30,000 complete rations up the Pearl River
to the men working on the road. In July he was ordered
to dispatch camp equipment for the 200 men working on the
59northern section of the road.
By September the troops were working rapidly and 
there were reports that the road would be completed by 
November. The upper end of the road was reported to be 
open already. When it was finished, the route from Nash­
ville to New Orleans would be about three hundred miles 
shorter than the old route. This report was apparently 
overly optimistic as the troops working on the northern 
section of the road went into winter quarters in the 
vicinity of the Tombigbee River.
The work on the road was essential but it pre­
sented definite problems. The men were becoming skilled 
road builders, but at the expense of their professional 
training. The troops were working in shifts, some building 
the road and others drilling and training. Major John 
McIntosh, the commander of the troops on the north end 
of the road, was told:
The commanding General is well aware
CQHead Quarters 8th Military Department to Hunt,
May 24, 1819, LS8MD; Head Quarters to Hunt, July.14, 1819, 
Ibid. The letter book for the 8th Military Department is 
filled with information concerning the movement of troops 
and supplies to the road.
^°Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 25, 1819, Vol. XVII; 
Head Quarters to McIntosh, Jan. 8, 1820, LS8MD.
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of the difficulties you must encounter, 
in disciplining your regiment under such 
circumstances, but such, Sir, is the 
nature of the Service that it is un­
avoidable. This road must be pushed 
with all possible diligence.®1
While the troops worked through the wilderness of 
the Mississippi Territory, the topographical engineers 
were laying out a road from Mobile Bay to Lake Ponchartrain.
By December the Secretary of War had decided that the road
62should be extended from Chef Menteur to New Orleans.
The Indians of Florida had been quiet for a short 
time but by the fall of 1819 they were beginning to raid 
the white settlements again. In December General Gaines 
decided that a show of force along the Georgia-Florida 
border was necessary. The Governor of Georgia had re­
quested military aid to protect the surveyors who were 
laying off a parcel of state land near the Florida line. 
Orders were issued for a detachment of troops to march 
through that section of the country: "Under a hope that
the savages may at the same time be intimidated and the 
primary object pursued."^
In December the troops were placed on alert be­
cause of the suspected intentions of the Spanish. The
Headquarters to McIntosh, Jan. 11, 1820, LS8MD.
62Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 25, 1819, SWLS. 
Roll 10, 286; Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 21, 1819, 
and Secretary of War to Gadsden, Dec. 24, 1819, Ibid., 398.
^Glassell to Clinch, Dec. 4, 1819 and Glassell to 
Parker, Dec. 5, 1819» LSED.
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troops were ordered to observe the activities of the
Spanish at Pensacola. If reinforcements arrived at that
garrison, the troops were to counter any offensive
operations.^
On January 12, 1820, a confidential circular was
issued to all commanding officers:
The General has directed me to say 
to you that he has cause to expect 
a rupture with Spain, in which event 
an immediate attempt will be made to 
reduce the fortresses in the provinces 
of East and West Florida.65
But in late January and early February the Sec­
retary of War informed Generals Gaines and Jackson that 
he did not believe that Congress would authorize the move­
ment of American troops into Florida until November. With 
the occupation of Florida delayed, Jackson was cautioned 
not to take any steps that would increase the expenditures 
of his department.^
As a result of this economy measure the troops 
were expected to perform even more labor. In addition to 
the regulars assigned to the various construction projects, 
military convicts sentenced to hard labor were put to work 
building fortifications and barracks. At Baton Rouge new
^Glassell to Dinkins, Dec. 26, 1819, Ibid.
65Glassell to Commanders, Jan. 12, 1820, 1SED, I.
66Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS, 
Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Jackson, Feb. 5, 1820, 
Ibid., 416; Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 15, 1820, 
SWTS, Roll 11, 9-10.
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barracks were being constructed, and new fortifications
were being erected at Petite Coquille and New Orleans by
the troops and convicts. Lieutenant Colonel Zachary Taylor
was informed of a few of the duties being performed by the
troops in addition to the normal construction work:
The fragments of companies at Mobile 
Point, and Petite Coquille having to 
furnish boat crews for the officers 
of Engineers and a clerk for this 
office, and that at Fort St. John's 
exclusive of a guard for the magazine, 
attendants for the General Hospital at 
this place, Boatmen, Orderly and Clerk 
for Major Many, has lately attached to 
the Engineers Department: He considers
that it would be improper to detach men 
from Baton Rouge, at the very time, when 
that Post has to be reinforced from your 
command, and cannot weaken the garrison 
of Fort St. Philip without absolute 
necessity.
On January 31 the troops were ordered to resume 
working on the road from Tennessee to Mobile. In May 
Jackson was told that because of a lack of appropriations, 
work on the road should be suspended unless it could be 
completed with little additional expense. The road was 
completed by June 19, and the soldiers were being dis­
patched to new locations in order to aid in other con­
struction projects.**®
67Sands to Taylor, Dec. 19, 1820, LS8MD. For 
assignment of troops and convicts see: Headquarters to
Whartenby, Jan. 16, 1820; Headquarters to Strong, Jan. 18, 
1820; Headquarters to Chase, Jan. 28, 1820; Headquarters 
to McIntosh, Jan. 19, 1820; Headquarters to Whartenby,
Aug. 20, 1820, all in Ibid.
68Headquarters to Faulk, Jan. 31, 1820, Ibid.; 
Secretary of War to Jackson, May 16, 1820, SWLS. &oll 11,
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(There were renewed problems with squatters and
intruders on public and Indian lands. General Gaines
was ordered to remove the squatters from the reservation
surrounding the post at Montpilier. One week later Jackson
was instructed to remove the intruders from the Cherokee
lands. But those on the Creek lands would be allowed to
remain for a short time. The Secretary of War summed up
his view of the Indian situation:
I agree with you in opinion that 
it is high time the treaties with the 
Indians were executed with good faith 
and am aware of the evil consequences 
of the failure to do so upon future 
negotiations with them, but the nature 
and character of the population on the 
frontiers have hitherto rendered it 
difficult to execute them completely.
The government however has constantly 
felt the strongest solicitude to fulfil 
satisfactorily all its engagements withthe Indians.
Apparently Jackson was effective in removing the
intruders as five men were brought before the district
court at Milledgeville, Georgia. Certain officers were
to be ordered to appear before the court to testify
70against the intruders.
42; Secretary of War to Jackson, June 19, 1820, Ibid.,
57; see reports in Niles Weekly Register, Sept. ~WT~
A V T T ?  "VU1« A X V «
6QSecretary of War to Gaines, July 13» 1820,
SWLS, Roll 11, 73-74; Secretary of War to Jackson,
Tilly 20, 1820, Ibid.. 76-77.
70Niles Weekly Register, Sept. 9, 1820, Vol. XIX; 
Secretary of War to Jackson, Dec. 14, 1820, SWLS, Roll 11, 
129.
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On the eastern part of the frontier the soldiers 
were occupied throughout 1820 in preventing the illegal 
importation of slaves into the United States and appre­
hending runaways. The runaways were returned to their 
masters when they were identified and the bills incurred 
during their detention were paid. The slaves seized in
Florida were returned to their owners after the latter
71paid for the expense of detaining them.
In February 1821, the Adams-Onis Treaty was finally 
ratified by the United States Senate and was proclaimed on 
February 22. Within a week Congress adopted a new organ­
ization for the Army. Despite the recommendation of 
Secretary of War John C. Calhoun that his plan for an
expansible force be adopted, Congress reduced the size
7?of the Army from 12,664 to 6,183 men. Twenty days after 
the reduction of the Army, orders were issued to occupy 
Florida. The occupation of the Florida posts meant that 
the other garrisons would be stripped of most of the troops. 
The troops from Mobile were to occupy Pensacola. Fort 
Gadsden was to be evacuated, and the troops were to march 
to St. Marks and the troops from Amelia Island were to go
71Secretary of War to Gaines, Jan. 25, 1820, SWLS, 
Roll 10, 412; Secretary of War to Fanning, Feb. 9, 1820, 
Ibid.. 420; Secretary of War to Gaines, May 19, 1820,
SWI.S, Roll 11, 45; Secretary of War to Copp, June 9, 1820, 
TbTcL, 51.
72J. F. Callan, The Military Laws of the United 
States (Philadelphia: G. W.'bhilds, 1864), 3<75^33*rT
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to St. Augustine. The ships used to transport the soldiers 
from Amelia Island were to transport the Spanish troops to
Havana. By June the troops had occupied the posts, but
7 \Spanish soldiers were still present at St. Augustine.
The work on the nation’s fortifications continued
with only a few interruptions. At Mobile construction
was suspended until a decision was made concerning the
fortifications being built on Dauphin Island. Congress
had not made an appropriation for the works and until the
74-problem was resolved all of the work was stopped. The 
works had been proceeding slowly and there seemed to be
little indication that they would proceed with any more
. . . .  . . 75speed m  tne ruture.
The work at Petite Coquille was virtually at a 
standstill and military convicts were sent to work on 
the fortifications. The construction of the public 
buildings at Baton Rouge was hindered by a lack of paint­
ers, glaziers, and carpenters. The commands at New Orleans
"^Secretary of War to Jackson, Mar. 22, 1821,
SWLS, Roll 11, 167; Secretary of War to J. Q. Adams,
Mar. 22, 1821, Ibid., 166; Secretary of War to Butler,
June 9, 1821, Ibid7, 244.
^Secretary of War to Gadsden, Mar. 20, 1821,
Ibid., 170-71; Secretary of War to DeBussey, June 9,
1821, Ibid., 223-24. The entire question of defending 
Mobile Bay was considered by the House of Representatives 
in 1822, see ASPMA, II, 345-49.
75See Report on Fortifications, Feb. 15, 1821, 
ASPMA. II, 304-13.
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and Bay St. Louis were to be searched for men with the
necessary talents to speed the completion of the build- 
76ings.
The year 1821 was one of relative inactivity after 
the troops marched into Florida. As in the past after 
occupying new territory, the Army slowed its pace in an 
effort to consolidate its position and determine the 
course of its future activities. The next year was almost 
a mirror image of the proceeding year. The only major 
event that occurred was that the War Department changed 
its command system. The old southern and northern divi­
sions were eliminated and were replaced by eastern and 
western departments: "The eastern department comprises
all east of a line drawn from the southern most point of 
Florida to the north-west extremity of Lake Superior -
the western, all west of that line, taking in the whole
77of Kentucky and Tennessee."
The strength of the Army during the year had 
declined because of discharges and desertions and by 
December it stood at 5,211. During the year only 310 
men had enlisted, and the ratio of officers to rank and 
file had dropped to 1 to 10.25. The average expense for
76Headquarters to Chase, Apr. 2, 1821 and Head­
quarters to Sands, Apr. 14, 1821 and Headquarters to 
Many, Apr. 24, 1821, Headquarters to Taylor, Apr. 24,
1821, LS8MD.
77Francis Paul Prucha, A Guide to the Military 
Posts of the United States, 178^-75^$ (Madison': The
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1964), 146-47.
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each officer and soldier stood at $153.11*
The soldiers continued to work on the posts and
construct fortifications through the South. At Baton
Rouge the new post was nearing completion. The coastal
fortifications across the nation were being pushed to
completion as rapidly as possible. The officers of the
Topographical Corps were occupied in mapping and exam-
70ming the Gulf Coast and Florida.
One problem faced by the officers of the Army was
the prospect of civil lawsuits being brought against them
because of the execution of their orders. In 1822 Congress
passed an act authorizing the President to employ the naval
and land forces to stop the cutting of public timber in
Florida. This was just the type of order that would bring
about lawsuits. The War Department had adopted the policy
of defending the officers in court if the officers had
been executing their orders.^0
Lieutenant Frederick Griffith was sued for his
activities for seizing slaves in East Florida in 1819.
The Secretary of War wrote:
At this stage of the prosecution the 
government is not prepared to state
^®Niles Weekly Register, Mar. 16, 1822, Vol. XXII 
and ASPMA. TI,~"450-7£.
79Secretary of War to Topographical Officer,
Feb. 25, 1822, SWLS, Roll 11, 355.
®°Niles Weekly Register, June 8, 1822, Vol. XXII.
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the degree of responsibility, if any, 
that it will meet, which would tend 
to release that of the officers con­
cerned. But in order that they may 
be properly defended, you will apply 
to the United States District Attorney 
at Charleston, if he has not already 
been employed.
During the periods of inactivity on the part of 
the soldiers, discipline became a problem. In 1823 and 
1824, for example, two complaints were lodged against 
officers attached to the command at Baton Rouge. In 1823 
a citizen accused a number of officers of breaking into 
his house on several different occasions. The first time 
they broke into his house after midnight with a band of 
musicians and knocked down the door of his bedroom. After 
forcing his wife to surrender the key to his bar, they 
stripped it of liquor and wrecked the room. A few months 
later the same officer broke into his house and searched
the house and broke down a number of doors and destroyed
82his property.
In the following year complaints were lodged 
against an officer stationed at Baton Rouge who had as­
saulted a Catholic priest in the city. The officer had
81Secretary of War to Bankhead, June 21, 1822, 
SWLS. Roll 11, 408.
82Gaines to Taylor, Oct. 15, 1823, Letters Sent, 
Western Department, Records of United States Continental 
Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National 
Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
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been turned over to the civil authorities and a civil suit 
had been instituted against him. After the arrest of the 
officer, a number of his fellow officers had marched a 
Masonic procession into the Catholic church in an effort 
to intimidate the priest. The Secretary of War ordered 
an immediate investigation of the incident and told the 
commanding officer to prevent similar incidents from
O 7
occurring in the future.
In 1825 the attention of the Army in the South 
was focused upon Georgia and the possibility of a war 
with the Creek Indians. The trouble centered around a 
treaty negotiated by William McIntosh and other Creek 
chiefs by which more Indian lands were ceded to the 
United States. The treaty was apparently negotiated 
by representatives of only a minority of the Indians.
In reaction to the treaty, William McIntosh and several 
other chiefs who had signed the treaty were killed by the 
members of the opposition party. The supporters of the 
treaty were said to number about 500, while those who 
opposed it about 4,000. Governor Troup of Georgia feared 
that the hostile Indians would attack the frontier settle­
ments of his state and destroy the Indian faction friendly 
to the United States.®^
^Secretary of War to DuBourg, July 21, 1824,
SWLS. Roll 12, 72.
84Secretary of War to Troup, May 18, 1825* Ibid.,
150-52.
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
284
Orders were issued to General Gaines to be pre­
pared to take appropriate actions to protect the citizens 
of Georgia and the friendly Indians. The General was 
given specific orders to govern his conduct if hostil­
ities had begun:
You are also authorized to call to 
your aid such portions of the regular 
troops convenient to the scene of 
operations, wherever stationed, as 
you may deem proper. . . .
If hostilities have been com­
mitted by the Creeks on the people 
of Georgia you will instantly chastise 
them by pursuing them into their own 
territory if necessary - and you will 
pursue offensive operations till you 
have inflicted a just retaliation or,
until by their entire submission they
shall be entitled to climency [sic]. 5
After these instructions came a number of items left 
largely to the discretion of the general. If he deter­
mined the Indians had hostile intentions, he was to march 
into their territory and govern his conduct according to 
existing circumstances. If he found that the friendly 
Indians were in danger of being attacked by the hostile 
party, he was to offer them protection of his force. But
he was not to commence hostilities unless attacked. He
was to do everything in his power to restore peace between 
the two parties and the state of Georgia. Gaines was to 
see that the friendly Indians who had fled from this lands
Ac Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825, Ibid.,
152-55.
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were given provisions and protection. To aid the General, 
four companies were ordered to march from Baton Rouge. The 
reinforcements were to be stationed at such places as
Q gGaines deemed proper.
The instructions placed Gaines in a delicate 
position. He had to maintain peace between the two Indian 
factions and between the Indians and the Georgia settlers. 
In June the situation was further complicated by the pro­
posed actions of the Georgia officials. The officials 
planned to survey the lands ceded by the Indians before 
the date of removal stipulated in the treaty. The pro­
blems with the Indians who were opposed to the treaty had 
not been solved and the proposed survey would arouse them 
even more. The Secretary of War informed Troup that if 
the survey was attempted by Georgia:
It will be wholly upon its own responsibility, 
and that the government of the United States 
will not, in any measure be responsible for 
any consequences which may result from that 
measure.87
On the same day instructions by which he was to 
govern his conduct were issued to Gaines. He was to hold 
his troops in readiness for any action that might be re­
quired. With respect to the survey and its possible
86Secretary of War to Gaines, May 18, 1825 and_.._ 
Secretary of War to Gaines, May 20, 1825, Ibid., 152-%.
8TSecretary of War to Troup, June 15, 1825, Ibid.,
162-63.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
286
consequences lie was told:
You will give on the part of the 
United States, no assent or co­
operate to that measure whatever, 
but under any consequences which 
may result from it, confine your 
operations to the protection of 
the people in Georgia, should it 
be required, within the territory 
already in their possession and 
against any possible hostile in­
cursion of the Indians.
These instructions placed Gaines in the difficult 
position of trying to resolve a number of complicated 
questions to the satisfaction of all parties concerned: 
he had to resolve the differences between the two Indian 
parties in order to gain an acceptance of the treaty and 
its provisions; and to prevent Georgia from conducting the 
survey of the lands until it was agreed to by the Indians. 
The Army was placed in the middle, opposed to the interests 
of a state and bound to uphold the treaty obligations of 
the United States.®^
The majority of the Indians refused to accept the 
treaty on the grounds that it had been obtained through 
intrigue and treachery. Gaines and Major Timothy Andrews 
held a conference with the Indians in an effort to elim­
inate the differences between the two parties. While 
awaiting the results of this conference, the Secretary of
88Secretary of War to Gaines, June 15, 1825, Ibid.,
163.
89Secretary of War to Gaines, July 11, 1825, Ibid., 
166. ----
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War communicated the views of the President concerning 
the survey to the Governor:
The President acting on the 
treaty as though its validity had 
not been impeached . . . the faith 
of the United States solemnly 
pledged to protect the Creek Indians 
from any encroachment till their re­
moval in September 1826. He there­
fore decides that the entering upon 
and surveying their lands before 
that period would be an infraction 
of the treaty, whose interpretation 
and execution, should it remain un­
cancelled, are alike confided to 
him. I am therefore, directed by 
the President to state distinctly 
to your Excellency that for the 
present, he will not permit such 
entry or survey to be made.^u
The extent to which the President was willing to
go was revealed in the instructions sent to Gaines. The
collision between the federal and state authorities was
to be regretted, but the President acted ’’under a solemn
sense of duty." The Secretary of War concluded with
specific instructions by which Gaines was to govern his
conduct if Governor Troup should send a party onto the
Indian lands:
To survey the lands embrased within 
the Treaty you are authorized to 
employ the military to prevent their 
entrance on the Indian Territory, or 
if they should succgcu xn cn 
the country to cause them to be 
arrested and turn them over to the
QOSecretary of War to Troup, July 21, 1825, Ibid.,
169-70.  
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Judicial authority to be dealt with 
as the law directs.91
As the prospect of a confrontation between the
United States and the state of Georgia became more and
more likely, Gaines tried desperately to work out a
settlement with the Indians. He managed to obtain an
agreement whereby the friendly Indians might return to
their homes from their exile. Finally he arranged a
conference of all the Creek Indians to be held in 
92November.
On August 14 the Secretary of War told the 
Governor of Alabama, Andrew Pickens, that the United 
States would not enter the Indian lands until the period 
agreed upon by the treaty. By the end of the month the 
Secretary was able to express his relief that Governor 
Troup had decided not to proceed with the survey until 
Gaines had concluded his negotiations in November. J
The instructions issued to Gaines concerning the 
November meeting was straight-forward. He was to obtain 
the consent of the Creeks to the treaty negotiated in
91 Secretary of War to Gaines, July 21, 1825, Ibid
170-71.
92 Secretary of War to Gaines, July 22, 1825, Ibid
171-72; Secretary of War to Andrews, July 23, 1825, Ibid. 
174-75; Secretary of War to Gaines, Aug. 30, 1825, Ibid., 
179. ----
^Secretary of War to Pickens, Aug. 14, 1825, 
Ibid.. 177-78; Secretary of War to Troup, Aug. 31, 1825, 
Ibid.. 180-81.
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February. If that effort was unsuccessful, he was to 
negotiate a new treaty whereby the Indians would cede 
their lands in the state of Georgia. The President was 
so desirous of obtaining this treaty that Gaines was 
authorized to offer them land, acre for acre, and 
$400,000.94
Although it appeared that the situation in Georgia 
was about to be resolved, Governor Troup demanded the 
arrest of General Gaines. The Governor felt that Gaines 
had violated the Articles of War by publishing his letters 
to the Governor. The President rejected the Governor's 
request, but cautioned the General to refrain from any­
thing offensive in his future communications to the 
95Governor.
The conference between Gaines and the Indians in
November was a failure. In January of 1826 the Creeks
finally signed a treaty ceding their lands in Georgia.
The treaty provided for the payment of $217,600 and a
perpetual annuity of $20,000. The treaty allowed the
Indians to select the land in the west where they would
96live after leaving their homes in Georgia.
94Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 16, 1825 and 
Secretary of War to Crowell, Sept. 16, 1825, Ibid., 181-82.
95Secretary of War to Gaines, Sept. 19, 1825 and 
Secretary of War to Troup, Sept. 19, 1825, Ibid., 183-84.
96Charles J. Kappler, Indian Affairs: Laws and
Treaties (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1$03),
II, 264-68.
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In 1826 the Army was occupied with the routine
duties of a frontier garrison. In Florida there was
concern that the Indians would attack Pensacola, an
event which the Secretary of War considered to be highly
unlikely. In September a company of troops was sent to
the mouth of Suwannee to stop the sporadic Indian raids
97against the white settlements.
The acquisition of Florida necessitated the 
establishment of new roads, and the task fell to the men 
of the Army. As early as 1824 the troops were engaged in 
opening a road from St. Augustine to Pensacola. Another 
road was being cut from Camden County Georgia to Jackson­
ville, Florida. The work was considered to be so important 
that in October the Quarter Master at Pensacola was 
authorized to employ civilians to help in the opening of 
the road to St. Augustine. In December of 1825 the Sec­
retary of War reported that the road would be completed in 
the course of the following month. The troops had worked 
on the road from September of 1824 to June of 1825 and had 
completed one hundred and sixty-five miles of road at a 
cost of $9,583. The civilian contractor had agreed to 
open the remaining one hundred and eighty miles in twelve 
months for $13,500.^
97 Secretary of War to Duvall, Sept. 16, 1826 and 
Secretary of War to Brown, Sept. 17, 1826, SWLS, Roll 12, 
245.
98Secretary of War to McLean, July 20, 1824, Ibid., 
71; Secretary of War to Call, Oct. 8, 1824 and Secretary 
of War to Duvall, Oct. 8, 1824, Ibid.. 90.
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While the troops were cutting the road from 
Pensacola to St. Augustine, Army officers were surveying 
other roads through the region. A road from the Suwannee 
to Cape Sahle had been partially surveyed and also a route 
from St. Augustine to Cape Florida. The troops were also 
working on a road from Coleraine, Georgia to Tampa.
By 1826 the road from Pensacola to St. Augustine, 
a distance of four hundred miles, was finished. The road 
was sixteen feet wide but could easily be increased to 
twenty-five feet by the troops with little additional 
expense. The soldiers had completed one hundred and 
twenty miles of the road from Tampa Bay to Coleraine and 
were expected to complete another forty-eight miles by 
January of 1827. The final fifty-six miles were under 
contract and were expected to be completed by December 
1826.
In addition to the surveys of roads in Florida, 
the engineers were searching for a route for a road from 
Washington to New Orleans. The engineers were considering 
three different routes in an effort to determine the best 
possible line of communication. In addition the Secretary 
of War recommended that a new road be opened by the 
soldiers from Natchitoches to Fort Towson and then to 
Fort Gibson, a distance of three hundred and twenty miles.^
99ASPMA, III, 117-22.
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At Port St. Philip the soldiers were building new 
barracks and a hospital. At Savannah barracks were being 
constructed to house two companies and at Suwannee for 
one company. The Secretary of War recommended the con­
struction of a road from Pensacola to Berkely in Alabama 
to facilitate the transportation of supplies to the 
Florida garrisons.10^
In December of 1826 the total strength of the 
Army was reported as 5,809 officers and enlisted men.
Only 1,325 men had been recruited in the last year. The 
work on the fortifications continued and in March of 1826 
it was reported that in the period from 1794 to September 
30, 1824 the government had expended $2,884,558.89 on the 
works.
The small Army had been engaged in an extensive 
construction program for a number of years. The massive 
brick fortifications that dotted the coastline were of 
little immediate value to the nation. However, the roads 
that had been built would be of lasting value to the 
settlers long after the soldiers left the region. In 
fact, by 1826 there was only one thing detaining the 
troops on the southern frontier, and that was the continued 
presence of the Indians. As long as the contest over the
100Ibid.. 330-38.
101 Ibid., 245-60.
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possession of the Indian lands continued, the troops 
would be called upon to protect the whites from the 
Indians and the Indians from the whites. The conflict 
that had developed between the state of Georgia and the 
Indians living within her borders in 1825 was an indication 
of things to come. Increasingly the soldiers would be 
called upon to maintain law and order on the southern 
frontier.
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CHAPTER VI
INDIANS, INTRUDERS AND NULLIFIERS
In 1827 suddenly developing event3 in Georgia 
threatened to disturb the peace. In that state the Creek 
Indians were becoming ominously restive and seemed about 
to resort to war. Consequently, on January 8 Colonel 
Clinch was ordered to post approximately five hundred 
troops in such a way as to protect the settlers along 
the Georgia-Florida border. Specifically, the Indians 
were angered by the fact that white men, reputed to be 
Georgia surveyors, had entered the land to be ceded by 
the Creek3, and they had complained to the President that 
this violated the Treaty of 1826.1
As a consequence of these complaints, a special 
messanger was dispatched with letters from the War Depart­
ment to the Governor of Georgia, the Federal Marshall and 
the District Attorney at Savannah. Governor Troup was
'Secretary of War to Clinch, Jan. 8, 1827, Sec­
retary of War to Troup, Jan. 8, 1827, and Secretary of 
War to Duvall, Jan. 8, 1827, in Records of the Office 
of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Relating to 
Military Affairs, 1800-1889» Record Group 108, Micro­
copy 6, Roll 12, 265-68. Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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warned:
The treaty of Washington like all other 
treaties. . . .  is among the supreme 
laws of the land. Charged by the con­
stitution with the execution of the 
laws, the President will feel himself 
compelled to employ if necessary all 
the means under his control to maintain 
the faith of the nation by carrying 
this treaty into effect.2
The orders to the Marshall and District Attorney required 
them to take immediate action to see that the treaty 
obligations were fulfilled.-^
In March the Secretary of War ordered the command­
ing general to detach groups of soldiers to work on five 
different roads: (1) from Memphis to Little Rock; (2)
from Port Smith to Fort Towson and then to the northern 
border of Louisiana; (3) from the Georgia line to New 
Smyrna by way of St. Augustine; (4) from St. Augustine 
to Pensacola; and (5) from Halifax to Indian River in 
Florida. The work was to be supervised by officers of 
the Quarter Master Department.^ .
For the next year the frontier was quiet, but the 
threat of Indian raids always remained. In April of 1828
pSecretary of War to Vinton, Jan. 30, 1827, and 
Secretary of War to Troup, Jan. 29, 1827, Ibid., 270-71.
•^Secretary of War to Morel, Jan. 29, 1827 and 
Secretary of War to Habersham, Jan. 29, 1829, Ibid. .
4Secretary of War to Brown, Mar. 21, 'PSPT̂ arid: 
Secretary of War to Quarter Master General,-Mar. 21, 
1827, Ibid., 279-80.
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the settlers near the headwaters of the St. Mark’s River
were disturbed by the prospect of the withdrawal of the
one company stationed at Camp Xing. The Commanding General
of the Western Department, Winfield Scott, had ordered the
camp broken up and the men transferred to New Orleans.
The general felt that detachments of Hess than several
companies were detrimental to the efficiency of the troops.
Therefore he had decided that a display of force by fifty
men, twice a year, from Cantonment Brooke would be suffi-
cent to reassure the residents of the area and hold the
5Indians in check. Two weeks later the Secretary of War 
informed Representative Joseph White that the order to 
evacuate Camp King had been countermanded by the War 
Department.^
In February a problem arose concerning the command 
of the Army. On the twenty-fourth General Jacob Brown 
died, leaving the highest post in the Army vacant. The 
death of Brown placed the President and Secretary of War 
in a difficult situation since the two Department Com­
manders, Generals Scott and Gaines, detested each other.
If either was named as the commanding general, the other 
would view it as a personal affront and probably resign
5Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent,
Western Department, Vol. IV, Records of United States 
Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
^Secretary of War to White, Apr. 18, 1828, SWLS, 
Roll 12, 345.
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from the Army. The controversy between the two men was 
caused by the question of who outranked whom. Both claimed 
to be senior to the other. Their commissions as brigadier 
generals bore the same date, but Gaines claimed that be­
cause of his name preceded Scott's alphabetically, he was
senior. Scott's brevet as a major general antedated
7Gaines' brevet, and Scott claimed he was senior.
The solution which the War Department finally hit 
on only created another problem. Alexander Macomb, who 
had been retained as a colonel in 1821, was promoted over 
both Scott and Gaines. As a result of this action, Scott 
resigned his commission. He recalled it when the War 
Department healed his wounded pride with soothing letters, 
but for a long time Scott had only the most formal re-
o
lations with Macomb.
While the decision as to who should be placed in 
command was being thrashed out, the Army continued its 
usual activities. Construction continued on the works on
7William B. Skelton, "The Commanding General and 
the Problem of Command in the United States Army, 1821- 
1841," Military Affairs. Vol. XXXIV (Dec., 1.970;, 117-22.
g
Scott had entered the Army on May 3, 1808, was 
promoted to Brigidier General, Mar. 9* 1814 and r»o q o VS Cl 
his brevet on July 2, 1814; Gaines had been commissioned 
Jan. 10, 1799, promoted to Brig. Genl. on Mar. 9, 1814 
and received his brevet on Aug. 15, 1814; Macomb was 
commissioned on Jan. 10, 1799; promoted to Brig. Genl. 
on Jan. 24, 1814 and received his brevet on Sept. 11, 
1814, retained a Col. and chief engineer, June 1, 1821, 
Francis B. Heitman, Historical Register and Dictionary 
of the United States~Army (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1903), o70, 442, 680.
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the Savannah River, the Cape Fear River, and the Mississippi 
River. In addition, works were being erected at Pensacola, 
Beaufort, and Mobile. In order to improve water trans­
portation, engineers were removing the obstructions from 
the mouth of the Pascagoula River, eliminating the shoals 
at Ocracock Inlet, and deepening the harbor of Mobile.
An inspection was being made on the Red River to determine 
how to remove the obstructions to navigation on the river.^ 
On September 20 a company of soldiers was ordered 
into the Creek Nation, in Alabama, to aid in the removal 
of those Indians who desired to move west of the Missis- 
ippi. Captain Philip Wager was to offer all of the aid 
in his power to carry the removal policy into effect.
The presence of the troops was intended to give confidence 
to those Creeks who might be inclined to emigrate. The 
troops were expected to return to Fort Mitchell within 
five or six weeks to protect the area around the 
Chattahoochee River.^
In December General Macomb recommended that a new 
post be established at Key West. The recommendation was
^Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 9, 1828, Vol. XXXIV; 
Macomb to Commanding Officer at Cantonment Jesup, Oct. 9. 
1828, Letters Sent, Head Quarters of the Army, *1828-46, 
Records of the Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108 
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.
^Macomb to Porter, Septs 20, 1828 and Macomb to 
Wager, Sept. 24, 1828, Ibid.; Secretary of War to Forsyth, 
Sept. 23, 1828 and Secretary of War to Macomb, Sept. 23, 
1828, SWLS. Roll 12, 377.
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made as a result of requests from the citizens of the 
island. According to Macomb the presence of troops at 
that place was necessary Mto maintain the sorveignty of 
the U. S. at that place, as well as to aid in carrying 
into effect the laws and mandates of the civil courts."
On January 10, 1829, the Secretary of War ordered Colonel 
Brooke to proceed to Key West to determine why the 
authorities had requested the troops and what would be 
expected of them if they were sent to the island. He was 
to determine if the site would be healthy or could be made 
so by improvements. Broolce was to be accompanied by a
4  4
surgeon who was to aid in selecting the site.'
The work of establishing new posts and consolid­
ating the Army's position was a major concern in 1329*
In Florida the old post at St. Mark's was abandoned and 
a new post was begun at St. Rosa Island. At Tampa Bay an 
area around the post was surveyed and marked out of the 
public lands. In March the troops were withdrawn from 
Cantonments Towson and Leavenworth. Those from Towson 
were stationed at Fort Jesup and those from Leavenworth 
at Jefferson Barracks. While those garrisons were being 
pulled back, two companies were to be stationed in a 
position that would allow them to protect the traders on 
the Santa Fe trail. The Secretary of War suggested that
11Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 17, 1828 and 
Secretary of War to Brooke, Jan. 10, 1829, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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the men camp near where the trail crossed the Neosho 
River.12
While much of the attention of the War Department 
was being focused on the area west of the Mississippi, 
the problems with the Creek Indians flared up again. Some 
white settlers had been killed on the Georgia frontier, 
and the troops were ordered to cooperate in trying to 
bring the Indians to justice. The Secretary of War in­
structed the commanding officer to demand the immediate 
surrender of the murders to the civil authorities of 
Georgia.1^
The controversy between the Indians and the 
citizens of Georgia apparently revolved around intruders 
on the Indian lands. In May the Secretary of War re­
quested that the Governor of Georgia do everything in his 
power to keep the whites out of the Indian nation. The 
Secretary stated that the United States was "pledged by 
treaty stipulations to protect them in the enjoyment of 
their soil, every solicitude is felt, that the guarantees
A  J
made may be strictly maintained."
12Macomb to Gratiot, Jan. 21, 1829, Ibid.; Sec­
retary of War to Macomb, Mar. 23. 1829, SWLS, Roll 12. 
420-21. ----
^Secretary of War to Forsyth, Mar. 24, 1829 and 
Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1829, SWLS, Roll 12, 421.
14Secretary of War to Forsyth, May 14, 1829,
Ibid.. 433.
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By July the situation was such that additional
troops were required at the Creek Agency. General Macomb
determined that Captain Wager’s company, ordered to the
agency in March, was to be reinforced by a company of
artillery from Augusta. The troops were to prevent rival
Indian factions from hindering the removal of the Indians 
15to the west.
In October Secretary of War John Eaton set forth
his views regarding the Indians in a long letter to
Governor John Forsyth. Ke felt that the state of Georgia
was justified in trying to extend its authority over all
of the land included within its boundaries. The Secretary
asked that the state be patient a little longer before
trying to assert its authority over the Indians. The
Federal government hoped to be able to persuade the
Indians to remove west of the Mississippi where collisions
between them and whites could be avoided. The Secretary
doubted the success of any effort to civilize the Indians:
The years gone by, since the settlement 
of this country induces an apprehension 
that the first-original inhabitants of 
our forests are incapable of self govern­
ment by any of those rules Cf right which 
civilization teaches. In all intercourse 
with their civilized white brothers, and 
the various efforts made and expenditures 
incurred to inspire them with a knowledge 
of industry and forgetfulness of their 
erratick habits, as yet success has not 
been attained.
15Cooper to Crowell, July 6, 1829 and Macomb to 
Forsyth, July 7, 1829, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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Concerning the removal of the Indians, Eaton 
observed that it was the best thing for the Indians:
Every day observation shows that 
the near association of the white and 
red man is destructive of the latter.
The History of our country throughout 
every quarter teems with evidence 
establishing the truth of this assertion, 
and points to the necessity of a removal.
In order to resolve the differences between the
Cherokee Indians and the whites, General John Coffee had
been requested to visit the Indians. He was to assertain
their views and convey their feelings to the President.
To provide for the continued existence of peace during
the meeting, all intruders were to be ordered from the
Indian lands. All of those who did not leave by the
fifteenth of December would be forciably removed by the
soldiers.1^
By November the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell 
was told to wait for additional orders from the War Depart­
ment before responding to any request from the Indian agent 
to remove intruders. The time for the whites to be re­
moved might be deferred to a latter date. He was cautioned: 
"for reasons of policy it is desired that you say nothing 
as to this order, but keep it entirely to yourself.” The 
reason for delaying the removal was explained to the Indian 
agent a few days later. General Coffee had not had an
^Secretary of War to Forsyth, Oct. 14, 1829,
SWLS. Roll 12, 454-59.
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opportunity to conclude his investigation and until he
submitted his report, no action would be taken. The agent
was to urge the settlers to remove from the Indian lands
as soon as possible, because as soon as the report was
received immediate action would be taken against all 
17squatters.
While the troops watched for trouble between the
whites and Indians in Georgia, the soldiers in western
Louisiana were ordered to patrol the border between the
United States and Texas. The military patrols were to
stop the smuggling of goods into the United States. One
company was to be detached from Cantonment Jesup and
stationed at a suitable site on the Calcasui River. From
this camp they were to operate against the smugglers. If
it was found that one company was inadequate to meet the
situation, a second should be detached to assist in the
effort. Revenue officers were to be sent west by the
Treasury Department to enforce the laws. Upon their
arrival they were to be protected and assisted in their
18efforts by the soldiers.
On November 30 Colonel Duncan Clinch was ordered 
to afford the inhabitants of Florida all the protection
17Secretary of War to Commanding Officer at Fort 
Mitchell, Nov. 3» 1829» Ibid., 461; Secretary of War to 
Montgomery, Nov. 26, 182^, Ibid., 463.
1 RSecretary of War to Many, Nov. 20, 1829* LSHQA,
Vol. I.
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possible from Indian raids. The Creeks were raiding into 
Florida from Alabama and it was feared that the Indians 
living in Florida might join them. Since the Army was 
already broken up into numerous small detachments, the 
commanding general felt that it would be inexpedient to 
establish any new posts in Florida. Therefore Clinch was 
to do everything in his power to protect the inhabitants 
without incurring any "extraordinary expense." To main­
tain peace without additional expense, the Commanding 
General suggested a plan:
The show of a detachment of one company 
where there may be disorders, will be 
sufficient to keep the Indians in order 
should they manifest any disposition to 
be mischievious. It is presumed an 
excursion could be made at any time 
by a company, lightly armed and equipped 
for a short tour of service, without any 
considerable expense, and it is such a 
movement, which is contemplated as all 
that will be required to keep peace in 
the Peninsula and which you are au­
thorized to m a k e . 19
In February 1830, the Creeks prevented a mail 
stage from passing through their lands, and the War Depart­
ment ordered the Army to arrest the guilty Indians. To 
help quiet the Indians, General George Brooke, who was com­
manding at Fort Mitchell, was to order all unauthorized 
settlers from the Indian nation. Those whites who did 
not leave within fifteen days were to be arrested and
1^Cooper to Clinch, Nov. 30, 1829, Ibid.
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2 0turned over to the civil authorities of Alabama* No 
sooner was this problem settled than the Army had to turn 
its attention to another tribe of Indians on another part 
of the frontier, the Cherokees in Georgia.
The Cherokees were disturbed because the War 
Department had delayed removing the settlers from their 
lands. Taking matters into their own hands, the Indians 
forcibly expelled sixteen families from their lands. The 
action had been ordered by the head of the nation, John 
Ross. The expulsion angered the citizens of Georgia, who 
retaliated against the Cherokees, killing one and captur­
ing three othersc To guard against future hostilities on 
either side, the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell was 
ordered to send as many troops as possible into the nation 
to restrain both sides. On February 26 General Brooke was
ordered to Washington to receive instructions from the
21Commanding General on how to deal with the Indians.
In an effort to determine what course of action 
should be taken concerning the claims of the Indians and 
the state of Georgia, the opinion of the Attorney General 
was requested. While awaiting the legal opinion, the
20Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. IS, 1330, SWLS, 
Roll 12, 473; Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 20, 1830, LSHQA,
Vol. I.
21 Secretary of War to Macomb, Feb. 24, 1830, SWLS, 
Roll 12, 484; Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, 
Feb. 75f 1830, and Macomb to Brooke, Feb. 26, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
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garrison at Port Mitchell was strengthened by two companies
from Tampa Bay. It was hoped that this force would be able
22to maintain order among the Creek and Cherokee Indians.
On March 14 the Secretary of War informed the
Cherokee agent that the troops from Port Mitchell had
been ordered into the nation to preserve order. Until
the troops arrived, the agent was to tell both the whites
and Indians to cease their hostile activities. Those who
disobeyed would be punished according to existing laws.
With regard to the Indians removing the intruders from
their lands, the Secretary stated the government's policy:
The Cherokee Indians at the commencement 
of the present administration were given 
distinctly to understand, that the right 
to enforce obedience to the laws of the 
United States within their confines did 
not belong to them, and under no cir­
cumstances would be conceded to them.
They were informed that the government 
had neither the power nor the disposition 
to permit one of her citizens to be pro­
nounced guilty of the infraction of her 
laws by any other tribunal than her own.
The Secretary stated that General Coffee had de­
termined the boundaries between the Indian lands and the 
state of Georgia. All of the Indians living outside of 
the boundaries were to move "within their own undisputed
22Secretary of War to Berrien, Mar. 1, 1830, SWLS, 
Roll 12, 473-74; Macomb to Clinch, Mar. 6, 1830 and Macomb 
to Gaines, Mar. 11, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
23Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 14, 1830, 
SWLS. Roll 12, 475-77.
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territorial limits.” The whites who were living within 
the limits of the Indian lands would be ordered to move.
The policy of the Federal government with respect 
to the Cherokees was still based upon removal:
The object of the government is 
to persuade, not to coerce their Indian 
friends to a removal from the lands of 
their fathers. Beyond all doubt they 
cannot live peaceable and happily where 
they are; yet still they will be pro­
tected to the extent that right and 
justice and powers possessed require, 
beyond this the President has neither 
the inclination nor the authority to 
go. It is idle to talk of rights which 
do not belong to them, and of protection 
which cannot be extended.24
On March 16 instructions were issued to General 
Macomb concerning the removal of intruders from the 
Cherokee lands. The Indian agent was to compile a list 
of those individuals who were legally entitled to live 
on Cherokee land and those who were intruders. This list 
was to guide the officer assigned to remove the whites. 
The designated officer was to give notice to the settlers 
to leave. After ample time had passed, he was to expel 
those who remained and destroyed their houses and fenses. 
After the removal had been completed, he was to place his 
command in a position to prevent further intrusions.
24Ibid.
25Secretary of War to Macomb, Mar. 16, 1830 and 
Secretary of War to Montgomery, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid., 
478-79.
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The instructions given to Major Wager, who would 
supervise the removal, were intended to prevent hostil­
ities. It was hoped that the appearance of the troops 
would cause the intruders to retire without resorting to 
force. If all peaceful efforts failed, then the settlers 
were to be forced to retire by the destruction of their 
homes and improvements. The Secretary suggested that if 
force were required:
Operate first upon some small and 
detached settlement, and having 
acted, to wait a little while for 
the information to become effectual.
To proceed directly and generally 
against any numerous and strong 
settlement might make up an excite­
ment, which would perhaps operateprejudicially.26
During the controversy, General Gaines, one of the
staunchest friends the Indians had among the Army officers,
came to the defense of the Cherokees who had removed the
intruders. The General believed that the actions of the
Indians had been justified:
They surely were competent PEACEABLY 
to put such intruders out of their 
houses as we should be to thrust 
Russian or English intruders from 
our houses or barracks should they 
see fit forcible to enter them.
It is not for us in this the 53rd 
year of our age, as a nation to deny 
that the rights of all free men are 
equal and unchanageable as the justice
^Secretary of War to Wager, Mar. 17, 1830, Ibid., 480. ----
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But the General’s intervention on behalf of the 
Indians was unsuccessful. The soldiers faced the prospect 
of spending the rest of the year in the Cherokee Nation.
In May there were two companies in the Cherokee Nation,
two at Port Mitchell and two on the boundary line between
28the Creek and Cherokee Nations.
In late June it appeared likely that trouble was 
developing in the Cherokee country again. The trouble 
involved the Indians and the settlers who had been re­
moved. The Indians had taken over the mining operations 
that the intruders had been forced to abandon. The whites 
were angry and threatened to attack the Indians in order 
to prevent them from removing the gold. In addition to 
the controversy between the Indians and the settlers, the 
state of Georgia claimed the gold as its own and requested 
that the mining operations be halted. The Secretary of 
ffar ordered General Macomb to have the mining stopped and 
prevent the removal of the minerals. The order against 
the mining was to apply equally to whites and Indians.
The operations were to be stopped peacefully if possible, 
"but if these should not succeed, resort to force must be
27Gaines to Macomb, Mar. 25, 1830, LSWD, V. See 
also James W. Silver, Edmund Pendleton Gaines, Frontier 
General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana University Jpress, 1§49}.
?8Macomb to Hook, May 21, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
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2Qauthorized to accomplish it." v
Neither the President nor the Secretary of War
wanted to resort to violence if it could be avoided. On
June 18 the commanding officer in the nation, Captain
T. W. Brady, suggested that a display of force might
solve the problem. The reply of the Secretary of War
indicated that the government wished to avoid armed
hostilities:
Your suggestion of spending a few 
cartridges to enforce obedience 
to the orders of the government 
it is hoped was not the result of
serious reflection, and that such
a resort will, never be had until 
measures of a more pacific character
have failed of the desired effect.
The shedding of blood on slight pro­
vocation would entail consequences 
which you would probably be the first 
to feel and we should all have to 
lament.30
In August the situation in the Cherokee mining
area was growing more delicate and more explosive. On
the sixth of the month Macomb informed Captain Brady that 
his actions in halting the mining had been correct. If 
there were further instructions or orders to be executed, 
he would be informed by the Secretary of War. On the
eighteenth the Secretary of War instructed Macomb to
29Secretary of War to Macomb, June 26, 1830, 
SWLS. Roll 12, 496-97.
^Secretary of War to Brady, July 13» 1830, 
Ibid.. 498.
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order Captain Wager to assume command of the troops in 
the Cherokee Nation. The decision to send Wager to the 
Cherokee Nation resulted from his peaceful removal of 
the intruders from the Creek lands. The Secretary believed 
that his discretion was what was needed to avert the 
possibility of an armed clash between the Indians and 
intruders, with the Army caught in the middle.^1
On August 24 it was reported that a number of 
whites had returned to the Cherokee lands to dig for 
gold. As a result, it was necessary to increase the 
number of troops in the nation. The commanders at Port 
Mitchell, Augusta, and Charleston were to march one 
company each from their commands to support the troops 
trying to maintain order. Captain Brady and his men con­
tinued to remove the intruders, who, however, returned as
32soon as the troops moved on to another area.
When Wager arrived in the Cherokee Nation, the 
process of removal began in earnest. The Secretary of War 
approved of the methods employed by the troops in removing 
the miners. But he cautioned Wager to avoid any methods 
that might “make a resort to arms necessary.
■^Macomb to Brady, Aug. 6, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I; 
Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 18, 1830, SwTS, Roll 13,
8; Secretary of War to Wager, Aug. 18, 1830, Ibid.
32Secretary of War to Macomb, Aug. 24, 1830, Ibid., 
9; Cooper to Brady, Sept. 1, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
■^Secretary of War to Wager, Oct. 4, 1830, SWLS. 
Roll 13, 11. ----
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The methods employed in the removal of the in­
truders was described in a story printed in the Georgia 
Athenian:
The policy pursued is to destroy the 
provisions, camp-equippage, working 
utensils, or whatever else is found 
belonging to the diggers; while the 
diggers themselves are conveyed to 
the nearest ferry, and put across 
the river free of charge.
The report stated that in one day at least one hundred
whites had been expelled or had voluntarily left the area
after seeing others removed by the troops.
Understandably, the Indians were not satisfied with
the government’s decision to halt all digging on their
lands. On October 1 an article appeared in the Cherokee
Phoenix, an Indian newspaper, that revealed the feelings
of the Indians. The soldiers had arrested both Indians
and whites who were mining. The Indians had been released
after being escorted out of the area. The story concluded
with the statement that "it now appears plainly, that our
35great father considers us in light of intruders."
In a letter to the officer commanding the troops
in the nation the Indians argued their case:
They are laboring in an honest way, 
upon their own lands, for the support 
of their families; they intruded upon 
the possessions of none; they infringe
^ Georgia Athenian, Sept. 21, 1830.
^ Cherokee Phoenix. Oct. 1, 1830.
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upon none. The United States, by- 
treaties and otherwise, have ac­
knowledged the country to be theirs, 
and have stationed their troops with­
in its bounds to protect them in 
their territorial possessions. . . .
The Indians were determined to continue digging gold on 
their own lands, and if they were arrested they were 
"resigned to such fate as the consequences of their 
honest labor upon their own lands may consign them to, 
■under the laws of the United States." ̂
The Cherokees were fearful that the state of 
Georgia might take action against them and requested 
that the Federal government protect them. Specifically, 
the Indians feared that Georgia might attempt to enforce 
two laws passed by the state legislature in 1828 and 1829* 
The former law declared that the authority of the state 
was supreme in the Indian nation and that the sovergnity 
of the Cherokee was null and void. The second act re­
affirmed the law of 1828 and provided a term of four 
years in prison for anyone who violated the state laws.^
^"Copy of a letter addressed to the officer 
commanding the detachment of the United States troops,” 
in Niles Weekly Register. Nov. 6, 1830, Vol. XXXIX.
37See Cherokee Phoenix for Oct. and Nov, of 1830- 
William C. Dawson (ed.), A Compilation of the Laws of the 
State of Georgia. Passed by the General A33embly since 
the year 1819 to the year' 1829, inclusive (Milledgeville. 
Georgia, TF3T), l5S^99l The 1828 laws declared; "All 
laws, usages, and customs made, established, and in force 
in the said territory, by the said Cherokee Indians, be, 
and the same are hereby on and after the first of June, 
1830, declared null and void."
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If the Georgia law was not enough of a problem for the 
Indians, the discovery of gold on their land in 1828 was 
the final blow to their hopes of retaining their land.
A law passed by the Cherokee government had given them 
control of all metals found within their borders. It 
was on the basis of this law that the Cherokees had re­
moved the intruders and requested Federal troops to help 
them. But the laws of Georgia now declared the Cherokee 
laws void.
The people of the 3tate of Georgia were angered
by the presence of the United States troops and requested
that they be withdrawn from the Cherokee lands. On
October 29 Governor Gilmer of Georgia addressed a long
letter to President Jackson stating that Georgia was
capable of enforcing its laws without the aid of Federal
troops. The Governor complained that the gold diggers
had been mistreated by Major Wager and his men:
In some instances unoffending citizens 
have been made the subject of punish­
ment, in violation of their rights, 
and the authority of the state. Com­
plaints have been made to this depart­
ment, and redress asked for. The removal 
of the troops is believed to be the most 
effectual means of preventing the 
repetition of such injuries.39
Ul>aws of the Cherokee Nation (Tahlequah, Cherokee 
Nation: Cherokee Advocate Office. 1&52). 50.
•jqGilmer to Jackson, Oct. 29, 1830, in Nile3 
Weekly Register. Nov. 13, 1830, Vol. XXXIX. For a 
condemnation of Wager's actions see Planters Gazette,
Oct. 19, 1830.
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On November 8 Macomb ordered Major Wager to re­
move his command from the Cherokee Nation for the winter. 
The troops were to be moved to some location where they 
could be comfortably accommodated and still be in a 
position to move back into the nation if they were again 
needed. The companies of artillery drawn from Augusta, 
Savannah, and Charleston were to return to their stations. 
Macomb felt that the "Legislature of Georgia now.in 
session, will undoubtedly take the proper and necessary
40steps to preserve tranquility along the Indian borders."
On November 10 the Secretary of War informed
Governor Gilmer that the troops had been ordered to leave
the Indian nation. He also justified the conduct of Major
Wager: "It is much to be regretted that in the execution
of his orders, the commanding officer should have found
himself constrained to resort to measures which may have
41operated hardly upon some individuals."
With the withdrawal of the troops from the Cherokee 
Nation, the Indians were left to the mercy of the state of 
Georgia. On December 22, 1830, the Georgia legislature 
passed an act creating the "Georgia Guard," and assigned 
it to the Indian territory. The act also provided that 
no Cherokee governing body could meet for any purpose
40Macomb to Wager, Nov. 8, 1830, LSHQA. Vol. I.
41 Secretary of War to Gilmer, Nov. 10, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 13, 15-16.
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other than ceding lands. In addition, Indian officials 
were liable to four years of hard labor if they held 
courts of any kind. The law required that by March 1, 
1831, all whites residing in the Nation possess a
license, which was to be issued only after an oath had
4.2been taken to uphold the laws of Georgia.
While the Cherokees were losing their battle with 
Georgia, it appeared that the Creeks in Alabama were be­
ginning to lose their struggle with that state. In 
November the Secretary of War informed Lieutenant P. 
Newcomb that he had acted correctly when he declined to 
comply with a request to stop the cutting of the road 
through Creek territory. The Secretary stated that since 
the road was within the limits of Alabama and was autho­
rized by an act of the state legislature, "there is no 
authority in the General Government to interfere.
In Mississippi the Choctaw Indians were also 
troubled by intruders on their lands. To remove the 
whites from the Choctaw lands, two companies of soldiers 
were ordered from Jefferson Barracks to the Yazoo River. 
From this position they would be able to remove the
AAsettlers and maintain order in the area.
42 , xOliver H. Prince (ed.), A Digest of the Laws
of Georgia . . . Previous to . . .“December, 18¥/ (Athens.
Georgia/ 1837), 2W^T.----- ------------
Secretary of War to Newcomb, Nov. 10, 1830,
SWLS. Roll 13, 15.
44Secretary of War to Ward, Nov. 13, 1830, Ibid.,
17; MacRea to Jones, Dec. 17, 1830, LSWD. V.
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The fact that the frontier was moving beyond the 
South was clearly indicated by General Macomb’s re­
commendations to consolidate the various regiments and 
establish a line of defense on the frontier. Cantonment 
Jesup was the only post mentioned that was located in a 
southern state. The scheme called for the gathering of 
full regiments at three posts, Cantonments Leavenworth, 
Gibson, and Jesup, with smaller detachments at other 
posts. Some posts that had outlived their usefulness 
were to be abandoned a3 soon as possible. The proposed 
distribution of the troops would allow them to protect 
not only the white settlers but also the Indians who were
45expected to remove from the areas east of the Mississippi.
White expectations of a quick expulsion of the 
Indians from their lands were increased in May 1825» when 
Congress enacted an Indian removal bill. The measure 
authorized the President to begin negotiations with the 
Indians to cede their lands and appropriated funds to 
finance their removal. By September 27, 1830, the Treaty 
of Dancing Rabbit Creek was signed with the Choctaws. The 
Choctaws ceded all of their land east of the Mississippi 
and were given three years to remove to the territory 
assigned to them west of the A r k a n s a s . T h e  Treaty of
45Macomb to Eaton, July 20, 1830, LSHQA, Vol. I.
46U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, 411-12; Charles 
J. Kappler7 Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1^7JT, II, 316-13.
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Dancing Habbit Creek was only the first in a series of 
treaties negotiated with the Indians living east of the 
Mississippi that would eventually result in the removal 
of most of the Indians.
By January of 1331 the troops were preparing to
escort the Indians to the western territory. The troops
stationed at the Yazoo River would be the first soldiers
to take part in the Indian removal. While the removal
process was beginning in Mississippi, preparations were
made across the South during 1831 for the removal of the
47eastern tribes.
In Alabama Major Wager was still in command at 
Port Mitchell, but he was being called upon to defend 
his actions in removing intruders. Wager faced the 
possibility of being sued by the citizens for destroying 
their property while executing the orders of the War Depart­
ment. The possibility that an officer might be called 
upon to defend his actions in a court of law, undoubtedly 
influenced the officers in the execution of their duties 
when civilians were involved. Wager's case was not un­
usual, in the same year that he faced court action a suit 
stemming from an officer's actions during the War of 1812 
was finally settled. The case was decided in favor of the 
plaintiff and against Major Massias. The officer had been
^MacRea to Butts, Jan. 3, 1831, LSWD, V.
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assisted in his fifteen-year court fight by government 
attorneys. Even after the legal question of liability 
was settled, the officer's problems were not over. To 
obtain reimbursement for the expenses he had incurred and 
the cost of the damages, he was required to make an 
application to Congress to obtain his m o n e y . I f  
Congress did not appropriate funds to meet the expenses, 
the full burden of the judgement fell upon the officer.
During the spring and summer of 1831 the strength 
of the southern posts was increased as the preparations 
for the removal continued. During the summer the Army
was concerned with the possibility of a slave revolt in
49Louisiana. But by September the crisis had passed, and 
attention was once again focused on the task of removing 
the Indians.
It was hoped that the Cherokees living in Georgia 
could be induced to move. To speed the process, Benjamin 
Curry of Tennessee was appointed to direct the operation. 
He was to determine the Indian's attitudes concerning re­
moval and attempt to eliminate any opposition. Curry was 
to confine his operations to the Indian lands within the
A RCooper to Wager, Jan. 25, 1831, Macomb to
Thompson, Jan. 27, 1331, Macomb to Wager, Feb. 23» 1831,
Cooper to Wager, Apr. 11, 1831, LSHQA. Vol. I; Secretary
of War to Moxey, Nov. 10, 1831, SwEs. Roll 13, 92 and
Secretary of War to Massias, Nov. 13, 1831, Ibid., 95.
49DeHart to Jones, Feb. 20, 1831 and DeHart to 
Jones, Mar. 2, 1831, LSWD, V. See Chapter IX.
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state of Georgia. He was to make a report of his findings
to the President and no final decision would be made until
50his report was received.
The preparations for the removal of the Choctaws
proceeded rapidly. George S. Gaines, brother of General
Gaines, had been appointed to supervise the movement of
the Choctaws from Mississippi. Major F. W. Armstrong had
been appointed as the permanent agent for the Choctaws
once they reached their new homes in the west. Gaines had
selected the sites where the Choctaws would board the boats
that would move them to the west. The southern part of the
nation would board steamboats in the vicinity of Vicksburg,
51and the northern part would board at Memphis.
Although events were moving rapidly in Mississippi, 
in Georgia they were not proceeding quickly enough to 
satisfy the whites. On September 9 the Secretary of War 
informed Representative Thomas Foster that the President 
had not yet decided to extend the emigration system to 
the Creek Indians. On the same day he told Governor Gilmer 
to be patient:
So far as it depends upon the actions
50Secretary of War to Gibson, Sept. 3, 1831»
SWLS, Roll 13, 75; Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 7, 
THTT, Ibid.. 77-78.
51Secretary of War to George Gaines, Sept. 8,
1831 and Secretary of War to Coffee, Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS, 
Roll 13, 78-79; Clark to Lewis, Oct., 1831, LSWD. VI.
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of this department every reasonable 
facility shall be afforded to carry 
into effect the plan of emigration.
If all the measures which are re­
commended are not taken, and as 
speedily taken as you could wish, 
you must attribute the result not 
to any indisposition to meet the 
question in every proper manner, 
but to its complicated bearing 
and to the practical difficulties 
of removing a large body of de­
pendent people. . . .52
The Secretary might have added that the biggest obstacle
to a speedy emigration of the Indians was the fact that
the Cherokees did not want to leave their lands.
Despite the Secretary's plea for patience on the
part of Georgia, the state legislature began to debate
whether or not to survey the Indian lands. This debate
once again brought a request from the Secretary that the
legislature not authorize a survey of the land:
Every effort in the power of the executive 
is now making to induce the Cherokees to 
cede their rights in Georgia, and to 
migrate to the country west of the Missis­
sippi; I can but hope that this measure not 
less necessary to their present comfort 
than their future existence will ere long 
be accomplished.54
^Secretary of War to Foster, Sept. 9, 1331 and 
Secretary of War to Gilmer, Sept. 9. 1831, SWLS, Roll 13. 
79-80.
5 3Henry Thompson Malone, Cherokees of the Old 
South, A People in Transition (Athens: ^Ke^University
of Georgia Press, 1956), 170-71.
54Secretary of War to Troup, Dec. 13, 1831,
SWLS, Roll 13, 98-99.
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The year 1832 began in much the same way as 1831*
with complaints against the actions of the officers of the
Army engaged in removing intruders. Not only were charges
made by whites, but the Indians complained that the troops
had destroyed their property while removing the squat- 
55ters.  ̂ In an effort to circumvent the regulations con­
cerning mining operations on the Indian lands, one white 
group applied to the War Department for a license to 
work the mines. The Secretary declined to issue such a
license on the grounds that he lacked the authority and
56that it was inexpedient at the present time.
The problem of intruders continued to plaque the 
government and spread to include the Creek lands in 
Alabama and the Cherokee mining areas within North Carolina. 
Major Wager, still commanding at Fort Mitchell, was in­
structed to give all assistance required by the United
57States Marshall to remove the intruders in Alabama.
In North Carolina the problem centered around a 
large number of whites, who had moved on to the Cherokee 
lands with a work force of Negroes to work the gold mines. 
The white force was said to number about 200. The Governor
55Secretary of War to Foster, Jan. 14, 1832, Ibid., 
112-13; Van Buren to Wager, Feb. 16, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
56Secretary of War to Carson, Jan. 17, 1832, SWLS, 
Roll 13, 116.
■^Macomb to Wager, Apr. 5, 1832, LSHQA. Vol. II.
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of North Carolina had requested assistance from the War 
Department to remove the intruders and enforce the treaty 
obligations with the Indians. To meet this request, two 
companies of artillery were ordered from Charleston Harbor 
to the Indian territory. The troops were to cooperate
Kgwith the Indian agent in the expulsion of the whites.
By July the Commanding General informed the Governor that 
the whites had been removed and the troops would remain 
in the area to prevent their return. If the settlers 
should move back onto the land, they would be arrested
KQand turned over to the proper civil authorities.
Actually, the troops were not required to expell the 
intruders in North Carolina. The whites left the Indian 
country before the two companies had arrived. However, 
the Indian agent, Hugh Montgomery, and General William 
Armistead, commanding the troops, had decided that the 
soldiers should be used to remove the intruders on the 
Cherokee lands in Tennessee.^
On July 14 Macomb informed the Secretary of War 
that the troops were available for assignment in either
*58Macomb to Armistead, Mar. 21, 1832, Ibid.; 
Stauton, Virginia, Spectator, June 8, 1832.
^Macomb to Stokes, July 18, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
60Macomb to Armistead, July 18, 1832, Ibid.
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the Creek or Cherokee nations. There were two companies 
stationed near Calhoun, Georgia, to prevent intrusions on 
the Cherokee lands. At Port Mitchell two companies were 
available for immediate action in that region. If 
additional troops were needed in the Indian country, they 
could be drawn from the garrisons at Augusta and 
Charleston.^1
The reason for the concern about the availability 
of troops was that a potentially explosive situation was 
developing in Alabama. The source of the trouble was a 
treaty signed by the Creeks on March 24, 1832. The treaty 
did not specifically call for the removal of the Creeks, 
but set up a system whereby each head of a family would 
receive an allotment of 320 acres of land within the 
nation. Presumably the unallotted lands could be occupied 
by whites. The treaty guaranteed the Indians against 
intrusions on their lands and forcible removal. The intent
of the treaty was one thing, but its actual operation was
fiPan entirely different matter.
The treaty required that whites who occupied Indian 
lands would be removed. But as in some other instances, 
those intruders whose improvements did not infringe upon 
the Indian rights were to be allowed to remain long enough 
to harvest their crops. These decisions once again placed
^1Macomb to Secretary of War, July 14, 1832, Ibid.
Kappler, Indian Affairs, II, 341-43.
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the men of the Army in the middle of a potentially 
dangerous situation.
In July the soldiers, acting in support of the 
Federal Marshall, evicted a number of white settlers at 
Irvington and burned their homes. The whites returned 
with their weapons and the sheriff. When the sheriff 
attempted to serve writs on the Marshall, the officer 
commanding the troops, and the Indians who had repossessed 
their improvements, the commander ordered one of the 
soldiers to stop him. The soldier bayoneted the sheriff 
in the arm as he advanced upon the Marshall.^
As a consequence of the influx of settlers hoping 
to acquire the unallotted lands and the anger aroused by 
the clash between the United States Marshall and Federal 
troops on one side, and the sheriff and intruders on the 
other, the Marshall requested that troops be stationed on 
the Creek lands to protect the Indian’s crops and homes. 
Major Wager was ordered to prevent encroachments and de­
predations by the whites. At the same time he was to 
limit his expenses. The Major was to govern his conduct 
according to the dictates of the situation and the
“"Mary E. Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and 
Rednecks: Indian Allotments in Alabama and Missis­
sippi, 1830-186b (Norman: Dnrversiiy of OklahomaPress, T55D7TT.
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64-suggestipns of the Marshall.
The situation in which the officers commanding
in the Indian territories found themselves was summarized
by General Gaines in a letter to Major Francis Belton:
You are placed in a position where 
important conflicting laws, with 
adverse authorities and interests - 
operating powerfully upon the worst 
of the bad passions of man, white as 
well as red. Combine to render your 
command deeply interesting, delicate 
and difficult.
The only guide the general could offer was con­
tained in his closing statement:
When we recollect that we are 30lumnly 
sworn to bear true faith and allegiance 
to tfae~UhH;ed Stales'"af America, and to 
serve them honestly and faithfully 
against their enemies or opposser3 
whomsoever, and to oHey the orders 
of the £resilent of the United States, 
and the orders of~theOfficers appointed 
over us, according to the Rules and 
Articles of War; we cannot but perceive 
the strong outline by which we are to 
pass through the labyrinths of conflicting 
legislation and opinion.
The problems in the Indian nation were momen­
tarily overshadowed by events in South Carolina. As the 
nullification movement developed, the commander of the 
troops in the harbor of Charleston was cautioned to be 
alert to any attempt to seize the fortifications. On
^Cooper to Wager, Aug. 10, 1832 and Cooper to 
Wager, Aug. 13, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II.
65Gaines to Belton, Aug. 23, 1832, LSWD, VI. 
Gaines' italics.
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October 29 orders were issued to Major Julius Heileman
to defend the fortifications against attack: "The attempt
to surprise the forts and garrisons, it is expected, will
be made by the militia, and it must be guarded against by
66constant viligance and repelled at every hazard."
On November 7 two companies of artillery were 
ordered to Charleston Harbor from Fort Monroe, Virginia. 
Macomb ordered that if the companies were not at full
strength, the ranks should be filled before the troops
67sailed for Charleston. On the same day Macomb in­
formed Heileman that the troops were ordered from Virginia 
to strengthen this command. He instructed Heileman to 
inspect the ordnance stores and to have those that might 
be useful transferred from the arsenal in Charleston to 
the fort in the harbor=>
Heileman was to inspect the fortifications and 
make all repairs that were possible under the existing 
circumstances. The Major was to keep the commanding 
general informed about conditions within the city and 
the state, specifically whether or not the people actually 
planned to resist Federal authority. As a last precaution 
he was to determine if any of the men under his command 
were inclined to side with those who opposed the authority 
of the United States. If he found any men who were so
^Macomb to Heileman, Oct. 29, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II. 
67Macomb to Eustis, Nov. 7, 1832, Ibid.
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68inclined, they were to be transferred from Charleston.
On November 12 Macomb sent additional instructions 
to Heileman concerning his conduct at Charleston. If the 
authorities of South Carolina demanded that Heileman 
surrender the Citadel and the state weapons stored there, 
he was to comply with the request. The Citadel belonged 
to the city but was occupied by a company of artillerists. 
Heileman was cautioned to conduct all of his negotiations 
with city and state officials in writing. He was to avoid 
any committment about hostilities, ’’but defend yourself if 
attacked in conformity with the instructions you have 
received.
On November 18 the Secretary of War ordered
General Scott to repair to Charleston. He was to inspect
the fortifications and make any repairs that might be
necessary. He was also authorized to draw additional
troops from any other posts to reinforce the garrisons.
The Federal laws were to be enforced by the civil
officials until the President decided otherwise:
Till, therefore, you are otherwise 
instructed, you will act in obedience 
to the legal requisitions of the proper 
civil officers of the United States.'0
^^Macomb to Heileman, Nov. 7> 1832, Ibid. This 
letter marked confidential.
gqMacomb to Heileman, Nov. 12, 1832, Ibid.
70 Secretary of War to Scott, Nov. 18, 1832, as 
seen in Niles Weekly Register, Feb. 28, 1833» Vol. XLIII.
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In late November additional troops were ordered 
to Fort Mitchell to aid in the removal of white squatters. 
One week later Macomb informed General Winfield Scott, 
who was at Savannah supposedly on his annual tour of in­
spection, that the troops were marching to Fort Mitchell.
He had just learned that the troops were no longer needed 
in Alabama and therefore Scott could use them in South 
Carolina if he believed it was necessary. Macomb also 
informed Scott that four additional companies had been 
ordered to move from Fort Monroe to Fort Moultrie and 
that all officers were ordered to join their companies 
at Charleston. The command of the force gathering in 
Charleston would be assumed by Colonel James Bankhead who 
had been ordered to the city. On December 7 another company 
of artillerists w a s  ordered from Fort Monroe to Charleston 
Harbor.71
By mid-January General Scott was in Baltimore on
his way back to his headquarters in New York, having left
Colonel Bankhead to supervise the activities in Charleston.
However, the General was prepared to return to South
72Carolina at the shortest notice. On January 24 Macomb
71Macomb to Anstill, Nov. 26, 1832 and Macomb to 
Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, Nov. 27, 1832, LSHQA, 
Vol. II; Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832 and Macomb to 
Eustis, Dec. 4, 1832, Ibid.; Cooper to Commanding Officer 
of Fort Monroe, Dec. 7, 1832, America State Papers,
Military Affairs (Washington: Galesand Seaton, 1836),
V, 166. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
72Macomb to Scott, Jan. 22, 1833, LSHQA. Vol. II.
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informed Scott that the President and the Secretary of War 
expected him to return to Charleston by the end of the 
month. Two days later the Secretary of War ordered Scott 
to proceed to Charleston without delay and assume command 
of the force that was gathering there. The Secretary’s 
letter contained specific instructions by which Scott was 
to govern his conduct:
It is the earnest wish of the 
President that the present unhappy 
difficulties in South Carolina should 
be terminated without any forcible 
collision; and it is his determi­
nation that if such collision does 
occur it shall not be justly imputable 
to the United States. He is therefore 
desirous that in all your proceedings, 
while you execute your duty firmly, 
you act with as much discretion and 
moderation as possible. . . .
The troops were to act only in self-defense against the
citizens of South Carolina.
The Secretary expressed his concern for the
security of the Federal arsenal at Augusta. He felt that
Scott had acted wisely in ordering a company of troops
from the Indian Country to Augusta to reinforce the garrison
The arsenal was to be defended to the **last extremity” if
it was attacked by the citizens. Colonel Daniel Twiggs
was to be told to destroy the arms and ammunition rather
than allowing them to fall into the hands of the 
73assailants.
Cass to Scott, Jan. 26, 1833, ASPMA, V, 160-61.
The company ordered to Augusta had been stationed at Camp 
Armistead, see Macomb to Scott, Dec. 4, 1832, LSHQA, Vol. II
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While Congress considered what action should he 
taken regarding the situation in South Carolina, General 
Scott and his command waited patiently to learn the out­
come of the debates. On February 20 Secretary of War 
Lewis Cass told Scott that the settlement of the dispute 
by Congress was not certain. Until some definite decision 
was made "the President relies upon you to pursue the 
same discrete and firm course you have heretofore taken.
On March 13 General Macomb informed General 
Scott that complaints had been received that numerous 
intruders had moved onto the Indian lands in North Carolina 
and Tennessee after the troops had been marched to the 
coast. If Scott believed that the situation in South 
Carolina had quieted sufficiently to allow the removal 
of some of the troops, he was to order two companies of 
artillery to North Carolina. The commander of the detach­
ment was to follow the directions of the Governor of North 
Carolina in removing the whites. Scott was to order the 
extra three companies at Augusta Arsenal to return to Fort 
Mitchell. When they reached Fort Mitchell, they were to 
follow the direction of the District Attorney of Alabama 
in removing the intruders on Indian lands in that state 
and in Georgia. On March 22 the orders were issued send­
ing the three companies back to Fort Mitchell and the two
^Secretary of War to Scott, Feb. 20, 1833, SWLS, 
Roll 13, 343-44.
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7Ccompanies back to Fort Armistead.
On May 10 Macomb issued specific instructions to
the commanding officer at Fort Mitchell:
You will on the application of Robert 
L. Crawford, United States Marshall 
for the Southern District of Alabama, 
furnish such aid from the force under 
your command as he may require to 
carry into effect the instructions 
he has received from the War Depart­
ment in relation to the removal of 
intruders on the Creek lands and if 
required will march the whole force to effect the object.76
The execution of these orders would involve the 
United States Army in a major confrontation with the state 
of Alabama. The Alabama legislature in 1832 and 1833 had 
extended the jurisdiction of the state over the area in­
cluded in the Creek cession. This action had only served 
to increase the number of settlers who had moved onto the 
Indian lands. The Indians had been complaining about the
activities of the whites, and the troops had been ordered
77to cooperate with the Marshall in removing them.
In August one of the intruders was shot and killed 
by soldiers who were assisting the United States Marshall.
75Macomb to Scott, Mar. 13, 1833 and Macomb to 
Swain, Mar. 14, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II; Mercer to Gardiner, 
Mar. 22, 1833 and Scott to Twiggs, Mar. 22, 1833, LSED, X.
76Macomb to Commanding Officer at Fort Mitchell, 
May 10, 1833, LSHQA, Vol. II.
77Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and Rednecks,
78, discusses the actions of Alabama.
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The events leading up to the fatal shooting are clouded
by the partisan feelings aroused by the incident, and it
is difficult to establish the sequence of events. But it
seems that the intruder, Hardeman Owens, one of the most
objectionable and unscrupulous of the invaders, was
ordered to leave the Indian nation by the Marshall. Owens
refused to obey the order. He attempted to lure the
Marshall and his escort into his home, which he had mined
with explosives, in an attempt to blow them up* Failing
in his attempt to ambush the soldiers and the Marshall,
Owens attempted to fire upon the party, whereupon he was
78shot and killed by the soldiers.
The shooting of Owens brought the situation in
Alabama to an explosive point. Many citizens of the state
asserted that Owens had been murdered by the soldiers who
had no legal right to be in Alabama. The Tuscaloosa
Expositor stated:
It does, indeed, appear that the 
President intends to trample tinder 
his feet the constitution of the 
United States, and the sovereignty 
of the states. If there is any 
one thing, which the constitution 
does not authorize him to do, it
78Ibid.. 78; Albert James Pickett, History of 
Alabama and incidentally of Georgia and Mississippi 
(Burmingham: The Webb Book Company, l‘5'06), 686-87.
Charleston Courier, Dec. 15, 1833. The Charleston 
Courier ~of Oct. 19, 1833, reprinted the letter of the 
Marshall to lewis Cass in which he made a full report 
on the shooting of Owens.
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is the sending an Army into a state, 
to settle disputes between her cit­
izens.79
Another Alabama paper told the whites:
We would 3ay be calm, but firm.
The President is already in the 
wrong - keep him so. Let his menials 
dare commit another murder - they 
will be imprisoned and punished if they do.30
On August 19 Secretary of War Cass asked the 
Attorney General for his opinion as to whether or not 
the government had the right under the provision of the
Treaty of 1832 to remove the intruders from the Creek
8llands. Three days later the Attorney General replied
with a long and detailed statement. The important point
of the opinion concerned the jurisdiction over the land
ceded in 1832 and was contained in the last sentence of
the letter:
The lawful possession is still in 
the United States, and may in my 
opinion be defended against such 
trespasses, according to the di­
rections of the act of 1807, by 
the removal of the intruders by 
military force.32
XLV.
79As seen in Niles Weekly Register. Oct. 26, 1833,
30States Rights Expositor as seen in Niles Weekly 
Register, Oct. 26, Tb33, XLV.
81Secretary of War to Attorney General, Aug. 19, 
1833, SWLS, Roll 13, 406.
82Attorney General to Secretary of War, Aug. 22, 
1833, in Letters Received, Main Series, 1801-70, Record 
of the Office of the Secretary of War, Record Group 107,
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Armed with the Attorney General’s opinion, Sec­
retary of War Cass informed Governor John Gayle of 
Alabama that the right to remove intruders from the 
ceded lands in Alabama belonged to the Federal govern­
ment and not to the states. He also informed the Governor 
that the removal of the settlers would continue until the 
provisions of the treaty with the Indians were implemented. 
Governor Gayle replied by again asserting that the state 
of Alabama had jurisdiction over its territory and that
Q 7the Federal government was acting unconstitutionally.
By October the situation in Alabama was reaching 
a dangerous point. On October 7 Governor Gayle issued a 
proclamation informing the people of the Federal govern­
ment's intentions to continue expelling intruders on the 
Indian lands. The Governor implored the people to put 
their faith in the "Majesty of the law." His next state­
ment was virtually a call to arms for those people living 
in the areas effected by the removal policy.
In order, therefore that "the 
laws may be faithfully executed," 
and by virtue of the power and 
authority in me vested, I hereby 
require all civil officers in the 
countries aforesaid, to be attentive
Microcopy 222, Roll 120, 312-14. Hereinafter cited as 
SWLR.
^Secretary of War to Gayle, Sept. 5, 1833, SWLS. 
Roll 13, 418-20; Gayle to Cass, Oct. 2, 1833, SWLR.
Roll 120, 335-36; For Cass's reply see Cass to Gayle,
Oct. 22, 1833, SWLS. Roll 13, 425-26.
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to the complaints of the people, 
upon whom any crime or crimes may 
he committed. . . .  by issuing all 
such warrants and other process as 
may be necessary to bring offenders 
to justice, particularly such as 
may be guilty of murder, false 
imprisonment, house burning, 
robbery, forcible entries, and g. 
all such like heinous offences.
The Russell County Circuit Court indicted the 
soldiers who were members of the party involved in the 
shooting of Owens. When the sheriff attempted to serve 
the court orders at Port Mitchell, Major James McIntosh 
refused to admit him to the post. The sheriff made his 
report to the Court and was ordered to return to the fort 
and bring the Major before the Court to be cited for con­
tempt. The sheriff was again unsuccessful and his report 
summarized the situation in Alabama:
I went to the fort and called on 
defendant. He swore I should not 
touch him. I am satisfied if I had 
made the attempt it would have been 
at the rigque [sic] of my life; that 
defendant was commanding officer of 
the fort, and had sworn on yesterday 
he would not surrender up any one in 
the fort.85
On October 29 the Secretary of War issued orders 
to McIntosh not to hinder the officials of the courts in
84. _Proclamation of Governor Gayle, Oct. 7, 1833, 
as seen in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 26, 1833, Vol. XIV.
gcStatement of Sheriff Crowell, Oct. 16, 1833, 
reprinted Ibid., Nov. 16, 1833, Vol. XLV.
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the execution of their duties:
It is not the intention of the 
President, that any part of the mil­
itary force of the United States 
should he brought into collision 
with the civil authority. In all 
questions of jurisdiction, it is 
the duty of the former to submit 
to the latter, and no consideration 
must interfere with that duty.”®
Similar instructions not to interfere with the 
state authorities were issued to Marshall Anstill. At 
the same time Cass instructed the District Attorney for 
the Southern District of Alabama to offer all legal assist­
ance possible to the officer and the men charged by the
Qrt
state of Alabama. To try to settle the differences be­
tween the Federal government and the state, Francis Scott 
Key was sent to Montgomery. He was to investigate the 
entire incident but was to exercise due caution:
The Marshall and the military force 
must be defended against vexatious 
proceedings; and you will, therefore, 
without delay, in every instance 
where these are instituted against 
them, have the matter brought before 
a judge of the United States for his 
determination.
Cass to McIntosh, Oct. 29, 1833# in Letters 
Sent by Office of Indian Affairs, 1824-81, in Records 
of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Record Group 75,
Microcopy 21, Roll 11, 294-96. Hereinafter cited as LSOIA.
^Secretary of War to Anstill, Oct. 29, 1833 and 
Secretary of War to District Attorney, Oct. 29, 1833,
Ibid., 296-99.
88Cass tc Key, Oct. 31, 1833, Ibid., 302-305.
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On October 25 the Mobile Commercial Advertiser 
reported that the United States Marshall had indicated 
that he and the troops would take no action against the 
intruders before the fifteenth of January. The editor
expressed the hope that the differences would be adjusted
89before that date.
On November 20 General Macomb ordered eight 
companies of artillery from Port Monroe and two companies 
from the Cherokee country to proceed to Fort Mitchell. 
When these companies reached Alabama, the full strength 
of Port Mitchell would be fourteen companies. Lieutenant 
Colonel Daniel Twiggs was ordered to assume command at 
Fort Mitchell and hold the troops in readiness to assist 
the Marshall in his duties. Macomb suggested: "the
duties to be performed by the troops is a very peculiar 
nature, and while you will be firm in the execution of 
it, let me recommend as little violence and injury to
90the persons and property of individuals as possible
Key managed to arrange a compromise between the 
two governments. The state of Alabama dropped the pro­
secution of the soldiers who had "murdered" Owens, and 
the Federal government agreed not to act against the 
intruders until the Indian reserves had been located.^
89Mobile Commercial Advertiser, Oct. 25, 1833*
90Macomb to Twiggs, Nov. 20, 1833 and Macomb 
to Eustis, Nov. 22, 1333, LSHQA. Vol. II.
91Young, Redskins, Ruffleshirts and Rednecks, 79.
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On January 4, 1834, Macomb informed Twiggs that the
Marshall had been ordered to carry out the removal of
settlers on the Indian allotments. Twiggs was to assist
him in the performance of his duties: "and if you should
be opposed by force, you must as a matter of course, put
a pit down, by all the means you possess.”
On March 12 the Secretary of War informed Governor 
Gayle that the additional troops that had been ordered to 
Fort Mitchell during the preceeding year had been withdrawn 
and that only the regular garrison remained. Cass also 
expressed his pleasure over an act passed by the Alabama 
legislature in January. The law provided a fine of from 
$250 to $1,000 or three months in jail for anyone found 
guilty of trespassing on an Indian reserve without con­
tracting to buy or lease the land. He believed that this 
law would mean that the Federal government would no longer 
be required to enforce the treaty with the Creeks. J
With the settlement of the problems in Alabama, 
the Army in the South settled back into a peaceful routine. 
Preparations were being made to remove the various Indian 
tribes to the west of the Mississippi. By the spring of 
1834 all of the southern tribes, except the Cherokees, had
^^acomb to Twiggs, Jan. 4, 1834, LSHQA, Vol. II.
^Secretary of War to Gayle, Mar. 12, 1832, LSOIA, 
Roll 12, 185. Alabama Laws (1833-34), 42.
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94signed treaties agreeing to remove. There were scattered 
incidents of Indian raids on isolated white farms and a 
few white intrusions on Indian lands that required the 
attention of the soldiers. However, most of their time 
was occupied with drilling and policing the various posts. 
Even the large-scale building program of coastal forti­
fications was virtually completed, and only general main­
tenance work was required.
Undoubtedly there were some individuals who could 
foresee the day not too far distant, when complete peace 
would reign in the South. The Indians would have been 
removed and the only soldiers left in the South would be 
those who garrisoned the coastal fortifications and those 
areas where a slave insurrection might occur.
The few indications that events might not be 
proceeding as well as expected were largely ignored by 
most people. In January of 1835 General Duncan Clinch, 
who was trying to persuade the Seminole Indians to leave 
Florida, informed the Adjutant General:
The more I see of this tribe of 
Indians the more fully am I con­
vinced that they have not the 
least intention of fulfilling
94In addition to the treaties with the Creeks and 
Choctaws, the United States had signed treaties with the 
Seminoles on May 9, 1832, although it was not ratified 
until Apr. 12, 1834. A treaty had been signed with the 
Chickasaw on Oct. 20, 1832, Kappler, Indian Affairs, II. 
344-45, 356-62.
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their treaty stipulations, unless 
compelled to do so by a stronger 
force than mere words.95
The General continued his efforts to persuade the 
Indians to remove throughout the summer. By late October 
instructions were issued by the War Department to remove 
the Indians:
It is very desirable to accomplish 
the object of removing the Seminole 
Indians without the application of 
actual force. . . . You will of 
course proceed to embark and remove 
those first who are willing to go, 
postponing any decisive course with 
relation to the refractory ones till 
the others have set out. My impression 
is that they will then all peaceably 
follow.
In the event that the "refractory** Indians did not 
peaceably "follow," the Secretary had ordered four addi­
tional companies to join Clinch. These companies would
bring the number of companies at Clinch’s disposal to
96fourteen, with a strength of 700 men. In his annual 
report of November 30, Cass stated that he felt the force 
under Clinch's command was adequate to enforce the treaty 
obligations. But by December 9 the situation was changing, 
and Clinch was authorized to call out one hundred mounted 
troops from the Florida militia to aid him in his efforts
95Clinch to Adjutant General, Jan. 22, 1835, 
quoted in Rembert W. Patrick, Aristocrat in Uniform: 
General Duncan L. Clinch (Gainesville: University of
Florida Press, 1963), 7l•
96 Secretary of War to Clinch, Oct. 22, 1835, 
SWLS. Roll 14, 304-305.
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97to remove the Indians.
On December 28 any prospect of a peaceful removal 
was shattered when the Indians attacked and killed the 
Indian agent, Wiley Thompson, and Lieutenant Constantice 
Smith outside of Port King. On the same day a detachment 
of troops under Major Francis L. Dade was ambushed on the 
Withlacoochee River. Dade’s command was slaughtered: of
one hundred and eleven officers and enlisted men only 
three survived. With these two events the Second Seminole 
War began and would not be officially declared at an end 
until August 14, 1842.^®
The beginning of the Seminole War marked the end 
of an era for the United States Army in the South. By 
the time the war ended in 1842, the attention of the nation 
and the Army had shifted to the Trans-Mississippi West. 
During the war many of the southern posts would be stripped 
of their garrisons, and after the war the frontier posts 
were not re-garrisoned. With the removal of the Indians, 
the old posts were no longer necessary. After the war the 
Army would be assigned to the coastal fortifications and a 
few posts in areas with large concentrations of slaves.
The passage of the frontier removed the need for a large
^TaSPMA, V, 627; Secretary of War to Clinch,
Dec. 9, 1835, Ibid.. 368-69.
98For an account of the War see John K. Mahan, 
History of the Second Seminole War, 1835-1842 (Gaines­
ville: University of Florida Press, 19^7).
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military force in the South, and the soldiers followed 
the Indians west across the Mississippi River.
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CHAPTER VII
FEEBLE EFFORTS TO REFORM THE ARMY
The years between 1789 and 1835 were ones of rel­
ative calm, consequently little was expected of the men 
who joined the United States Army. They were required to 
render steadfast service in the face of countless hard­
ships but could not hope to receive personal fame or 
material rewards. In these circumstances, men were re­
luctant to offer their services to the Federal government 
without the incentive supplied by a national emergency, 
and many of those who enlisted were not of the highest 
caliber. This situation had existed since the American 
Revolution, but it was not -until the late 1820's and the 
early 1830's that a concerted effort was made to improve 
the type of men who served in the ranks of the Army. The 
reforms were directed at the enlisted men and had little 
effect on the officers. The first reform attempted was 
one designed to make the Army more American.
The enlisted strength of the Army in peaceful 
periods was drawn largely from the northeastern cities 
and at times consisted of a large number of foreigners.
Until 1825 there were no restrictions placed upon foreigners
344
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who wished to enlist in the Army. The General Regulations 
of 1820 stated that "all free male persons, above eighteen 
and under thirty-five" who were physically fit might en­
list. From 1821 through 1823 approximately one quarter 
of the men who entered the Army were foreign-born and this 
factor probably prompted the provision in the General Reg­
ulations of 1825 that "no foreigner shall be enlisted in 
the Army without special permission from general head­
quarters." Probably as a result of this regulation, the 
number of enlistments dropped in 1825 and 1826. The re­
striction was removed on August 13, 1828, when it was 
ordered that all citizens could be accepted for service, 
without regard to their place of birth.^
Although the officers complained about the type 
of recruits that the Army attracted, little or no im­
provement could be expected as long as no inducements 
could be offered that were attractive enough to draw 
better recruits. The term of service was long; the 
duties performed were arduous; the hazards to life and 
limb were many; the chance to advance was limited; many 
Americans viewed the very existence of the Army with 
suspicion; the pay was low; and the benefits to be derived
1 General Regulations of the Army (Philadelphia, 
1320), Article 74, Paragraph TJ. General Regulations 
of the Army (Washington, 1825), Article 74, Paragraph 
T2S7. Order Number 43, Aug. 13, 1828, War Department 
General Orders, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 
94 (National Archives).
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from the service were few. Faced with these uninviting
prospects, most Americans were reluctant to enli3t. In
addition, a large proportion of those who did enlist,
2deserted before their term of service expired.
As a result of these circumstances, the actual 
strength of the Army was rarely equal to that authorized 
by Congress. Even when the paper strength of the Army 
was increased by Congressional action to meet specific 
emergencies, such as the War of 1812, the number of men 
who entered the Army fell short of the figures required 
to meet the new quotas. In the early years, the dis­
parity between real and authorized strength lay in both 
the number of officers and enlisted men on duty. After 
the 'War of 1812, when many officers chose to remain in 
the service and new vacancies in the officers corps were 
filled with graduates from the Military Academy, the 
deficiency resulted because the number of enlisted men 
was lower than authorized by law. This small force of 
enlisted men performed the bulk of the services and 
labors executed by the Army.
The men who composed the rank and file of the 
Army left few written records that reveal any details 
about themselves or their life in the Army.^ The only
2See Appendix II.
^One account, written and published annonymously, 
by an enlisted man is Recollections of the United States 
Army. A Series of Thrilling TalesT~ant1 Sketches (Boston:
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extensive body of information available concerning these 
men was left by their officers and by observers from out­
side the service. In most cases, the picture of the rank 
and file that can be drawn from these sources is anything 
but flattering. The prevailing opinion was probably best 
summarized in a statement by Surgeon Thomas Henderson, 
who wrote: "The fact of voluntary enlistment is a warning
to the Surgeon that, morally or physically, something may
be wrong about the recruit. Too many offer for service
4who are fit for nothing else. . . ." The attitude adopted 
by most observers who commented on the character of the 
peacetime volunteers was that a man who volunteered his 
services to the nation was fit for nothing else. He 
simply could not make it in civilian life and sought 
refuge in the Army.
Surgeon Henderson's assessment was too harsh and 
did not tell the complete story. An English officer 
traveling through the United States probably came closer 
to the truth when he observed:
The great extent of territory in 
the States, with a scanty population,
James Monroe and Co., 1845)» according to a statement by 
the author the work was written "during a period in 'the 
service' since 1830." The book presented an unfavorable 
picture of the Army's officers and the life of the en­
listed men.
4Thomas Henderson, Hints on the Medical Examination 
of Recruits for the Army; and on the discharge of Soldiers 
from the Service on Surgeon^s Certificate, Adapted to the 
Service of the United States (Philadelphia: Haswell,
Barrington, and Haswell, 1S4O), 20.
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causes wages to be high, and pro­
visions are cheap. Generally 
speaking then, the most worthless 
characters enter the Army, which 
consists of a melange of English 
deserters, Dutch, French, Americans, 
etc. Five dollars is the monthly 
pay of a private, and many labourers 
in the States earn a dollar per day 
so that it is obvious there is no 
great inducement to belong to an 
Army which is held in no estimation 
by the citizens generally, and has 
no pension-list or asylum for dis­
abled soldiers.5
The condition of the American economy influenced 
the recruiting efforts of the Army. During the periods 
of prosperity, most men could find some type of employ­
ment that would pay them considerably more than they re­
ceived for their service in the Army. When periods of 
recession and depression set it, many found that the 
prospect of military service was more inviting than when 
jobs were easy to find. As might be expected, a direct 
relationship existed between the economic condition of 
the country and the rate of desertion from the Army. De­
sertions rose during the periods of prosperity and fell 
during periods of depression. The same type of correlation 
appears to exist for other categories, such as enlistments,
'’"Notes on the Army of the United States of 
America," Military and Naval Magazine of the United 
States. I, (Apr., 1^33), 9?-l3ET IrT1B^7" an order from 
the War Department had prohibited the enlistment of 
British deserters, but it would not have been difficult 
to avade the regulation and it is safe to assume that 
British deserters did enlist in the United States Army.
The order was issued September 15, 1807 as seen in the 
Order Book for the Garrison at Fort Johnston, N. C., 1795- 
1811. Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National Archives).
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re-enlistments, joined from desertion, resignations, and 
the number of recruits required at the posts.**
Economic conditions also influenced the difference 
between the actual and the authorized strength of the Army. 
During the depression that lasted from 1816 through 1820, 
the number of officers in the Army was higher than the 
authorized level in four of the five years. In the middle 
three years of the same period, the enlisted strength was 
not substantially below the legal limit and fluctuated 
only slightly. The next eight years were relatively pros­
perous, with the exception of three recessions: one in
the first half of 1322; a second from mid-1825 to mid-1326; 
and a third in late 1828 leading to the depression of 1829* 
During these years, with the single exception of 1824, the 
number of enlisted men declined in prosperous periods and 
increased in times of recession and depression. The number 
of officers in the service remained fairly constant 
throughout the period, but increased noticeably in 1825 
and then sharply in 1829. Economic factors along cannot 
fully explain why men chose to join or leave the Army, but
^Returns from United States Military Posts, 1800- 
1916, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M617. Fort 
Johnston, N. C., Roll 558; Fort Petite Coquille, La.,
Roll 906; New Orleans, La., Roll 343; Charleston Harbor,
S. C., Roll 197; Augusta Arsenal, Ga., Roll 55; Baton 
Rouge, La., Roll 84; Fort Pike, La., Roll 921; Fort Morgan, 
Ala., Roll 805; Fort Mitchell, Ala., Roll 735. Hereinafter 
cited as Post Returns.
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it appears that they did influence the men who served or
7might have considered serving in the Army.
The recruiting parties faced not only the task 
of increasing the size of the Army to its legal limit, 
but also of matching the rate at which men left the 
ranks, because of discharge, death, or desertion. The 
yearly losses from the ranks were such that it required 
a concerted effort to hold the strength at a constant 
level. In spite of the fact that the enlisted strength 
of the Army never equalled the authorized strength, the 
officers and enlisted men assigned to recruiting duty 
did a remarkable job in obtaining enough recruits to 
ensure the continued existence of the Army.
The high number of desertions which occurred 
annually were a constant drain upon the limited manpower 
of the Army. The War Department and the officers of the 
Army were generally at a loss to explain why so many of 
the men who enlisted subsequently decided to desert. Most 
of the individuals who ventured an opinion on the subject,
7 Secretary of War Jefferson Davis reported that 
there was a definite relationship between the prosperity 
of the nation and the number of desertions that occurred 
in the Army. Senate Executive Documents (33d Congress, 
1st Session), £art 2, Serial 697, 7-8. Also Jack D. 
Foner, The United States Soldier Between Two Wars; Army 
Life and Reforms, 1865-1898 (New Tories Humanities Press, 
1970), 3-9, draws similar conclusions for the period 
covered by his study. Leonard P. Ayres, Turning Points 
in Business Cycles (New York: The Macmillan Co., 193^)»
WTllard Long Thorp, Business Annals. . . . (New York: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1926).
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attributed the high desertion rate to the prohibition of
flogging as a punishment for the crime by an act of
Congress in 1812. Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote
in 1824 that there was no ". . . imaginable cause for the
prevalence of desertion, but the inadequancy of the punish­
esment annexed to it by law."
On January 25, 1830, Adjutant General Roger Jones 
reported the number of desertions since 1823; he noted 
that 1,340 recruits had deserted either from the rendez­
vous or before they joined their company. Another 2,796 
had deserted during their first year, most of these during
the first six months. The remaining 1,533 men had deserted
qduring the last four years of their terms. Jones esti­
mated that these 5,669 desertions represented a total loss
10of $471,263 to the government.
The magnitude of the desertion problem is clearly 
illustrated by comparing the number of men who were either 
killed or wounded to the number of men who deserted. Be­
tween 1789 and 1846 the regular Army was engaged in 163
®Brown to Calhoun, Nov. 20, 1824, Jacob Brown MSS, 
Letter Book, II, 252-53 (Manuscript Division, Library of 
Congress).
Q682 men in the 2d year; 400 men in the 3d year;
263 inthe 4th year; and 188 in the 5th. American State 
Papers, Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and Seaton,
i836), IV, 287. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
1 ° T V ^ 'Ibia.
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actions in which 2,320 officers and men were killed and 
another 3,750 wounded.11 The 6,070 casualities suffered 
in combat by the Regulars is just slightly higher than 
the 5,669 desertions reported in the period from 1823 to 
1829.12
The officers seldom mentioned the number of men 
who "joined from desertion" in their reports. The men 
who filled this category were those who took advantage 
of Presidential pardons issued to those deserters who 
surrendered themselves at any one of the nation's military 
posts.^ From 1823 to 1829, 1,353 men. were either 
apprehended or joined from desertion, and it can be 
assumed that the majority of these men returned volun­
tarily since the capture of deserters was extremely 
difficult. An observer at Fort Mitchell noted that,
"whenever a man became tired of his duty, off he went,
14-bag and baggage, and pursuit was hopeless." The size
^Francis Heitman, Historical Register and Dic­
tionary of the United States~~Army. if. 295 (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1965), II, 295. Here­inafter cited as Historical Register.
12Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, communicated 
to the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid.
1^For example see: James K. Richardson, A Com­
pilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents,
1 8§7“TWashington: Government Printing Office,
1896), I, 425, 512, 514, 543; II, 499. Hereinafter 
cited as Messages and Papers.
^ ASPMA, IV, 287; Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners 
in America (Edinburgh, 1833, 2 volumes), II, 26$.
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of the United States and the location of its military
posts afforded the deserter ample opportunity to hide
15once he left his assigned station. Despite the apparent 
ease with which an escape could be made, a number of de­
serters decided to return to the Army. However, the rate
at which men returned from desertion never approached the
1rate at which they left the Army.
Adjutant General Jones was unable to explain the 
desertions, but he made five recommendations designed to 
reduce the number.
I. The bounty system as now 
established by law should be abolished, 
thereby dispensing with any bounty in 
hand or previous to two years' faithful 
service.
II. The term of service should be 
reduced to four years. The pay of the 
non-commissioned officers should be 
increased. One dollar should be added 
to the monthly pay of the private 
soldier.
15In an effort to aid in the capture of deserters, 
rewards were offered. A General Order was issued by the 
Adjutant and Inspector General's Office on August 4, 1818, 
that authorized a $30 reward and all reasonable expenses 
incurred during the apprehension and return of a deserter, 
the amount of the reward and the expenses were to be de­
ducted from the pay of the deserter. On August 10, 1819, 
the order was amended so that the $30 reward would include 
all expenses. Orders of the Adjutant 8th Military Depart­
ment, 1817-1820, Army Commands, Record Group 98 (National 
Archives).
16The number of desertions in the period from 1823 
to 1829 was 5,669 and the number of men who were either 
apprehended or joined from desertion was 1,853, which left 
the Army with a deficit of 3,816 men. ASPMA, IV, 287. At 
the ten posts surveyed by the author there were 1,584 
desertions and 359 men joined from desertion during the 
same period. Post Returns.
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III. Establishment by law, a 
uniform, certain, and adequate punish­
ment for the crime of desertion.
IV. The absence of too many 
captains from company duty, the 
frequent changes in company commanders, 
and the consequent exercise of command 
by young, inexperienced officers, who, 
although otherwise qualified, have not 
acquired the art of commanding or ad­
ministering to the comfort of the private 
soldier.
V. To the foregoing causes maybe 
added the prevalence of intemperance.^?
Commanding General Alexander Macomb was also un­
able to make any positive statement as to why so many men 
deserted. He suspected that the excessive use of spirits 
and the low pay received by the troops were the chief 
reasons. In an attempt to defend the pay received by 
the privates, Macomb stated that the pay was not just 
five dollars a month since there were additional benefits 
included, such as three dollars for subsistence; two and 
a half dollars for clothing; fifty cents for fuel; and 
fifty cents for quarters. According to the General's
calculations, the monthly pay for a private was actually 
18twelve dollars.
A letter from General Edmund P. Gaines in which 
several recommendations were made concerning the punish­
ments awarded by military courts, accompanied the reports 
of Adjutant General Jones and General Macomb that were
17Jones to Macomb, Jan. 25, 1830, ASPMA, IV, 288. 
18Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 29» 1830, communicated to 
the Senate, Feb. 19, 1830, Ibid., 287.
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submitted to the Senate. Gaines was glad that "stripes 
and lashes" had been prohibited by law, but he objected 
to several forms of punishment still employed by the 
Army, and felt that they should be abolished.
He specifically mentioned:
I. Branding, marking with durable 
ink, and all such inflictions as tend 
durably to cripple or multilate the 
offenders.
II. An iron collar, a ball and 
chain, and with either or these attached 
to the neck, leg or other part of the 
offender, for him to perform hard labor 
in public, or otherwise, except in 
solitary cells.
III. Shaving the head, putting a 
straw around the neck of the offender, 
or requiring him to stand upon a barrel, 
etc., etc.
The General suggested the elimination of these 
punishments because they did little to improve the dis­
cipline of the troops. In lieu of the objectionable 
practices, he recommended the establishment of a uniform 
system that stipulated specific punishments for specific 
crimes. He suggested four types of punishments that 
might be used as guidelines in drawing up such a system:
I. Punishment of death, or from 
39 to 100 lashes, might be prescribed 
for the crimes of desertion, cowardice, 
or mutiny.
II. From 10 to 50 lashes for 
drunkenness or for stealing.
III. From one to 30 days* solitary 
confinement to hard labor on bread and
19Gaines on "General Courts-Hartial: Crimes and
Punishments," Ibid., 290.
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water for some two or three of the above 
crimes, and for the most aggravated of 
the minor offences.
IV. Fines, not to exceed one half 
the pay of the offender for one to six 
months, in part for anyone of the above
offences as may in the opinion of the
court, require a small fine.20
Gaines hastened to point out that these penalties
were to be awarded only by a general court martial and
solely for the crimes of desertion, cowardice, mutiny,
habitual drunkenness, and stealing. The General stated
that these penalties would not be considered any more
stringent than the penalty of death or hard labor for
crimes, such as piracy, robbery, forgery, or perjury in
a society that considered these capital offences. He
did not believe that such a system of punishments would
hinder the Army's efforts to recruit good men. It would
encourage them to join . .as without this kind of
punishment the best of men are obliged to watch and labor
21whilst the worst of them sleep under guard."
2QIbid.
21 Ibid. In addition to these recommendations, in 
an earlier report, Gaines had given other examples of 
punishments employed at some of the military posts.
"Hard labor with ball and chain attached to his leg, to 
wear around his neck an iron yoke of 10 pounds weight, 
having two arms extending from the neck 10 inches, to 
be marked on the hip with the word deserter an inch 
long. . . .  To be marked on the right hip with the word 
Mutiny and on the left with the word Deserter. . . .  To 
be marked on the right forearm and right hip with the 
word "deserter," and on the left forearm and left hip with 
the word "Fraud," to wear an iron collar with four pro­
jecting arms, to have his head shaved, be drummed out of 
service with straw halter. . . .  To stand on the head of
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General Gaines attributed the high rate of de­
sertion to the intemperate habits of many of the soldiers 
and recommended that the whiskey ration be abolished. As 
an additional measure to reduce desertions, he suggested 
that the pay of the enlisted men be increased, especially 
of the non-commissioned officers. The General offered 
the opinion that with a population of twelve million the 
United States should be able to maintain an Army with the 
strength of 1,000 men for every million citizens. While 
maintaining such a force, the nation should be able to 
pay wages to its soldiers equal to those paid by private 
individuals to their employees. Finally, he suggested
that the period of enlistment be reduced from five to 
22three years.
In his report to the Senate, Secretary of War 
John Eaton supported the conclusions of his officers.
He added one factor which they had not considered when 
he suggested that the limited opportunities for advance­
ment open to enlisted men greatly influenced the type of 
recruits attracted by the Army. Because of established 
practice, although not by law, the graduates of West Point 
had the exclusive privilege of becoming officers. The
a barrel, with a 24 pound shot on his back, every alternate 
two hours for fifteen days from sunrise to sunset. . . ." 
These punishments were awarded in 1829. Inspection Reports, 
1825-1829, Serial 1, Vol. 2, 225-28. Inspector General, 
Record Group 159 (National Archives). Gaines' italics.
22ASPI'.IA, IV, 290-91.
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consequences of this system were that any hope of advance­
ment, based on loyal and meritorious service, was futile. 
The enlisted man knew that no matter how diligently he 
worked and how proficient he became, he could not advance 
beyond the rank of sergeant. Eaton believed that if this
practice was altered in some way, better recruits might be 
2 3enlisted.
The Secretary felt that there was an urgent need 
to place the Army "on a more respectable footing." To 
accomplish this goal, it was necessary to improve the 
image of the Army and to remove the "opinion of in­
feriority attached to this service" by the people. If 
this was done, the soldiers might regain some of the 
self-respect that should be attached to their service 
in the Army. To achieve this object, the enlistment of 
men with "intemperate habits and of dissolute character" 
should not be allowed, since association with such men 
caused men with better characters to lose some of their 
pride. If higher self-respect and honorable incentive 
were not produced, the problems would continue to exist 
in the Army. He cautioned that "partial remedies are 
mere palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good."24
To further the reform efforts, Secretary Eaton 
believed that a new law establishing new penalties for
23Ibid., 285.
24Ibid.
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desertion was necessary. He warned the members of the
Senate that the law must receive the sanction of the
people in order to be truly effective:
Popular opinion, in the absence of 
War, is not with the existing law 
for the punishment of desertion.
In time of peace, public opinion 
turns with abhorence from the 
severity of the penalty, and 
renders the law a dead letter 
on the statute book. Milder 
punishments should be resorted 
to, carrying with them a more ps 
appropriate and certain effect.
Secretary of War Eaton, Generals Macomb and Gaines 
and Colonel Jones all agreed that some type of reform was 
necessary to improve the Army and they agreed on the es­
sential areas that required attention: something had to
be done to reduce the number of desertions that drained 
the limited strength of the Army; the term of service 
should be reduced from five years to either three or four 
years; the punishments awarded by military courts should 
conform more closely to the nature of the crime committed 
in order to make them effective; the pay of the enlisted 
men should be increased to enable the Army to compete more 
effectively with civilian employers; and most importantly, 
the ration of whiskey issued to the men should be dis­
continued, and additional efforts made to curtail the 
intemperate habits of the soldiers.
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These reforms, recommended in 1830, were directed 
toward solving problems that had plagued the Army and 
hindered its operations since the early days of its 
existence. Although they agreed in general as to what 
needed to be done, specific reforms would be difficult 
to achieve. Some problems could be eliminated simply 
by an order from the War Department, others required 
Congressional action, and some virtually defied solution.
The easiest of the recommended reforms to accom­
plish was the abolition of the daily whiskey ration. 
Whiskey or some other type of alcoholic beverage had 
been an intregal part of the soldier’s ration since the 
American Revolution. Throughout the period, officers had
accused the soldiers of drunkenness, and civilians had
26criticised the intemperate habits of the men.
Whether the Army whiskey ration should be con­
tinued or not received extensive consideration in 1329
26It is necessary to read only a few of the 
garrison and departmental order books, which contain 
the charges brought against the soldiers and the re­
sults of the courts martial conducted at the various 
posts, to find that most of the trials were the result 
of too much consumption of alcohol on the part of the 
soldiers. For example see: Letters Sent 8th Military
Department, May, 1817 - May, 1321; Orderly Book for the 
Garrison at Ft. Johnston, N. C., 1795-1811; General Orders, 
Southern Department, 1812; Orders Garrison of New Orleans, 
1806-1312, all in Army Commands, Record Group 98 
(National Archives); Letters Sent Western Department,
1321-1835t Vols. I-VII, Records of the United States 
Continental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD. Letters 
Sent Headquarters of the Army, 1828-1833» Vol. I-II 
Headquarters of the Army, Record Group 108 (National 
Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA.
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and 1830. During this period a number of reports were 
submitted to the House of Representatives concerning its 
beneficial and adverse effects, and various suggestions 
were advanced to control the use of whiskey by the 
soldiers.
In late January 1829, Secretary of War Peter B. 
Porter communicated reports on the effect of the whiskey 
ration to the House of Representatives from the Commanding 
General and the Commissary General of Subsistence. Porter 
summarized the opinions contained in the reports:
1st - That the habitual use of 
ardent spirits, in moderate quan­
tities, is unfavorable to health; 
and that the chances for health, 
vigor, and protracted life, in 
favor of an individual who finds 
it convenient wholly to abstain 
from them, are generally greater 
than of him who indulges.
2nd - That the use of so small 
a quantity as one gill a day, taken 
at proper times, will not seriously 
impair the constitution or diminish 
the health of a man who pursues 
laborious or active employments.
3rd - That a sudden and total 
abandonment of the practice by one 
who has been long accustomed to the 
free use of ardent spirits will 
diminish his vigor, and possible 
injure rather than improve his health 
and constitution; and
4th - That the evils of intem­
perance in our Army arise not so much 
from the moderate allowance of spirits 
made to the soldiers by the government 
and its officers, as from the excessive 
quantities procured by other means.*7
2^Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPflA, IV, 
83* In 1830 one gill of whiskey a day was allotted to
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These four propositions set the tone of the 
opinions delivered by the officers of the Army who sub­
mitted reports on the subject in 1529 1330. The
amount of the whiskey ration was not considered to be 
excessive. Porter ventured the opinion that in the United 
States there was not one man in four, among the laboring 
class, who did not drink more than one gill a day, and it 
was from this class that the members of the Army were re­
cruited. In addition, the ration was believed to be 
beneficial, because it stimulated the digestive process,
something the soldiers required because their diet con-
23sisted primarily of foods thax were dry and solid.
Secretary Porter, and the officers who submitted 
opinions, laid the blame for drunkenness upon the illegal 
sale of whiskey to the soldiers by civilians. This
each man and it was usually issued in equal parts twice a 
day. An additional quantity, either a half or a full gill, 
was normally issued to those soldiers who were assigned to 
fatigue duty. It was the individual soldier's choice as 
to whether or not he drew his daily ration. Therefore, 
it is virtually impossible to answer several important 
questions concerning the ration, for instance: how many
men drew the whiskey ration for personal consumption; how 
many men received the ration in order to pass it on to 
fellow soldiers; what proportion did not draw their ration; 
and how consistently did each man draw his daily ration? 
Despite these questions, a number of officers had expressed 
the opinion that the whiskey given to the men as a part of 
their ration was not the actual source of the problem. On 
March 16, 1802, the whiskey ration was increased from one 
half to a full gill. J. F. Callan, The Military laws of 
the United States (Philadelphia: G.~W7 Childs. 1^64).
TZT-VT.
o o
Porter to Stevenson, Jan. 31, 1829, ASPMA, IV, 83.
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practice had not been stopped because the civilians who 
made the sales were not liable to any sort of penalty in 
most of the states, whereas the soldier who purchased 
additional whiskey without permission was subject to severe 
punishment. To correct this situation, Porter suggested 
that the House of Representatives pass a resolution rec­
ommending that the states enact laws that would provide
for the punishment of citizens who sold alcoholic beverages 
29to soldiers.
Porter observed that there was probably a higher 
proportion of individuals in the Army addicted to the 
excessive use of liquor than was to be found in other 
occupations. This fact arose from the Army's practice 
of enlisting confirmed drunkards. The Secretary defended 
the whiskey ration for the vast majority of the men in 
the Army who were not drunkards, but were men who "exhibit 
examples of as pure integrity, as correct habits, as 
ardent love of their country and zeal for its defense"
29 Ibid., 33-34. In some cases the Army attempted 
to punish those individuals who were illegally selling 
liquor to soldiers. For example, in 1798 a Spanish sub­
ject, Martias Agustin, was found guilty by a court martial 
of selling taffia to soldiers without a permit. He was 
sentenced to receive one hundred lashes and to be drummed 
out of camp with two bottles suspended from his neck. 
General Wilkinson approved the sentence and then remitted 
all punishment, except his removal from camp. He justified 
his action on the basis of the amicable relations that 
existed between Spain and the United States. General 
Order, Nov. 19» 1798, ’Wilkinson's Book of General Orders, 
1797-1808, National Archives Microfilm Publication, M654.
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as might be discovered in the best of society. He stated:
To interdict such men the use of that 
which; if not a necessary, is deemed 
one of the comforts of life, and which 
is forbidden to no other persons but 
convicts, would be stamping them with 
a mark of degradation more injurious, 
it is believed, and debasing to their 
moral sense, than would follow from 
the most unrestrained license for its use.30
Surgeon General Joseph Lovell stated in his report 
that more ill effects might result from the abolition of 
the ration among men who were accustomed to receiving it, 
than the evils produced by the drinking. He speculated 
that the men who were inclined to drink too heavily would 
continue to do so even if the ration were stopped. The 
gill of whiskey that was issued was only a small quantity 
and the heavy drinkers would be willing to pay any price 
in order to obtain an adequate supply from other sources.
The ending of the ration would produce great dissatisfaction 
among the men and would not stop those individuals who 
drank excessively.
Lovell pointed out that there were only three ways 
in which a soldier might acquire ardent spirits; from his 
ration; from the sutler on written permission from his 
commanding officer; and from the civilians who ’'infest 
almost every military post." He felt that if the civilian 
dealers could be controlled, intemperance would cease to be
3°Ibid., 84.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
365
a problem. He stated that only one state provided any 
penalty whatsoever for illegal liquor sales to soldiers 
and recommended that the other states be requested to 
establish similar laws. In his opinion, all of the 
suggestions for solving the problem of intemperance were 
useless as long as the Army continued the practice of en­
listing new soldiers and re-enlisting others who were known 
to be drunkards.^1
In 1830, at the request of the House Committee on 
Military Affairs, Secretary of War Eaton, General Macomb 
and Colonel George Gibson, Commissary General of Sub­
sistence, submitted reports on the influence of alcohol 
on the members of the Army. Secretary Eaton's report 
served to reinforce the opinions rendered the previous 
year by Secretary Porter. Eaton wrote:
It is not the allowance made by the 
government to the soldier which pro­
duces his intemperance; the quantity 
is too small. It is occasioned by 
supplies of ardent spirits obtained 
from citizens, and which no vigilance 
heretofore practised at posts, has 
been sufficient to prevent.32
The resolution prompting the reports from the
three officials had directed the Committee on Military
Affairs to study the feasibility of a plan to induce the
soldiers and sailors to voluntarily relinquish the whiskey
■^Lowell to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, Ibid., 85.
32Eaton to Andrew Stevenson, Jan. 12, 1830, House 
Document #22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.
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ration. The inducement to be offered was a cash payment, 
equal to the value of the ration given up by the men, to 
be made at the expiration of the term of enlistment. To 
encourage sober and orderly conduct, it was suggested 
that the payment of an extra bounty, either in money, 
clothing, or both, be made to those men who could produce 
a statement, signed by their commanding officer, attesting 
to their good conduct and total abstinence during their 
term of service.
General Llacomb felt that nothing had done "so 
much to degrade the rank and file of the Army, as the 
excessive use of ardent spirits nor has it been less 
destructive of their health and discipline." He stated 
that he would welcome any plan which would eliminate the 
problem, Macomb suggested that the whiskey ration be 
stopped, and in its place the soldiers be issued a portion 
of rice and molasses. The General believed that a bounty 
paid at the time of discharge would be a valuable incentive 
to good behavior and abstinence. The bounty should consist 
of one dollar for each month of service to each non­
commissioned officer, musician, artificer, and private 
who could produce a certificate from his commanding officer 
attesting to his total abstinence and good conduct during 
his period of service.^
^Macomb to Eaton, Jan. 11, 1830, Ibid.
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George Gibson agreed that something should be 
done, but he was sceptical of the success that might be 
achieved by any voluntary system that would pay the 
soldiers a bounty. His scepticism was a result of the 
efforts to establish a similar system in 1820. At that 
time he had sent a circular letter to the fifty-six 
Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence at all of the 
military posts informing them that Secretary of War John 
C. Calhoun and he wished to end the whiskey ration. The 
plan was to be voluntary and the men would receive a cash 
compensation, equivalent to the value of the ration. The 
payments were to be made either monthly or quarterly, at 
the option of the commanding officer, who was to appoint 
an officer to make the payments to the troops. The plan 
was adopted at some posts and completely rejected at 
others. The new system was continued at the posts where 
it was adopted until the determination was made that the 
plan was ’'entirely of non-effect.”
As an alternative to the bounty system, Gibson 
recommended a plan which he had suggested the previous 
year when the House had considered the subject of the 
whiskey ration. He felt that this plan would adequately 
solve the problem of drinking among the soldiers and he 
strongly advised the Representatives to consider the 
proposal.^
34Gibson to Eaton, Jan. o, 1830, Ibid. Also in
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On January 26, 1829» Gibson had informed the 
Secretary of War that he could not think of any ben­
eficial effects of the whiskey issue nor did he feel 
that any were likely to result. On the other hand, he 
could not think of any great evil that might arise from 
the issuance of the small amount of whiskey that made 
up the ration. He concluded:
The most unhappy and pernicious effects 
of spirituous liquors to the Army result 
from its being clandestantly supplied by 
citizens; nor can this be totally pre­
vented, but might be in a very great 
measure arrested, by inducing the states 
to enact laws prohibiting persons selling 
ardent spirits to soldiers, under the 
penalty of levying fines, recoverable 
before a Justice of the Peace, one half 
of said fines to be applied to the use 
of the State, and the other half to 
the person giving the information. . . .
Could this be efficiently done, there
ASPMA. IV, 86. For the 1820 circular see Gibson to 56 
Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, Aug. 10, 1820, 
Records of the Office of the Commissary of Subsistence, 
Letters Sent, 1818-1820, Commissary General of Sub­
sistence, Record Group 192 (National Archives). Calhoun 
had strongly recommended the abolition of the whiskey 
ration in 1818. He wrote that "the spirits ought to be 
placed in depot, and be issued occasionally under the 
discretion of the Commander. Thus used, its noxious 
effects would be avoided, and the troops, when great 
effects were necessary, would, by a judicious use, derive 
important benefits from it. Molasses, beer, and cider 
according to circumstances, might be used as substitutes." 
Calhoun to House of Representatives, Dec. 11, 1818, ASPMA, 
IV, 781. In 1803 an effort had been made to substitute 
beer and light wines for whiskey, rum or brandy. If a 
majority of the troops at a post agreed, the commander 
could substitute malt liquor for spirits during the period 
from May to October. The attempt was a dismal failure. 
Dearborn to Freeman, et. al., June 17, 1803, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters Sent, Re­
lating to Military Affairs, 1800-1389, Record Group 107, 
Microcopy 6, Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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is no doubt that the deleterious 
effects of the use of spirituous 
liquors by the Army would cease, 
as regards the health, morals, and 
discipline of the s o l d i e r s . 35
On January 14, 1830, the reports were sent to the 
House of Representatives and read before that body. After 
the initial reading they were laid upon the table without 
any action being taken on any of the recommendations. On 
February 8, 1830, the Commissary General of Subsistence 
informed the House of Representatives that any plan to 
abolish the whiskey ration and substitute a ration of 
coffee and sugar would require approximately $21,900 a 
year in additional funds. He based his estimate upon the 
cost of the rations at all posts, one cent for whiskey
■3 g
and two cents for coffee and sugar. No further action 
was taken by Congress on the subject of the whiskey ration 
after Gibson submitted his report in February. However, 
in December of 1330 the whiskey ration was abolished in 
the Army.
35Gibson to Porter, Jan. 26, 1829, House Document 
#22 (21st Congress, 1st Session), Serial #195.
■^Gibson to House of Representatives, Feb. 8, 183O, 
ASPMA, IV, 275-76. Based upon Gibson's figures, the Array 
had issued 2,190,000 gills of whiskey for the period upon 
which he had based his estimate, or a total of 68,437 
gallons. The reported strength of the Army in 1829 was 
6,332 officers and enlisted men, if each man had drawn 
one ration per day, 2,311,180 gills should have been 
issued. If some men drew an extra half gill or full 
gill it is apparent that some men did not draw their 
ration each day. Gibson's calculations were fairly 
accurate, Secretary of iVar Lewis Cass reported that 
the Army issued 72,537 gallons of whiskey to the soldiers 
in 1830 at a cost of $22,132. Ibid., 709.
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Order Number 72, issued by the Adjutant General's 
office on December 8, 1830, promulgated a new regulation 
that prohibited the whiskey ration. Under the new reg­
ulation, soldiers would receive cash payments to com­
pensate them for the loss of the ration. The system of 
payments proved to be unsatisfactory and in November of 
1832 a regulation was established by the War Department 
that abolished it and substituted the issuance of eight
pounds of sugar and four pounds of coffee for every one
37hundred rations. Men who were engaged in activities 
such as building fortifications, cutting roads, making 
surveys and other types of manual labor for a period of 
not less than ten days would still receive one gill of 
whiskey each day, or at their own option, one cent per
Q
ration. The whiskey ration was permanently eliminated 
by legislative action in 1338. This step was apparently
taken to prevent any future President from restoring the
39ration by executive order.
In abolishing the whiskey portion of the ration,
^Order Number 72, Dec. 8, 1830, War Department 
General Orders. Order Number 100, Nov. 5, 1832, War 
Department General Orders.
38Regulations for the Subsistence Department of 
the Army (Washington: “sTaTr”and Rivers, 1835), 10.
39"Classics of Alcohol Literature. Early Medical 
and Official Views on Rations of Spirits in the Army and 
Navy of the United States," Quarterly Journal of Studies 
of Alcohol, IV (Mar., 1944), 606-34. The whiskey ration 
for seamen was not abolished until 1862.
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the War Department was making a feeble effort to solve 
a serious problem. It was a step that few of the officers 
believed would actually eliminate any of the drunkeness 
among the soldiers. The real source of the problem, the 
sale of spirits to the soldiers by civilians, was ignored 
by the order. It would be a safe assumption that without 
strict regulation of the liquor trade in the vicinity of 
Army posts, those soldiers who were inclined to drink 
heavily before the whiskey ration was abolished would 
continue to do so as long as they were able to obtain an 
adequate supply from other sources.^0
Congress had taken no action on the subject of 
the whiskey ration and it delayed any action on higher 
pay until 1833. In March "An act to improve the condition 
of the non-commissioned officers and privates of the Army 
and Marine Corps of the United States, and to prevent 
desertion" was passed by Congress and signed by President 
Jackson. The law incorporated many of the recommendations 
made in 1829 and 1830. It shortened the term of enlistment 
to three years and raised the pay of all enlisted men.
40One possible solution to the drinking of the 
soldiers was to isolate them from the temptation. W. C. C. 
Claiborne, Governor of the Mississippi Territory, justified 
the purchase of forty-one acres of land for the site of 
Port Dearborn because it would "prevent the citizens from 
erecting tippling houses immediately in the vicinity of 
the fort, which invariably produces irregularities among 
the troops." Claiborne to Dearborn, Feb. 15, 1803, Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 
1801-1806 (Jackson: Mississippi State Department of
Archives and History, 1917), I, 268-69.
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According to the provisions of the act, musicians and 
privates would receive six dollars a month, one dollar 
of which was to be retained by the Army during the first 
two years of service. The soldiers would receive the 
retained portion of their pay at the conclusion of the 
two year period, provided they had served faithfully 
during that portion of their enlistment. The musicians 
and privates who decided to re-enlist, either two months 
before or one month after their term expired, would receive 
two months extra pay in addition to the pay and allowances 
due them from the unexpired term. The men who re-enlisted 
would receive their full six dollars a month without any 
temporary deductions.
The act also abolished premiums paid to officers 
for enlisting new men and the bounties paid to new recruits. 
It further stipulated that no person who had been con­
victed of a criminal act was to be enlisted by recruiting 
officers. Finally, the act restored the penalty of
whipping for those men who were convicted of desertion
41by a general court martial.
41U. S. Statutes at Large, IV, 647-48. The pay 
of the other enlisted members was: to each Sergeant
Major, quartermaster sergeant, and chief musician, $16; 
to the 1st Sergeant of a company, $15; to all other 
Sergeants, $12; to each artificer, $10; to each corporal,
$8. It is interesting to note that the pay for a marine 
was one dollar more than to a member of the Army of equal 
rank. Also see Regulations of the Army, Mar. 23, 1833» 
Adjutant General's Office, this regulation explained the 
new system of enlistments and pay.
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Independently of the legislative action of 1833 
designed to upgrade the caliber of enlisted men, the War 
Department issued regulations for the conduct of the 
Medical Department and the Recruiting Service, in 1832 
and 1834 respectively. These two sets of regulations had 
previously been included in the General Regulations of the 
Army, and now they were expanded to make them more com­
prehensive ana issued separately to the officers of the 
42two services.
42Regulations for the Medical Department of the 
Army (Washington: Charles H. 6arron, 1832). Regulations
for the Recruiting Service of the Army of the United 
Stateff. (Washington: Francis f’reston STair, 1834).
The Checklist of United States Public Documents, 1739- 
1909 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1911), I,
lists each of these two publications as the earliest for 
each of the branches, the recruiting service is surveyed 
on page 1244 and the medical department on page 1388. The 
earlier volumes of General Regulations for the Army con­
tain the regulations for the two branches, for example, 
see Regulations for the years 1808, 1812, 1813, 1814, 1816, 
1820, 1825» A~discussion of the General Regulations is 
contained in G. Norman Lieber, Remarks on the Army Reg­
ulations and Executive Regulations in General (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 18$8). “T n  addition to the 
regulations for the Medical Department and the Recruiting 
Department various other manuals and regulations were 
published for the guidence of members of the Army between 
1827 and 1841. For example: Regulations for the Sub­
sistence Department of the Army (Washington: Blair and
Rives, 1835); Abstract of Infantry Tactics; Including 
Exercises and Maneuvers of light Infantry and Riflemen; 
for the Use of the MilitTa of the United States (Boston: 
HiTliard, Gray, tittle and Catkins, 1830); faules and Reg­
ulations for the Government of the Mounted Rangers 
(Washington, 1832); A System of Exercise and Instruction 
of Field-Artillery Including Manuevures for Light or Horse 
Artillery (Boston: Hilliard, Gray, Little, ana vVaTkins,
1829); System of Accountability for Clothing and Camp 
Equipage Issued to the Army of the United States (Washington: 
James C. Dunn, 1%27); Regulations for the Government of
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The 'regulations were designed to ensure the en­
listment of healthy men and the continuation of that good 
health after they entered the Army. Surgeons and assistant 
surgeons were to eliminate men carried on the muster rolls 
who were medically unfit for service. They were to inspect 
the rations issued to the soldiers and the living quarters 
and sanitary conditions at the military posts with a view 
to determining whether the General Regulations pertaining 
to these subjects were being observed by the officers and 
men. These precautions were to be emphasized so that the
health of the men did not suffer from causes that could be 
43corrected.
Ordnance Department (Washington: Francis Preston Blair,1834); Denis H. Mahan, A Complete Treatise on Field F ort if icat ions, with the- General "’Outlines of the prin­ciples Regulating the Arrangement,' the Attack, and the Defence of Permanent Works (New ‘fork: Wiley and Long,1 BIS); Alfred Mordecai, A Digest of the Laws Relating to the Military Establishment of the United States {Washington: Thompson and Homans, 1833 J; AlexanderMacomb, The Practice of Coyts Martial (New York: Harperand Brother, 1841 andHTew York: S. Colman, 1840); andThomas Henderson, Hints on the Medical Examination of Recruits for the Army; ana on the foischarffe of Soldiers from the Service of the~United States (Philadelphia: Kaswell, Barrington, and Haswell, 1840).
43Regulations for the Medical Department of the Army, passim. Just how effective the regulations were might oe seriously questioned, if the letter from the Assistant Adjutant General of the Western Department,A. Miller, is an example of what actually happened.Miller informed Lieutenant Colonel William S. Foster, commanding officer at Baton Rouge, that ’’Private George Simpson should be examined by the Surgeon, on whose certificate he maybe discharged should his short leg contribute to render him less efficient than he other­wise would be.” Miller to Foster, Mar. 15, 1833» LSWD,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
375
The regulations concerning the recruiting service 
required that each recruit receive four physical exam­
inations before being permanently assigned to a company.
It was expected that any individual who was physically 
unfit would be eliminated at one of the examinations. To 
avoid any laxity in the examination process, the reg­
ulations provided that the expense of any bounty and 
clothing which the recruit might have received from the 
government was to be deducted from the pay of any officers
and surgeons who had not observed the recruiting regula- 
44tions.
The regulations provided:
Medical officers, who's duty it 
maybe to examine recruits, will be 
particular in causing each recruit 
to be striped of all his clothes, 
and to be made to move about and 
exercise his limbs in their pres­
ence, in order to ascertain whether 
he has the free use of them; that his 
hearing and vision are perfect; that 
he has no tumors, ulcerated legs, 
rupture, or chronic cutaneous affections, 
or other infirmity a disorder which may
IV. That such a case should be called to the attention 
of the Department Commander, in light of the Army Reg­
ulations, reveals a decided unwillingness on the part 
of officers and surgeons to make decisions, even when 
authorized to do so.
ations for the Recruiting Service of the 
Army of the United States. 12. The recruits were to be 
examined at the following times: upon being recruited;
three days after their arrival at the general depot; 
before leaving the depot for their assigned stations; 
and four days after their arrival at their permanent 
station.
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render him unfit for the active duties 
of a soldier, or be the means of in­
troducing disease into the Army; and 
it shall be their duty to ascertain, 
as far as practicable, whether the 
recruit is an habitual drunkard, or 
subject to convulsions of any kind, 
or has received any contusions or 
wounds in the head which produce occasional insanty.45
A recruit was to be rejected as unfit if any of the 
negative conditions were found to exist. The surgeon 
was to determine if the acceptable men should be vaccinated, 
and if so, it was to be done as soon as possible.
The overall results of the reform efforts of the 
War Department and Congress in the early 1830's are dif­
ficult to assess. However, on November 28, 1334, Command­
ing General Macomb was able to state in his annual report:
The character of the soldiery 
is evidently improving. The law for 
bettering 'the condition of the rank 
and file seems to have already pro­
duced the most beneficial results.
The vice of drunkenness has diminished, 
and with it desertion and other crimes, 
while at the same time better men enlist.
In addition to the improvements noted by General
Macomb, the Adjutant General reported that enlistments from
January 1 to September 20, 1834, numbered 2,111 and that an
additional 335 men had re-enlisted and would receive two
months extra pay. He estimated that 507 additional recruits
45Ibid., 13.
4 6Report of the Commanding General accompanying 
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1834, ASPMA,
V, 362.
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would be needed to fill the ranks by December 31 »47 The 
reported strength of the Army at the end of 1334 was 7,030
only slightly below the 7,194 men authorized by Congress
_ 48in 1833* The increase in the number of enlistments was 
probably only temporary, because in the first three 
quarters of 1835 the number of recruits dropped to 1,590.4  ̂
The strength of the Army at the end of the year was 7,337, 
or 143 more than authorized by law. The increase in the 
size of the Army during the last quarter was in all like­
lihood unrelated to any policy of the Army, but was a
result of the warfare that marked the beginning of the
50Second Seminole War.
The November 1333 issue of The Military and Naval 
Magazine of the United States carried a letter to the editor 
which touched off a brief but heated discussion of the 
monthly pay of privates. From the letters that were pub­
lished, purported to have been written by privates, it is
47Ibid., 371-72.
48The actual strength of the Army is available in 
U. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the 
United States, Colonial Times to 1957 (Washington: Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1960). Hereinafter cited as 
Historical Statistics. The authorized strength is 
available in Historical Register, II, 560-85, and in 
the annual reports of the Secretary of War in the ASPMA, 
I-VII.
49Report of the Adjutant General in accompanying 
the Annual Report of the Secretary of War, 1335, ASPMA,
V, 642.
50Historical Statistics, 737.
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evident that their authors did not believe that the six 
dollars a month granted by Congress in March was sufficient 
to meet the needs of the soldiers. It is impossible to 
determine if their feelings reflected those of their 
fellow privates, but if the figures presented had any 
validity, it is probable that the men were not impressed 
with the new pay scale.
One critic wrote that there were certain "immediate 
and indispensible expenses” incurred by the soldiers, in 
addition to those allowed by the government. The extra 
expenses included such items as washing; wear and tear 
on mess furniture; pipe clay, etc.; entertaining visiting 
soldiers; beer; coffee; contributions for paints, towels; 
and the making and preservation of a seine. These items 
cost the soldier five dollars and thirty-five cents each 
month and when deducted from his monthly salary left him 
with a cash payment of sixty-five cents. The author cal­
culated that a prudent soldier would be able to retire at 
the conclusion of ten years of honorable service with 
savings totaling seventy-two dollars. Given these cir­
cumstances, he seriously questioned whether the United
51States would ever have an efficient Army.
51The soldier broke down the monthly expenses as 
follows: washing, 750; wear and tear of mess furniture,
250; entertaining visiting soldiers, 250; beer from the 
sutler, $2.50; coffee, 750; contribution of making and 
preservation of seine, 250; contribution for paints, pur­
chase of towels and other articles, 250; total per month, 
$5.35. Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval
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In his remarks on the soldier's letter, the editor 
of the magazine stated that "the private soldier is as 
much entitled to a hearing as the General Officer, and 
he shall have one." He then proceeded to lower the
estimate by eliminating those items he considered un­
necessary and those supplied by the government. He dis­
posed of the following items: beer as "a very unnecessary
and therefore useless expense"; mess furniture since it 
was provided either by the government or from a company 
fund; and coffee because it was a component part of the 
ration. He agreed that the expense of the seine was not
proper, but pointed out that if any fish were caught, the
soldier could save his meat ration which was worth more 
than the cost of the seine. The calculations of the editor 
revealed that the individual soldier was required to pay 
only two dollars for his maintenance each month instead 
of five dollars and thirty-five cents. The editor stated 
that his estimate was too high and he had been assured by 
officers “well informed on the subject" that one dollar
was sufficient for the soldier to purchase all of the
52necessary items not supplied by the government.
In January the privates' point of view was further 
expounded upon in a letter signed simply "Wayne". He
Magazine of the United States, II, Nov. 3» 1333 (Washington: William Greene, T53477 1B̂ .
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wrote that the private soldiers were grateful to the 
magazine for giving them a forum from which to express 
their opinions, because "there are many little occur­
rences happening every day, which it is of consequence 
for the good of the Army that they should be made public; 
and which are known among the privates, but unknown to 
the officers."*̂
Wayne's calculations yielded a slightly lower sum
than the one given in the first letter. Despite the
lower total, his list of articles purchased was more
inclusive. He estimated that each month he was required
to pay four dollars and fifty-six cents, or fifty-four
dollars and seventy-two cents a year, for the articles
54not allowed by the Government. He concluded that after 
the deductions were made from his pay, he would receive 
one dollar and forty-four cents a month, or seventeen 
dollars and twenty-eight cents a year.
Wayne agreed that some of the articles on his
53Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval Magazine of the United States, II,Nov. 3, Jan., 1834 (Washington: William"”Greene, 1 8 3 4), 2 9 4.
54The itemized list included: 3 extra pair ofshoes, at $1 . 5 0 each, 370 a month; 3 extra shirts, at 870 each, 210 a month; repairing shoes, 290; repairing clothes, 1 8 0; utensils for shaving, 1 2 0; blacking, brushes, etc. for shoes, 1 2 0; washing clothes, 5 0 0; sugar and coffee, 370; brooms for company rooms, 6 0; tobacco, 1 2 0; rotten stone and whiting for belts, 1 8 0; mess furniture, plates, etc., 6 0; postage on letters (250 each letter), 60 a month; 2 extra pairs of stock­ings per year, 60 per month; beer, 1 pint per day at 
60 a pint, $1.80. Ibid.
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list, specifically beer, tobacco, sugar and coffee, were 
considered useless luxuries by some individuals. However, 
he justified each item on the basis that: a pint of beer
after a hard day's work was beneficial to the soldier and 
perhaps even essential; tobacco, to the soldier who was 
accustomed to its use might suffer serious injury as a 
result of not having it; and sugar and coffee were 
necessary because the amount issued to the soldiers was 
insufficient to meet their needs. All of the remaining 
articles were listed at the lowest price and were in­
dispensable to the private soldier. In addition to the 
items on the list, there were other articles that were 
necessary to maintain a soldierly appearance that were
not included which would have raised the figure still 
55higher.
In addition to the statements concerning the pay 
of enlisted men, Wayne illustrated the inequality that 
existed between the men who had enlisted before and after 
the provisions of the "Act to improve the condition of 
the non-commissioned officers and privates" were imple­
mented. He cited the example of two men in his company, 
one of whom had enlisted on March 1 and the other on 
March 4-. Both men had sworn to serve for five years, 
but because of the provision in the act that stipulated
55He specifically mentioned button sticks and 
clothes brushes. Ibid., 295.
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that those who enlisted after March 2 would serve only 
three years, the second private's turn was shortened by 
two years. Also, he would receive six dollars a month 
for the three years, whereas the first soldier would re­
ceive five dollars a month for two years and then six 
dollars a month for the remaining three years.
V/ayne stated that many of the soldiers he knew 
were dissatisfied with the new system because they had 
already served from twelve to eighteen months of their 
enlistments and the new recruits who joined the company 
not only received higher pay but would be discharged 
before the older soldiers. He declared that if the 
purpose of the law was to put all of the men on an equal 
footing, it had failed. The new regulations had served 
only to arouse considerable discontent among the soldiers. 
He closed his letter with the plea that "notice will be
given of these few facts, and the grievances remedied, so
56that we poor soldiers may at all events be contented."
Two letters appeared in the next issue of the 
magazine, one supporting and one attacking the position 
taken by the privates. An officer who claimed to have 
"grown up with the service" rejoiced that the privates 
had called public attention to the amount of their pay.
He wrote to support the author of the November letter
56Ibid., 296.
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and to refute the editor's remarks that had accompanied 
that letter. He believed that a careful reading of the 
letter could not "fail to throw light on the matter, and 
enable the world to understand in what manner our Govern­
ment makes provisions for its defenders, and what induce­
ments are held out to her citizens to enroll themselves
57under her banners."
Just as the first two writers had presented lists 
of items and their costs to justify their arguments, the 
officer presented a third list which he felt was appli­
cable at most of the garrisons throughout the country.
His list of necessary items yielded a total cost of three 
dollars and thirty cents a month, which left the soldier 
with a balance of two dollars and seventy cents on pay­
day. He calculated that this would allow the soldier to 
retire at the end of ten years with savings amounting to 
$324 and if he did not use beer he could accumulate 
$547.20.58
When he justified the articles on his list, the
57Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval 
Magazine of the United States, II, Nov. 6, Feb., 1 S$4 
(Washington: William Greene, 1834), 381.
58The items and their cost per month were: wash­
ing, 500; wear and tear of mess furniture, 6 1/40; pipe 
clay, whiting, black varnish, etc., 6 1/40; entertaining 
visiting soldiers, no charge; beer, 1 pint per day at 
6 1/40, $1.86; coffee, sugar, tea, 500; contribution 
for seine, 250; contribution of towels, etc., 6 1/40. 
Ibid.
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officer made some candid statements about the items 
supplied by the government. He indicated that mess 
furniture was not furnished by the government or from 
a ’’post fund." Although the Quartermaster Department 
did furnish mess pans and camp kettles, they were "but 
seldom, if ever, used for culinary purposes, being un­
suitable for it." Such items as knives, forks, plates, 
glasses and other utensils were normally acquired either 
by a contribution or from a company fund, if such were 
available. The soldiers should be furnished with whiting 
and the other items necessary to keep his arms and accou­
terments in proper order. The assessment for entertaining 
visiting soldiers at posts w a s  eliminated by the officer 
since it was not accepted at any of the garrisons.
With respect to the expense of coffee, sugar, and 
tea he wrote:
The Army regulations contemplate 
but two meals, viz; breakfast and 
dinner. To enable the men to have 
the third meal, they are permitted 
to purchase the articles for that 
purpose. The small rations fur- ,-q 
nished them, being found inadequate.
The officer indicated that since the location of
his post provided good fishing, he had assessed each of
his men twenty-five cents for the purpose of making and
maintaining a seine. In the first year the catch was
large enough that the surplus was sold and the men received
59Ibid., 332.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
385
a return on their investment in the seine amounting to 
approximately 400 per cent. Although the catch earned 
the soldiers additional money, the fish obtained by 
using the seine did not save the regular rations as had 
been implied by the editor. The officer stated:
There are no "surplus provisions 
and flour saved in serving our rations,” 
or "re-bought by the Government.”
Rations always fall short of the normal 
weight and measure. But should there, 
at any time, be a surplus, it reverts 
to the Subsistence Department."^
The officer believed that neither the pay of the 
soldiers nor their rations were adequate. The officer’s 
opinions were directly opposed to those of the author of 
the second letter, who called himself "an old soldier.”
The old soldier took upon himself the task of 
answering some of Wayne's complaints. He attributed 
Wayne's discontent to the fact that "the government are 
so illiberal as not to furnish him "beer and tobacco.”
The basis of his argument was that while the soldiers 
did not receive these articles in kind, he was afforded 
"ample means” of obtaining them without drawing upon his 
pay proper. The "ample means" provided him was the clothing 
allotted to him by the government but not drawn by the in­
dividual. Drawing upon his own experiences, the old 
soldier related that when a man's clothing account was
60Ibid. Officer's italics.
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settled at the expiration of his term of service, he 
received more money from this source than from his pay. 
Now that the clothing accounts were settled periodically, 
he was certain that it would he an "improvident man who 
did not receive enough money to provide his beer and 
tobacco, from the liberality of the government in so 
abundantly clothing him."^1
The old soldier evidently believed that Wayne 
was fomenting discontent among the members of the Army:
It is to be regretted, that a 
man who can wield his pen so well as 
"Wayne", instead of devoting it to 
the instruction and improvement of 
his less fortunate comrades, to the 
repression of discontent and the ex­
citement of emulation, should pro­
stitute it to the making of unfair 
(at least) statements, calculated 
to produce uneasiness and dissatis­
faction in those not so well informed,
The clothing allotment was altered when the 
period of enlistment was changed from five to three 
years. The allowance for five years was: 3 uniform
coats complete; 4 cotton jackets; 4 woolen jackets;
20 pairs of boots; 10 flannel shirts; 10 cotton shirts; 
20 pair of stockings; 2 leather stocks; 1 great coat;
3 blankets; 1 forage cap; 10 pair woolen overalls; 15 
pair cotton overalls; 6 pair of drawers, and 1 hat 
complete. The allowance for three years was: 2 uniform
coats complete, 3 cotton jackets; 2 woolen jackets; 9 
pair of boots; 6 flannel shirts; 6 cotton shirts; 9 pair 
pair of stockings; 1 leather stock; 1 great coat; 2 
blankets; 1 forage cap; 6 pair woolen overalls; 9 pair 
cotton overalls; 3 pair of drawers; and a hate complete. 
Report of the Clothing Bureau, Mar. 25, 1S33» approved 
by the Military 3oard on Mar. 27, 1833* Proceedings of 
the Military Board, 1832-1835. Army Commands, Record 
Group 98 (National Archives). This issue hardly re­
presented an abundant clothing allowance for men who 
were engaged in hard manual labor.
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as himself; as for instance, the 
young recruit, or aspirant for 
the honorable ranks of the Army.
In an effort to relate the details which he felt
Wayne had neglected to mention, the irate "old soldier"
drew upon his own experiences in the Army. He pointed
out that in the many companies with which he had been
associated, all of the articles mentioned by Wayne, except
postage and button sticks, had been purchased with money
from the company fund. This fund consisted of money that
had been saved by combining certain parts of the men's
rations and the payments received for the whiskey portions
of the ration. The fund was normally administered by the
company commander, and it was to this source that Wayne
should turn for those small items not furnished by the
government.
He dismissed Wayne’s questions concerning five
and three year enlistments by saying that his captain
would explain the situation to him if Wayne would
"condescend to ask him the favor." The old soldier
criticised Wayne for mentioning the discontent among
the soldiers caused by the reduction of the term of
service. He concluded with these words:
On his intimation, however, that such 
inequalities promote discontent, and
6?Letter to the editor, The Military and Naval 
Magazine of the United States, il, Nov. 6>, Feb., 1 8j}4 
(Washington: vTilliam Greene, 1334), 381.
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will not prevent desertion. I have 
only to say, that whenever a man 
seeks for excuses for desertion, 
he will find them. . . . Much has 
been said and much written on the 
subject of desertion, but when 
Government will adequately punish 
the cowardly deserter, and not 
only him, but all aiders and 
abettors, citizens or soldiers . . . 
then a check may be given to the 
disease.°’
Wayne's reply to the "old soldier" appeared in 
the May issue of the magazine. He maintained his original 
contention that the articles he had mentioned were neces­
sary if the private soldier was to properly present him­
self for inspections. Contrary to the statements made 
by his advisary, the items were not furnished by the 
government nor purchased from the company fund, but were 
acquired by the individual soldier at his own expense. 
Wayne pointed out that the clothing allowance could 
scarcely be considered abundant and that any cash derived 
from the accumulated surplus should not be denied to the 
soldier as it arose from "an economy amounting to a self- 
denial." Having dismissed the idea that the soldier was 
only required to pay fifty cents a month from his pay, 
Wayne turned to a different topic:
63Ibid.
64Wayne illustrated the insufficiency of the 
clothing allowance with one example: "Rationally speak­
ing, our clothing is not more than sufficient for our use, 
and some articles are not at all sufficient. There are 
but three pairs of boots allowed to us in a year; and at 
some shelly posts, where there is much drill, six pairs 
will not serve us. . . ." The Military and Naval Magazine
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
389
I am well pleased with the "old 
soldier's" idea, in regard to the 
five years* men and three years' 
men, he states, that the inequality 
is apparent. There he agrees with 
me, hut as he has tired himself by 
his previous effort, he finds him­
self unable to explain the subject, 
and refers me to my captain for an 
explanation.65
The private was quick to point out that it was the 
"old soldier" who had brought up the question of desertion. 
He stated that his " . . .  wish was to ameliorate our con­
dition as much as possible, but with that wish the idea of 
desertion was never associated." He lamented the fact that 
a soldier was unable to present what he considered to be
just grievances without being accused of fomenting dis-
66content and unrest among his fellow soldiers.
Wayne rested his case with the conclusion that 
". . . every one acquainted at all with such matters will
at once pronounce that "an old soldier knows very little
67about soldier's affairs."
If "an old soldier" knew very little about the 
affairs of the common soldier, it is certain that most 
Americans knew even less. The opinion of the Englishman 
Thomas Hamilton would appear to have been very near the
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truth. In 1833 he wrote:
The people care nothing for a set 
of invisible being mewed up in some 
petty forts on the vast frontier, 
who have no enemy to contend with, 
and are required to brave nothing 
but fever and mosquitoes.68
Public apathy and the problems of maintaining a peacetime 
volunteer Army serve to explain the failure of the piece­
meal reform efforts of Congress and the War Department.
Ten years were sufficient to substantiate Secretary of 
War Eaton's warning that "partial remedies are mere 
palliatives and cannot answer any permanent good."**9 All 
of the old complaints were again being voiced: the rate
of desertion was too high; the soldiers drank too much; 
discipline was lacking; and the men who volunteered were 
not of the highest caliber. Despite repeated attempts to 
find lasting solutions to these problems, they persisted 
throughout the century. As long as the Army remained small 
and its activities effected only a few Americans, little 
improvement could be expected. The peacetime Army found 
itself in the unenviable position of being necessary and 
at the same time unwanted.
68Thomas Hamilton, Men and Manners in America 
(Edinburgh: 1833, 2 vols.), II, 268-69. A thoughtful
discussion of American opinion of the Military is con­
tained in Marcus Cunliffe’s Soldiers and Civilians:
The Martial Spirit in America, 1773-1866 (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1968),
69ASPMA, IV, 285.
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CHAPTER VIII
A CLIMATE REQUIRING ALL THE 
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE THE LAW ALLOWS
The reforms attempted in the period from 1825 to 
1835 were directed toward solving problems over which the 
officers of the Army and the officials of the War Depart­
ment could expect to exercise some control. However, 
there was one problem in the South caused by a factor 
beyond official control. As the noted historian of the 
South, Ulrich B. Phillips, said when discussing the 
factors that made life in the South unique: "Let us
begin by discussing the weather. . . . Since the 
weather and its effects could not be controlled, all 
that could be done was to find ways to lessen their impact 
on the soldiers.
The weather and its influences must have been one 
of the first things that the soldiers noticed as they 
moved into the South. The men who enlisted in the Army 
were usually not native to the southern region and they 
must have quickly become aware of the warmer temperatures
1Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, Life and Labor in the 
Old South (New York: Little, Brown and Qompany, 2$), 3.
391
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2and the different types of crops and foliage. These 
differences became more pronounced and more apparent as 
spring arrived in the South.
Springtime came early in the year in the southern 
region, bringing heavy rains, swollen rivers and streams, 
and swarms of mosquitoes. To soldiers and civilians it 
was known as the sickly season. It took each year, in 
some more devastatingly than in others, a heavy toll in 
human lives. Whether called yellow fever, ague, the "black 
vomit", the fever, or a variety of other names, the exact 
description of the malady mattered little, for the end 
result for many of those stricken was death.
No class or race was spared as sickness spread 
rapidly across the South in the spring and summer. A 
few citizens fled to the safety of regions which were 
known to be generally healthy. However, for the vast 
majority of the people who could not leave, each summer 
brought the specter of death in its wake.^
2Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States 
Army (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967), 1&9.
Francis Paul Prucha, Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of
the United States Army in the Development of the North­
west, ISI^-Tff&O (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press
IJBison SooksJ, 1967), 36. Both of these works deal with 
the source of recruits enlisted into the Army, as does 
the author in another part of the study.
T̂he Rudolph Matas History of Medicine in Louisi­
ana, John l)uffy (ed.) (Baton Rouge: Louisiana !TEate
University Press, 1958), I, passim. Hereinafter cited 
as History of Medicine in Louisiana. William Dosite 
Postell, The Health of Slaves on Southern Plantations
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The majority of the fever victims were the 
residents of low lying areas and of cities and towns, 
and in these areas the Army maintained most of its gar­
risons. In the cities of Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, 
New Orleans and Baton Rouge, and in the coastal fortifi­
cations of the Southern states, the number of sick and 
dead rose in the spring and summer.^
(Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1970), 7. In History
of Medicine in Louisiana it is stated that the figures 
Tor the ifew Orleans epidemic of 1819 do not include many 
individuals who were buried on plantations, and the 
members of the lower economic classes who were un­
ceremoniously dumped into the river, I, 359. This 
comment is undoubtedly valid for all of the available 
statistics. See Daniel Clark, senior to Capt. Guion,
June 4, 1793, in Guion Family Papers, 1789-1906, Southern 
Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill. Clark writes, "I have just paid my annual 
tribute to the fever and ague and am beginning to crawl 
about again. . . . ”
4Survey of available monthly returns from eleven 
posts. See Appendix II. Returns from United States 
Military Posts, 1300-1916, National Archives Microfilm 
Publication, M617. Port Johnston, N. C., Roll 558. Port 
Petite Coquille, La., Roll 906. New Orleans, La., Roll 
843. Charleston Harbor, S. C., Roll 197. Augusta Arsenal, 
Ga., Roll 55. Baton Rouge, La., Roll 84. Port St. Philip, 
La., Roll 1074. Savannah, Ga., Roll 1125. Fort Pike, La., 
Roll 921. Fort Morgan, Ala., Roll 805. Port Mitchell, 
Ala., Roll 785. Hereinafter cited as Post Returns. In 
describing the climate of Alabama in 181 § Justus Wyman 
wrote ’’The climate is various, almost the whole of the 
upper, and the high lands in the lower parts of the 
territory, are considered healthy; but the low lands, 
particularly about the head of Mobile Bay, are very un­
healthy during the summer months. . . . Families residing 
in the low lands and near the rivers are subject to the 
fever and ague, and other intermittent fevers, occasional 
probably, by their being more exposed to the Natural Causes 
of unhealthiness, than those on higher lands.” Justus 
Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory.” 
Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, Vol. Ill, 
114.
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The illness and high mortality among the troops 
profoundly effected the soldiers stationed at the un­
healthy posts. A survey of the available monthly returns 
for eleven southern posts indicates that as the incident 
of illness increased, the number of soldiers in arrest 
or confinement and the number of soldiers who deserted 
increased.
Reports of sickness and death started coming to 
the War Department and the Headquarters of the Army as 
soon as United States troops began to occupy the former 
Spanish posts and erect new ones throughout the South in 
1797* Captain Isaac Guion, commanding the American forces 
taking possession of the former Spanish posts, reported 
sickness among his troops -at Chickasaw Bluffs.^ The 
sickness had prevented the men from completing the con­
struction of the fortifications and new quarters. During
7one period, three-fourths of the men had been sick.
As Captain Guion moved his force south to Natchez, 
•he found that the situation became worse as he extended
5Post Returns.
^Guion to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1797, in "Military 
Journal of Captain Isaac Guion, 1797-1799" in Seventh 
Annual Report of the Director of the Department of 
Archives and HTstory oi the ?ta7e of Mississippi~TNash- 
ville: Brandon Printing Company, T^09), 42-44. Here­
inafter cited as Guion.
^Guion to Wilkinson, Sept. 2, 1797, Ibid., 42-44; 
Guion to Capt. Z. Pike, Sept. 25, 1797, Ibid.. 44-46;
Guion to Pike, Oct. 24, 1797, Ibid.. 56-57.
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his lines of communication still further from his supply 
base. In April of 1798 he wrote that the medicine he 
had requested the preceding autumn had not arrived and he
Qwas forced to buy provisions where he could find them.
Captain Guion informed the Secretary of War that 
a physician was indispensable at Walnut Hills as it was 
"an unhealthy spot." Therefore, he had engaged the serv­
ices of a doctor until the War Department could provide
Qa surgeon for the soldiers. On May 22 his command was 
reinforced by a detachment of twenty-four men, but they 
added little to the strength of the garrison because half 
of them were sick.1<̂  In June Guion reported that he had 
still not received the hospital stores that his detachment 
so desperately needed. He had been able to purchase only 
a small quantity of drugs at a "cost more than would an 
ample quantity of those articles for a Regiment for the 
same time, bought in the U. States."11
Upon his arrival at Walnut Hills Lieutenant 
Colonel John Francis Hamtramck, the new commanding officer 
at that post, found that the members of the garrison were 
very sick and without the services of a doctor. In
Q
Guion to Kersey, Apr. 12, 1798, Ibid., 75-76.
qGuion to the Secretary of War, Apr. 19, 1798, 
Ibid., 77-78.
10Guion to Kersey, June 7, 1798, Ibid., 90-91.
11Guion to Wilkinson, June 23, 1798, Ibid., 94.
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addition to the absence of a physician, there were no
hospital stores or medicine available to issue to the 
12troops. By the end of July more than half of the 
troops at Walnut Hills were sick and only two officers 
were fit for duty. At Natchez the situation was only 
slightly better, from a force of one hundred and seventy 
enlisted men, fifty-two were sick.^ In August Guion 
wrote to Hamtramck and summed up the situation, "I feel 
for your situation environed with fever and death and 
sincerely wish it was in my power to alleviate it - as 
we are not so deadly here, but our prospects are suffi­
ciently gloomy. . . ." The Captain included a recom­
mendation that he believed would safeguard the Colonel’s 
health: "You must not expose yourself to the sun beams
from nine to five o'clock, and not at all to the night
air; Sleep with your chamber windows shut and continue
14your bath and all will be right I hope.”
12Guion to Secretary of War, July 9, 1793, Ibid.,
98-99.
1^Guion to Wilkinson, July 30, 1798, Ibid., 99-100.
1^Guion to Hamtramck; Aug. 6, 1798, Ibid., 100-101. 
The practice of avoiding the bright sun from nine to five 
might have been carried over from the French practice of 
working during the early morning hours, then taking a long 
break and finally returning to work in the late afternoon, 
see Dumont du Montignv, Memoirs Historiques sur la Louisiane 
(2 vols., Paris, 1753), II, 241 -TT. A similar system was 
employed when slaves were working during the summer months, 
for example see, George J. Xollack, Rosedew Plantation Book 
(1840). "Plantation Rules." Kollack Plantation Records, 
Southern Historical Collection, University of North Carolina,
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On August 11 Guion wrote that many of his men
were sick and some were dying. The new Governor of the
Mississippi Territory, Winthrop Sargent, had arrived in
Natchez five days earlier, but he had been unable to
1 5perform any of his duties because he too was sick. J 
Captain Guion was finally transferred to another post, 
but his successor, Colonel Thomas Cushing, voiced the 
same complaints in 1799.
Cushing reported sickness at Loftus Heights and 
Walnut Hills with some of the men in danger of dying, 
but sickness was rare at Natchez. He stated that the 
season was so hot that one of the Kentucky oxen had died 
from heat exhaustion. Deputy Quartermaster General,
William Jones, was sick with "Mississippi fever" and 
had not been able to perform his duties for three weeks.
One officer, Captain Piercy Pope, had died as a result 
of the fever. In addition to these problems, the command's 
medical supplies were virtually exhausted at the time when 
they were most needed.1^
Chapel Hill; Charles Tyell, Second Visit to the United 
States of North .America (2 vols., New Vork, 1849)» I,
263; Postell, Fhe Health of Slaves on Southern Plan­
tations, 28-29.
^Guion to Mitchell, Aug. 11, 1798, Guion, 102.
1 ̂ Cushing to Manuel Gayoso, July 20, 1799, and 
Cushing to Williamson, July 22, 1799, Letters Sent,
Cushing, Records of Army Commands, Record Group 98 
(National Archives).
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The complaints made by Captain Guion and Colonel 
Cushing in the late 1790's would be repeated again and 
again in later years by officers who commanded in the 
southern states. Combined with the high rate of illness 
were other conditions that bore directly on the soldier's 
welfare which were attributable to the South's climate and 
weather.
The Army's summer uniforms had to be issued ear­
lier to those who served in the warmer section of the 
nation. Various parts of the rations issued to the 
soldiers either spoiled quickly in the South or were 
not available at certain times of the year. The design 
of the barracks was modified to provide adequate venti­
lation in an effort to protect the health of the troops. 
The work performed by the troops was influenced by the 
weather, since certain types of work were not performed 
if it was possible to delay them until cool weather re­
turned to the region. The Army sought solutions to all 
of the problems presented by the South's climate. The 
solution most urgently required and most diligently sought 
after was to the problem of the sickly season.
Three plans were suggested that might reduce the 
number of soldiers stricken by disease during the sickly 
season. The most logical plan was to remove the troops 
from the unhealthy permanent stations and assign them 
temporarily to relatively healthy positions until the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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season passed. The second scheme was to recruit native 
southerners, who were thought to be immune to the dis­
eases, for service at posts in the South. The third plan 
was to rotate the troops every two years from southern to 
northern stations.
The practice of moving the troops to healthy 
locations was only partially effective in reducing the 
number of sick. If the summer quarters were not care­
fully chosen, the results could be disastrous. The most 
glaring example of an improper selection occurred in 1809, 
when General James Wilkinson lost approximately one-half 
of his army because of disease. The General was not 
solely responsible for the fiasco, a part of the blame 
must rest with the War Department.
After the United States acquired Louisiana, a 
number of reports sent to the government recounted the
hazards which befell newcomers during the warm months of 
17the year. In addition to the normal rigors of the
season, New Orleans experienced yellow fever epidemics
in 1804, 1807 and 1808, and lesser outbreaks of the disease
18in almost every year after 1796. Secretary of War Henry
17Claiborne to Jefferson, Aug. 29, 1804, Clarence 
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United 
States: IX, Orleans Territory (Washington: (xovernment
Printing Office, 1934-1962), 280. Hereinafter cited as 
Carter, Territorial Papers. Claiborne to Jefferson,
Sept. 10, 1 W ,  Ybx&T'ZQA.
18John G. Clark, New Orleans, 1718-1812: An
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1 9Dearborn, a physician, was aware of all of these facts.
The series of events which lead to the disaster 
below New Orleans began when Secretary Dearborn ordered 
three full regiments of Infantry, the 3rd, 5th, and 7th, 
and a battalion of a fourth regiment, the 6th along with 
all Riflemen, Light Dragoons and Light Artillery recruited 
south of New Jersey to assemble at New Orleans. This 
force, the largest concentration of troops in the country, 
was collected to protect the city from an anticipated
Economic History (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University
Press, 1970), 278. History of Medicine in Louisiana, 
345-49. Jo Ann Carrigan, "YeTlow Fever in New drleans, 
1853: Abstractions and Realities,” Journal of Southern
History, XXV (Aug., 1959), 339-55.
1 9̂Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana: The
American Domination (4th Edition. New OrleansT~ P.
Hansell and Brothers, Ltd., 1903;, IX, 36-37. Reveals 
that President Jefferson was aware of the unhealthiness 
of New Orleans as early as 1804. As early as April 23, 
1804, Secretary of War Dearborn had told Colonel Freeman 
"You will as early as possible look out for the most 
healthy retreat for such part of the troops as can be 
spared from New Orleans in the sickly season it ought 
to be as near New Orleans as possible and where the 
transportation to and from will be as much as possible 
by water, and where it will not be difficult or very 
expensive for the contractor to furnish provisions - 
I trust it will not be found necessary for you to retire 
from New Orleans, and I hope it will not be found necessary 
for any part of the garrison to retire for more than two 
or three months at farthest." Secretary of War to Freeman, 
Apr. 23, 1804, in Records of the Office of the Secretary 
of War, Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800- 
1889, Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 2, 219-20. 
Hereinafter cited as SWLS.
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20attack by the British.
On December 2, 1803, the Secretary of War ordered
General Wilkinson to assume command of the force gathering 
21at New Orleans. The General did not arrive in New
Orleans and take command of the force until April 19»
1809. By the time he arrived, the force was already
22on the verge of disintegration. Experienced officers 
commanding veteran troops had found the maintenance of 
discipline difficult when stationed at New Orleans, where 
prostitution and gambling flourished and liquor was cheap 
and plentiful. In such surroundings, the training and 
control of the new recruits that made up the force was
virtually impossible for their equally inexperienced
23officers. The consequent lack of discipline combined 
with the fact that disease was spreading rapidly through 
the army served to render the force virtually useless.
The number of sick had increased by twenty-five 
percent in the six days between the tenth and the sixteenth
20Dearborn to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1808 in American 
State Papers: Military Affairs (Washington: Gales and
Seaton, i832), t, 272. Hereinafter cited as ASPMA.
21Ibid.
22James Wilkinson, Memoirs of General Wilkinson, 
(Washington, 1811), II, Appendix, cYTl.
23Wilkinson, Ibid., 345-46. Deposition of Captain 
George Peter, ASPMA, I, 282. Deposition of Dale,
Wilkinson, Memoirs, II, Appendix, CXI.
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of April. On the latter date the enlisted strength of
the force was 1,733» of this number 553 men were unable
24to perform any duties due to a variety of complaints. 
There were two hundred officers present, many of whom 
were too ill to perform their duties. Only three of 
the doctors attached to the command were well enough 
to render any assistance to the men. With the worst 
part of the simmer months rapidly approaching, the hos­
pitals were filled to overflowing and medical supplies
25were scarce.
General Wilkinson's orders of December 2, 1808, 
allowed him to move the troops to any location he might
choose, as long as they remained in a position to defend
26New Orleans. On April 30, 1809- Secretary of War
William Eustis, who had assumed office on March 9> wrote
to Wilkinson stating that the health of the troops should
be his primary consideration. Eustis suggested that they
be moved up the Mississippi River to the high ground near
27Natchez and Fort Adams.
On May 29 after considering a number of possible 
sites, Wilkinson announced that he would move his command
2^Wilkinson, Memoirs. II, Appendix, CIII.
25"Mortality in the Troops at New Orleans."
ASPMA, I, 268-69.
26Dearborn to Wilkinson, Dec. 2, 1308, Ibid., 272. 
2^Eustis to Wilkinson, Apr. 30, 1809, Ibid., 273.
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to Terre au Boeufs, some twelve miles below New Orleans 
on the Mississippi River. He reported that the new 
position was dry and healthy and had been recommended 
by Governor Claiborne and the people of the neighborhood.
Despite the General's claims for the new ground, it proved
28to be a most unsatisfactory site for a camp.
On June 9 the troops reached the new cantonment 
where they would spend the hot summer months. When the 
summer rains started, the campground, which was three 
feet below the river level, flooded and turned into a 
sea of mud. The supply system broke down forcing the 
men to eat spoiled provisions. Throughout the growing 
crisis, Wilkinson and the contractor, both of whom re­
mained in New Orleans, argued over the condition of the 
supplies. The soldiers were unable to help themselves by
purchasing fresh supplies because their pay was months in 
29arrears.
28Wilkinson to Eustis, May 29, 1809, Wilkinson,
Memoirs, II, 258-61; Wilkinson to Claiborne, July 27,
ASPMA, I, 292; Claiborne to Wilkinson, July 28,
1809, flpid. The exchange of letters between Wilkinson
and Claiborne was prompted by the criticism directed at 
Wilkinson and he sought confirmation in July that 
Claiborne had indeed endorsed the site.
29ASPMA, I, 279-99. "From a medical standpoint 
one of the mosi astounding aspects of this whole episode 
was the failure of some of the hospital surgeons to 
diagnose the nature of the soldiers' trouble. The cause 
and cure of scurvy were well known by this date. Con­
sidering that the paymaster had sat in New Orleans for 
months, not deigning to journey the twenty-odd miles 
down the river to Terre au Boeufs while the soldiers
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The rate of illness at Terre au Boeufs was
staggering and was much higher than at New Orleans.
On June 22 Secretary of War Eustis, alarmed by reports
he had received from the camp, ordered General Wilkinson
to move his command to higher ground. Again he suggested
Natchez and the surrounding area.^
General Wilkinson received the order on July 20
and took steps to implement the movement north. He
doubted that the move would help because there had been
sickness at Port Adams when the area was originally
occupied by American forces. The General predicted that
he would have trouble finding adequate transportation for
the entire command. Twenty-four navy gunboats had been
assigned to move the troops. But they could only carry
900 men, slightly more than half the force. Wilkinson
assured Eustis that if the gunboats were supplied he
would adopt other measures to ensure that only the men
who were too ill to travel would be left behind. The
letter ended with a startling statement:
Under all circumstances, I must 
frankly say that, was my discretion 
permitted, I should stay here and 
hazard the consequences, but, as
were dying for want of fresh food which they might have 
been able to purchase with their pay. . . .* History 
of Medicine in Louisiana, 472.
^Eusti3 to Wilkinson, June 22, 1809, ASPMA, I,
274.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
405
there would be hazard, I am glad for 
your order to move, not only as it 
lessens my responsibility, but be­
cause the change of place may prove 
salutary to our men. In all events, 
you may depend on whatever my judge­
ment, experience, personal exposition, 
and attention, can effect.3*
On August 19 General Wilkinson wrote that he was 
"progressing rapidly in my arrangements for moving the 
troops, an object near my heart and which occupies all 
my attention." He indicated that the movement might be 
delayed by problems involved in using the naval gunboats. 
There were not enough men available to properly man the 
boats since most of the sailors were sick. In addition, 
the design of the boats made them impractical for trans­
porting troops, but they were being modified in an effort 
to make them usable. Several barges, lying at Natchez 
since 1807, had been brought to the camp to supplement 
the gunboats. The old barges would be repaired and 
additional boats would be hired in New Orleans if the 
gunboats were not available. Wilkinson estimated that 
his makeshift transportation system would enable him to 
move his command to Natchez in twenty days, the sick going 
by water and the healthy marching overland.
Wilkinson's letter described the situation in the 
camp: disease, primarily fever and ague, was prevalent
Wilkinson to Eustis, July 23, 1809, Ibid.
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throughout the army; and there was a shortage of food, 
especially meat and flour. In an effort to acquire 
supplies, he had offered one hundred dollars for a small 
cow and advertised for one hundred barrels of flour on 
any terms, but to no avail. He anticipated further com­
plications as the number of men on the sick list approached 
six hundred, and the medical stores were being rapidly 
consumed. The General warned that his expenses, already 
high, would increase if he was forced to replenish his 
depleted stores on the open market.
Defending the location of his camp, Wilkinson 
related that sickness had never been so rampant among 
the local residents as during the present season. He 
reported that the inhabitants of the neighborhood were 
all afflicted with the same illnesses that were sweeping 
through the army. He closed with assurances that he would
begin his movement north as soon as all of the necessary
32arrangements were completed.
It was not until September 10 that the remnant 
of Wilkinson’s army began to move up the river to Port 
Adams. Many of the men who survived the trip to reach 
the high ground at Natchez died from the effects of their 
ordeal before the end of the year. Prom January, 1809 to
32Wilkinson to Eustis, Aug. 19, 1809, Ibid.»
274-75.
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January, 1810, the force under General Wilkinson*s command 
suffered ruinious casualties. In a force of 2,036 en­
listed men, there were over 1,000 losses, consisting of 
166 desertions and an undetermined number of deaths.^
The disaster which virtually destroyed General 
Wilkinson*s army was unique, but it served as a constant 
reminder of the fate that awaited any commander who was 
not extremely careful when selecting a site for quartering 
his command. The report of the Committee of Congress 
which investigated the reasons for the high incident of 
illness among the troops at Terre au Boeufs listed the 
factors which they felt had caused the high death rate:
1) The detachment consisting of new levies.
2) The insalubrity of the climate - the 
summer and autumn of the year 1809 being 
•unusually sickly.
3) To the nature of the ground on which the 
detachment was encamped at Terre au Boeufs, 
and the detention of it at that place during 
the whole of the summer, contrary, as the 
Committee conceive, to the instructions con­
tained in a letter to the Secretary of War, 
bearing date the 30th of April 1809.
4) To the want of sound and wholesome pro­
visions and of vegetables; the want of an 
hospital, hospital stores and medicines.
5) The excessive fatigues to which the troops 
were subjected in clearing, ditching, and 
draining, the ground on which they were 
encamped.
^James R. Jacobs, The Beginning of the U. S. Army, 
1783-1812 (Princeton: Prince'bon University Press’, T947),
552; James R. Jacobs, Tarnished Warrior: Major General
James Wilkinson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 193b),
247-60. At a time when the strength of the Army was 6,954 
men, Weigley, History of the United States Army, 566.
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6) To the want of repose during the night, 
owing to the troops not being provided 
with bars or nets to protect them from 
the annoyance of musquitoes [sic].
7) The want of cleanliness in the camp, 
the impracticable to preserve it.
8) The sick and well-being confined to 
the same tents, which neither pro­
tected them sufficiently from the 
heat of the sun, nor kept them dry 
from the dews and rains.34
Normally the troops that were moved during the 
summer faired far better than those vuader General Wilkinson 
in 1809. The sites for summer encampments were carefully 
selected and if they proved to be unhealthy the troops 
were removed and the locations were not used again.
The troops from the garrisons at New Orleans,
Baton Rouge and Savannah were usually moved during the 
spring and summer months. The troops at Baton Rouge used 
a variety of summer posts such as, the Pine Woods, near 
the city, or Barataria Bay. The troops from New Orleans 
moved to Bay St. Louis or Pass Christian on the Gulf of 
Mexico. The soldiers from Savannah moved to posts known 
to be healthy during the summer months. When the troops 
were withdrawn, the posts were left to the care of small 
detachments of "seasoned soldiers."
34ASPMA, I, 272.
Post Returns. The returns for the posts from 
which the troops were removed show that in most instances 
a small detachment was left at the post to guard the care 
for it. When all of the troops were removed a civilian 
caretaker was usually employed to maintain the post.
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However, some of the unhealthy posts, usually 
permanent fortifications, were too important to be aban­
doned for six or seven months each year. Consequently, 
the troops remained at these sites, and hoped for a rel­
atively healthy season. Fort St. Philip, situated sixty- 
five miles below New Orleans on the left bank of the 
Mississippi River, was such a post. Inaccessable by 
land, surrounded by swamps, sluggish streams and land 
which would not support the weight of a man, Fort St. 
Philip gained a reputation unequalled by any ether post 
in the United States. A survey of eleven permanent 
garrisons shows that only at Fort St. Philip did the 
total number of deaths surpass the number of desertions. 
This startling comparison indicates not only the un­
healthiness of the post but also its isolation, there 
was no place for a deserter to go if he left the post.^
In an article written by a 3ritish officer that 
appeared in The Military and Naval Magazine of the United 
States, a story was told that graphically illustrated the 
situation at Fort St. Philip. In 1315 a young artillery 
officer, a recent graduate of West Point, was assigned to 
the post along with two senior officers and 150 enlisted 
men. Within a short time after their arrival, the second 
in command and fifty of the soldiers had died from
^Ibid. The available returns for Fort St.
Philip list 45 men dead and 39 deserted.
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sickness. The senior officer, apparently in a fit of 
despair over the loss of his men, committed suicide by 
jumping from the parapet into the ditch where he drowned. 
After nine months at Port St. Philip the young officer 
and ten soldiers were ordered to New Orleans, where all 
of the men, except the officer and his servant, died of 
yellow fever. The officer, ordered to Fort St. Philip 
to replace the young artillerist indicated that he would 
resign his appointment before going to the fort. He re­
turned his orders along with his commission to the War 
Department.
The editor of the magazine had only one comment
about the story, "A solitary case, incident to a post
which is perhaps the most unhealthy in the country. The
yjmilitary ->osts are generally healthy." The episode was 
probably unique, but at least a part of the story must 
have been relatively common. The reluctance of officers 
to report to Fort St. Philip was so widespread that 
General Edmund Pendleton Gaines suggested that new duty 
stations not be announced by the Headquarters of the Army. 
Instead, officers should be ordered to Department Head­
quarters to receive their assignments in person. The 
General felt that this method was advisable since officers 
assigned to certain posts, especially Fort St. Philip,
"Notes on the Army of the United States of 
America," The Military and Naval Magazine of the United 
States, I (Apr~ 1^33), 100.
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had countless excuses for not reporting for duty. A 
situation which did not exist at the better duty stations,
■3 Qsuch as Boston and New York.
Line officers were not the only ones who tried 
to avoid serving at posts such as Fort St. Philip. The 
members of the Medical Department also tried to avoid 
stations that were hazardous or undesirable. The policy 
of the Medical Department allowed the senior men to select 
their assignments, a practice that worked against the in­
terests of the soldiers. General Gaines strongly protested 
the action of the Department in placing "junior and com­
paratively inexperienced assistant surgeons" in the city 
of New Orleans and the surrounding area. Gaines argued 
that the Surgeon General placed the most inexperienced 
men in the posts that required the most experienced med­
ical officers. He stated:
There is perhaps no military principle 
better established, than that the post 
of greatest danger is the post of honor 
and at which~the most experience? veterans 
should be stationed. And when the enemy 
to be apprehended is only disease, then 
this principle will apply more particularly 
if not exclusively to the medical staff.39
• sOGaines to Roger Jones, Adjutant General U. S. 
Army, Aug. 10, 1826, Letters Sent, Western Department,
III. Records of the United States Army Continental 
Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives). 
Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
■^Gaines to Jones, June 20, 1327» LSWD, IV.
Gaines' italics.
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On March 16, 1330, an order was issued that re­
scinded the regulation of December 14, 1525, that allowed 
surgeons to choose their stations. Following the order 
of March 16, they would be assigned to their stations by 
the Secretary of War on "application through the Surgeon 
General." The order also provided that no surgeon or 
assistant surgeon should receive a furlough or leave of 
absence that exceeded thirty days. If an extension beyond 
the thirty day limit was necessary, an application was to 
be made through the Surgeon General to the Secretary of 
War. The application was to be accompanied by the written 
approval of the commanding officer of his Regiment or post. 
The tightening of the regulations governing furloughs was 
an attempt to eliminate the expense of employing private 
physicians to care for the soldiers during the absence of 
the post physician. This regulation was intended to
correct the situation which General Gaines had complained
40of three years earlier.
Fort St. Philip was too important not to be 
garrisoned at all times. The importance of the fort had 
been amply demonstrated when a powerful British naval 
force had been prevented from ascending the Mississippi 
to support the 3ritish land force below New Orleans in
^Order No. 10, Adjutant General's Office,
Mar. 17, 1330.
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41December, 1314. General Gaines tried to improve the 
living conditions at Fort St. Philip by recommending the 
construction of new barracks for the men. In March of 
1826 he said that the building should have been reported 
as "untenable and uninhabitable" in 1322. 3ut he had 
been convinced that the repairs contemplated by the 
commander would provide adequate shelter for the troops 
until the new fort across the river was completed. Gaines 
lamented the fact that those repairs had not been made, 
because:
With good barracks, I have no doubt that troops would enjoy better health at Fort St. Philip than at any immediate point on the Mississippi Hiver from Thence to St. Louis; but without such as will effectually screen them from rain and stormy weather, it would be a matter of surprise to no one acquainted with the character of the place to learn that in the course of one summer and autumn more than a majority of the troops stationed there had been carried off by disease.
41For the importance of Fort St. Philip during the British attack on New Orleans see: Alexander Walker,Jackson and New Orleans. An Authentic Narrative of the Memorable Achievements of the American Army, iJncTer Andrew JacksonT~before New Orleans, in the 'Winter of 1814, *1$, (New York! J. C. Derby, 185677 370-74. WiTTiam James,A Full and Correct Account of the Military Occurrences of the Late War Between Great Britain and the United States of America; with an Appendix, and platesT (London: T89877 TT, 348. H. M. Brackenridge, History of the Late War Between the United States and Great Britain: Com­prising a Minute Account”of the Various Military and Naval Operations (6th Edition, Philadelphia: JamesKay, and Brother, 1836), 287.
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I think it my duty to report 
that the barracks at Port St. Philip 
are absolutely unfit to be occupied 
by the troops during the approaching 
summer, and that it is very question­
able whether mere repairs will be 
sufficient to render them habit­
able. . . . The fort needs thoroughrepairs.42
It was not until the following year that the War
Department instructed General Gaines to remove the troops
from Fort St. Philip during the sickly season. Gaines
promptly ordered the troops to move to Pass Christian, a
location that had been uniformly healthy for a number of
years. Although the removal left the river approach to
New Orleans unguarded, the new summer location was close
enough to New Orleans to enable the troops to return to
defend the city. The General cautioned Lieutenant Colonel
Zachary Taylor to select a healthy site at Pass Christian
48out of the grasp of land speculators.
By the time General Gaines received authorization 
to move the troops from Fort St. Philip during the sickly 
season, the post had lost its standing as the unhealthiest 
station in the United States to the site at Baton Rouge. 
The 1st Regiment of United States Infantry had the
42Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Mar. 29, 1826,
LSWD, III.
^Gaines to the War Department, June 8, 1827,
LS'WD, IV; Gaines to Lt. Col. Z. Taylor, June 8, 1827, 
ibid. James W. Silver, Bdmund Pendleton Gaines:
Frontier General (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1949), 99*
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misfortune of occupying the post, which one writer called
"the grave of the regiment", during most of the period
from 1820 to 1828.^ In the period from 1829 to 1825,
the quarterly reports from 3aton Rouge reveal that the
annual percentage of deaths among the members of the
command averaged just over twenty percent. "In the third
quarter of 1321, for example, the total of deaths was
thirty-five, in a mean strength of 237, being one third
45of the aggregate of the whole army." At 3aton Rouge 
between 1329 and 1838 there were sixty-five deaths re­
corded on the medical returns and seventy-one on the
46Adjutant General’s returns.
General Gaines tried to protect the troops at 
Baton Rouge from the threat of disease during the sickly 
season. He proposed that the government purchase a tract
44Samuel Forry, The Climate of the United States 
and Its Endemic Influences. 3ased Chiefly on the Records 
of the Medical Department and Adjutant General's, United 
sTates Army (New York, 1342). 201.
45Ibid., 200. Thomas Lawson, Statistical Report 
on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the Unixed 
States. Compiled from the Records of the ISurgeon Ceneral's 
and Adjutant General *'s Office - Embracing a Period of 
Twenty Years, From January, 1819~^o January, 183$ (Washing­
ton: Jacob Gideon, 1840). The annual percentage of
deaths at Baton Rouge were 12.8 in 1819; 22.2 in 1820;
23 in 1821; 25.8 in 1822; 18.5 in 1823; 17.3 in 1824.The strength of the garrison ranged from 123 to 479 and 
the annual deaths from 29 to 85, 125.
46Lawson, Statistical Report of the Sickness and 
Mortality in the Army of the United States,
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of land outside of the city to be used for summer quarters.
His proposal was not enthusiastically received by the War
47Department and no action was taken. The regulars re­
mained at the post and the policy of removal to the Gulf 
Coast continued. Despite the glowing description that 
appeared in 1840, the post remained unhealthy:
The barracks, constructed of brick, 
with slate roofs, were completed in 
1824. The hospital built of the 
same material, was finished in 1339•
These buildings are well constructed 
and admirably adapted for the purposes 
intended. The public grounds are well 
shaded by trees, such as the mulberry, 
pride of China, et. These trees, 
planted in 1824 contribute it is 
believed, very materially towards.n 
the healthfulness of the station.
47Ibid., 255-56. The illnesses reported were 
Intermittent Fever, Remittent Fever, Synochal Fever,
Typhus Fever, Diarrhea and Dysentery, Catarrh and 
Influenza, Pneumonia, Pleuritis, Phthisis Pulmonalis, 
Rheumatisn. The number of men reported sick on the 
quarterly reports for the other posts surveyed are as 
follows, the number in parenthesis is the number of quarters:
1 st 2d 3d 4 th
Fort Moultrie (7) 456 (7) 506 (7) 521 (6) 278Fort Johnston (7) 181 (7) 198 (6) 194 (5) 124Oglethorpe Barracks (6) 185 (5) 181 (4) 183 P 110Fort Jesup (7) 1058 (7)1591 (7) 1520 (7) 932Augusta Arsenal (7) 327 (7) 213 (7) 237 (7) 102Fort Mitchell (5) 543 (6) 381 (7) 364 (6) 286New Orleans (3) 330 (4) 275 (2) 161 (4) 308Fort Pike (7) 125 (7) 155 (6) 170 (6) 98Fort Wood (7) 350 (7) 265 (7) 377 (7) 243Fort Jackson (4) 143 (2) 68 (2) 152 (4) 144Fort Marion (6) 145 (6) 177 (7) 243 (4) 114Fort King (4) 171 (4) 244 (3) 347 (4) 388Fort Brooke (5) 542 (4) 435 (4) 560 (4) 474Key West (5) 313 (4) 227 (3) 260 (3) 197
48 oAdjutant General to Gaines, Apr. 4, 1331* Letters
Sent, Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National
Archives).
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The permanent posts in the South were generally
more healthy than Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge. But
at each of the posts the death rate and sick list showed
a marked increase during the period from April to 
49October.
In certain years other posts were as unhealthy
as Fort St. Philip and Baton Rouge. In 1826 for instance,
two companies of artillery moved from Fortress Monroe,
Virginia, to Savannah, Georgia, within two years nearly
one-half of the men had died. On April 1, 1828, an
additional 103 men arrived at Savannah to augment the
depleted garrison. By December fifty-one of the new men
had died and their families had suffered in the same 
50proportion.
The effectiveness of the removal policy is 
difficult to judge because the number of sick and dead 
at the posts still increased during the summer months.
It can only be assumed that the number would have been 
even higher had removal not been practiced.
49Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and 
Mortality in the Army of the United States, 2$4.
50Post Returns. Lawson, Statistical Report on 
the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the Unite'd 
States, 24^-43; 284-85; 318—19- Niles Weekly Register, 
Apr. 4, 1329, XXXVI, 86. The editor cited these figures 
and recommended that the troops be removed and the gar­
rison abandoned. These deaths do not appear in the 
totals in Appendix II, as seventeen returns are un­
available out of a possible thirty-six, but sixty-two 
deaths were recorded.
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The second plan for reducing the effect of the 
sickly season was prompted by the belief that a period 
of time was necessary in order for individuals to adjust 
to the South’s peculiar climate. This assumption was 
widely accepted in the South, especially in the city of 
New Orleans where disease was common. In the areas 
where sickness was prevalent, the reason usually given 
for the high mortality rate was the large number of new­
comers and transients in the area. During the yellow 
fever epidemic of 1817, the New Orleans City Council re­
quested that all individuals "who have just arrived and 
are not yet acclimated" leave the city and reside in the 
country for a few weeks until the crisis had passed. To 
aid those individuals who could not afford to leave the 
city, the council set up a relief camp across the Missis- 
ippi River. The camp was located in some old Army barracks 
which were no longer being used by the Federal government
51to quarter soldiers.
The observations of Dr. Gerardin, a physician, 
who served in New Orleans during 1817, seem to confirm 
the assertion that newcomers were the principle victims 
of the fever. In 1820 he wrote:
The epidemic did not end, being fed
by all the French who arrived at
51Proceedings of the City Council, Book 3, Vol. I,
54-55.
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this time; if the American government 
had forced them to ascend the river 
and spread out in the country it would 
have saved the lives of a great many 
of these unfortunates. . . . Imbued 
with this truth, the American went 
and saved himself, the Frenchman 
always impruident and foolhardy, remained and died.”52
The doctor's opinion was supported by the editor of the
Louisiana Gazette who stated that most of the deaths in
1817 occurred among transients.
Justus :.Vyman observed in 1819 that in the area
around Mobile and Blakely, Alabama, "It is presumed that
not more than two-thirds of the emigrants from the Atlantic
States who attempt to stay in either of these places
through the unhealthy months live; and not more than one-
5 ̂tenth escape the sickness."
One authority on Louisiana medical history has
observed that:
The tragedy of this bland assumption 
was that it blinded the public au­
thorities and leading citizens to
52Dr. N. V. A. Gerardin, Memoires sur La Fieuve 
Jaune (Paris, 1320), 88-89.
^^Louisiana Gazette, Oct. 23, 1817* Justus Wyman, 
"A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory," in 
Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III, 116. 
See Letters from Soloman Mordecai to his sister, Ellen 
Mordecai. Soloman was a physician in Mobile for a number 
of years and wrote to his sister each week for about ten 
years. Their letters contain much information about health 
conditions in Mobile. Their letters are in the Mordecai 
Family Papers, 1783-1947, Southern Historical Collection, 
University of North Carolina, Chapel Kill, North Carolina.
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the fact that the city was the un­
fortunate possessor of one of the 
highest death rates in the country.
If only the new arrivals were sus­
ceptible to the fevers, then it 
followed logically that there was 
little need for any sanitary and 
public health reform measures.54
The health problems at New Orleans were perhaps 
more prominent than in other cities and areas of the 
South, but no area was completely free from the threat 
of disease. Reliable figures on the number of deaths 
that occurred in the southern countryside are unavailable, 
but a survey of newspapers and personal letters indicates 
that "the fever” was an annual fear in most areas of the 
South. General Gaines, who accepted the assumption that 
a period of acclimation was beneficial, suggested that the 
Army recruit native southerners for assignment to southern 
posts. He argued that since these men were already accus­
tomed to the southern climate, it was likely that the 
sickly season would not take such a heavy toll among the 
men.
Governor Claiborne had hinted at such a system in 
1811 when he requested Naval commissions for the sons of 
two prominent New Orleans families. The Governor asked 
that the two men be stationed in New Orleans because they 
were already accustomed to the unhealthy climate and were
54History of Medicine in Louisiana, 357.
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55well suited for service in that area. It remained for 
General Gaines to strongly recommend the idea to the A'ar 
Department.
In 1827 General Gaines suggested to Lieutenant 
Colonel Zachary Taylor that the unhealthy posts in 
Louisiana should be garrisoned by native-born officers 
and enlisted men. The plan would be put into operation 
by removing seven-tenths of the men from the Louisiana 
posts to Pass Christian on the Gulf Coast. This site was 
healthy and close enough to New Orleans to allow the men 
to return by steamboat in six hours. The remaining three- 
tenths of the troops would garrison the posts during the 
summer.
He reasoned that:
In times of unusual disease these 
guards if furnished by regular 
details would doubtless encounter 
the risk of a forlorn hope but 
native born officersand men of 
Louisiana and of other southern 
states would cheerfully encounter 
this risk and . . . would be at 
least as healthy as the native 
citizens whilst a more numerous 
body of troops at these posts 
composed of men from the middle 
and northern states could not 
fail to suffer the frequent
5CClaiborne to Hamilton, Dec. 25, 1811, in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of tf. C. C. Claiborne, 
1801-1816 (Jackson: State Department of Archives and
History, 1917), VI, 19. Hereinafter cited as WCC.
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scourge of mortal disease.:>0 
This plan was transitional in nature. It en­
visioned the construction of large and spacious barracks 
at Pass Christian to accommodate the troops removed from 
the other garrisons. The men left at the posts would 
consist of native southerners and seasoned veterans.
Under this system, a force of regulars would maintain 
the forts and not civilian caretakers.
In the spring of 1832 General Gaines wrote to 
Adjutant General Jones to suggest his solution to the 
health problems encountered by the Army in the South.
Gaines had first advanced his plan in 1825 but it had
not been favorably received. The earlier plan was similar 
to his recommendation of 1827. The General wrote:
Convinced as I am that no means 
hitherto employed will preserve from 
frequent disease and premature death, 
officers and soldiers born and raised 
in the middle and northern states and 
stationed at any of the unhealthy posts 
or places south of Arkansas, Tennessee 
or North Carolina and that a remedy for
this evil will be found in making se­
lections or accepting as volunteers 
southern officers and men and sending 
such as shall have been completely 
acclimated to Southern stations and 
recruiting southern men with clear 
understanding that they shall not, 
except on extraordinary occasion be 
ordered from the southern frontier 
to suffer the consequent risk of a
Gaines to Taylor, June 8, 1827, LSWD, IV.
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57northern climate. . . .
When Gaines had first proposed the idea, he was 
informed that the laws did not authorize such a plan. He 
argued that the President, as commander in chief, could 
make changes in the disposition of the troops that were 
necessary for the good of the service, provided the changes 
were not contrary to existing laws. The plan could be put 
into operation by issuing a few orders and transporting 
approximately twenty companies from southern to northern 
stations.
Gaines assured the Adjutant General that there 
were enough southern-born officers in the various corps 
of the Army, who would welcome an opportunity to serve 
in the South, to execute the plan. Native southerners 
stationed at the posts in the South offered two important 
advantages: (1) these men had a necessary understanding
of the institution of slavery; and (2) they were already
58adjusted to the climate.
To support his argument that the plan was necessary, 
Gaines cited the example of Forts Jackson and Wood. During
57Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, 
Ibid. Also see Adjutant General Patrick Galt, Western 
department to Captain Richard Zantzinger, Mar. 26, 1829, 
Ibid. Captain Zantzinger was given permission on the 
advice of his medical staff to remove the garrison of 
Fort Wood to Bay St. Louis.
^®For a discussion of the Army and slavery, see 
the following two chapters.
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the last sickly season, the posts had been manned by a 
small company of northern men and it had been impossible 
to muster enough men to remove the ever "accumulating 
masses of vegetable and animal matter embracing the 
elements of disease and death, duties in many respects 
peculiar to the Mississippi and its swamps."
The General believed that the feeble condition 
of the troops, especially those unaccustomed to the 
climate "during the season of heat, Musquitoes [sic] 
and disease", required some type of positive action.
He concluded his letter with the recommendation that a 
force of at least four companies, composed entirely of
59southern officers and men be stationed at Fort Jackson.
In May, George McCall, the Acting Adjutant General 
of the Western Department informed Captain Nehemiah Baden, 
the commander of Fort Wood of the recommendation that Fort 
Jackson be garrisoned by four companies of southerners. 
This force would enable him to maintain a proper police
of the post and still have an efficient disposable
* 60 force.
General Gaines was convinced that most of the men 
who enlisted, especially those from the great northeastern
•^Gaines to Jones, Apr. 30, 1832, LSWD, VI.
^°McCall to Baden, May 25, 1832, Ibid. In another 
letter to Major Richard Zantzinger, June 8, 1832, Ibid., 
McCall repeated the information concerning General Gaines' 
recommendation.
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seaports, would never make good soldiers for the garrisons
in Louisiana. The General felt that better recruits were
needed, but the type of men required would never be
attracted by the existing bounty and pay offered by the 
61Army.
The type of recruit attracted by the Army was 
the principle reason the plan proposed by General Gaines 
was impractical. The number of men who enlisted from 
the southern states was not large enough to meet the 
demands of such a system. It is probable that enough 
southern born officers were available, but sufficient 
enlisted men were not. The garrisons in the South con­
tinued to be manned largely by men recruited in the 
great northern cities.^
In the South several severe sickly seasons in 
succession meant that the number of non-immunes was re­
duced. This probably explains the mildness of the yellow 
fever epidemic in New Orleans in 1820. The city had
^Albert Miller, Aide de Gamp, to Lt. Col. William 
S. Foster, Mar. 15, 1833, Ibid.
62For information on the Army's recruiting 
activities see Adjutant General's Office, Recruiting 
Service Letter Books, 1825-1349, and Adjutant General's 
Office, Registers of Enlistment, Records of the Adjutant 
General's Office, Record Group 94 (National Archives).
In all probability Southerners enlisted and volunteered 
in proportional numbers to Northerners in time of national 
need, but in peacetime the Army was forced to rely on its 
recruiting officers in the northern cities to fill the 
depleted ranks of the Army.
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suffered two major epidemics in three years:
Hence, when the yellow fever again 
became epidemic in 1820, its ravages 
were limited by a lack of material.
A high percentage of the natives 
must have acquired an immunity 
through a mild attack while the 
mortality of the past three years 
would have thinned the ranks ofthe newcomers.^3
A similar thinning process worked at the garrisons 
in the South and the number of soldiers who gained a degree 
of immunity to the fevers through mild attacks increased. 
But the vacancies that occurred were continually filled, 
usually with men from outside the South who were not 
immune and who had little or no choice in where they 
spent the sickly season. If there was any validity to 
the theory that a period of acclimation was necessary and 
that newcomers were the most susceptible to the ravages 
of the season, the policy of the Army simply helped to 
keep the mortality rate high.
The third plan suggested was the rotation system.
It was intended not only to help preserve the health of 
the troops, but also to add a degree of fairness to the 
assignment of stations. Under this system, every two 
years units serving at southern posts would exchange 
stations with units serving in the north. The system 
was first tried among artillery units before being
^ History of Medicine in Louisiana, I, 361.
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expanded to include the infantry,,
The rotation system was contrary to the idea that 
acclimation to the South's climate was necessary. It was 
generally assumed that the period of acclimation lasted 
two or three years. If the individual managed to sur­
vive this period of exposure, his chances of contracting 
any of the illnesses were greatly reduced. Thus, under 
the rotation system, men who had gained a degree of 
immunity after serving two years in the South, would be 
replaced by men who would have to undergo the same process. 
Although ignoring the idea of acclimation, the rotation 
system was implemented because it was believed that the 
burden of southern service should be shared by all 
members of the service.
In early 1326 the Secretary of War asked the 
Quartermaster General Thomas Jesup and Surgeon General 
Joseph Lovell to estimate the expenses which would be 
incurred under the rotation system and the possible ben­
efits to the health of the troops. The plan being con­
sidered was to replace the troops in the following manner: 
the First Regiment would replace the troops of the Third; 
the Third would replace the troops of the First; the Second
would replace the troops of the Fourth; and the Fourth
64would replace the troops of the Second.
64Secretary of War to Jesup, Jan. 24, 1 306, m  
Records of the Office of the Secretary of War, Letters
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
428
The War Department considered the plan for more 
than a year. On October 12, 1827, orders were issued 
putting the plan into operation. The system was jus­
tified in the first paragraph of the order:
This has been determined on as a 
measure of equal justice to all; 
as being called for by the best 
interests of the service, and by 
the common rule of equity in 
military detail. It is there­
fore to be regarded as the 
commencement of a system, prom­
ising to the artillery,generally, 
the advantages of a biennial ex­
change, and to the garrisons of the 
sickly stations in particular, (on 
the southern frontiers) the hope of 
periodical relief.
Consideration was given to the health of the 
troops during the move. The surgeons and assistant sur­
geons of the First and Second Regiments were ordered to 
"accompany the troops of those regiments to the South, 
and return with the troops of the Third and Fourth Reg­
iments, who may be relieved from thence.
The plan broke down rapidly and became the sub­
ject of a heated debate between the members of the infantry
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1300-1889, Record 
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 12, 206. Hereinafter cited 
as SWLS. Secretary of :.Var to the Surgeon General, Jan. 24, 
l80F7Tbid., 206.
^General Order No. 54, Oct. 12, 1827, Records of 
the Adjutant General's Office, Record Group 94 (National 
Archives), also in Niles Weekly Register, XXXIII, Oct. 20, 
1827, 121-22.
66Ibid.
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and the artillery. In addition to the charges of dis­
crimination that were leveled at the new system by the 
members of the infantry, there were criticisms of the 
additional expenses entailed by the movement of the 
troops. In addition; questions were raised as to whether 
or not the President could order such a movement.
The expenses incurred by moving the four Regiments 
of Artillery amounted to 315,632. An additional expend­
iture of forty-eight dollars for medical assistance given 
the troops brought the final total to 315,680. In response 
to a resolution from the House of Representatives, in­
quiring upon what authority the movement had been made, 
Commanding General Jacob Brown wrote:
The only "regulation" known to the 
Army, "respecting the removal of 
troops from one post to another”, 
since the Declaration of Independence 
as a nation, is to be found in that 
discretionary power inherent in the 
president, as commander in chief, 
or in a general commanding an Army, 
to make such disposition of the 
troops as may be demanded by the 
high interests of the public service, 
and by that measure of justice and 
impartiality which may be due to the 
troops themselves.
The movement was justified on the basis of the powers
possessed by the Chief Executive and because the move
was necessary for the good of the service.
67Brown to House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1827, 
in Niles Weekly Register, XXXIII, Jan. 26, 1328, 362-63.
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As an addition justification, Brown referred to 
those European powers who possessed West Indian colonies. 
They relieved their garrisons in sickly regions at 
regular intervals after short-terms of service. As 
further proof that such a system was needed, the General 
cited the case of one of the rotated regiments. The 
regiment had been stationed on the Gulf frontier since 
the reorganization of the Army in 1821 and had furnished 
the troops for most of the "dreary and sickly posts in 
that quarter." General Brown reported that sixteen
officers had died in seven years, four times the average
68number in the other three regiments.
The General was willing to concede that the move­
ment was likely to cause some personal hardships. But 
individual interests were to be "viewed as secondary"
69to the more important military considerations involved. 
The General's letter touched briefly on the issue that 
would eventually evoke the most controversy. General 
Brown justified the movement on the grounds of fairness
68The General did not specify which of the 
Regiment's suffered these losses, but in all likelihood 
it was the Fourth Regiment.
69On January 9, 1328, the Secretary of War in­
formed Senator Martin Van Buren that the provisions of 
the order could not be relaxed and that Lieutenant 
Merchant, on whose behalf the Senator had written, 
would have to move from his present post to his new 
assignment on the southern coast. Secretary of War 
to M. Van Buren, Jan. 9» 1828, SWLS, Roll 12, 332.
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in the assignment of stations when he wrote:
Ever ready to obey the calls of 
the country, and to devote its last 
energies in its defense, the Army 
still looks to its government for 
justice and impartiality in its 
dispensations. Neither severity 
of discipline nor rigor of service 
will ever be complained of, while 
its distributions are S&de with 
fairness and equality.
The assignment of stations might have been fair 
within the artillery, but the new system brought complaints 
from the infantry that one branch was favored over another.
The rivalry and jealousy was clearly expressed in 
a series of letters published in The Military and Naval 
Magazine of the United States. In August of 1833 a letter 
appeared which was the first of many in the verbal battle 
between the two branches. It was addressed to the Pres­
ident of the United States and signed simply "W". The 
tone of the letter clearly indicated that some members 
of the infantry resented the apparent favoritism shown 
to the artillery. The author presented the infantry's 
argument in concise terms when he wrote:
In a series of years past the 
Artillery and Infantry of the Army 
have been distributed, the former 
on the seacoast in the several 
fortifications, and the latter on 
the Indian frontier, for the most 
part in temporary cantonments— the
70Brown to House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1827, 
Niles Weekly Register. XXXIII, Jan. 26, 1828, 363.
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former admidst the enjoyment of 
luxuries, the pleasures of society, 
the repose of peace— the latter 
often remote from comfort far dis­
tant from friends, and frequently 
engaged in warfare with the savage.
During the long period of this 
distribution but one or two changes 
have been made affecting the Artillery, 
and these involving no privation, no 
fatigues; while the Infantry, almost 
without exception, have been year 
after year, employed either in con­
structing cantonments, opening roads, 
changing posts, or warring with 
Indians.7“
The author might have overstated his case, but 
there is little doubt that life in the infantry was far 
different than that in the artillery. The rotation system 
could only have added to the infantry’s feelings that the 
artillery received preferential treatment. General Brown's 
references to fairness in the assignment of stations and 
sharing the burden of southern service must have seemed 
strange to the members of the infantry regiments that had 
served for long periods at posts in the South; for ex­
ample, the First Infantry Regiment had been stationed at 
Baton Rouge since 1821. The controversy soon spilled 
over into the public press when the New York American 
published several letters concerning the assignments 
given to the infantry and artillery.
71Letter to Benjamin Homans (ed.), The Military 
and Naval Magazine of the United States, I. Mar. to Aug., 
1833 (Washington: Thompson & Homans, T833), 335.
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The assignment of artillery units to permanent
duty in coastal fortifications and arsenals was justified
by the argument that the forts were primarily armed with
artillery pieces and they should be manned by members of
artillery. Since the arsenals were designed to produce
small arms and artillery pieces, it also seemed only
logical that the posts be garrisoned by artillerists.
The discussion continued for a year after the first few
letters without anything new being added to the debate.
The final shot in the controversy was fired in
May of 1334, when a letter written by a private in the
Second Regiment of Artillery, appeared in the press. The
private's regiment had been ordered South in 1827 and
after seven years it was still there. Each year the men
felt that they might be returned to the North, but had
been disappointed in their expectations. The men hoped
to return to the North because:
The 2d Regiment of Artillery is com­
posed, almost entirely, of northern 
men, the most of them left their 
relations and friends to come out 
to the south, when the 2d Regiment 
came, totally unacclimated, and 
with the hope that they soon would 
be relieved. What is it that forms 
the basis of our small but effi­
cient Army? It is, that all, as 
far as practicable, may be satisfied; 
and how is this desirable end to be 
obtained? It is by placing us all 
upon an equality. We are all serving 
our country on the same terms, and if 
there are bitter and sweets in the
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service, let us all, at least, haveour share.72
He concluded by citing the first paragraph of 
Order No. 54, which assured the members of the artillery 
that they would only serve two years at a time in the 
South. He requested that the men of the Regiment be re­
moved as soon as possible.
The rotation system was theoretically still in 
operation when the Second Seminole War erupted and ended 
any hope of a prompt movement out of the South for the 
Artillery units. The plan never had a fair test, since 
only the first move had been made, and no attempt had 
been made to move the troops after two years. In all 
likelihood, if the system had been followed, it would 
not have reduced the amount of sickness among the troops. 
There is evidence that acclimation to the southern climate 
was necessary. In two years the troops would just have 
become acclimated when they would be moved and replaced 
by troops who would have to undergo the same process.
All three of the suggested plans to protect the 
health of the troops were temporary measures and not ex­
tremely effective. The removal system was costly and 
inefficient, and required the maintenance of additional
72Letter to Benjamin Homans (ed.), The Military 
and Naval Magazine of the United States, III,Mar. io 
Aug., 1834 (Washington: William W. Moore, 1334), 236.
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military posts and the expense of transporting the troops 
to and from the summer camps. The recruitment of native 
southerners for service in the South was impractical, 
because an adequate supply of recruits was not available. 
The rotation system was never properly tested and probably 
would have been too expensive if extended to both infantry 
and artillery units. None of the plans was a solution to 
the real problem, the cause of the high incidence of 
disease.
Despite the attempts to reduce the number of sick 
during the summer months, the sickly season would con­
tinue to be a problem until the causes of the various 
illnesses were understood and eliminated. No amount of 
acclimation or rotation would help as long as the swamps
and mosquitoes remained and the improper disposal of
73filth and waste persisted. Medical science would have 
to make great progress, not only in the treatment of
73In describing the causes of the unhealthiness 
at Mobile Justus flyman wrote, "The natural causes of 
this unhealthiness must always exist; but the vegetable 
causes will gradually be removed. The fogs arising from 
the rivers, and exhalations from the swamps and low lands, 
together with the quantities of stagnant water always to 
be found in these swamps, will ever be prevailing causes 
of sickness. But as the country increases in population, 
the vast quantities of old logs and other vegetable sub- 
sistance which now lays consuming and which, in a manner 
corrupts the air, and renders it putrid, will be destroyed. 
This, however, will be a work of several years." Justus 
Wyman, "A Geographical Sketch of the Alabama Territory," 
in Transactions of the Alabama Historical Society, III,1141
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disease but also in the prevention of illness, before the 
sickly season would vanish. Even when medical science 
made the necessary advances, there was no assurance that 
the information would be disseminated rapidly throughout 
the Medical Department of the Army.
Prom 1789 to 1335 the Army's Medical Department 
was neither very large nor extremely efficient. It was 
adequate to meet the demands of normal conditions, but 
it normally failed in times of crisis. On September 29, 
1789, Congress passed an act which provided for the 
organization of an Army. The act provided for one sur­
geon and five surgeon’s mates to care for the 886 members 
of the Army. By 1836 the Medical Department had been in­
creased to include a Surgeon General, fifteen surgeons and
74sixty assistant surgeons, to care for 7,957 men. In 
spite of the fact that surgeons and assistant surgeons 
were available at the permanent posts throughout the 
country, the presence of a member of the Medical Depart­
ment did not necessarily ensure the soldiers of proper 
medical attention.
Much of the blame for the disaster that befell 
General Wilkinson's command at Terre au Boeufs must rest 
with three men who were trained as physicians, General
74.. .unixea States Statutes at Large, 1st Congress, 
Session 1 (1739), I, $5-^6; UnTtecT~States Statutes at 
Large, 24th Congress, Session 1 (1836), V, 117.
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Wilkinson and Secretaries of War Henry Dearborn and 
William Sustis. The physicians on the scene were un­
doubtedly overwhelmed by the number of sick. 3ut there 
can be no excuse for their failure to recognize the 
symptoms of scurvy among the troops and to treat it prop­
erly. Surgeon Jabez Heustis, who served at Terre au 
Boeufs in the Second United States Regiment, wrote a 
vivid description of the medical situation at the camp.
The men were first beset by fevers and dysentery and then 
the situation was complicated by the appearance of scurvy. 
Heustis described the condition of some of the soldiers:
The patients would pick them [teeth] 
from their mounts with their fingers 
. . . .  [one patient] taking hold of 
his tongue, . . . deliberately drew 
it from his mouth, . . . The jaws 
of several patients became carious; 
and in some instances, the lower jaw 
was detached from its natural connexions 
by the spreading of the mortification, 
and fell from the head in a state ofputrefaction.
The attending physicians either did not recognize
the symptoms or were simply unable to rectify an extremely
bad situation. Heustis stated that the standard treatment
for scurvy had been mercury, with the result that:
Its effects were certain and un­
equivocal to those who would give 
themselves the trouble of observing.
75Jabez Wiggins Heustis, Physical Observations on 
Ifledical Tracts and Researches, on the Topography and 
Diseases of Louisiana (New York, l8l7), yb-91.
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A violent salivation immediately ensued; 
and every symptom was rapidly and sen­
sibly aggravated. A few doses of this 
medicine relieved the patient of his 
misery, and put an end to his earthly 
sufferings. Death, perhaps, was in­
evitable; and it is certain that the 
patients' sufferings were shortened 
by this mode of treatment. Whether 
this, therefore, was to be considered 
as an act of humanity consistent with 
the duties of a physician, I leave for 
others to judge.
The problem at Terre au Boeufs was primarily caused
by a lack of fresh fruits, vegetables, meat and a shortage
of medicines, compounded by the fact that the troops had
not been paid and were unable to purchase fresh provisions
on their own. When the troops were paid and able to buy
77fresh foods, the health of the troops improved rapidly.
The performance of the surgeons at Terre au Boeufs 
could not have been worse. According to one authority on 
medical history, malaria and dysentery were common dis­
eases among the soldiers of the Army in all sections of 
the country. By 1809 malaria was not common in the New 
England states, but it was still prevalent in the states 
south of New York. The standard treatment for malaria 
and victims of most other types of fevers was cinchona 
bark. In addition there were medicines which would give 
relief to those suffering from dysentery. "The excessive
76Heustis, Physical Observation on Medical Tracts, 
98; History of Medicine in Louisiana, 47lT
77History 01 Medicine in Louisiana, 472.
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use of mercury in treating a large group of men suffering 
from the combined effects of scurvy, dysentery, and ma­
laria dees not speak well for the calibre of army sur-
,,78geons.”
In 1834 an effort was made to improve the caliber
of Army surgeons. On June 30, 1834» Congress passed an
act which required that all prospective assistant surgeons
be examined by an Army medical board before receiving their 
79appointments. The laxity of the system prior to 1834 had 
allowed men who were completely unqualified to hold the 
post of assistant surgeon. These men might have been 
able to cope with the every day problems that arose, but 
in periods of stress and urgency the medical system 
functioned badly.
Many of the men who were appointed to the'Medical 
Department were undoubtedly men of ability and dedication, 
but the Department was not an extremely important branch 
of the Army and offered little opportunity for advancement 
or reward. The pay was 1 CVY f *u]jLS life was hard, and chances 
for advancement were slight. The position of the surgeons 
and assistant surgeons was ill defined within the frame­
work of the Army, and military rank was not conferred
7 ftHistory of Medicine in Louisiana, 473-74.
79United States Statutes at Large, 23d Congress, 
Session 1 ('1834), IV,' 7lTI-------------
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80upon Army doctors until 1847.
Despite their many deficiencies, the members of
the Medical Department produced a number of reports and
studies concerning various aspects of the health of the 
81soldiers. Despite the valuable information contained 
in many of the reports, the routine medical problems of 
the soldiers went without solutions. Until medical science 
discovered not only the causes of the wide-range of ill­
nesses but also effective preventive measures, soldiers 
and civilians would continue to suffer during the sickly 
season. In general, the treatments prescribed for the 
various diseases were the same in 1835 as they had been 
in 1739, and there was general disagreement as to which
goMichael J. Reedy, "Army Doctors - Long Years 
Attaining Military Rank and Command," Military Medicine, 
CXXX (Aug., 1965), 813-20. Michael J. Reedy, "Army 
Doctors: Four Short Term Medical Chiefs," Military
Medicine. CXXXII (Mar., 1967), 188-94.
81
See the Annual Report of the Surgeon General 
which accompanied the Annual Report of the Secretary of 
War. Also James Mann, Medical Sketches of the Campaign 
of 1812, 13, 14, To which are added Surgical Cases: 
reservations on Military Hospitals; and Plying hospitals 
Attached to amoving Army" Also, An Appendix, Comprising 
a Dissertation on Dysentery; which~obtained the~iioylstonian 
Prize Medal for the Year 1805, and Observations on the 
Winter"Epidemic of l8l5-l£ Denominated Peripneumonia hotha, 
As it Appeared at Sharon and Rochester, Slaxe of faas’s- 
achussetts (Dedham: H. Mann and Co., 1816). Report
Books 1818-1835» Surgeon Generals Office, Record Group 112 (National Archives).
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Q p
of the known treatments was most effective.
Army physicians and civilian doctors fought the
same battles in the South:
In these Army garrisons medical pro­
cedures varied little from those used 
by private practitioners in Louisiana 
and elsewhere in the United States.
In general health conditions among 
soldiers stationed in Louisiana were 
far worse than was generally true of 
other army posts. The semi-tropical 
climate of New Orleans intensified 
the malaria and dysenteries and made 
their ravages among the northern born 
troops exceedingly severe, w&ile yellow fever exacted an added toll.°3
To the soldiers of the United States Army, medical 
science could offer little protection from the ravages of 
the diseases that seemed to flourish in the South's pe­
culiar climate. They could only hope that their con­
stitutions were strong enough to carry them through the
32See John Duffy, Sword of Pestilence: The New
Orleans Yellow Fever Epidemic of~~T853 (BatonRouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, "f§o6); John Duffy, 
"Medical Practices in the Ante Bellum South," Journal 
of Southern History, XXV (Feb., 1959), 53-72; John 
Duffy, "Sectional Conflict and Medical Education in 
Louisiana," Journal of Southern History, XXII (Aug., 
1957), 289-366; Jo Ann Carrigan "Yellow Fever in New 
Orleans, 1853: Abstractions and Realities," Journal
of Southern History, XXV (Aug., 1959)* 339-55; Jo Ann 
Carrigan, "The Saffron Scourge: A History of Yellow
Fever in Louisiana, 1796-1905," (unpublished Ph. D. 
Dissertation, Louisiana State University, 1961); Jo 
Ann Carrigan, "Medicines and Miscellanies, A Handbook 
of Remedies, Recipes, Etc. (c. 1830-1870)", (Unpublished Masters Thesis, Louisiana State University, 1956).
33.History of Medicine in Louisiana, 486.
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normal rigors of life in the section and that the summer 
months would not be unusually unhealthy during their tour 
of duty.
The South's climate had a definite impact on the
life of the Army. From 1789 to 1835 more soldiers died
from disease than from all other causes. At the Battle
of New Orleans, General Jackson's casualties were six
killed; in the first quarter of 1321, an unusually healthy
34period, there were eight deaths at 3aton Rouge. Illness
was common throughout the Army of the United States, but
in the northern section it was not nearly as devastating
as in the southern region. In the first quarter of 1320
there were twenty-six deaths in the northern division and
one hundred and forty-two in the southern, with thirty-
85eight at the post of Baton Rouge. In the words of the 
Secretary of War, the South truly possessed ". . . a
climate requiring all the medical assistance the law
, i „36 allows."
As the South's reputation as a burial ground 
spread, it seriously effected the men who were assigned
John S. Bassett, Life of Jackson (New York, 
1925), 197. Lawson, Statistical Report on the Siclaiess 
and Mortality in the Army of the United I^Eates, 124.
85Lawson, Statistical Report on the Sickness and Mortality in the Army of the United Spates, 124.
86Secretary of War to General Pinckney, Nov. 4, 
1812, SWLS, Roll 6, 221-22.
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to serve there. Officers refused to serve in the section, 
either resigning or requesting to be assigned to other 
posts for reasons of health or personal hardship. The 
only alternative to service in the South open to enlisted 
men was desertion, and it is certain that many of them 
took that alternative. The problem could not be avoided 
because the posts were too important to be abandoned. 
Therefore new troops were continually dispatched to fill 
the depleted ranks of the garrisons in the South.
In spite of the earnest efforts of the War Depart­
ment and the officers of the Army to find a solution to 
the problems presented by disease, the men faced the very 
real prospect of dying. Not the death of a warrior, but 
death in a sick bed, struck down by disease. The soldiers 
could protect the nation against Indians, foreign 
enemies and domestic insurrections, but they could not 
defend themselves against an enemy which was unseen and 
unknown to them.
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CHAPTER IX
THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION 
OP SLAVERY, 1789-1815
The Army’s principle function in the South, as in 
the rest of the nation, was to protect the citizens from 
foreign invasion and hostile Indians. In the southern 
states and territories, the citizens assumed that the 
troops would serve as a protective shield against yet 
another source of potential danger. Although spoken of 
only in carefully guarded terms and usually in private 
communications, Southerners hoped that the United States 
Army would protect them in the event of slave rebellions.
The fear of slave insurrections was persistent 
throughout the antebellum period. The actual number of 
revolts i3 open to debate. In what he calls a minimal 
list, historian Herbert Aptheker cites revolts in forty- 
three of the forty-seven years from 1789 to 1825. In 
twenty-six of the forty-three years he reports that more 
than one revolt occurred.^ The number of revolts recorded
1Herbert Aptheker, Negro Slave Revolts in the 
United States. 1526-1860 (New York: International
Publishers, 1939), 71-72. For a more comprehensive 
analysis by Aptheker see his American Negro Slave Re­
volts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1541).
Hereinafter cited as Negro Slave Revolts.
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by Aptheker is much too high and includes incidents that 
should more properly be classified as conspiracies and 
forms of resistance. If these are carefully defined and 
counted, it is probable that there were no more than a
pdozen insurrections between 1691 and 1835*
For the purposes of this study, the specific number 
of revolts is not as important as the number of suspected 
conspiracies and planned rebellions, and the currency given 
to the reports by white Southerners. Aptheker bases his 
extensive list of revolts upon the numerous reports and 
rumors that circulated in the slave states. Even if none 
of the stories were true, they reveal that white Southerners 
lived in constant fear of their slaves. Little or no actual 
proof was necessary to substantiate the reports, they were 
true because the Southerners believed they were true.
Whether the numerous reports of plots and revolts 
were real or imagined, they profoundly influenced the
2John 31assingame’s definition of a revolt in The 
Slave Community: Plantation Life in the Ante Be H u m  South
(rtew York: Oxford University Press, 19?2), 125, is accept-
able to this author. Blassingame defines a revolt "as any 
concerted action by a group of slaves with the settled 
purpose of and the actual destruction of the lives and 
property of local whites. In addition, the activities 
must have been recognized as an insurrection by public 
officials who called out the armed forces of the locale 
to destroy the rebels." Using this criteria he states 
that there were at least nine revolts between 1691 and 
1865. Marion D. de B. Xilson in "Toward Freeman: Am
analysis of Slave Revolts in the United States," Phylon,
XXV (Summer, 1964), 175-87, defines a revolt "as attempts 
to achieve freedom by groups of slaves." With this 
liberal definition the number of revolts between 166 3 
and 1865 is increased to sixty-five.
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Southerner's concept of the role the Array should play in 
the South. The fear of rebellions was most prevalent in 
those areas where there were heavy concentrations of 
blacks, or in areas where the number of white residents 
was reduced during various times of the year. Until 1332 
the fear of rebellion seeras to have been greatest in 
Louisiana, followed closely by South Carolina and Georgia. 
Following the Nat Turner Rebellion, the appeals for pro­
tection came from all areas of the South.^
To provide an adequate safeguard against its slave 
population, the South developed an internal system of
Garvey Wish, "American Slave Insurrections before 
1361," The Journal of Negro History, XXII (July, 1937),
299, 320. "As might be expected, insurrections tended 
to occur where King Cotton and his allies were most firmly 
entrenched and the great plantation system established. 
Slave unrest seems to have been far greater in Virginia 
rather than in the states of the Lower South," 311. "Next 
to Virginia, Louisiana had the greatest difficulty among 
the Southern states in coping with repeated attempts at 
insurrection," 313. Kilson found that of the sixty-five 
revolts studied, 25$ were in Virginia, 15$ in Louisiana, 
and 15.5$ in South Carolina, "Towards Freedom: An Analysis
of Slave Revolts in the United States," 179* The percent­
age of the slave population to the total population by 
states from 1790 - 1840.
1790 1800 1810 1820 1830 1840
Alabama ---- ---- ---- 32.7 38.1 42.9
Florida — — ---- ---- ---- 44.6 47.2
Georgia 35.5 36.5 41.7 43.9 42.1 40.6Louisiana ---- ---- 45.3 45.0 50.8 47.3Mississippi ---- 33.3 36.0 43.5 48.1 52.0North Carolina 25.5 27.9 30.4 32.1 33.3 32.6South Carolina 43.0 42.3 47.3 51.4 54.3 55.0
Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Soutnern
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defense. Intended to enforce the slave codes, it con­
sisted of the individual masters on their plantations, 
the local patrols and finally the state militia. Upon 
this system of defense the South preferred to rely, rather
than admit to the world the possibility that it was unable
4to maintain order among its bondsmen.
Despite the elaborate system developed in the 
section to insure internal security and assurances that 
it was capable of meeting any situation which might arise, 
the petitions, memorials and letters addressed to Federal 
officials reveal that some citizens were not completely 
convinced that the South could quell uprisings if they 
should occur. State and local authorities repeatedly 
requested information concerning the availability of 
Federal troops should they be needed.
In actual practice, regular troops were rarely 
used to suppress rebellions with physical force because 
of the Southerner’s preference for using the local militia. 
Instead, the Army served an important psychological func­
tion. It was an ever present force upon which the whites
4For one such statement see Anthony Benezet to 
Robert Pleasants, Apr. 8, 1773» in George S. Brooks,
Friend Anthony Benezet (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 1937), 301. ”1 know it is the
general opinion, that nothing ought to be published 
whereby the Negroes maybe made acquainted with their 
own strength and the apprehension of danger the whites 
are in from them, for this reason in every publication 
I have made, I have guarded against it. . . ."
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could call if the situation was critical enough to 
warrant such action. In addition, the presence of the 
regulars was believed to be a powerful deterrent to any 
group which might be contemplating an insurrection.
The orders issued to commanders stationed in 
the South indicate that the Secretary of War and the 
ranking officers of the Army heeded the requests and 
pleas of the citizens of the South. Officers were 
instructed to render whatever aid and assistance might 
be required by state and local authorities. The aid 
authorized included, arms and munitions for the militia, 
suggestions for defensive measures, and the employment 
of military force by the regulars.
In December of 1301 W. C. C. Claiborne, the new 
governor of the Mississippi Territory, requested Federal 
aid in his efforts to organize the militia of the 
Territory. He informed Secretary of State James Madison 
that except for the small detachment of regular troops 
at Fort Adams, the Territory was virtually defenseless.
He expected the Territorial Legislature to pass a strong 
militia law before it adjourned, but he feared that arming 
the force would be difficult since suitable arms were 
scarce in the district.
Governor Claiborne suggested that four hundred 
muskets and a similar number of rifles be sent to Natchez
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by the government. These weapons would be sold at a 
price sufficient to repay the United States their original 
purchase cost.
The Governor based his conviction that a strong 
militia was needed on four important points: (1) the
Mississippi Territory bordered the territory of a foreign 
power and a military force might be required to protect 
that border; (2) the Territory was separated from the 
nearest state, Tennessee, by six hundred miles of wilder­
ness and must depend on its own resources for immediate 
protection. Uppermost in the Governor's mind were the 
last two reasons: (3) the Territory was surrounded by
numerous tribes of potentially hostile Indians; and (4) 
its Negro population was nearly equal to the white pop­
ulation. The prospects for peace under these conditions 
depended upon the existence of a well armed and trained
5body of militia.
Governor Claiborne gave careful attention to the 
establishment of a militia system in the Mississippi 
Territory and again in the Orleans Territory because of 
the importance of that organization to the defense of the 
nation. The militia system as outlined in the Constitution
5Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 20, 1801, in Dunbar 
Rowland (ed.), Official Letter Books of W. C. C. Claiborne, 
1801-1816 (Jackson: State Department of Archives and
History, 1917), I, 27-31. Hereinafter cited as Rowland, 
WCC. Again the need for arms was expressed by the 
Governor to Madison, Jan. 23, 1802, Ibid., 38-39.
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and later Acts of Congress, placed the responsibility for 
organizing the state bodies upon the individual states.
In the territories the responsibility rested with the 
Territorial Governor and Legislature. The militia was 
considered important not only to the security of the 
nation but also of the states. A reliable force was 
essential and in the South it was more important than 
in any other section of the nation, and considerable time 
and attention was expended to see that it was ready to 
meet any emergency.
The President is the commander in chief of the 
militia only when it has been called into the service of 
the United States by Congress. At all other times, the 
militia is under the control of the chief executive of 
the individual states. The power to appoint officers in 
the militia is denied to the President and is retained by 
the states. The Constitution makes no mention of who 
has the authority to appoint the commanding officer when 
the militia of two states are serving together. Nor are 
command arrangements specified in the event a militia 
force is to serve with a regular force.
The President is 30lely responsible for the con­
duct of war. His powers as set forth in the Constitution 
are generally supplemented by statutory grants of authority
U. S., Constitution. Art. 2, Sec. 2, Clause 16*
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from Congress. The first major statutory grants concerning 
the militia were passed by Congress in May 1792, in an 
effort to provide an effective defense force. These acts, 
renewed with slight modifications in 1795, would plague
7the War Department for over a century.
The first act, approved on May 2, 1792, was 
entitled, "An Act to provide for calling forth the Militia 
to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections 
and repel invasions."
Section one of the act provided that whenever 
the United States is invaded or is in danger of invasion 
by a foreign nation or Indian tribe, the President is 
authorized to call upon the militia most convenient to 
the area in danger. The number of men to be called forth 
was left to the judgement of the President. The orders of 
the President were to be issued through the officers of 
the respective militia units. The President was also 
authorized to call the militia into service to put down 
insurrections in any state, upon the request of the state 
legislature.
In the second section of the act, the President 
was given the authority to call upon the militia to en­
force the laws of the Union. If the militia called upon
7A. A. Schiller, Military Law and Defense 
Legislation (St. Paul: West Publishing Co., 1941), 27.
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refused to obey the orders of the President, he was 
authorized to call out the militia of another state in 
numbers sufficient to enforce the laws of the Union.
The third section of the law stipulated that when 
the President shall decide that it is necessary to call 
out a military force to suppress an insurrection, he shall 
issue a proclamation commanding the insurgents to disperse 
and retire to their homes within a specified time. Only 
when this procedure has been followed could the President 
use the militia against domestic insurrections.
The fourth section of the law provided that the
militia force called into the service of the United States
shall be paid and receive the same allowances as troops
of the United States, and were to be governed by the same
rules and articles of war. The militia called into the
service of the nation could not be compelled to serve more
5than three montns in any one year.
A second act approved by Congress on liay 8, 1792, 
provided for the establishment of a uniform militia 
throughout the United States. All free able-bodied white 
male citizens between the ages of eighteen and forty-five 
years of age were to be enrolled in the militia of their 
respective states. Every citizen enrolled was to provide
gUnited States Statutes at Large, 2d Congress, 
Session 1 (1792), I, 264-65. Walter Millis (ed.y,
American military Thought (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Kerrii
Company, Inc., 1966), 61-62.
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himself with a good musket or fire lock, a bayonet and 
belt, two spare flints, a pouch with a box containing 
not less than twenty-four cartriages within six months.
Certain groups of citizens were exempt from 
militia duty by the act: the Vice President of the
United States; the officers of the judicial and execu­
tive branches of the government; the members of both 
Houses of Congress and their officers; the custom-house 
officers with their clerks; the post officers and stage 
drivers who handled the mail; all ferry men employed on 
ferries or post roads; and all persons who might be ex­
empted by their respective states.
The act also provided an outline for the organi­
zation of the militia, the number of men and officers in 
the various units and the number of units. It specified 
that the militia was to be governed by the rules set
Qforth by Congress in 1779.
In the territories of the southern region where 
frontier conditions combined with the existence of 
slavery to produce a potentially explosive situation, 
the militia system was ’’exti'emely" important. The func­
tion of the militia was to supplement the Federal forces 
in the event of an invasion or rebellion, and close co­
operation between the militia and the regulars was
9United States Statutes at Large, 2d Congress, 
Session 1 (1792), I, 271-74. Uillis, American Military 
Thought, 62-67.
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necessary. In the territories, where the Governor was 
appointed by the central government, such cooperation 
was easier to acquire than when the militia of a state 
was involved. Governor Claiborne realized the importance 
of the militia to the defense of the nation and of the 
close relationship between the function of the regular 
Army and the territorial force.
While awaiting an answer from Washington, Governor 
Claiborne turned to General James Wilkinson for assistance 
in solving the arms problem. He acknowledged that the 
small body of Federal troops at FoT't Adams would afford 
some protection in the event of trouble. However, the 
distance of the fort from the populous settlements meant 
that much slaughter might result before the troops could 
take the field in the event of a sudden attack. The 
militia was needed to support and supplement the small 
body of regulars in the event of attack by Indians or 
insurrection among the blacks.
To be effective the militia needed arms and the 
command at Fort Adams had a quantity of extra weapons.
The Governor suggested that if these weapons could be 
stored at some central location and their use subject 
to his order, it would be to the advantage of the citizens
- 4.1. 1 0oi the region.
^Claiborne to Wilkinson, Jan. 2rJ, 1-302, Rowland, 
WCC, I, 42-4 3.
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On February 5 the Governor informed the Secretary 
of State of the request he had directed to General 
Wilkinson. He stated that the peaceful situation which 
existed was at best precarious due to the presence of 
Indians and the numerous Negroes. Assurances were given 
that the erection of new buildings for the proper storage 
of the weapons would cost the government nothing, since 
the land, materials, and labor would be donated by the 
citizens.^
The General's response to the Governor's request 
was immediate and positive. Wilkinson stated that his 
superiors considered the "safety and tranquility" of the 
citizens to be of primary importance in the disposition 
of the troops. He would issue orders for the establish­
ment of a small post at a site selected by the governor 
and place 250 or 300 stand of arms there subject to his 
order. General Wilkinson believed "that our troops were 
intended for the accommodation of the civil authority, to
be used or employed as circumstances should render
„12necessary. . . . ”
Although the General and the Governor agreed upon 
the establishment of a post, it was a year before con­
struction began. In the intervening months, Claiborne
11Claiborne to Uadison, Feb. 5, 1802, Ibid., 40-42.
12Wilkinson to Claiborne, Jan. 29, 1802, Ibid.,
43-44.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
456
requested the sanction of the President for the new post, 
the loan of 1,000 arms, and supplies for the artillery 
company of Natchez."*^
In I.Iarch Secretary of War Henry Dearborn informed 
Claiborne that in response to his requests, the President 
had ordered five hundred rifles and three hundred muskets 
shipped to the Governor. These arms were to be sold to 
the militia in whatever manner the Governor deemed proper 
to defray the purchase cost of the weapons.1 -̂ In April 
the Secretary of War stated that the President had autho­
rized the movement of one company of soldiers from Port
Adams to Natchez. The troops were to be used in the
15manner previously suggested by the Governor.
The collaboration between the civil and military 
authorities resulted in the construction of Fort Dearborn 
near the city of Washington some six miles east of Natchez. 
Construction began in 1803, but before the post was com­
pleted both Governor Claiborne and General Wilkinson had 
left the Mississippi Territory to take formal possession
1^Claiborne to Madison, Mar. 6, 1802, Ibid., 53- 
54; Claiborne to Dearborn, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid.» 71-74.
These letters concern sanction of the new post by the 
government. Claiborne to Madison, Apr. 3* 1802, Ibid., 
69-70. Request for 1,000 arms. Captain Bartholomew 
Shamburgh to Claiborne, Apr. 7» 1802, Ibid.. 79;
Claiborne to Shamburgh, Apr. 12, l802,*TFTd., 80-81.
^Dearborn to Claiborne, Mar. 10, 1802, Ibid..
104.
1^Dearborn to Claiborne, Apr. 8, 1802, Ibid., 11Q- 
12; Claiborne to Dearborn, May 24, 1802, Ibid., 112-13.
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Claiborne was appointed Governor of the new pro­
vince and upon taking possession of New Orleans he turned 
immediately to the task of organizing the machinery of 
government. He again faced the problem of using Federal 
and militia troops'to reassure the citizens that they 
were safe from possible slave insurrections. He found 
that the normal apprehension of slave rebellion had been 
increased by the events in Santo Domingo, which were told 
and retold by refugees who fled to Louisiana from the 
French Colony.
The military force which had accompanied the 
American Commissioners to New Orleans was a combination 
of regulars and volunteers, numbering between four hundred 
and fifty and five hundred men. Of this force approximately 
two hundred were volunteers who would remain in service
only until General Wilkinson felt that they could be safely 
16discharged. .Vhen this force of volunteers was dis­
missed and returned to their homes, protection of the new
territory would depend upon the regulars and militia of 
17the territory.
1^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 4, 1803, Ibid., 302- 
303; Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 5, 1803, Ibid., 303-304; 
Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 7, 1803, Ibid., 305; Claiborne 
to Madison, Dec. 8, 1803, Ibid., 305-^06.
1^Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 312- 
16. The volunteers had not been dismissed due to the small 
number of regular troops in the province.
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The situation of the militia in New Orleans was 
somewhat different than it had been in the Mississippi 
Territory. The Spanish had maintained an efficient 
militia organization, and it only remained for Governor 
Claiborne to recommission the units in order to have a 
militia force at his disposal. During the reorganization 
process, Governor Claiborne encountered a problem which 
went to the very heart of the Southern system and the 
relationship of the military to the "peculiar institution."
Governor Claiborne was called upon to determine 
the fate of two large companies of "people of colour", 
both of which had been a part of the Spanish militia 
system. The governor promptly recommissioned the white 
units, but the fate of the two companies of blacks raised 
two perplexing questions. If they were recommissioned, 
the action might anger a large segiment of the nation's 
population and destroy some of the principles upon which 
the safety of the South rested. If they were not re­
commissioned, the militia members might be angered and 
possibly become an armed enemy in the heart of the nation. 
Governor Claiborne chose the diplomatic way out of the 
dilemma; he requested instruction from Washington before 
taking any action. ®
1 8Claiborne to Madison, Dec. 27, 1803, Ibid., 312- 
16; Claiborne to Madison, Jan. 17# 1804, Ibid.. 359-41; 
A’ilkinson to Dearborn, Dec. 21, 1803, Clarence E. Carter
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On February 20, 1804, Secretary of War Henry 
Dearborn wrote to Governor Claiborne informing him that 
he should renew the Corps of Free Men of Color. The 
Secretary cautioned that the number of men in the or­
ganization should not be increased and if at all possible 
it should be diminished. The letter was received on
March 22, and was answered with assurances that the in-
19structions would be followed.
In compliance with the instructions from Washington, 
the subsequent actions of Governor Claiborne indicated that 
the position of the Battalion of Free Men of Color was 
changing. On April 19 the Governor requested that the 
officials of New Orleans conduct a census which would
(ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United States, IX,
The Territory of Orleans, 1803-1812 (A'ashingTion, 19457.
13$. Hereinafter citedas darter, Territorial Papers,
IX. Contains a request that 500 regular troops be 
assigned to New Orleans. The reason for the additional 
troops was "the formidable aspect of the Armed Blacks 
and Malattoes [sic] officered and organized," Wilkinson 
found to be "Painful and Perplexing." Donald Everett, 
"Emigres and Militiamen: Free Persons of Color in New 
Orleans, 1803-1815." The Journal of Negro History,
XXXVIII (Oct., 1953) t~~T77-$5Zm.
19̂Claiborne to Dearborn, Mar. 22, 1804. Rowland, 
WCC, II, 58-60. John Hope Franklin in The Militant South 
180O-1861 (Cambridge: Oxford University £ress, 1956*5
to be an official part of the militia, citing Charles 
Gayarre, History of Louisiana (New Orleans: F. F. Hansell
& Brothers, Ltd., 1903;, IV, 127. Roland C. McConnell, 
Negro Troops of Antebellum Louisiana: A History of the
Battalion of Free Men of Color (teaton Rouge: iiouisiana
State tJniversity Press, 1968), gives the full history of 
the battalion.
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facilitiate his reorganization of the militia. The census
was to include all free, white males between the ages of
eighteen and forty-five. There was no mention made in
20the governor’s request of free Negroes.
On June 9 the Governor reported to the War Depart­
ment that he had appointed two officers to serve in the 
Battalion. The appointment had aroused some dissatisfac­
tion among the men of the Corps. The men commissioned
were white, and the members of the militia unit had ex-
21pected to be commanded by their own officers.
The apprehension over the existence of an or­
ganized and armed body of blacks in the heart of an area 
with a large slave population was a natural outgrowth of 
the existence of the institution of slavery. It was re­
ported that there was a great dislike between the white 
natives of Louisiana and the free blacks, and it is
probable that the whites would have greeted the end of
22the Corps with approval.
In 1805 the Territorial Legislature failed to 
make any mention of the Free Men of Color when they passed
20Claiborne to the Mayor and Municipality of New 
Orleans, Apr. 19, 1304, Rowland, WCC, II, 106.
21 Claiborne to Dearborn, June 9» 1804, Ibid., 199- 
200. For instructions to Major Fortier, one of the officers 
in question, see Claiborne to Fortier, June 22, 1804,
Ibid., 215-16.
22Claiborne to Dearborn, June 22, 1804, Ibid.,
217-18.
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the general militia law on April 5. Claiborne felt that
this had been done as much from a fear of the organization
as from a desire to injure him personally. The Governor
was certain that the men had been "soured" on the American
government and that their dependibility was no longer a
certainty. He was of the opinion that at least the
property holders and those of a "fair reputation" could
be depended upon to remain l o y a l . O n  January 9, 1807,
Governor Cliaborne ordered a census taken of all free men
of color in New Orleans and the surrounding area who had
previously held positions in the Corps. The Governor
hoped that the Territorial Legislature would pass an act
which would make the corps a part of the permanent militia 
24organization. Four days after ordering the census,
Claiborne addressed the Legislature and urged them to
recognize the Corps. He outlined the loyal service of
the Corps under the Spanish regime and stated that they
25still wished to become a part of the regular militia.
2 ̂JClaiborne to Madison, Jan. 3, 1806, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, IX, 561. James Brown reported that 
"the free people of color have lost their consequence by 
being stripped of Arms and are anxious to regain it."
Brown to Albert Gallatin, Jan. 7, 1806, Ibid., 559.
24General Order, Jan. 9, 1807, signed by Colonel 
Henry Hopkins, Adjutant General, Territorial Militia, 
Ibid., 717. The number of free men of color in New 
Orleans in 1806 was 2,312 and increased to 5,727 by 1310. 
Free Men of Color to Claiborne, Jan., 1808, Ibid., 174.
25Rowland, WCC, IV, 92-93.
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The Territorial Legislature again took no action on the 
issue when it considered the organization of the militia.
The reason for the concern stemmed logically from 
the southern concept of the principal functions of the 
militia. If it was to be the major acency is suppressing 
slave insurrections, any doubt about its reliability and 
ability to fulfill its assignments could not be enter­
tained. But the loyalty of the free blacks could always 
26be questioned.
The anxiety about the loyalty of the Battalion 
appears to have been unfounded. During the insurrection 
of 1311, the militia was called out to suppress the re­
bellion north of the city. One company of free men of 
color was called into service and won the praise of
Governor Claiborne for its conduct in the city of New
27Orleans during the crisis.
The Battalion of Free Hen of Color still retained 
its organization in 1815 - General Andrew Jackson addressed
26For a discussion of free Negroes and the owner­
ship of arms see John Hope Franklin, The Free Negro in 
North Carolina, 1790-1860 (New York: W. V«. Norton ancf
Company, Inc., 1971), 75-78 and 95-101. A discussion 
of slaves and the possession of weapons can be found in 
most of the general works on slavery, for instance, John 
Hope Franklin, From Slavery to Freedom: A History of
Negro Americans (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, 3rd ed.,
1967), l8b. Herbert S. Klein, Slavery in the Americas:
A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 197T), 4o.
27Claiborne to Du Bourg, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland, 
vvcc, V, 9 9 .  Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 
TST1, Ibid., 10U.
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a proclamation to the free colored inhabitants of Louisi­
ana promising them the same privileges and considerations
pQenjoyed by white soldiers if they enlisted. By mid-
December of 1314-, a second battalion of free men of color
had been raised in response to Jackson's proclamation.
Both battalions held front line positions during the
29defense of New Orleans and performed admirably.
The problems of organizing the civil and military 
affairs of the province were momentarily overshadowed by 
problems in the western part of the territory. While 
forcing administrative details into the background, the 
unrest pointed out the importance of a well organized 
militia and close cooperation between that body and the 
Federal troops.
In October of 1804, the first hints of trouble 
among the slaves in the vicinity of Natchitoches were 
discovered and promptly reported to the governor. The 
source of the trouble was attributed to the presence of 
the readily accessible border between American and Spanish 
territory. Nine slaves had run away and it was feared
pDA. Lacarriere Latour, Historical Memoir of the 
War in West Florida and Louisiana in l3l4-1̂  (Philadelphia, 
1316J7 Appendix No. XVII, XXXI-XXXII. Charles Gayarre 
lists two proclamations issued by General Jackson, one 
on Sept. 21, 1314 and the other on Dec. 13, 1314, in 
History of Louisiana, IV. 355 and 403.
29McConnell. Negro Troons of Antebellum Louisiana,
6 4 - 9 0 .
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that more would join them. They were pursued in the 
direction of the Spanish post at Nacogdoches, where they 
apparently expected to receive santuary. The inhabitants 
of the area feared that if no action was taken to prevent
the crossing of the border, what had begun as a minor
30incident might become general.
Governor Claiborne addressed two strong protests 
to the Spanish representative, the Marquis de Casa Calvo. 
The protests were prompted by the agitation among the 
slaves, combined with reports that Spanish agents had 
been urging certain Indian tribes to attack the Americans. 
The letters pointed out that the reported actions by the 
Spanish authorities might injure the good understanding 
which existed between the two countries. ̂  On November 3 
the Governor reported the situation to Secretary of State 
James Hadison and informed him that if the Spanish author­
ities were disposed to be unfriendly, trouble might re-
^ Claiborne to Casa Calvo, Oct. 30, 1804, Howland, 
WCC, II, 382-83. Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 16, 1804,
Tfbid., 386-38. An 1306 census of the Territory of Orleans 
gives the following populations: Pointe Coupee, 267 white
males of 21 years and up, 258 white males below 21, 443 
white females of every age, 115 free men, women, and child­
ren of color, and 2,251 slaves; Natchitoches, 407 white 
males of 21 years and up, 270 white males below 21, 410 
white females of every age, 121 free men, women, and 
children of color, and 1,209 slaves. Carter, Territorial 
Papers, IX, 923*
31 Claiborne to Casa Calvo, uct. 30,  130 4 ,  Rowland, 
WCC, II, 3 8 2 - 6 3 ;  Claiborne to Casa Calvo, (<ct. 31» 13 0 4 ,  
Ibid., 3 3 3 - 8 4 .
\2Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 3» 1804 ,  Ibid., 3 8 1 - 3 2 .
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While endeavoring to settle the problem through 
diplomatic channels, Claiborne suggested to Colonel Thomas 
Butler, commanding the American forces, that reinforce­
ments be sent to the post at Natchitoches owing to the 
apprehensions over possible Indian attack and the unrest 
among the slaves. The Governor recommended that a sub­
altern and twelve or fifteen men might be detached from 
the troops stationed at Attakapas and Opelousas in an 
effort to preserve good order. ~>̂
Captain Edward Turner, the civil and military 
commandant at Natchitoches, gave the governor ample reason 
to worry about the situation in Natchitoches when he re­
ported:
This circumstance has so enraged 
the Inhabitants against the Spaniards, 
that I believe they would almost to a 
man willingly go to Nacogdoches and 
lay it in waste. In fact they have 
requested me in case the Negroes are 
not sent back to permit them to go, 
observing that is [sic] something is 
not immediately done, they will not 
have a slave left in three months.
I have tried to quiet them by saying 
they may depend on protection and 
justice.34
Turner was obviously a man caught between the 
desires of the citizens of Natchitoches and the in­
structions of his government.
■^Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 1, 1304, Ibid., 384. 
4̂Turner to Claiborne, Oct. 17, 1304, Ibid., 385-
56.
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3y November 3 the crisis had passed, Claiborne 
was able to inform Captain Turner that the Marquis de 
Casa Calvo had censured the actions of the Commandant 
at Nacogdoches and that the fugitives would probably be 
arrested and returned to their owners. Turner was to 
continue the night patrols and afford the residents of 
the district all the protection possible. If these 
measures did not quiet the citizens, the Commandant was
to make every effort to see that they took no aggressive
35action against the Spanish.
As the crisis passed at Natchitoches, the Gov­
ernor informed the Secretary of State that the unrest 
had spread to Pointe Coupee, where the occurrences in 
Nacogdoches were known among the slaves. The citizens 
addressed a petition to the governor requesting a force 
to protect them in the event of an insurrection. The 
Governor wrote to Colonel Butler asking him to dispatch 
a subaltern's command to Pointe Coupee to provide the 
area an added measure of protection.
Claiborne's report to the Secretary included 
a statement that would be repeated again and again by 
officials in the South: "Our troops here are too few
in number to admit to detachments to the various posts 
where they would be serviceable, and I most earnestly
■^Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 3* 1304, Ibid., 339-
90 .
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advise that the regular force in Louisiana be augmented
*> /■
with all possible dispatch."'5
Colonel Butler dispatched a force of regulars 
composed of a subaltern and twenty-five or thirty men 
to Pointe Coupee. The detachment took with it one hundred 
stand of public arms. These weapons were to be distrib­
uted to the militia in an effort to bolster the local 
37defenses.
Although Governor Claiborne lamented the necessity 
of maintaining a standing army, he realized that the un­
rest within the Territory and the presence of a superior 
Spanish force on its borders would not permit a reduction 
but instead required an increase in that force. He stated
that this situation would continue to exist at least until
38the civil authority was strong enough to maintain order.
In 1307 the planters of the Mississippi Territory 
reported to Governor Robert Williams that they suspected 
that there might be a slave revolt in the region during 
the summer. As a precaution against such an event, the 
Governor established a patrol to guard against the slaves.
■^°Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 8, 1304, Ibid., 394. 
Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1804, Rowland, WCC, III, 5.
^Claiborne to Butler, Nov. 8, 1304, Ibid., 5. 
Claiborne to Turner, Nov. 3, 1304, Ibid., 6-7.
Claiborne to Madison, Nov. 10, 1304, Ibid.,
7-3.
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In addition to the patrol, a detachment of United States
39troops was stationed at Fort Dearborn. Either the sus­
picions of rebellion were unfounded or the presence of 
the militia and regulars accomplished their desired object 
for there was no more talk of large-scale rebellion in the 
Territory for a period of three years.
In 1310 the fear of slave rebellion spread rapidly 
through the Mississippi Territory and the neighboring 
province of West Florida. As the men of West Florida 
rushed to join the revolutionary forces in 3aton Rouge, 
they left their families behind without adequate pro­
tection. The families appealed to Colonel Hugh Davis, of
40Homochitto, for protection. The request was forwarded 
to Governor David Holmes, who immediately sent a request 
to Colonel Thomas Cushing for a detachment of regulars to 
protect the Americans and their property in the vicinity 
of Pinckneyville, near the border with 'West Florida. The 
Governor also put into motion plans for bringing the 
militia into service. The militia and regulars were to 
patrol the American side of the border to prevent slaves 
from crossing in either direction and to maintain order
39Dunbar Rowland, History of Mississippi: The
Heart of the South (Chicago: S. J. Clarke Publishing
Co., 1925)t II, £34. Aptheker, American Negro Slave 
Revolts, 243*
40Davis to Holmes, Sept. 25, 1o10, Mississippi 
Territorial Archives, i-I. S., Vol. 9.
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along the border. The combined operation was successful
in maintaining the peace, and the regulars returned to 
41Fort Adams.
On January 9, 1011, the citizens of New Orleans 
and the surrounding area were thrown into a state of 
panic when word was received that the slaves on the plan­
tation of Colonel Andre had revolted. After wounding the
Colonel and killing his son, the slaves started to march
42toward New Orleans, only thirty-six miles to the south.
As the slaves proceeded south, they gained strength 
as they passed plantations which were abandoned by their 
owners when they learned of the uprising. While the 
whites mobilized their military strength, the slaves con­
tinued their advance, burning three houses and pilliaging
Carter, Territorial Papers, The Mississippi 
Territory, VI, 121~ Holmes to Cushing, Sept. 26, 1ol0 
and Holmes to Smith, Oct. 3, 1810, 3ureau of Rolls and 
Library in the Department of State, Government Corres­
pondence, Mississippi Territory. Holmes to Davis,
Sept. 27, 1810, Proceedings Executive Council, Missis­
sippi Territory, M. S. I. Issac J. Cox, West Florida 
Controversy, 1798-1313 (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1557),
406—407•
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311, 
Rowland, Vv’CC. V, 95. Claiborne to Andre, Jan. 13, 1811, 
Ibid., 97. The 1806 census of Orleans Territory gives 
the following populations: the German Coast, 555 white
males of 21 years and above, 647 white males below 21, 
972 white females of every age, 229 free men, women and 
children of color, and 3,285 slaves; Orleans, 2,108 
white males of 21 years and above, 1,422 white males 
below 21, 2,781 white females of every age, 2,312 free 
men, women and children of color, and 8,378 slaves. 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 923.
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43several other plantations. The strength of the force
gathered by the slaves was variously reported as being
44from 180 to 500 men strong.
The insurrection on Louisiana's German Coast 
provides an excellent example of the speed with which 
the South could put a military force into action. Gov­
ernor Claiborne received the news of the revolt at ten
in the morning on the ninth and immediately set the de-
45fensive machinery in motion. New Orleans was sealed
against entrance or exit to the north by blacks when a
4-6guard of regulars was placed at the Bayou Bridge. By 
three in the afternoon Claiborne reported that a detach­
ment of regulars and two companies of volunteer militia
had marched to meet the slaves and the remaining members
47of the militia were on duty in New Orleans. The strength
Francois-Xavier l/.artin, The History of Louisiana 
(New Orleans, 1822), II, 300. Alcee Fortxer, A History of 
Louisiana (Paris, 1904), III, 78. Gayarre, History of 
Louisiana, IV, 265. In a letter from Governor dlaiborne 
to John N. Detrehan, the loss of property is called con­
siderable, Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1811, Howland, 
V/CC, V, 107-103. Claiborne to Dr. Steele, Jan. 20, 1 Si 1, 
Ibid.. 112-13.
44Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311, 
Howland, VVCC, V, 95*
Ibid.
45 oClaiborne to ilajor Bullingney, Jan. 9, 1811,
46Claiborne to General Hampton, Jan. 9, 1311,
Ibid., 93-
^Claiborne to Secretary of State, Jan. 9, 1311, 
Ibid., 95-96.
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of the force that marched north was reported by the Gov-
APiernor to number several hundred men.
The picture which Claiborne presented was some­
what different than that painted by Brigidier General 
Wade Hampton in his report to the Secretary of vYar. 
Hampton was informed by Claiborne of the outbreak at 
noon, and he immediately began to assemble a military 
force:
The regular force in the city was 
inconsiderable, and as there was 
nothing like an organized militia, 
the confusion was great beyond de­
scription.
So soon as two companies of 
volunteer militia could be paraded,
I joined to them 30 regulars and 
marched at their head, about six 
o'clock, to meet the Brigands.
It was all the force, except a 
small garrison left in the Fort, 
which at that time appeared sus­
ceptible of command. On our march 
we overtook a company of seamen, 
which Comodore [sic] Shaw had sent 
forward, of which I also took the 
command. This little force reached 
the Plantation of Colonel Fortier, 
six leagues from the city, about 
half after 4 o'clock on the morning 
of the 10th through roads half leg deep in m u d .49
43Claiborne to St. Amand, Jan. 9. 1511, Ibid.,
93-94.
49 «Hampton to Secretary of War, Jan. 1b, 1311,
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 917-18. Claiborne to 
Secretary of State, Jan. 14, 1811, Rowland, vYCC, V,
100. In this letter Claiborne states that several hun­
dred sailors had volunteered their services, and that 
one company of them had marched to aid the planters.
The regulars, militia, and sailors hardly represent a 
force of several hundred men from New Orleans.
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From the standpoint of the slaves, the area in 
which the insurrection began was filled with disadvantages. 
Bounded on the west by the Mississippi River, to the south 
by New Orleans, to the north by Baton Rouge, the only pos­
sible avenue of escape was to the east into the woods and 
swamps. There could be little doubt as to the outcome 
once the whites regained their composure.
General Hampton marched at the head of the com­
bined force from New Orleans and Major Homer Milton, of 
the United States Army, marched with a detachment of 
regulars from 3aton Rouge. Before the two forces could 
converge on the scene, the slaves were met and soundly 
defeated by a local force. About eighty planters, who 
responded to the "exertions and exhortations" of Colonel 
Andre, had pursued the fugitives as they moved south. The 
planters caught and attacked the rebels, and in a brief 
but furious battle they either killed or captured a large 
number of the slaves. The slaves who managed to survive 
the initial attack took refuge in the dense woods that 
bordered the battlefield.
The planters divided their force and in con­
junction with the forces that arrived on the scene after 
the battle, continued to pursue the slaves in the heavily
wooded countryside. During the vigorous pursuit, the re-
50mainmg slaves were either killed or taken prisoners.
Andry [Andre] to Claiborne, Jan. 11, 1311,
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On January 11 the force under General Hampton net 
Major Milton's command. The Major and his troops were 
posted in the neighborhood of the rebellion to give aid 
and assistance to the citizens in their search for the 
remaining slaves. General Hampton returned the troops 
from New Orleans to the city, feeling that the planters 
were now capable of protecting their own property. How­
ever, as an added precaution, he ordered a company of 
light artillery and a company of dragoons to march from 
3aton Rouge to visit every settlement of any size. This 
force was intended to crush any rebellions that might 
have broken out further up the river. General Hampton 
attributed the outbreak of trouble as being "unquestion­
ably of Spanish origin, and has had an extensive com- 
51bination."
Fifteen of the captured slaves were tried in a 
court of law for their part in the insurrection. The 
sentences which they received were considered to be equal 
to the enormity of their crimes. The fifteen were found 
guilty and executed. As a deterrent to future rebellions, 
the heads of the executed slaves were put on tall poles 
which were placed along the river from New Orleans to the
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 915-16•
51Hampton to Claiborne, Jan. 12, 1811, Ibid.,
915-17.
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52plantation where the revolt started.
In commenting on the sentences of the court,
Governor Claiborne wrote:
The example which has been made 
of the guilty actors in the late in­
surrection will I hope produce the 
desired effect. Justice, policy, 
our future safety required that the 
guilty should suffer; for the sake 
of humanity however it is greatly 
to be desired that the list of the 
guilty may not be found stillgreater.53
The Governor hoped that the insurrection would have
some beneficial effect. The Territorial Legislature had
adjourned for two weeks during the insurrection and was
54soon to return to its deliberations. Claiborne wanted 
the legislature to pass laws providing for a more energetic
52Martin, History of Louisiana, II, 301. Fortier,
A History of Louisiana, III, 78-79* These two accounts 
give the number tried and executed as 16. Gayarre, A 
History of Louisiana, IV, 267- Aptheker, American Negro 
Revolts, 25^7 The correspondence of Governor Claiborne 
indicates that fifteen slaves were tried, all of them were 
convicted but that one had been recommended to the mercy 
of the executive. The Governor indicated that if a jury 
recommended mercy he would comply and issue a pardon. 
Claiborne to Judge St. Martin, Jan. 19, 1811, Rowland,
ACC, V, 104. The Governor states that six of those 
captured were ordered to St. Charles Parish for trial; 
eight had already been tried and condemned in New Orleans, 
with mercy recommended for one; and Chief Gilbert, one of 
the leaders had just surrendered. Claiborne to Detrehan, 
Jan. 19, 1311, Ibid., 107-103. Claiborne to John Ballinger, 
Jan. 20, 1311, Ibid., 108-109.
•^Claiborne to Detrehan, Jan. 19, 1311, Ibid., 107.
54Proclamation of Claiborne, Ibid., 98.
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militia system and to check the "indiscriminate impor-
55tation of slaves from the southern states."
In accessing the role of the United States Army
in suppressing the rebellion, General Hampton wrote:
The prompt display and exhibition of 
a regular military force all along 
the coast (the river) by land and 
water, has had a most happy effect 
as well upon the blacks, as the 
citizens, who by this countenance 
have been enabled to use and feel 
their own strength and to rely upon 
that which the government can at all 
times from Baton Rp^ge or this city 
send to their aid.^°
In spite of the executions, the hopes of the 
Governor, and the predictions of General Hampton, the 
citizens of the German Coast and New Orleans were thrown 
into turmoil again in December. Although doubting the 
reports of unrest had any foundation in truth, the Gov­
ernor made certain that the military forces in the area
57were prepared to meet any outbreak.
The militia forces in the area were alerted and 
put on patrol duty both in New Orleans and along the
C C Claiborne to John Ballinger, Jan. 20, 1811, 
Ibid., 108-109. For the Governor’s recommendations see 
Claiborne to both Houses of the Legislative Body of the 
Territory of Orleans, Jan. 29, 1811, Ibid., 123-24.
56Hampton to the Secretary of War, Jan. 16, 1811, 
Carter, Territorial Papers, IX, 918.
57Claiborne to the Secretary of the Navy, Paul 
Hamilton, Dec. 26, 1811. Rowland, vVCC, VI, 20.
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5 3German Coast. The Governor ordered the commander of
the regular forces in New Orleans to hold his command
ready for prompt action. The Governor also requested
that Major iVilliam MacRae place one hundred and fifty
stand of arms and several boxes of cartridges at the
disposal of the City Guard, to be used only if they
were needed. This supply of weapons was for the use
of the militia, which Claiborne observed would be of
little use unless they were well supplied with arms and 
59ammunition. The Governor's desire to have a well-armed 
and effective militia force to combat slave insurrections 
would be echoed by others as the threat of a foreign war 
increased.
In the debates that preceded the declaration of 
war by the United States on Great Britain on June 18,
1312, predictions were made that the Americans would 
march victoriously into Canada, inflict defeat on the 
British, and humble Spain if she were foolish enough to 
join the Unglish. At least one member of Congress voiced 
an opinion that must have occurred to more than one 
Southerner as he listened to the orators painting pictures
58Claiborne to James Mather, Dec. 24, 1811, Ibid., 
18. Claiborne to Adland Fortier, Dec. 24, 1311, Ibid.,
17.
■^Claiborne to MacRae, N. C., Ibid., 16-17.
This letter was either written on the 23d or 24th of 
December.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
477
of American victories and retrieved national honor. John
Randolph, Congressman from Virginia and a slave owner,
spoke of the danger arising from the black population
of the Couth: "While talking of taking Canada some of
us are shuddering for our safety at home. I speak from
facts when I say that the night bell never tolls for fire
in Richmond that the mother does not hug the infant more
60closely to her bosom."
The vision of its male population marching off 
to a distant theatre of war must have been 'unsettling to 
more Southerners than just Representative Randolph. In 
August of 1312 the Secretary of War informed General 
Pinckney that the intention of the President with respect 
to the militia was to use that force until the regular 
troops could be raised.
In the northern states where it 
was found necessary to concentrate, 
the regulars for offensive operations 
the aid of the militia was relied on, 
al "tiro uh e views of the President have 
not been seconded by the governors of 
some of the states.
From the southern states there 
is at this time no probability that 
the regular troops will be required 
for distant operations, and as it is 
desirable that the militia should be 
spared as much as possible, particularly
Hugh A. Garland, The Life of John Randolph of 
Roanoke (2 vols. in 1, 11th edition,"ITew York, » I,
293-95. William C. Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, 1773- 
1333 (2 vols., New York, 192277 250-5U Aptheker,American Slave Revolts, 23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
473
at this season of the year, as our 
great reliance in case of strong 
emergencies, is in them. . . .
General Pinckney was instructed to reduce the
number of militia in service and to relieve those that
remained as soon as recruits became available from the
regular force.01
The first serious problems arose in Georgia
where the citizens were aroused to fever pitch by a
guerrilla war on the frontier, waged by Indians and run-
away"slaves. The proximity of the border between Georgia
and Spanish East Florida provided a convenient refuge for
the Indians and their black allies. In addition to the
sanctuary it offered the raiders, Spain had employed a
number of Negro soldiers in its efforts to suppress the
abortive insurrection in East Florida, an action that
62further frightened the angered American slave owners.
° Secretary of War to Pinckney, Aug. 22, 1312, 
in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. Letters 
Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1300-1839. Record 
Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 6, 91-92. Hereinafter cited 
as SWLS. The Secretary's reference to militia having 
been refused was in reference to the actions of Mass­
achusetts and Connecticut, both refused their quotas 
of militia when requested by the President. No case 
has been found where the militia requisitioned from a 
southern state was refused.
62Julius 7/. Pratt, Expansionists of 1312 (New York: Peter Smith, 1949), 192-95, 207-12; T. F. Davis,"United States Troops in Spanish East Florida, 1S12—1313," The Florida Historical Society Quarterly (1930— 1931), IX, 3-12, 96-109, 133-55, 255-7HT Rembert vY. Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia -
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While the citizens of Georgia worried about the 
situation on their frontier and meddled in the affairs 
of 3ast Florida, the fear of rebellion was spreading in 
the Mississippi Territory. On July 2 2 ,  1 3 1 2 ,  Governor 
David Holmes wrote to General Wilkinson expressing his 
concern for the safety of the inhabitants of the Territory. 
The basis of the Governor's concern was the possibility of 
trouble with the Choctaw Indians and the equally important 
prospect of a slave rebellion.
Holmes wanted Wilkinson to send him a large supply 
of muskets, rifles and a quantity of powder and lead for 
the use of the territorial militia. The Governor stated 
that hardly a day passed without some warning reaching 
him concerning the designs of the slaves. Holmes 
wrote, ". . . it is my firm belief that the safety of 
the citizens here may depend upon my procuring a suf­
ficient number of arms to enable them to defend them- 
selves against the dangers apprehended.”
As the United States poured its manpower and 
resources into the conflict on the northwestern frontier,
Florida Border, 1310-1815 (Athens: University of Georgia
Press, 1954;, traces the history of the troubles on the 
Georgia frontier.
^Holmes to :Wilkinson, July 2 2 ,  1 8 1 2 ,  Carter, 
Territorial Papers, VI, 299. For evidence of the dis­
content among the slaves of the Mississippi Territory 
see Holmes to David Pannelli, July 23 > 1812, Ibid., 301.
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General Wilkinson was informed that he must make the most
of the means at his disposal. The General had requested
reinforcements, but no recruits were available and there
was confusion as to who should command the force of
64marines stationed within the General's Department.
On October 14 General Wilkinson was informed that 
not only were additional recruits not available, but be­
cause the demand for arms was so great in the north,
65additional arms for his command would be delayed. The 
General, left to his own resources for the moment, turned 
to his one remaining source of manpower, the militia.
He requested that Governor Holmes send a detach­
ment of militia outside the borders of the Mississippi 
Territory. The Governor responded by saying that there 
were apprehensions of Indian and slave troubles in the 
territory if the militia were ordered to another area. 
However, Holmes was certain that if the cavalry could 
be allowed to remain behind and two hundred additional 
muskets supplied for the use of the militia, the security 
of the Territory could be maintained. He pointed out 
several important reasons as to why all of the militia 
should not be taken: the militia force encamped at
fidSecretary of War to Wilkinson, Sept. 11, 1512, 
SWLS, Holl 6, 136.
6*5Secretary of War to Wilkinson, Oct. 14, 1312, 
Ibid., 194.
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Washington was one-fourth of the physical force of the 
Mississippi Territory; the slave population of the dis­
trict was nearly equal to the white population; and the 
frontier counties were thinly populated. It was the 
Governor’s hope that Wilkinson would carefully weigh
r s'
these considerations before taking all of the militia. °
While Governor Holmes worried about the security
of his province, a report was circulating that seemed to
reinforce the Southerners’ apprehensions. The Tennessee
Herald of September 5 carried the news that the British
had occupied Pensacola, and a part of that force was
composed of black troops. The author reflected the
opinion prevalent in the South concerning the use of
black troops:
The policy of stationing troops of 
that description upon our frontier 
cannot be mistaken. The same hand 
which has incited against us the 
scalping knife and the tomahawk of 
the Indians, will not stop to renew 
upon the Mobile and Lower Mississippi 
the tragedy of St. Domingo.
The report pointed out that the alarm this news
had produced was not unfounded. The settlements on the 
Mobile were separated from the settled parts of the
United States on the north and northwest by six thousand
Creeks and two thousand Choctaws; to the south were the
66Holmes to VIilkinson, uct. 19> 1312, Carter, 
Territorial Papers, VI, 328-29.
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British and their black and Spanish allies; and in their 
midst a population that if excited to revolt would require 
the entire military force to subdue. The states of Georgia 
and South Carolina were in no position to afford the 
settlements assistance; the only source of aid was 
Tennessee, three hundred miles away.
The Herald * s report was bolstered by a letter to 
the editor of the Niles Weekly Register from Captain 
James 3. 'Wilkinson, who was stationed at Fort Stoddert.
The Captain reported that there were nearly three hundred
63Negro Troops in the town of Mobile.
The Georgia Legislature was deliberating over
what course of action should be taken with regard to
Florida, as the reports of Spanish cooperation with
England mounted. The Georgia House of Representatives'
Committee on East Florida reported that the state was
constitutionally vested with the power to occupy East
Florida and maintain its occupation until the national
government did something to eliminate the danger that
69tnreatened the people of the state.
Apprehensions of slave insurrections and British-
cnTennessee Herald, Sept. 5, 1312, as reported 
in Niles Weekly Register, Oct. 17, 1S12, III, 107.
63James 3. Wilkinson to editor, Oct. 14, 1312,
Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 7, 1312, III. Wilkinson 
states that the black troops were Spanish.
Q
° Niles vVeekly Register, Dec. 26, 1312, III.
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supported black troops continued throughout the war, 
and the British played upon these fears. On April 1,
1814, Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Inglis Cochrane assumed 
command of the Royal Navy’s North American Command. The 
next day he issued a proclamation that was clearly in­
tended to arouse American slaves. The Admiral offered 
to persons who wished to leave the United States an 
opportunity to do so. Those who left the United States
could either enter the service of the King or become free
70settlers in an English colony.
The proclamation was received with consternation 
and anger in the South. The editors of the Savannah paper 
refused to print the proclamation, believing it to be 
"inexpedient” to do so. One editor's comment was, "If 
this proclamation is what we are led to believe it to 
be, it caps the climax of dishonor and barbarity and
J. IvlacXay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812:A Military History (Toronto: ijniversity of Toronto Press.T9b5/, 206-207. The proclamation read as follows:WHEREAS it has been represented to me, that many persons now resident in the United States, have expressed a desire to withdraw therefrom, with a view to entering into His Majesty’s service or being received as free settlers into some of His Majesty's colonies.This is therefore to give notice That allthose who may be disposed to emigrate from the United States, will with their families, be received on board His Majesty's ships or vessels of war, or at the military posts that may be established upon or near the coast of the United States, when they will have their choice of either entering into His Majesty's sea or land forces, or of being sent as FREE settlers, to the British possessions in North America or the West Indies, where they will meet with all due encouragements.
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shall give eternal infamy to the British name, unless 
disavowed.
Further alarm was caused when it was reported
that approximately a thousand Creek Indians had gathered
at Pensacola to receive arms and other supplies from the
British. It was also reported that the British had
17,000 stands of arms in addition to those given to the
Indians. It was believed that these arms were for "the
'humane* purpose of enabling the slaves to destroy the
72white population - men, women and children."
As the Americans and British began the series of
maneuvers in the South which would eventually bring them
to the Battle of New Orleans, the fear of insurrection
would hinder and influence the concentration of American
troops. Anticipating a possible British thrust at
Louisiana through Mobile, the President ordered Governor
'William Blount of Tennessee to detach five thousand militia
to join General Jackson. In addition the Governor of
Georgia was ordered to muster five thousand militia,
half of this number to be held in reserve until Jackson
73determined whether he needed them.
^ Niles Weekly Register, May 21, 1814, VI.
72Niles Weekly Register. Aug. 23, 1814, VI.
^Secretary of War to Blount, Sept. 25, 1814,
S.VLS, Roll 7, 317-18. Secretary of War to Governor of 
Georgia, Sept. 25, 1314, SWLS, Roll 7, 318-19.
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General Jackson had already requested 2,500
militia from Tennessee, making a total requisition of
7,500 from that state. When the War Department learned
this, it requested 2,500 militia from Kentucky in order
to keep the requisition on Tennessee at 5,000.^ As the
reports of the strength of the British force destined
for New Orleans came to the War Department, the orders
of October 3 to the Governor of Tennessee were rescinded
and the militia from Georgia were ordered to march. Thus
a militia force of 12,500 men had been ordered to join
75General Jackson's command.
General Jackson had at his command all of the 
regular troops in his Department, the detached militia 
in Louisiana, the Mississippi Territory, and Tennessee.
He also had the authority to engage the warriors of the 
Choctaws, Chickasaws, and the Creeks to aid the United 
States. At first this appears to be a large reservoir 
of men to draw upon, but the Secretary of War added a 
sentence to the instructions which revealed the true
74'Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky,Oct. 3» 1814, SWLS, Roll 7, 334. Secretary of War to Governor of Tennessee* Oct. 3# 1814* SWLS. Roll 7*
337.
75Secretary of War to Governor of Kentucky,Oct. 10, 1814y SWLS. Roll 7, 342. Secretary of War to Governor of Tennessee, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid.* 342-43* Secretary of War to Governor of Georgia, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid., 344. Secretary of War to Jackson, Oct. 10, 1814, Ibid.. 344.
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situation. "It is known that the regular troops are 
distributed into many posts, and that the militia of 
Louisiana will be less effective for general purposes 
from the dread of domestic insurrection, so that on the 
militia of Tennessee your principal reliance must be.”
Thus when Jackson faced the British at the 
Battle of New Orleans in January of 1815 * his Army was 
composed largely of Tennessee and Kentucky militia, with 
smaller groups of regulars, pirates, Indians and Louisiana 
militia from the immediate area.
Secretary of vYar to Jackson, Sept. 27, 1814, Ibid., 323-25.
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CHAPTER X
THE ARMY AND THE INSTITUTION 
OF SLAVERY, 1816-1835
In the twenty years after the War of 1812, white 
Southerners continued to rely principally upon the local 
militia for protection against slave insurrections. Al­
though the militia was generally better organized and 
more effective after the war, Southerners requested that 
Federal troops be available to afford them additional 
protection from the black population. However, as the 
years passed and the agitation against slavery mounted, 
the leaders of the South became more and more reluctant 
to openly express their fears. Historian Stanley Elkins 
writes:
A heavy and cramping tension thus exists in most of the formal writings.The spokesmen did not want it supposed for an instant that the South was un­able to control its slave population or that the inferior creatures were anything but pleased with their happy conditions.1
iStanley M. Elkins, Slavery: A Problem inAmerican Institutional and Intellectual1 Iilfe (flew~York: Grosset and Dunlap LThe Universal LibraryJ, 1963), 218. Elkins calls the fear of insurrection irrational.
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While the formal writing and public utterances 
reveal little concern over slave insurrections, the pri­
vate correspondence of the southern leaders reveal no 
reluctance to call upon the Federal government in their 
time of need. As the frontier line was pushed westward 
and settlers moved into the unsettled regions of the 
South, military posts and garrisons that might otherwise 
have been abandoned were maintained in areas that had 
little to fear from Indian attack or a sudden invasion 
by a foreign enemy.
In 1816 United States troops took the field in 
what would result in one of the few actual clashes be­
tween regular troops and blacks in the period from 1815 
to 1835. The clash arose out of the occupation of a 
British built fort in East Florida by a large band of 
runaway slaves and a few Indians. In March the Secretary 
of War wrote to General Andrew Jackson concerning the 
fort and warning him that the practices of the force of 
enticing slaves from the frontier of Georgia might en­
danger the peace of the nation. He wrote:
The President has therefore directed 
me to instruct you to call the atten­
tion of the governor or military 
commander of Pensacola to this sub­
ject. The principles of good neigh­
borhood require the interferences of 
the Spanish authority to put an end 
to an evil of so serious a nature.
Should he decline this interference, 
it will be incumbent on the Executive
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to determine what course shall be 
adopted in relation to this banditti.
Should it be determined that the 
destruction of the fort does not 
require the sanction of the leg­
islature, measures will be promptly- 
taken for its reduction.^
Before anything constructive could be accomplished 
through diplomatic channels, the Savannah Journal pointed 
out the necessity of some type of action being taken:
"In the course of last winter, several slaves from this 
neighborhood fled to that fort; others have lately gone 
from Tennessee and the Mississippi Territory. How long 
shall this evil requiring immediate remedy be permitted 
to exist?"^
On July 17 Colonel Duncan Clinch, accompanied by 
a force of 116 regulars and 150 Indian allies, left Camp 
Crawford to march on the Negro fort. Just one month 
after the publication of the denouncement in the Savannah 
Journal, a shot fired by an American gunboat struck the 
main powder magazine of the fort and completely destroyed 
the structure. In the official report to the War
2Secretary of War to General Jackson, Mar. 15, 
1816, in Records of the Office of the Secretary of War. 
Letters Sent, Relating to Military Affairs, 1800-1889, 
Record Group 107, Microcopy 6, Roll 8, 471-72. Herein­
after cited as SWLS.
^Savannah (Georgia) Journal. June 26, 1816. See 
Isaac J. Cox, The West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813 
(Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1967), 666 ff; Rambert W.
Patrick, Florida Fiasco: Rampant Rebels on the Georgia -
Florida Border: 1816-1815 (Athenal University of
Georgia Press, 1954).
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Department, Colonel Clinch reported that out of an esti­
mated three hundred and twenty-five people in the fort, 
not more than one-sixth escaped instant death.
Although the regulars were not engaged in any 
heavy fighting, merely capturing the few survivors, the 
actions taken by Colonel Clinch to reduce the Negro fort 
on the Apalachicola River did much to ease the minds of 
the people on the Georgia-Plorida border. But the action
did little to further the diplomatic negotiations between
tSpain and the United States. ‘
The expedition was effective in quieting the
trouble on the border for the moment, and the Secretary
of War felt that the troops could be safely put to work
repairing the road from Port Hawkins to Port Stoddert.
As the hostile disposition of the Creeks 
appears to have in some degree subsided 
and as the destruction of the Negro fort 
on the Appalochicola, may have a tendency 
to intimidate them, it is probable that 
part of the troops, stationed in the Indian 
Country may now be safely employed in this 
work.5
4Clinch to Butler, Adjutant General, Division of 
the South, Aug. 2, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, Nov. 20, 
1819, XIII; Clinch to Governor Mitchell, Aug. 4, 1816, 
Niles Weekly Register, Aug. 31, 1816, XI; See Hawkins 
to Governor Mitchell, May 10, 1816, Niles Weekly Register, 
June 1, 1816, X; and Sept. 14, 1816, Xl.
5Secretary of War to David Mitchell, Governor of 
Georgia, Sept. 24, 1816, SWLS, Roll 9, 149-50; Herbert 
Aptheker, MMaroons within ihe Present Limits of the 
United States,** The Journal of Negro History, XXIV,
(1939), 167-84. ----------------- ----------
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Again in March 1820, slaves who had just recently 
been brought into Florida (now a part of the United 
States) from Jamaica rebelled and the citizens of the 
area called for Federal aid. A detachment of regulars 
marched to the scene and quickly subdued the rebels.
One slave was killed in the process, but other details 
concerning the insurrection are not available.^
The report of a disturbance on the German Coast 
again disrupted the quiet of the New Orleans region. A 
detachment of regulars under the command of Captain 
William Harney marched from New Orleans with three days 
rations to the scene of the revolt. The issue was con­
fused a few days later when it was reported that the 
troops had marched up the Coast merely for the purposes
of "drill and exercise", and further mention of the
7rebellion disappeared from the news.
The example of a detachment of troops being sent 
on an exercise into the area of the German Coast marks 
a transition point in the role of the Army in the South. 
The activities of the War Department and the Army tended 
more and more to become that of a reassuring influence
^Helen T. Catterall, Judicial Cases Concerning 
the Negro and American Slavery (5 vols., Washington, 
T9?6^Tg37) 7 T i r i 3 7  -28; Aptheker, American Negro Slave 
Revolts, 266.
7New York, Evening Post, Nov. 7 and 9, 1826, as 
seen in Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 278-79.
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and a powerful psychological force. The type of ser­
vices rendered varied from place to place and from time 
to time, but the Army*s role became that of the patient 
observer, ready to meet any emergency. As Governor 
Holmes observed in 1812, MIn slave countries the danger 
of insurrection always exists, and the inhabitants should
g
be prepared to meet the event."
The city of Savannah affords an excellent ex­
ample of the continuous concern of citizens for some 
form of protection from its black population. Fort 
Jackson had been built during the War of 1812 to protect 
the city from a possible British attack. With the con­
clusion of the war, the Federal government took under 
advisement the question of whether or not the post should 
be abandoned and the public buildings sold. In an effort 
to reach a decision, the War Department requested opinions 
from a number of different individuals and it was not
until 1819 that all of the reports were finally sub- 
gmitted.
QHolmes to Wilkinson, Oct. 19, 1812, Clarence 
E. Carter (ed.), The Territorial Papers of the United 
States. VI. The Mississippi Territory. 328-29.
QSecretary of War to the Honorable William 
Stevens, Oct. 21, 1816, SWLS. Roll 9, 172; Secretary 
of War to Colonel James McDonald, Oct. 21, 1816, Ibid.,
171; Secretary of War to General Gaines, Feb. 4, 1818, 
Ibid., 2; Secretary of War to Charles Harris, Feb. 4,
1818, Ibid.. 2-3; Secretary of War to General Gaines,
July 14, 1818, Ibid., 99. Secretary of War to General 
Gaines, Feb. 2, 1819, Ibid., 239.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
493
While the fate of the post at Savannah was under 
consideration, the troops stationed there were removed 
from the garrison during the summer months in an effort 
to preserve the health of the soldiers. In 1819 the 
government decided to continue the post, and the soldiers 
stationed there suffered heavily from disease during 
their tour of duty.
The garrison was removed from Fort Jackson in 
1824, and the action brought an immediate and sharp 
response from the citizens of Savannah. In April the 
Secretary of War, John C. Calhoun, informed Representa­
tive Edward F. Tatnall that he was "fully sensible of 
the weight of reasons" that the United States troops 
should not be removed from the city. The Secretary 
stated that the decision to remove the troops from 
Savannah had been made from necessity and for no other 
reason. The soldiers had become virtually ineffective 
as a military force due to illness during the period 
they had been stationed in the town. Secretary Calhoun 
assured Representative Tatnall that if a more healthy 
location could be found in the area, the troops would 
be returned. He also suggested that if the troops re­
turned immediately, they might be quartered in the city, 
as the season was too far advanced to erect new barracks
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to accommodate the soldiers.^ The next month Calhoun
requested an interview with Tatnall for the purpose of
discussing possible locations for quartering the troops
in or near Savannah.^1
In addition, arrangements would be made for
erecting suitable buildings in some healthy location
near the city. The troops would occupy the new build-
12ings during the sickly season in future years. Major 
Call and the members of the Council met and decided upon 
a site near Savannah, and the soldiers returned to the 
post for the remaining summer months.^
The United States started erecting new barracks 
for the Savannah garrison in the follwing year. By 
1827 the Secretary of War was able to report to the 
House of Representatives that it would require an ad­
ditional 114,452.51 to complete the barracks and other
14buildings at Cantonment Oglethorpe. Despite its new
^Secretary of War to the Honorable E. P. Tatnall, 
Apr. 30, 1824, Ibid., 49-50.
^'Secretary of War to Tatnall, May 11, 1824,
Ibid.. 53.
12Secretary of War to the Members of the Common 
Council of Savannah, May 15, 1824, Ibid., 56.
1^Niles Weekly Register. June 12, 1824, XXVI.
^American State Papers: Military Affairs
(Washington, 1832-1861), III, 588-83T rfereinafter 
cited as ASPMA.
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location and new quarters, the new site at Savannah re­
mained as unhealthy as the old site. In 1829 General 
Alexander Macomb authorized Colonel William MacRae to 
remove the garrison during the sickly season. The 
General suggested that the troops move to Augusta
Arsenal, a post that was only slightly more healthy
15during the summer months than was Savannah.
The policy of removing the garrison from the city 
during the summer months continued in an effort to pre­
serve the health of the soldiers. During the disturbance 
in the fall of 1831 caused by the Nat Turner Rebellion, 
the regulars were ordered to return from Augusta to 
Savannah as soon as a proper regard for the health of 
the soldiers would permit.1^
If the practice of previous years was continued, 
the troops would again be removed with the approach of 
the 1832 sickly season. The Mayor of Savannah prompted 
by this prospect wrote to the Secretary of War on 
January 6, 1832, setting forth his apprehensions. General 
Macomb responded to the Mayor's letter with assurances
1 *5Macomb to MacRea, Apr. 26, 1829* Letters Sent, 
Headquarters of the Army, 1821-1903* II* Record Group 108 
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSHQA. See 
Appendix II.
^Assistant Adjutant General to Colonel Panning, 
Oct. 21, 1831* Letters Sent Eastern Department, VIII, 
Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 
1821-1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives), Here­
inafter cited as LSED.
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that the troops would remain throughout the coming year
17in consequence of the Mayor’s letter.
Throughout 1831 the War Department was again 
considering the abandonment of the barracks outside of 
Savannah and a movement to quarters within the city, be­
cause the new position was found to be no more healthy 
than the old position. Commanding General Macomb in­
formed the Secretary of War that new barracks in the city 
might possibly be healthier than those presently occupied 
by the troops. He cautioned that since the move would 
be expensive, quarters should be rented within the city 
in order to determine if the move would produce the de­
sired results.^®
On March 22, 1832, Congress entered the contro­
versy over whether to abandon the post at Savannah. The 
House Committee on Military Affairs made its report on 
an application from the citizens of Savannah that barracks 
be erected and permanently garrisoned in the city. The 
Committee recommended in favor of the petition after con­
sidering the evidence presented. A letter from the Mayor 
of Savannah to the Committee expressed the reason the 
people wanted the troops permanently stationed in the
17Macomb to the Honorable William B. Waring,
Feb. 17, 1832, LSHQA, II.
1 ̂ Macomb to Secretary of War, Mar. 19, 1832,
LSHQA, II. Also in ASPMA, V, 6-7.
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city. The Mayor requested that buildings be erected for
the quartering of at least one hundred men, ”in order
that this community might be benefited by the residence
of United States Troops among them, and particularly at
a time when, from the periodical migration of many of our
19white population, a military force is most needed.”
The implication of the Mayor’s argument is
obvious; the people of Savannah wanted the troops to
protect them from their slaves, who might choose the
season when many whites left the area because of illness
to launch an insurrection. On April 7, 1832, the commander
of the force at Savannah received orders to keep his
troops in the best and most healthy location he could
20find near Savannah.
Cities other than Savannah called upon the Federal 
government for aid. In June of 1829 the Intendant of 
Charleston, South Carolina, requested that a company of 
artillerists be removed from one of the forts in the 
harbor and stationed in the town. One company was or­
dered into the city to cooperate with the local autho­
rities whenever called upon to do so by the Intendant
19ASPMA, V, 6-7.
20Macomb to Brevet Captain C. S. Merchant,
Apr. 7, 1832, LSHQA, II. See also Macomb to Judge 
Wayne, Apr. 25» 1o}2, Ibid.
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21or any three of the Wardens of the city.
Requests could not always be granted, and on 
rare occasions they were denied. One month after moving 
a company of soldiers from the harbor, the Secretary of 
War's office denied another request from the Intendant 
of Charleston. The City Guard was trying to obtain per­
mission to use some space in the United States Arsenal. 
After consulting the Ordnance Department, the Secretary 
of War was forced to deny the request because no part
of the Arsenal could be turned over to the city without
22considerable inconvenience.
In April 1828 General Winfield Scott wrote to 
Colonel Roger Jones, the Adjutant General, concerning 
a letter that had been referred to him by the Secretary 
of War. The letter was from the Governor of Florida, who 
requested that a company of regulars be stationed near 
the head of the St. Mary's River, close to the center 
of population. The company was to form a Hnucleus for 
the militia" in the event of unrest among the slaves.
The Governor based his apprehensions on the fact "that 
many of the slaves taken to Florida are the very worst 
in the Union."
21 Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, June 30, 
1827, SWLS, Roll 12, 297.
22Secretary of War to Joseph Johnson, July 7, 
1827, Ibid.. 298.
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Scott wrote:
The distribution of regiments into 
detachments of less than several 
companies greatly augments ike 
expense of their maintanance [sic] 
and is highly injurious to their 
efficiency and finally that I am 
not aware that we have even estab­
lished a military post solely on 
the grounds of the Governor's 
application.
For these reasons General Scott did not believe that a
23post should be established on the St. Mary's River.
Some of the requests directed to the War Department 
were relatively easy to comply with since they required 
only the transmission of information to reassure con­
cerned citizens. On March 24, 1829, in response to a 
letter from Congressman William Brent of Louisiana, 
Commanding General Alexander Macomb outlined the dis­
position of the nation's regular forces. To defend the 
city of New Orleans and protect the neighboring area 
against possible insurrection, the Army had ten companies 
stationed in Louisiana. In the event more troops were
required, they could be ordered south into the state
24from Jefferson Barracks.
In addition to the assurances given of the ability
■^Scott to Jones, Apr. 5, 1828, Letters Sent 
Western Department, IV, Records of United States Con­
tinental Army Commands, 1821-1920, Record Group 393 
(National Archives). Hereinafter cited as LSWD.
2^Macomb to Eaton, Mar. 24, 1829, LSHQA, I.
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of the Army to support the citizens of Louisiana,
General Macomb informed the Governor of the orders 
issued to the officers stationed in the state. In­
structions had been given "to cooperate with you in any 
measures your Excellency may take in suppressing the in­
surrectionary disposition manifested by the black pop- 
25\ilation. . . . "
In December the Commanding General gave addi­
tional details concerning the plans for protecting the 
inhabitants of Louisiana. In addition to the ten com­
panies stationed in the state, two companies from Florida, 
two from Alabama, four of the five companies stationed on 
the Arkansas River, and four companies from Jefferson 
Barracks could be moved into the state if the situation 
were serious enough. Within a period of fourteen or 
fifteen days after receiving marching orders, these
twenty-two companies, with a paper strength of 1,100 men,
26could be in the state to confront any rebellious force.
In December 1830 the attention of the Commanding 
General shifted from Louisiana to North Carolina. In a 
letter, marked confidential, to the commanding officer at
25Macomb to Governor Derbigny, Mar. 27, 1829, Ibid.
26Macomb to Secretary of War, Dec. 30, 1829, Ibid. 
The letter gives the total number of companies as 32, but 
the count from the text of the letter i3 22.
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Portress Monroe, the General ordered two companies to be
sent to Wilmington, North GoTCj.j.na> uxixy bhtf cumuitiufider
of the detachment was to know the nature of the unit's
mission, which was to meet any insurrectionary movement
27which might take place during the Christmas season.
The order was in response to a letter from Wilmington's 
Magistrate of Police, who had requested aid from the
War Department because of a disposition toward insurrec-
28tion manifested by the slaves.
General Macomb informed Brevet Major Sylvester 
Churchill, who was stationed at Smithville, North Carolina, 
that the two companies were on their way from Fortress 
Monroe. Churchill was to assume command of the troops 
and march with them to Wilmington. Upon his arrival he 
was to consult with the local authorities as to what 
measures should be employed to provide security to tne 
residents of the area. Macomb suggested that it might 
eliminate confusion if the Major went to Wilmington and 
arranged for the accommodation of the troops before their 
arrival. However, the General cautioned him, ”. . .  you 
will see the proprity of not disclosing the object of 
your visit, lest the black3 anticipating the coming of
2^Kacomb to Colonel J. B. Walbach, Dec. 9, 1830,
Ibid.
28Secretary of War to James T. McRee, Dec. 9, 
1830, SWLS, Roll 13, 22.
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the troops, might attempt to carry into effect their evil
29intentions more promptly than they otherwise should do.M
late in December the citizens of the Wilmington 
area were still apprehensive, and additional instructions 
were sent to Major Churchill. General Macomb believed 
that a demonstration by a company of troops might have 
a beneficial effect on the disposition of the blacks.
To accomplish the desired object, it was suggested that 
a show of force be made by marching the company from 
Wilmington to Newburn. This display of force was in­
tended to overawe and intimidate the blacks while re­
assuring the white population. The company was to re­
main at Newburn unless needed elsewhere in the neighbor­
hood or until ordered to return to Fortress Monroe.^
Major Churchill and his detachment remained in 
Wilmington and Newburn until the end of April. As the 
rumors and fears subsided, the troops were ordered back 
to their station at Fortress Monroe.^1
Louisiana was a continuing source of concern to 
the officials of the War Department. From January to
^Macomb to Churchill, Dec. 9, 1830, LSHQA, I.
^°Macomb to Churchill, Dec. 28, 1830, Ibid.
■^Macomb to Brigidier General George Gibson, 
Commissary General of Subsistence, Mar. 29, 1831, Ibid. 
Acting Assistant Adjutant General DeHart to Colonel 
Jones, Apr. 15, 1831, LSED, VIII.
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July of 1831 a number of letters were exchanged by 
citizens of Louisiana, the War Department, and officers 
of the Army, all concerned with the protection of the 
state and its citizens in the event of an insurrection.
In January the Commanding General informed a concerned 
citizen that the commanding officers at New Orleans and 
Baton Rouge had orders to cooperate with the local au­
thorities in suppressing any insurrectionary movements
32that might be discovered.
In April the Governor of Louisiana wrote the 
Secretary of War, John Baton, expressing his concern 
for the safety of the citizens and requesting that reg­
ular troops be stationed in New Orleans and that arms be 
supplied for the militia. In answer, the Secretary sent 
a detailed letter to the Governor outlining measures 
to be taken for the defense of New Orleans.
Eaton suggested that New Orleans follow the 
example of the citizens of Charleston, South Carolina, 
who had constructed a citadel within the limits of the 
city. The citadel was constantly garrisoned by a company 
of United States Artillerists and was designed to serve 
as a rallying point for the city*s volunteer corps. T f  
New Orleans built such a citadel, placed a garrison and 
a few small field pieces in it, the purposes of security 
and defense would be served. Additional troops could not
32Macomb to G. Saul, Jan. 21, 1831, LSHQA, I.
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be sent to the city at this time because there were no 
quarters available for them. Colonel Clinch, commanding 
officer at Baton Rouge, would be ordered to New Orleans 
to confer with the Governor on additional defensive 
measures that might be adopted.^
On instructions from the Secretary of War, General 
Macomb sent orders to Colonel Clinch for the defense of 
New Orleans. The troops at Baton Rouge and the passes 
to New Orleans, along with the forces on the Red and 
Arkansas rivers, were available to defend the state of 
Louisiana. The commanding officers of the various posts 
had been instructed to cooperate with the state author­
ities in the event of an insurrection among the blacks.
The Commanding General lamented the fact that 
the United States had relinquished the "ancient barracks" 
in New Orleans to the City Council and that circumstances 
had prevented the maintenance of a permanent garrison in 
the city. However, if the city were to build a citadel 
in which troops could be comfortably quartered, then 
Colonel Clinch was authorized to order two companies of 
regulars from Baton Rouge to occupy the position. Colonel 
Clinch was to vist New Orleans immediately and confer with 
the Governor and the city authorities concerning addi­
tional measures which were necessary to defend the town.
■^Eaton to Governor of Louisiana, May 16, 1831 *
Ibid.
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In addition, he was to order a supply of arms, not to 
♦exceed 1,000 stands, to the city if he deemed it absolutely 
necessary. The arms were to be stored in some secure 
location until they were needed by the Governor.
Also, Colonel Clinch was to visit the forts at 
the Balize, the Rigolets and Chef Menteur and inspect 
the garrisons to determine their fitness. The commanders 
were to be especially vigilant to avoid the possibility 
of surprise as there had been reports that assistance 
might be furnished from abroad. If these reports were 
true, it was probable that an attempt might be made to 
seize the forts that guarded the passes to the sea and 
to secure the weapons stored xn them.
Colonel Clinch was to assume a general command 
if an insurrection or an invasion occurred, but his 
authority should not exceed its present limits unless 
either or both of the events occurred. General Macomb 
apologized for communieating directly with the Colonel 
instead of going through the Department Commander, but
he felt that the urgency of the situation required such
35action on hie part.
34J No evidence has been found that would either 
confirm or deny that foreign aid to a slave insurrection 
was possible. It is probable that this was another mani­
festation of the continual fear caused by the successful 
rebellion in Santo Domingo.
•^Macomb to Clinch, May 17, 1831, LSHQA, I.
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General Edmund P. Gaines, commander of the Western 
Department, who had been bypassed in the chain of command, 
received a copy of General Macomb*s letter to Colonel 
Clinch and immediately sent a letter to the Secretary 
of War containing his own suggestions for protecting 
Louisiana. The answer he received from the Commanding 
General, if it had been written twenty years earlier, 
might have evoked a call from Gaines for satisfaction 
on the field of honor:
The views which you have taken 
of the subject and the arrangements 
which you have adopted, in regard to 
the defense of Louisiana, have been 
submitted by the Secretary of War to 
the President of the United States, 
and I am instructed to say to you 
that, as the Government is duly 
advised of the state of things in 
Louisiana and can conveniently de­
termine what cause it may be expedient 
to adopt, no movement of the troops 
will be made, other than those which 
have been authorized by letter to 
Colonel Clinch . • ., nor will any 
requisition be made by you on the 
State authorities for Militia or 
Volunteer forces without reference 
to General Headquarters, that the 
same may be submitted to the War 
Department, for the decision of 
the President. . . .  I cannot close 
this communication to you without 
reminding you of the propriety of 
making your official communications 
connected with military services 
according to the established rules 
as pointed out by the General Reg­
ulations and subsequent orders.
^Macomb to Gaines, July 25, 1831, Ibid.
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The reference in Macomb's letter to requisitions
on the militia was reinforced by a letter from a number
of concerned citizens who wrote to Clinch in August;
their document sheds additional light on the possible
insurrection. The rumors were that the slaves were
planning a simultaneous attack on Baton Rouge and New
Orleans. The slaves needed the arms stored in Baton
Rouge to facilitate their assault on New Orleans and
give it a chance of success. The citizens did not want
the local militia called into service: "doing so would
in our opinion only show to that class of our population
that we feared them and would consequently be the best
means that could be devised of letting them know their
own strength of which it is our obvious policy to keep
37them ignorant."
After the admonishment from Macomb, Clinch for­
warded the letter from the citizens to General Gaines 
with a cover letter describing conditions in the area.
An additional detachment of troops had arrived in New 
Orleans and everything seemed to be tranquil throughout 
the entire state. Whatever had been the intentions of 
the slaves, the rebellion never occurred, and events in
^H. H. Gurley, et al to Clinch, Aug. 19, 1831, 
Letters Received, Adjutant General's Office, Record 
Group 94 (National Archives).
^Clinch to Gaines, Aug. 22, 1831, Ibid.
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Louisiaxia would soon be overshadowed by those in far-off 
Virginia.
The Nat Turner Rebellion which erupted on 
August 21, 1831, brought an avalanche of requests for 
aid and protection from all areas of the South. Al­
though the Secretary of War was able to inform a group 
of concerned citizens in Southampton County, Virginia, 
on September 8, that it was the belief of those in his 
Department that the insurrection had been completely
quelled and no additional troops should be stationed
3Qthere, it was only the beginning of the scare.
On September 23, 1831, General Macomb proposed 
a disposition of the troops on the Atlantic Coast to 
Louis McLean, Acting Secretary of War. This disposition 
was, he felt, the best possible one to afford adequate 
protection to the citizens of the slave states. Two 
companies would be removed from Boston harbor, one com­
pany from New London, two companies from the harbor of 
New York, and two companies from New Castle, Delaware.
Five of those companies were to be stationed at Fortress 
Monroe and two were to occupy the Marine Barracks in the 
city of Washington. The companies stationed in Washington 
would be in a position to guard Washington, Georgetown, 
Alexandria and the state of Maryland. The troops at
39Secretary of War to Jeremiah Cobb, et al 
Sept. 8, 1831, SWLS, Roll 13, 78.
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Fortress Monroe would protect Virginia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Georgia and Maryland.
The two companies of Infantry stationed at Fort 
Mitchell, Alabama, would be marched to Augusta Arsenal, 
where they would be in a position to act in Georgia,
South Carolina and North Carolina. Should more troops 
be needed, two battalions of Infantry could be called 
from the frontier garrisons without endangering the 
safety of the citizens or posts. If this force was not 
equal to the task, three companies could be moved quickly 
from Sackett's Harbor and Fort Niagara. All of these 
movements would be made with very little expense to the 
government and would leave no post without a garrison.
General Macomb expressed a special concern for 
the security and safety of the Arsenal located near 
Richmond. There was a large and well organized force 
of black laborers, said to number 1,500, working in 
the coal mines within gun-shot of the Arsenal. Within 
a short distance, not exceeding seven miles, were ap­
proximately 6,000 able-bodied blacks who were capable 
of bearing arms. Stored in the Arsenal were 17,000 
stand of arms intended for the use of the militia in 
case of invasion or insurrection. If the blacks could 
gain possession of the arms they might be able to capture 
Richmond and spread the insurrection over a wide area
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before they could be checked. To guard against this 
eventuality, Macomb recommended that one company be 
dispatched from Portress Monroe to provide additional 
protection for the Arsenal.
General Macomb felt that these preparations
would enable the government to afford the best possible
security against any slave uprising. The movements were
never completed because the crisis in Southampton passed.
However, requests continued to be sent to Washington from
40throughout the South.
Prom the state of North Carolina, Major Churchill 
informed the headquarters of the Eastern Department on 
September 12 that he had detached a part of his command 
at Port Johnston to the city of Wilmington. He had taken 
this action upon the requisition of the magistrates of 
the city, who felt that additional measures were necessary 
to defend the city. The Commanding General of the depart­
ment approved the actions taken by Major Churchill, and 
immediately sent ten recruits to reinforce his weakened 
command.^1
^Macomb to McLean, Sept. 23, 1831, LSHQA, I.
^Churchill to Headquarters Eastern Department, 
Sept. 12, 1831, Letters Received, Eastern Department, 
Records of United States Continental Army Commands, 1821- 
1920, Record Group 393 (National Archives); Bache, 
Assistant Adjutant General, Eastern Department, to 
Churchill, Sept. 21, 1831, LSED, VIII.
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On October 3, 1831, General Macomb addressed a 
letter to the Intendant of Police at Beaufort, North 
Carolina. The letter was in response to a resolution 
passed by a unanimous vote of the citizens of the town 
and its vicinity, both of which had been sent to the 
Secretary of War. The population was concerned because 
of a threatened insurrection among the blacks, and they 
requested that a military force be stationed in or near 
Fort Macon to protect them.
Macomb informed the citizens that a similar re­
quest had been received by the Department of War from 
the citizens of Newburn, North Carolina. In consequence 
of this request, a company of troops had been ordered to 
Newburn, and it was presumed by the General that because 
of the closeness of Newburn and Beaufort, one company 
would be sufficient to met the needs of both towns.'
On October 21 General Macomb wrote to a number 
of citizens in Wilmington, where the fear of an in­
surrection was still strong, that the company of Artillery 
stationed at nearby Fort Johnston should be sufficient to 
protect the citizens. He felt that because of the prompt 
action by local officials in suppressing the insurrec­
tionary movement and the punishment of the offenders that 
the need to assemble a military force at Wilmington had
^^Macomb to Conady, Oct. 3» 1831» LSHQA, I.
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almost ceased to exist at the time of his writing* The 
General informed the citizens:
The military means at the dis­
posal of the government you must be 
aware, are not very extensive. It 
may be satisfactory to you however 
to know that additional troops are 
ordered to Fortress Monroe, with a 
view to affording aid to the au­
thorities of the States in which 
the Blacks may attempt any in­
surrectionary movements, should the 
authorities of those states desire 
it. . . • Should the alarm continue 
in your vicinity, any communication 
on the subject which you should think 
proper to make for the information of 
the Department will receive due at­tention. 4 3
As the fear engendered by the Turner Rebellion 
swept through the South, Robert C. Nicholas, a Louisiana 
planter, wrote that Louisiana needed all of the help it 
could obtain in order to provide an effective security 
system. He suggested that the best way to solve the 
problem of rebellion on the German Coast was to establish 
a patrol on the Mississippi River. The patrol would be 
maintained by two steamboats, each with a well armed 
complement of Federal troops aboard, working up and down
^Macomb to Citizens of Wilmington, N. C., 
Oct. 21, 1831, Ibid. Macomb's last paragraph con­
cerning reinforcements for Fortress Monroe and 
correspondence with the War Department, was identical 
to the last paragraph of his letter to Conady at 
Beaufort, North Carolina, Oct. 3, 1831, Ibid.
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44the river between New Orleans and St. Francisville.
General Gaines suggested a similar plan to 
Governor A. B. Roman of Louisiana, one calling for un­
scheduled and unannounced tours through the region by- 
large units of United States troops. Gaines believed
that this scheme would provide a satisfactory system
45of defense for the planters of Louisiana.
On October 12 General Macomb once again explained 
the measures taken by the government to defend Louisiana. 
The apprehensions of the citizens, which never completely 
disappeared, had been intensified by rumors that the 
black population of New Orleans and the German Coast 
intended to rise against the whites, it was also re­
ported that the slaves had been in correspondence with 
the blacks in the Islands. On Macomb’s orders Colonel 
Clinch conferred with the Governor, inspected the forts 
protecting the approaches to the city, stationed two 
companies in the city, supplied arms to be used by the 
militia, and reached an understanding with the Governor 
and city authorities concerning defensive measures to 
be taken in the event of trouble.
Clinch was certain that the troops at Baton Rouge
^Robert C. Nicholas to Nicholas Trist, Oct. 22, 
1831, Nicholas Trist Papers, Library of Congress.
45Gaines to Roman, Nov. 16, 1831, Personal Papers, 
Miscellaneous, G, Library of Congress; Aptheker, American 
Negro Slave Revolts, 312.
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and those in New Orleans were sufficient to suppress any 
outbreak among the slaves. However, in the event re­
inforcements were required, Colonel Clinch possessed the 
authority to call additional troops from the Arkansas and 
Red rivers. The General closed his letter with a note of 
caution: "You will of course see the propriety of not
allowing the information here given to find its way into
46the public prints."
During the first week of November General Gaines, 
commanding the Western Department, wrote from Mobile that 
the apprehensions of an insurrection had subsided to a 
level where he felt it safe to begin his inspection tour. 
The season had been healthy in Louisiana and Mobile, and 
most of the white inhabitants had remained in their homes 
thus enabling them to keep a close watch on the slave 
population. Gaines adequately summarized the services 
the regulars performed in Louisiana: "The known habitual
vigilance of the few troops stationed in that state, with 
the precautionary measures taken to increase their 
efficiency, and whenever necessary their numbers had 
doubtless contributed to dispel the fears of the in-
47habitants and to keep in check the evil disposed Blacks." 
^Macomb to Nathan Morse, Oct. 12, 1831, LSHQA,
I.
^Gaines to Jones, Nov. 3* 1831» LSWD, IV.
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In late November and early December the commanders 
in Louisiana were reminded of their responsibility to co­
operate with local officials and to afford protection to 
the citizens of Louisiana. When 3revet Major R. A. 
Zantzinger was assigned to command the Artillery units 
in the area around New Orleans, he was ordered to cooperate 
with the Infantry commanders and local officials to avert 
or suppress any insurrections.^®
General Gaines instructed Colonel Clinch to issue 
a supply of arms and ammunition to the Governor of Loui­
siana in response to his requisition. General Gaines had 
already ordered a supply to be sent from the 3aton Rouge 
Arsenal but any additional arms not required for the 
immediate use of the Federal troops should be sent to 
the governor, the total number not to exceed 2,000 stand, 
along with the equipment and ammunition to correspond with 
such a supply of arms. Gaines stated, "that measures of 
prevention constitute the most certain means of security 
against the apprehended evils of insurrection. . . . "  He 
concluded his letter with an admonishment to Colonel 
Clinch, "Repeating my desire that you will cooperate with 
the public functionaries of the state in whatever measures
^®M. L. Clark, Acting Aide de Camp to the Governor 
of Louisiana, Mayor of New Orleans, and Commanding Officers 
of Forts Pike, Wood, Jackson and New Orleans, Nov. 20,
1831, and Clark to Mayor of New Orleans and Governor of 
Louisiana, Nov. 27, 1831, Ibid.
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you may deem necessary and proper to ARREST THE APPREHENDED
EVIL OR TO ARREST OR CRUSH IT, if it should commence.’'49
The requests for detachments continued to come
into the War Department throughout December, and for
the first time the Commanding General was forced to deny
the requests because of a shortage of troops. General
Macomb denied the request of the Committee of Vigilance
of Raleigh, North Carolina, and one from the Governor of
Florida for a detachment of troops to be stationed in the
city of Pensacola. These requests were rejected because
of the dispersed state of the Army and the belief that
further detachments would interfere greatly with the
plans of the War Department and the discipline of the 
50troops.
General Macomb, in a communication to Represen­
tative Thomas R. Mitchell of South Carolina, reiterated 
the problems posed by a further dispersal of the regular 
forces. The city of Georgetown, South Carolina, had 
requested a detachment of troop3 to protect it in the 
event of an insurrection in the district. Macomb stated 
that the dispersed state of the Army and its limited 
members precluded affording protection to more than the
49Gaines to Clinch, Dec. 2, 1831» Ibid. Gaines*
emphasis.
50Macomb to Cass, Dec. 8, 1831» LSHQA, I.
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maritime frontier and the garrisons on the interior border.
Orders were issued to the commander of the three companies
in Charleston to watch the events in Georgetown and if
there, was cause for serious alarm he was to detach a small
part of his small force to aid the citizens. Macomb could
only express his hope that this arrangement would meet the
51approval of the citizens of Georgetown.
On January 17 General Macomb, in answer to the
representations of the citizens of Alexandria, Louisiana,
could only state that the troops at Port Jesup would be
used if a rebellion broke out, because additional troops
could not be ordered into the district. The limited means
of the Army had been exhausted by the numerous requests
which had been received from the Southern states since the
52disturbances of the previous year.
General Gaines, commanding the Western Department, 
wrote to the Adjutant General of the Army expressing his 
concern for the safety of the inhabitants of Louisiana.
He felt that because of the strength, character and con­
dition of the slave population, Louisiana required twelve
Macomb to Mitchell, Dec. 27, 1831, Ibid.;
A. Van Buren to Major Heilman, Jan. 7, 1832, LSHQA,
II; Van Buren to Heilman, Jan. 23, 1832, Ibid.
"^Macomb to W. H. Overton, Jan. 17, 1832, Ibid.; 
Van Buren to Brigidier General H. Leavenworth, Cantonment 
Jesup, Jan. 24, 1832, Ibid.
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to fifteen additional companies of regular troops to pro­
vide adequate protection against insurrections. Gaines 
wrote:
I should be guilty of an unpardonable 
omission if I did not solicit the 
attention of the proper authorities 
to the mortifying fact that, there 
is not within or near the Island of 
Orleans nor at Baton Rouge as Colonel 
Clinch justly intimates a sufficient 
force to justify the expectation that 
in the event of insurrection (to the 
extent reasonably apprehended, when 
the Blacks out number the whites as 
three or four to one) very little if 
anything could be done by the U. S. 
troops beyond the immediate defense 
of the positions which they occupy.
Not doubting but that it is the 
dictate of humanity and justice 
rather to provide efficient means 
of prevention and security against 
the PROBABILITY if not the possibility 
of insurrection than by witholding 
these means so completely within our 
power, suffer a stroke to be struck 
or a match to be lighted that a few 
triumphs might not be checked. . . . ”
In April and again in May of 1832 General Macomb 
sought to reassure the citizens in and around Baton Rouge 
that their safety and security was being considered by the 
War Department. As soon as additional troops were avail­
able they would be stationed at Baton Rouge to provide
greater security for the Arsenal and to the citizens of 
54the community.
5 Gaines to Adjutant General, Apr. 11, 1832,
LSWD, VI.
54Macomb to Philip Hicky, Baton Rouge, Apr. 16,
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The eruption of numerous rebellions and reports 
of rebellions which had culminated in the Turner Re­
bellion and the subsequent anxiety of the citizens of
the South for their safety led to a period of relative 
55calm. It was not "until August of 1835 that the fears 
of an insurrection returned to haunt white southerners.
In that month a letter was sent to Lieutenant Colonel 
William Poster, the commanding officer at Baton Rouge, 
from the Headquarters of the Western Department. Foster 
was cautioned to remain alert and vigilant to the dis­
position of the black population and to the rumors of 
planned insurrections instigated by white men. It was 
stated that much good and no evil could result from an
eg
increased watchfulness and readiness for action.
The year 1835 ended with the citizens of Louisiana
again aroused to a high state of singer. A plot had been
discovered in the East Pelician district where slaves had
been found with arms and other weapons. Armed patrols
marched through the countryside and some of the planters
57fled to the safety of New Orleans.
1832, LSHQA, II; Macomb to Representatives White, Thomas 
and Ballard, May 30, 1832, Ibid.
55Aptheker, American Negro Slave Revolts, 323-24.
56McCall, Aide de Camp, Western Depsirtment, to 
Poster, Aug., 1835, LSWD, II.
^Niles Weekly Register, Jan. 16, 1836, XLIX, 
letter dated New Orleans, Dec. 29, 1835.
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In the period from 1789 to 1835 the United States
Army performed a function which Southerners viewed as
58essential to their safety. The elaborate system of 
controls which the existence of slavery fostered did 
not afford the whites a3 much protection as they desired. 
The United States Army, with the power and resources of 
the Federal government at its command, seemed to afford 
the Southerners the extra security that they required.
When viewed against the background of the per­
sistent requests that Federal assistance be given to the 
lecal authorities, the assurances given to Southerners by 
their leaders of their ability to control the slave 
population have a hollow ring. In actual practice, how­
ever, the local system of control appears to have been 
effective in most cases, with the authorities turning 
to the employment of regulars against the slaves only 
on rare occasion.
The regulars possessed one advantage over the 
local forces and it was invaluable in the event of an 
insurrection. Unincumbered by personal property and 
families, the regulars could move rapidly against the 
rebels without the worries that plagued the white
^^William L. Richter, "Slavery in Baton Rouge,” 
Louisiana Higtory, Spring, 1969, Vol. X, 136-37. It is 
stated that "Partly because of the presence of the United 
States Army in the fort, Baton Rougeans felt rather safe.”
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Southerner who might be called upon to leave his home 
and family unprotected if called into service. South­
erners were rarely anxious to leave their homes to 
fulfill their militia obligation if it meant that their 
families would be unprotected.
The War Department and the individual officers 
tried to comply whenever possible with the requests they 
received from Southerners for all types of aid. It is 
evident that the Federal officials felt that the pro­
tection of American citizens from their slaves was as 
much a part of their duty as protecting them from hostile 
Indians and foreign invasion. General Gaines suggested 
that Southern officers might be stationed in the South 
because:
Their constitutions being adapted to 
the climate posses the additional 
advantage of knowing more intimately 
than Northern or Eastern men, the 
characters and peculiar habits of 
the Southern people of all colors, 
so that in any such emergency that 
we have reason now to apprehend, 
the most efficient service might 
reasonably be expected from the 
officers and men born and raised 
upon the spot, or in its immediate vicinity.59
It is difficult to imagine a slave rebellion of 
such a magnitude that the white Southerners would not 
have been able to suppress it rapidly. Armed and
59Gaines to Adjutant General Jones, Apr. 30, 
1832, LSWD, VI.
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organized, the whites actually had little to fear from a 
general uprising among the slaves, and this was amply 
demonstrated by the end results of all the efforts to 
mount rebellions. But the fear was always present and 
the picture of Santo Domingo never disappeared from 
view. Though reluctant to speak about the need they 
felt for Federal troops, many white Southerners pro-, 
bably rested more comfortably at night than they would 
have had the soldiers not been present.
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EPILOGUE 
THE PASSING OP THE ARMY
The role of the Army in the westward movement has 
been acclaimed by some historians and questioned by others. 
Earlier writers generally recognized that the military had 
played an important part in pushing the frontier across 
the continent. More recent writers have tended to con­
clude that the Army’s influence has been exaggerated and 
may even have been harmful. Representative of the views 
of the new school is a statement by Roger Nichols:
In particular, frontier and military 
historians have placed increased 
emphasis upon the contributions of 
the United States Army to the west­
ward movement, A group of historians, 
which might be labeled the “imperial 
school," claims that soldiers more than 
other frontier agents, explored the west, 
built roads, pacified Indians, enforced 
laws, protected settlers, founded cities, 
and even brought religion, education, and1 
other cultural trappings to the frontier.
Nichols then states that if the performance of the
Army in the Missouri River Valley during the first thirty
years of the nineteenth century was any indication of their
Roger L. Nichols, "The Army and the Indians 
1800-1830 - A Reappraisal: The Missouri Valley Example,”
Pacific Valley Historical Review, XLI (May, 1972), 151.
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importance, it has been vastly overestimated:
Their incompetence and bungling caused 
them to play only a modest role in 
solving the Indian problem and in 
promoting expansion and settlement.
Instead of serving as the "Sword of 
the Republic," as one prominent 
military historian claims, the Army 
in the Missouri Valley might better 
be described as the republic's broken 
lance, or at least its dull one.2
Perhaps this assessment is correct for the Missouri 
Valley frontier. However, on the southern frontier for 
forty-six years the Army was not only the "Sword of the 
Republic" but also its shield. During the period from 
1789 to 1835 the officers and men of the Army performed 
virtually every conceivable type of service, civil as 
well as military. By the time the need for the troops 
had passed in the South, the Army had left an indelible 
mark upon the region.
The activities of the Army were essential to the 
settlement of the southern frontier. The vast wilderness 
would have been opened and settled eventually had the
2Ibid., 152. The reference by Nichols is to the 
work of Francis Paul Prucha, The Sword of the Republic: 
The United States Army on the Frontier,T 7 B j M 846 (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1969). In this work
Prucha expands the thesis contained in his earlier work 
Broadax and Bayonet: The Role of the United States Army
in the Development of the Northwest, 1815-1860 (Madison: 
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1953)• Prucha 
contends that the Army played an important part, perhaps 
more than any other factor, in bringing civilization to 
the frontier.
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soldiers not been present, but the process would have 
taken far longer to complete. The Army made an organized 
attack upon the wilderness and helped to bring some 
semblance of order to the movement. The Army provided 
an available source of manpower, men who were able to 
devote their time and labor to projects not directly 
connected to their own survival. It is difficult to 
imagine how the settlers, struggling to carve homes and 
farms from the wilderness, could have found the time 
necessary to perform the numerous tasks assigned to the 
soldiers.
Perhaps the most important function the Army per­
formed was the assertion of Federal authority. For many 
of the settlers on the frontier, the soldiers were the 
only representatives of the national government with whom 
they had any contact. Whether occupying new territory, 
fighting Indians, or enforcing the national laws, the 
soldiers represented the United States. There were other 
Federal officials on the frontier - revenue officers, 
Indian agents, marshalls - but these individuals lacked 
the physical power necessary to enforce the law. It was 
one thing to resist the authority of a marshall or revenue 
collector; but to defy the orders of Federal officials 
when they were supported by a detachment of armed soldiers 
was an entirely different matter. The use of the troops 
to enforce national laws normally produced the cry of
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military despotism from those individuals whose interests 
the soldiers opposed. The same groups who opposed the 
use of the soldiers in the enforcement of Federal laws 
were often the first to call upon the soldiers to enforce 
state and local laws, especially those intended to prevent 
slave uprisings.
The officers and men usually performed the varied 
duties assigned to them competently and on occasion with 
distinction. This was remarkable in view of the limited 
training which the officers had received; many of them 
were scarcely prepared to command troops, much less to 
perform countless other jobs, both civil and military.
It can only be assumed that they relied upon the experi­
ence gained from long years of service in subordinate 
positions to guide their conduct when they found them­
selves in difficult situations. The officers were also 
aware that if they overstepped the bounds of their au­
thority, they were responsible to military as well as 
civil authorities.
The troops occupied the position of being wanted 
when a crisis arose, but unwanted at other times. The 
existence of the Army was viewed as a necessary evil. 
Albert Gallatin probably summarized the sentiments of 
civilians, at least those of Jeffersonian persuasion, 
concerning the Army:
The distribution of our little Army
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to distant garrisons where hardly 
any other inhabitant is to be found 
is the most eligible arrangement of 
that perhaps necessary evil that can 
be contrived. But I never want to 
see the face of one in our cities 
and intermixed with the people.3
With such attitudes prevailing, efforts to im­
prove the Army were doomed to fail. The military estab­
lishment had to be small because a large establishment 
was not only expensive but dangerous to the liberties of 
the citizens. An Army that was efficient might be 
difficult to control. Political leaders did not really 
consider that the condition of the rank and file might 
be made more comfortable or bearable. The kind of life 
lived by soldiers was not a concern of civilians. The 
Army might protect society but it was not a part of 
society.
Most civilians held soldiers in low esteem. The 
men were frequently characterized as crude, tough, and 
uncivilized. By safe, stay-at-home standards they were. 
But considering the type of life they led, it would have 
been surprising if they had been refined individuals. 
Isolated for long periods, engaged in hard, monotonous 
work, the soldiers had little inclination and no time to 
learn the social graces. By and large the characteristics
^Gallatin to his wife, July 7, 1807, in Henry 
Adams, life of Albert Gallatin (New York, 1901), 304.
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of the soldiers strongly resembled those of other fron­
tiersmen, who led similar lives of isolation and hard 
work.
The accomplishments of the officers and men of 
the Army who served in the South were numerous, and 
although their actions and units were small they added 
up to a great result. The Army had opened a wilderness 
to settlement and then had policed and protected it while 
it was being peopled. But once the Indians had been 
subdued, the presence of the Army was no longer considered 
necessary or desirable. After 1835* with the exception of 
the installations in Florida, most of the military posts 
in the South were abandoned. The permanent fortifications 
that protected the nation*s maritime frontier were re- 
tained, as were the posts at New Orleans and Baton Rouge. 
From these small garrisons southern whites would be able 
to draw whatever military assistance they might require 
in the event of slave insurrections.
The Army in the South had outlived its usefulness 
once it appeared that the Indian problem was about to be 
eliminated. The Indians would move west and the soldiers 
were expected to follow. By 1835 the soldiers in the 
South were preparing to follow the frontier line west, 
just as other soldiers before them had dene. They left 
a country that was vastly different than it had been
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when the first soldiers had arrived more than forty years 
before. The soldiers had done much to tame the wilder­
ness, and now they moved on to begin the process anew on 
a different frontier.
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Port Bowyer. General James Wilkinson began construction 
of a wooden work called the "Seraf" in 1813, it was lo­
cated on Mobile Point and guarded the sea approach to 
Mobile Bay. The name was changed to Port Bowyer before 
the end of the War of 1812. The United States began the 
construction of Port Morgan on the site in 1819, it was 
completed in 1834.
Pert Charlotte. The post had been constructed by the 
Spanish in the city of Mobile. It was surrendered to 
American troops in April, 1813- The United States main­
tained a garrison in the works until about 1820.
Fort Claiborne. Established in 1813 on the Alabama River, 
at the site of the present town of Claiborne, Alabama, the 
post was not continued after the campaign against the 
Indians was completed.
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Fort Crawfordo During Jackson’s campaign against the 
Indians, Fort Crawford was established at the site of 
the present town of Brewton, Alabama.
Fort Confederation (Fort Tombigbee). The works were 
originally built by the French in 1735 and called Fort 
Tombigbee. It was located above the confluence of the 
Tombigbee and Black Warrior rivers, in Chickasaw and 
Choctaw Indian country. The British occupied the site 
following the French and Indian War and changed the name 
to Fort York. The British abandoned the post after five 
years. The Spanish occupied the site in 1794, recon­
structed the fort and named it Fort Confederation. It 
was garrisoned by the Spanish until 1797, the next year 
the fort became a possession of the United States. It 
was abandoned soon after the United States negotiated a 
treaty with the Choctaw Indians there in 1802 - 1803.
Fort Deposit. General Andrew Jackson erected the fort 
on the Tennessee River at the site of the present town 
of Fort Deposit, Alabama. The post was not continued 
after the War of 1812.
Fort Gaines. The fort was constructed on the eastern end 
of Dauphin Island at the entrance to Mobile Bay. Con­
struction began in 1822 but was delayed a number of times 
while the advisability of the post was considered. It
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was designed to compliment Fort Morgan on the opposite 
side of the Bay. It was not regularly garrisoned.
Fort Hamilton. The fort was constructed in 1810, to the 
north of the great hend of the Tennessee River, near the 
present town of Athens, Alabama. The post apparently was 
not used on a regular basis after 1815, but there was a 
garrison there in 1817.
Fort Jackson. The post was established in April, 1814, 
as a post during the Creek War, near the junction of the 
Coosa and Tallapoosa rivers. The post was garrisoned 
until 1817.
Fort Mims. This was the stockaded farm of Samuel Mims. 
Located on the eastern bank of Lake Tensaw, twenty miles 
nc-**th of Mobile. The farm was the site of the Fort Mims 
Massacre in August, 1813.
Fort Mitchell. Located on the west side of the 
Chattahoochee River, at the present town of Fort Mitchell, 
Alabama. Originally constructed by the Georgia militia, 
it was first occupied by United States troops in 1813.
It was a part of the factory system beginning in 1817- 
The post was again occupied by troops in 1828 and the 
garrison was continued until 1837.
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Port Morgan. The fort was constructed on the site of 
Fort Bowyer at Mobile Point to protect the entrance to 
Mobile Bay. The post was first occupied in 1834.
Cantonment Montpelier. Located ten miles from the Alabama 
River and seven miles northwest of Port Montgomery, 
Alabama.
Port Montgomery. Constructed in 1814, ten miles above 
the junction of the Tombigbee and Alabama rivers.
Port St. Stephens. Constructed by the Spanish on the 
Tombigbee River north of Mobile. Alabama. It was trans­
ferred to the United States in 1799* The post was not 
maintained after the United States built Fort Stoddert 
to the South.
Port Stoddert. After the area was evacuated by the 
Spanish, Port Stoddert was established in 1799. It was 
located four miles below the junction of the Alabama and 
Tombigbee rivers.
Port Strother. Established in 1813 on the Coosa River as 
a defensive post during the Creek War.
Port Tombigbee (see Port Confederation).
Fort Toulouse. Begun in 1717 by the French, it was the 
eastern outpost of French Louisiana until the end of the
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French and Indian War. Located at the junction of the 
two tributaries of the Alabama River, the Coosa and 
Tallapoosa rivers. The moat was all that remained in 
1814 when General Andrew Jackson constructed Fort Jackson 
on the site after the Battle of Horseshoe Bend.
Fort York (see Fort Confederation).
FLORIDA
Fort Barrancas. Constructed as an addition to the older 
Spanish fortification to protect the entrance to Pensacola 
Harbor. It was occupied by American troops in 1820. It 
served as a naval reserve from 1825 to 1844.
Fort Brooke. Located at the head of Tampa Bay on the 
Hillsboro River about thirty miles from the Gulf of Mexico. 
It was originally intended to protect the Seminole Indians 
in the vicinity. Called Cantonment Brooks from 1824 until 
1835 when the name was changed to Fort Brooke.
Fort Clinch. Constructed three mile3 from Pensacola in 
1823* it was abandoned in 1834.
Fort Gadsden. Established by General Andrew Jackson on 
the east bank of the Apalachicola River in 1818 during 
his invasion of Florida. It was abandoned in 1821.
Key West Barracks. Established in 1831 on the north shore 
of Thompson9s Island, about sixty miles southwest of Cape
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Sable•
Fort King. Constructed in 1827 near the present city of 
Ocala, about ninety-five miles northeast of the head of 
Tampa Bay, forty miles due west from the Gulf of Mexico.
Post of St. Augustine. The post was originally con­
structed by the Spanish and was occupied by the United 
States troops when the territory was acquired in 1821.
The fort was named Fort Marion in 1825 and irregularly 
garrisoned until 1852. Located about two miles from the 
ocean.
Fort St. Marks (see San Marcos de Apalache).
Fort San Carlos de Barrancas. Originally constructed in 
1787 by the Spanish on a bluff called "Barrancas de Santo 
Tome" and occupied the same site as Fort San Carlos de 
Austria, which had been constructed during the first 
period of Spanish settlement, and had been destroyed by 
the French in 1719. The British blew up the new post in 
1814 when General Jackson captured the city. After the 
Americans withdrew the Spanish began to rebuild the fort. 
The fort passed to the control of the United States when 
the city was again attacked by General Jackson. During 
the period from 1833 to 1844, the United States strength­
ened the defenses of Pensacola Bay. In the rear of Fort
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San Carlos de Barrancas they constructed Port Barrancas 
and 1,000 yards to the north Fort Redouht.
Port Marion (see Post of St. Augustine).
Fort Pickens. Construction began in 1828 on the western 
end of Santa Rosa Island to command the entrance to 
Pensacola Harbor. The post was first garrisoned in 1834 
but not on a regular basis.
Fort Redoubt (see San Carlos de Barrancas).
San Marcos de Apalche. The Spanish constructed three 
different forts on the site from 1565 to 1763. During 
the British occupation the name was changed to Fort St. 
Marks. During the Seminole Campaign in 1818, General 
Jackson captured the fort and settlement. Control of 
the fort passed permanently to the United States with 
the ratification of the Adams-Onis Treaty in 1819-
GEORGIA
Augusta Arsenal. The arsenal occupied two different 
locations. Originally established in 1817 as an arsenal 
of deposit on the Savannah River, but because of the un­
healthiness of the site the arsenal was moved in 1826. 
The new site was three miles from the west bank of the 
Savannah River and about the same distance from the city 
of Augusta.
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Post at Colraine. The post at Colraine, on the St.
Mary*8 River, was first garrisoned in 1793 and con­
tinued until about 1796.
Port Pidius. In its efforts to protect the Georgia 
frontier, the United States established Fort Pidius in 
1793. It was located on the north bank of the Oconee 
River. The garrison was removed in 1797.
Fort Gaines. The fort was erected on the Chatachoochee 
River near the Creek boundary line in 1816. A small 
garrison was stationed there until 1819«
Port Greene. The fort was constructed on Cockspur Island 
at the mouth of the Savannah River in 1794. It was de­
stroyed by the action of the ocean in 1804.
Port Hawkins. The fort was started by Colonel Benjamin 
Hawkins on a hilltop commanding several miles of the 
Ocmulgee River, at the site of the present city of 
Macon, Georgia. It was a combined military post and 
factory. The troops and factory were moved to Port 
Hawkins from Port Wilkinson in 1806. The factory was 
moved to Port Mitchell, Alabama in 1 Si7 and after 1819 
the post was not garrisoned by troops.
Fort Jackson. Constructed on the west side of the Savannah 
River, three miles below the city of Savannah.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
560
Port Jones. Constructed on the south bank of the 
Altamaha River in 1797. The post was abandoned in 1802.
Oglethorpe Barracks. The post was located in a number 
of different positions, within the city of Savannah, the 
suburbs and beyond the limits of Savannah.
Fort Pulaski. The post was constructed on Cockspur 
Island on the site of Port Greene. It was started in 
1833 but not garrisoned until the Civil War.
Port Scott. Constructed on the Flint River near its 
junction with the Chattahooche River. It was garrisoned 
in 1816 and abandoned in 1821.
Port Telfair. The post was one of those constructed for 
the defense of the Georgia frontier. Built on the 
Altamaha River in 1790 it was abandoned about 1795.
Fort Wayne. The post was established near the present day 
site of Brunswick in 1821. The garrison was removed in 
1823.
Fort Wilkinson. The fort was started in 1797 on a site 
west of the Oconee River near the present-day site of 
Milledgeville. It was the principal post in that portion 
of the frontier until it was replaced by Port Hawkins.
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LOUISIANA
Fort At Attakapas. When the United States occupied the 
Louisiana Purchase a garrison was stationed at Attakapas. 
The garrison was maintained from 1804 to 1808 and troops 
were again stationed at Attakapas in 1818 and 1819.
Camp Atkinson. Established on the Calcasieu River near 
the present town of Lake Charles. It was established in 
1830 and abandoned in 1832.
Baton Rouge Barracks. The Spanish town and fort of Baton 
Rouge was occupied by United States troops on December 10, 
1810 and buildings were constructed for the troops. In 
<820 barracks and an arsenal were started on a site pur­
chased the previous year on the east bank of the Missis­
sippi River. An arsenal was established there in 1826.
Fort Jackson. The fort was constructed on the west bank 
of the Mississippi River about seventy-five miles below 
New Orleans, directly opposite Fort St. Philip. Con­
struction was started in 1322 and the two posts were 
thereafter jointly administered.
Fort Jesup. The fort was established on the watershed 
between the Sabine and Red rivers in 1822. From 1822 
until its abandonment in 1845» the post was the most 
southwesterly military establishment of the United
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States. Located about twenty-five miles southwest of 
Natchitoches.
Fort Macomb. The post was established on the west side 
of the Chef Menteur Pass on the southern boundary of 
Petite Coquille Island, about twenty-five miles from 
New Orleans in 1827. It was originally called Fort Wood 
but the name was changed to Fort Macomb on June 23t 1851.
Post of New Orleans. New Orleans was first occupied by 
United States troops in 1803 and the city was garrisoned 
thereafter as a guard against slave rebellion. In 1834 
and 1835 new barracks were constructed on the left bank 
of the Mississippi River below the city. The new barracks 
were originally called New Orleans Barracks, after the 
Civil War the post was known as Jackson Barracks.
Post at Natchitoches. Natchitoches, on the Red River was 
first occupied by United States troops in 1804. The post 
was called Fort Claiborne and in 1820 a new post, Fort 
Selden, was constructed at Natchitoches. After the 
establishment of Fort Jesup the troops were withdrawn 
in 1822.
Post at Opelousas. The town of Opelousas was first 
garrisoned by United States troops in 1804 as a part 
of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The 
garrison was withdrawn in 1808.
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Post at Ouachita. The town of Ouachita was first garri­
soned by United States troops in 1804 as a part of the 
occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The garrison was 
withdrawn in 1808.
Port Pike. A post was established on the northern margin 
of Petite Coquille Island at the entrance of Lake 
Pontchatrain about thrity-five miles northeast of New 
Orleans in 1816. The post was first called Petite Coquille 
but in 1827 the name was changed to Port Pike. The post 
was abandoned in 1849.
Post at Pointe Coupee. The town of Pointe Coupee was 
first occupied by United States troops in 1805 as a part 
of the occupation of the Louisiana Purchase. The garri­
son was withdrawn in 1808.
Port St. Philip. Originally a Spanish fort, located on 
the east bank of the Mississippi River at the mouth of 
the Plaquemine River about seventy-five miles below New 
Orleans. The post was first occupied by American troops 
late in 1803. Located opposite Port Jackson and adminis­
tered jointly after the building of Port Jackson.
Fort Selden. Constructed at Natchitoches in 1820, it 
was abandoned in 1822 when the troops were moved to Fort 
Jesup.
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MISSISSIPPI
Fort Adams. The post was established at Loftus Heights 
on the east bank of the Mississippi River in 1798. Lo­
cated at the extreme southwestern corner of United States 
territory it was to guard the boundary between American 
and Spanish Territory. In 1807 Cantonment Columbia 
Spring was established four miles east of the fort.
Both the fort and camp were abandoned in 1810.
Fort Dearborn. As a protection against possible Indian 
attacks and slave rebellions the fort was constructed 
near Washington in 1803. The post was abandoned in 1809.
Port McHenry. The post was established in 1798, after 
the withdrawal of the Spanish troops from the territory, 
at the town of Vicksburg. The post was not regularly 
garrisoned.
Fort Rosalie. The fort was a French post established in 
1716 at the site of present-day Natchez.
Post at Natchez. The town of Natchez was occupied by 
United States troops in 1798 and was used by General 
James Wilkinson as his headquarters. The General des­
ignated the post Fort Sargent, but the name was not
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regularly used. The post was abandoned in 1808.
Fort Nogales. The Spanish built a post at the present- 
day site of Vicksburg in 1790. The Spanish evacuated the 
post in 1797 and the Americans occupied the area.
Post at Pass Christian. United States forces were 
stationed at Pass Christian to guard the entrance to Lake 
Borgne in 1812. The post was used by American troops as 
a summer camp until about 1818.
Fort Sargent (see Post at Natchez).
Cantonment Washington. A cantonment was established at 
Washington in 1809. The camp was abandoned in 1811.
NORTH CAROLINA
Fort Hampton. Located in the town of Beaufort, North 
Carolina.
Fort Johnston. Located in the town of Smithviiie, North 
Carolina, on the west bank of the Cape Fear River, three 
miles from its mouth. The site was occupied by United 
States troops in 1794 and construction of a permanent 
post began. The post was repeatedly abandoned and re- 
garrisoned.
Fort Macon. The fort was built between 1826 and 1834 
on Bogue Island, near Beaufort, North Carolina. It was
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SOUTH CAROLINA
Fort Moultrie. Located on a sand island in the mouth 
of Charleston Harbor, Fort Moultrie was constructed on 
the site of the Revolutionary War Fort Sullivan.
Charleston Harbor. The works in Charleston Harbor were 
reported together. They included such works as Fort 
Johnson, Castle Pinckney, Fort Moultrie and Fort Sumter. 
And in the city of Charleston, Fort Mechanic, situated 
on the point of the city.
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POST STATISTICS
The material contained in these tables was ob­
tained from the monthly post returns. The first figures 
given are the total number of men, officers and enlisted, 
reported present at the post on the available returns, 
and the average number present each month. As none of 
the returns are complete, percentages are given for the 
number of returns available: (I) the percentage available
on a yearly basis; (II) the percentage available for the 
period from April to October; and (III) the percentage 
available for the period from November to March.
The five categories considered are the number of: 
(A) enlisted men sick; (B) officers in arrest or confine­
ment; (C) enlisted men in arrest or confinement; (D) 
desertions; and (B) deaths from all causes, a few of 
which can be attributed to causes other than sickness, 
but not in sufficient numbers to materially alter the
calculations. Totals are given for three different
periods of time: (1) the total number of men reported
in each category; (2) the total number of men reported
567
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in each category from April to Ootober; and (3) the total 
number of men reported in each category from November to 
March.
In order to make a comparison of the three periods, 
monthly averages were taken for each of the three catego­
ries. These figures show the average number of men re­
ported on the available monthly returns. Not included in 
the tables are totals obtained by using the percentages 
and averages to determine the total in each category if 
the returns were complete and if the rate of occurrance 
was constant. For example, if the returns were complete 
for the sickly season at Baton Rouge: on the basi3 of
216 deaths on 77.1# of the possible returns the projection 
for 100# of the returns would be 277.5 deaths; and on the 
basis of 2.66 deaths per month for 105 months, the total 
is 279.3 deaths.
The figures should be 1,Q?d only for comparing the 
situation at the ten garrisons, and it should be remem­
bered that they are not complete. If the missing returns 
were to be included, the totals, averages and percentages 
would probably be altered, but not the overall picture 
presented by the figures. For instance, the high incidence 
of sickness and death reported at Savannah in the period 
from 1826 to 1828 is shown by 62 deaths on 19 returns.
The returns for the entire sickly season of 1827 are 
missing, when it is to be presumed that additional soldiers
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died.
When the monthly averages are compared they show 
that the death rate was higher during the sickly season 
at all of the posts, except Port Morgan. The average 
number of men reported sick was higher in the period from 
April to October at all of the posts, except Charleston 
Harbor. The desertion rate was higher during the sickly 
season at seven of the ten posts, Baton Houge, Port 
Morgan and Port Pike the exceptions. The posts of Baton 
Rouge, New Orleans, and Charleston had the highest monthly 
death rate and the highest rate of desertion.
These figures present a bleak picture of service 
in the South. Assuming that the rates remained constant, 
the War Department could expect to lose a total of 234 
men each y6ar, at the ten posts surveyed, from desertion 
and deaths without the troops ever taking the field for 
any type of activity.
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Augusta Arsenal, Georgia. 1822 - 1325
Total number of men reported present on 166 monthly 
returns, 8,695, or a monthly average of 52.37.
I. 166/168 = 98.8$
II. 96/93 = 97.9$
III. 70/70 = 100$
A 3 c D E
Total 860 3 889 196 43
April 70 50 17 5May 66 1 76 24 0June 92 ---- 89 23 3
July 60 ---- 116 20 7
August 80 — — 71 13 4September 33 ---- 30 18 7October 56 ---- 63 10
Total 512 1 550 130 32
Total N-M 348 2 339 66 11
Av. 166 mos. 5.18 0.01 5.35 1.13 0.25Av. 96 mos. 5.33 0.01 5.72 1.35 0.33Av. 70 mos. 4.97 0.02 4.34 0.94 0.15
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Baton Rouge, Louisiana. 1821 - 1835
Total number of men reported present on 138 monthly 







A Du n.o L E
Total 2740 30 2405 479 294
April 215 2 158 52 18May 261 4 245 56 35June 221 5 157 29 46July 268 6 158 33 19August 300 2 170 24 28September 264 1 193 36 30October 229 _2__ 202 ,)1 40
Total 1758 22 1280 261 216
Total N-M 982 8 1125 218 78
Av. 1 38 mos. 19.85 0.21 17.42 3.47 2.13Av. 81 mos. 21.70 0.27 15.80 3.22 2.66Av. 57 mos. 17.22 0.14 19.73 3.82 1.36
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Charleston Harbor, South Carolina. 1819 - 1835
Total number of men reported present on 101 monthly 
returns, 13,242, or a monthly average of 131.10.
I. 101/204 = 49.5$II. 65/119 = 54.6$III. 36/85 = 42.3$
A B c D E
Total 977 5 1140 219 57
April 45 ___ 49 12 3May 65 --- 73 8 2June 74 --- 72 28 4July 101 1 130 15 2August 109 1 137 54 12September 127 2 138 23 14October 8? 1 135 22 8
Total 604 5 734 162 45
Total N-M 373 0 406 57 12
Av. 101 mos. 9.67 0.04 11.28 2.16 0.56Av. 65 mos. 9.29 0.07 11.29 2.49 0.69Av. 36 mos. 10.36 0.00 11.27 1.57 0.33
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£ort Johnston, North Carolina, 1318 — 1835
Total number of men reported present on 185 monthly 
returns, 9»523, or a monthly average of 51.50.
I. 185/216 = 35.
II. 100/126 = 79.35°III. 81/90 = 90.Og
A B
Total 533 ---
April 42 — -May 44June 52
July 53August 47 — —September 60 — —
October 48 ---
Total 346 ---
Total N-M 237 ---
Av. 185 mos. 3.15Av. 100 mos. 3.46
Av. 85 mos. 2.78
c D E
349 49 44
24 2 533 8 1





2.19 0.33 0.291.52 0.18 0.17
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Fort Mitchell, Alabama. 1825 - 1835
Total number of men reported present on 84 monthly 
returns, 7,181, or a monthly average of 85.47.
I. 84/113 = 74. 3#II. 51/65 = 78.4#
III. 33/48 = 68.7#
A 3 C 3 E
Total 478 3 516 127 20
April 33 ____ 47 21 3May 44 - — 44 10 5June 38 ------ 34 5 1July 45 ------ 41 15 ------August 67 — — 59 15 2September 46 1 41 12 3October 42 1 48 6
Total 315 2 3 H 84 17
Total N-M 163 1 202 43 3
Av. 84 mos. 5.69 0.03 6.14 1.51 0.23Av. 51 mos. 6.17 0.03 6.15 1.64 0.33Av. 33 mos. 4.93 0.03 6.12 1.33 0.09
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Fort Morgan, Alabama. 1822, 1823, 1833* 1834, 1835
Total number of men reported present on 44 monthly 
returns, 1,594, or a monthly average of 36.22.
I .  44/6O = 73.#
II. 27/35 = 77.1#










April 5 ___ 3May 6 --- 5 2 ---
June 9 — — S 4 1July 15 --- 29 2 1August 10 --- 13 2 2September 11 --- 17 1 ---
October 6 --- } --- 2
Total 62 --- 79 11 6
Total N-iff 27 --- 19 12 5
Av. 44 mos. 2.02 _ 2.22 0.52 0.25
Av. 27 mos. 2.29 --- 2.92 0.40 0.22Av. 17 mos. 1.53 — — 1.11 0.70 0.29
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New Orleans, Louisiana. 1821 - 1835
Total number of men reported present on 103 monthly 
returns, 10,866, or a monthly average of 105.49.
I. 103/180 = 57.2̂
II. 61/105 = 58£
III. 42/75 = 56£
A B C D E
Total 1132 2 1025 305 85
April 98 1 101 31 3May 116 --- 36 56 3June 115 --- 93 25 6July 97 --- 97 26 10August 64 -- 63 13 3September 62 --- 72 19 14October 222 1 105 20 22
Total 774 2 617 190 66
Total N-M 358 0 408 115 19
Av. 103 mos. 10.99 0.01 9.95 2.96 0.32Av • 61 isos. 12.68 0.03 10.11 3.11 1.08Av. 42 mos. 8.52 0.00 9.71 2.73 0.45
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Fort Pike (Petite Coquille) Louisiana. 1821 - 1935
Total number of men reported present on 151 monthly 







A B C D T
Total 305 8 269 36 24
April 26 24 2 3May 32 --— 27 4 3June 32 --- 26 1 5July 44 -- ■ 23 4 1August 32 4 28 5 2September 19 -- 25 4 1October 20 -— 20 --- 1
Total 205 4 173 20 16
Total N-M 100 4 96 16 8
Av. 151 mos. 2.01 0.05 1.78 0.23 0.15Av. 90 mos. 2.27 0.04 1.92 0.22 0.17Av. 61 mos. 1.63 0.06 1.57 0.26 0.13
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Fort St. Philip, Louisiana. 1821 - 1831
Total number of men reported present on 97 monthly 







A B c D E
Total 468 9 145 39 45
April 32 1 13 6 2May 49 — — - 12 6 2June 35 12 2 1July 61 2 9 2 7August 30 1 12 4 5September 45 ------ 12 4 11October 33 -— 12 1 3Total 340 4 82 25 31
Total N-M 128 5 63 14 14
Av. 97 moe. 4.82 0.09 1.49 0.40 0.46Av. 53 mos. 6.41 0.07 1,54 0.47 0.58Av. 44 mos. 2.99 0.11 1.43 0.31 0.31
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Savannah, Georgia. 1824 - 1835
j.ot.ai numDer oi men reported 
returns, 5,833, or a monthly
I. 105/144 * 72.#II. 55/84 =: 65.4£III. 50/60 = 83.3£
A B
Total 741 ---
April 32May 41June 40July 71 ____
August 110
September 130October 78 ---
Total 502 ---
Total N-IS 239 ---
Av. 105 mos. 7.05Av. 55 mos. 9.12Av. 50 mos. 4.78 —




37 13 230 7 140 8 4




5.27 1.05 1.305.64 1.02 0.30






5. Cantonment Montpel6. Fort Stoddert
7. Fort Mims
8. St. Stephens





































3* Fowl HI nmw
4. Fort Hawkins
5. Fort Wilkinson6. Fort Fidius
7. Coleraine
8. Fort Wayne
9. Fort Telfair10. Fort James
11. Savannah
12. Fort Pulaski
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Fort Macomb 
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4. Bay St. Louis
5. Pass Christian
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